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Fragments of Russian Buk- M1-2 missile body are identical to fragments from MH17 wreckage, – expert report

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Body fragments of the Russian anti-aircraft missile Buk- M1-2 were identified during examination of the wreck from the crash scene. Similar fragments of missiles were extracted from the wings and body parts of the airliner.

According to Censor.NET sources close to the investigation into the downing of the Malaysian Boeing, chemical analysis proved the identity of these fragments.

The examination of the fragments of the antiaircraft missile continues in The Hague.

Read more: Russia strives to split the countries investigating MH17 flight downing, – Dutch MP on Lavrov’s statement

“Russia is preparing itself for the final battle to change the results of the investigation of the Boeing crash. A group of Russian experts from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is going to visit The Hague to prove that the launch of the deadly AA missile was made not from the vicinity of Snizhne but from some other location.

“The ballistics experts from Ukraine will be also defending their conclusions in the ICAO.

“The Hague awaits Putin. His chance to follow Gaddafi’s destiny is constantly increasing,” Censor.NETChief Editor Yurii Butusov wrote on Facebook.

Source: http://en.censor.net.ua/n346911


Filed under: Information operations

Russian Intelligence – Have they sent you a LinkedIn invitation?

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This LinkedIn Blog post makes perfect sense.

Not only are the Russians putting out information in a wide variety of mass media, engaging in conversations as trolls, hosting events designed to persuade, and paying scholars to write pro-Russian articles, but they are also engaging in good old-fashioned spying.

That person who just sent you a LinkedIn request, who appears legitimate, might not be. That woman (or man, depending on your preference), did you ignore their good looks and really examine their credentials?

Most of you know the story of Robin Sage, a little experiment which fooled a lot of my friends. I recognized the name as the graduation exercise in Phase III of the Special Forces Qualification Course, so I knew something was amiss.  I received a phone call from a friend in the Pentagon to watch out for her, but quite a few days later.  When the story broke, it was the talk of Washington DC.  Nobody mentioned any names of who was fooled, but friends admitted to me they had been hornswoggled.

A friend, a now retired Army Colonel, had his information borrowed (perhaps you might say stolen) on LinkedIn.  The new profile was magnificent.  This person had all the credentials of someone with whom I would connect with.  The profile was fake. My only clue was the picture was of my friend. I immediately called him up and told him to look at the fake profile, change his password and contact LinkedIn about the fake profile.  He did and the profile was removed.  I received another phone call from my friend in the Pentagon, cautioning against this profile.  I just thanked him and hung up the phone, he never knew I had initially identified the fake.

I receive LinkedIn requests every day. Today I received one which was highly suspicious.  A senior individual with absolutely no job history, works in a high tech company as a human resources manager, but has well over 500 connections.  I accepted the invitation and am now sending him an email to verify his credentials. I might even call him, he’s local.

The point is: be careful out there.  I know I deal with some very unsavory characters in less than ideal conditions.  I interact with Russians in multiple forums (I know, technically fora), I trade notes with bad guys in China, I have questionable friends in multiple former Soviet Republics, and I treat them all with caution. I also have established good relationships with people all over the world, through LinkedIn, Facebook and other fora.

Be careful out there.  The bad guys are definitely gunning for you.  Yes, you.


by , Social-Cultural Analysis

In my recent post, ‘Russian’s Increasing Intelligence Activities’, I listed 14 countries in western and eastern Europe where Russia’s intelligence services are making a concerted effort to obtain information. The official threat assessments from these countries clearly shows Russian intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover, illegals or NCO’s (non-official cover) and sleepers continue to operate at a level not seen since the height of the Cold War. Other well-placed commentators also suggest the number of Russian intelligence operations and the resources used to support of these operations far exceed the Soviet Union’s Cold War activities.

According to John Schindler, a retired intelligence analyst with the National Security Agency, the recent FBI success in arresting a Russian spy ring based in New York, “… is the tip of the iceberg…Since the demise of the Soviet Union Russian intelligence services have rebuilt {their} overseas networks, partly to wage economic war against the west…” (CNN Politics, 28 January 2015

The Russian Federation, even more so under President Putin, aspires to be a great power, not only through its possession of nuclear arms, but also being among the largest economies in the world. Recognition as a leading scientific nation also supports the claim of great power status.

Apart from those countries listed in my previous post (“Russia’s increasing Intelligence Activities”), in 2007 the British government announced that Russian and Chinese intelligence activities in Great Britain was forcing intelligence resources to be diverted away from fighting terrorism.

During the Cold War era the Soviet Union’s intelligence services supported large-scale efforts to obtain scientific, technological know-how through overseas operations, and this continues to this day. In order to compete with the west this search for technology is equally matched by Russia’s use of extensive intelligence sources and tools for long-term industrial espionage. Anything providing a military, scientific, political, technological or economic advantage over the western nations is firmly in the sights of Russia’s three main intelligence agencies which often work collectively to achieve this aim.

Russia’s attempt to win the information war by dominating the internet and controlling their domestic news corporations; their army of trolls who work 24/7 (See my post ‘Puppet and Puppeteers’) and various reports describing Russia’s aggressive intelligence initiatives,  further support claims of an unprecedented level of Russian intelligence activities throughout the world.

After examining official reports and statements from various security services who have identified hostile Russian activities, which have greatly increased since Russia invaded Ukraine, we can clearly identify what information Moscow is seeking to obtain. For instance, all fourteen countries have reported attempts to target information on companies and research institutions that deal with energy, finance, media, dual-use technology and defence.  There have also been accounts of Russian intelligence attempting to obtain information on military formations, military-civil infrastructures, and other information which may be used to undermine a countries political stability, defence and security; and other prime targets for sabotage in the event of hostilities.

Apart from career agents from the SVR (overseas intelligence), FSB (Security service) and GRU (military intelligence) directing operations and acting as agent handlers, success depends on the calibre and large numbers of willing, unwilling and often unaware participants for their operations. The recruitment of ‘clean skins’, individuals who are native to the target country; have no criminal record and are unknown to the authorities, continue to be a priority simply because they are extremely difficult for counter-intelligence officers to detect.

From what we know about those responsible for recruiting overseas assets and agent handlers, they are intelligent, sociable, extrovert, find it easy to build relationships and winning trust before turning their targets into informants.  If using ‘natural charm’ is unsuccessful they revert to a more aggressive approach- blackmail, financial arm-twisting, threats and false promises. As we have seen in the case of Anna Chapman the ‘honey trap’ is still an effective tool!  Although the procedures and resources are in place to recruit and ‘persuade’ suitable individuals, they first have to identify potential agents and then establish what can be used to make them spy against their country. The internet, and in particular social media, has made this easier than it was during the Cold War era.

Anna Chapman – SVR agent. 

LinkedIn

Have you ever wondered who those anonymous viewers of your profile are? The majority may be quite innocent: legitimate recruitment agencies or other members who just want to see if you have the required skills and experience before sending an invitation to connect. Others may have more sinister intentions, ranging from troll activities to recruiting intelligence assets.  For instance, over two year ago a LinkedIn member openly looked at my profile on several occasions.  This was at a time when Russia ‘was not’ invading Ukraine and I was posting real-time information and breaking news on LinkedIn. This information was originating from Twitter contacts inside eastern Ukraine at the time.  The profile of this member claimed he was an IT specialist based in Moscow and he spoke fluent English.

During this period, when I was relatively new to LinkedIn and my network security was not as effective as it is now, my malware software detected an attempted attack which had been blocked.  According to the report generated by this software the attack was from an IP address in Saint Petersburg! It would appear the IRS (internet Research Centre) were not using or had inadequate proxy servers. Several months later, whilst researching the internet for information on current Spetsnaz operations, I came across the photograph of a FSB officer who looked very familiar. According to the accompanying news reports he was a communications specialist who had recently been killed whilst operating with a small group of Spetsnaz troops in eastern Ukraine. Although still inconclusive, I immediately saw a resemblance to the profile picture of the Moscow based LinkedIn member who had looked at my profile several times.

Another example of ‘questionable’ LinkedIn activity occurred whilst writing this post. I was emailed by a contact in the USA who is known for their extensive activities against Russian trolls.  This ‘troll slayer’ expressed concerns regarding the profile of someone who claimed to be living in England and was not sure whether to accept their connection request. After agreeing to look at this profile it became immediately apparent they had failed to do their research: this individual claims to be serving in the Royal Air force (RAF) but their profile picture is the cap badge of the British army’s Royal Engineers! Apart from having no military connections there are also several inconsistencies in his/her profile. Due to some of the expressions and terminology used, there is also the strong possibility this person is not British.

Due to LinkedIn being an extremely diverse professional network which spans almost every country, profiles and other open data relating to the usefulness and activities of members can be examined and, if considered relevant, may be recorded or acted upon. For example, what appears to be an innocent request to link to you may result in you pressing the accept button. Once connected, this new contact is in a position to poach your useful contacts, thus increasing their number of contacts which also results in increased credibility and influence across your network.

According to Bob O’Neill of ZDNet (6 May 2015) an organisation which claims to be actively investigating ‘surveillance and human rights Issues’ have developed a piece of software called ‘Transparency Tool kit’ which mines LinkedIn by searching for useful information contained within profiles. According to O’Neill, “people post all sorts of interesting information in their resumes on LinkedIn… This LinkedIn crawler automatically collects public profiles which are matched to various search requirements… It also collects information from ‘people also viewed lists’.”

Also, according to his article, “Over 27,000 people working in the US intelligence community… are listed within a database which has been created simply through ‘mining LinkedIn’.”  O’Neill also claims this database, using open data, includes the resumes of people working for intelligence contractors, the military and intelligence agencies.  It’s a sure bet this database also contains information about individuals from other countries.  Although he does not suggest any Russian involvement, these allegations are interesting because they support many earlier claims that Moscow uses similar software tools to examine Facebook. Consequently, it appears extremely unlikely that Moscow has not recognised the plethora of useful information available on LinkedIn.

Apart from potential targets working for government and private industries, there are also undergraduates studying various disciples ranging from history to the sciences, who may be identified as potential long-term assets (see Russia’s Increasing Intelligence Activities).

As Russia continues to devote massive resources to support their information war and their army of trolls, it is also likely the FSB are interested in the LinkedIn ‘troll slayers’ in order to see how they may counter their comments and activities. Unlike Facebook and other social media platforms, the trolls using LinkedIn continue to fight a losing battle.

‘Illegals’ arrested in the United States (Anna Chapman- top row third from the left)

Profiles

Many of us now recognise the tell-tale signs of the many bogus profiles appearing on LinkedIn and a quick internet search often confirms our suspicions.  This is particularly true when it comes to identifying Russian propagandists.

The problems starts when you come across profiles which pass close scrutiny and that individual wishes to connect to you and your network. For instance, I don’t see anything wrong with the following profile. He has locked his contacts so we can’t see his connections, that’s fair enough. He does not have a profile picture of himself, again that’s not a problem; many members, including myself don’t have a personal profile picture and I don’t consider this to be a problem.

If you work in banking or an industry associated with this member’s skills and experience, would you accept his connection request?

As we can see from the above screen shot, Evgeny Buryakov states he is the Deputy Representative of Vnesheconombank (VNE). After completing an internet search I confirmed this information was correct. He works at 777 Third Avenue, New York City, NY 10017, and his direct telephone number is also listed on the company website.  Consequently, if you work in the banking and finance industry and received an invitation to connect, you are likely to regard him as a good business contact- but you would be wrong!

Although this is a legitimate profile; Buryakov, also known as Zhenya, was arrested by the FBI and accused of being part of a Russian spy ring operating in the United States.

Two SVR officers, Igor Sporyshev and Victor Podobnyy, were also arrested after being identified as agent handlers for the network.Unlike  their agents, they had been operating under diplomatic cover and this provided the safety net of diplomatic immunity from prosecution. These officers are believed to have returned to Russia. The same old story, the career agents escape prosecution and the ‘illegal’ is left to their own fate – another disposable asset, but I guess they have many more!

In the case of Russia’s quest for science and technology (S&T), the following extracts form an official US document provides a thumb-nail sketch of Russian intelligence activities in the United States; activities which may be mirrored in other countries and yet to be detected by the relevant authorities.

“U.S. Attorney’s OfficeOctober 03, 2012

Eastern District of New York

BROOKLYN, NY—An indictment was unsealed today in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York charging 11 members of a Russian military procurement network operating in the United States and Russia, as well as a Texas-based export company and a Russia-based procurement firm, with illegally exporting high-tech microelectronics from the United States to Russian military and intelligence agencies.

Alexander Fishenko, an owner and executive of the American and Russian companies, is also charged with operating as an unregistered agent of the Russian government inside the United States by illegally procuring the high-tech microelectronics on behalf of the Russian government. The microelectronics allegedly exported to Russia are subject to strict government controls due to their potential use in a wide range of military systems, including radar and surveillance systems, weapons guidance systems, and detonation triggers.

The charges were announced by Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Stephen L. Morris, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Houston Field Office; Under Secretary of Commerce Eric L. Hirschhorn, Department of Commerce; and Timothy W. Reeves, Special Agent in Charge, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Central Field Office.

The defendants arrested yesterday and today will be arraigned this afternoon before U.S. States Magistrate Judge George C. Hanks, Jr., at the U.S. Courthouse in Houston, where the government will seek their removal to the Eastern District of New York.

In addition to the unsealing of the charges, search warrants were executed today at seven residences and business locations associated with the defendants, and seizure warrants were executed on five bank accounts held by Fishenko and defendant Arc Electronics Inc., the Texas-based export company. In conjunction with the unsealing of these charges, the Department of Commerce has added 165 foreign persons and companies who received, transshipped, or otherwise facilitated the export of controlled commodities by the defendants to its “Entity List.” This designation imposes a license requirement before any commodities can be exported from the United States to these persons or companies and establishes a presumption that no such license will be granted.

As alleged in the indictment, between approximately October 2008 and the present, Fishenko and the other defendants engaged in a surreptitious and systematic conspiracy to obtain advanced, technologically cutting-edge microelectronics from manufacturers and suppliers located within the United States and to export those high-tech goods to Russia, while carefully evading the government licensing system set up to control such exports. The microelectronics shipped to Russia included analog-to-digital converters, static random access memory chips, microcontrollers, and microprocessors. These commodities have applications and are frequently used in a wide range of military systems, including radar and surveillance systems, missile guidance systems, and detonation triggers. Russia does not produce many of these sophisticated goods domestically.

According to the indictment and a detention motion filed by the government today, defendant Alexander Fishenko was born in what was, at the time, the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, and graduated from the Leningrad Electro-Technical Institute in St. Petersburg, Russia. He immigrated to the United States in 1994 and became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 2003. In 1998, he founded defendant Arc Electronics Inc. in Houston. Between 2002 and the present, Arc has shipped approximately $50,000,000 worth of microelectronics and other technologies to Russia. Fishenko and his wife are the sole owners of Arc, and Fishenko serves as the company’s president and chief executive officer. Fishenko is also a part owner and executive of defendant Apex System LLC, a Moscow, Russia-based procurement firm. Apex, working through subsidiaries, served as a certified supplier of military equipment for the Russian government. Between 1996 and the present, Fishenko has regularly traveled back and forth between the United States and Russia. Defendant Alexander Posobilov entered the United States from Russia in 2001 and became a naturalized citizen in 2008. He joined Arc in 2004 and serves as its director of procurement. Posobilov was arrested at George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston on his way to Singapore and Moscow.

The defendants allegedly exported many of these high-tech goods, frequently through intermediary procurement firms, to Russian end users, including Russian military and intelligence agencies. To induce manufacturers and suppliers to sell them these high-tech goods and to evade applicable export controls, the defendants often provided false end-user information in connection with the purchase of the goods, concealed the fact that they were exporters, and falsely classified the goods they exported on export records submitted to the Department of Commerce. For example, in order to obtain microelectronics containing controlled, sensitive technologies, Arc claimed to American suppliers that, rather than exporting goods to Russia, it merely manufactured benign products such as traffic lights. Arc also falsely claimed to be a traffic light manufacturer on its website. In fact, Arc manufactured no goods and operated exclusively as an exporter.

According to the court documents, the defendants went to great lengths to conceal their procurement activities for the Russian military. For example, on one occasion, defendants Posobilov and Yuri Savin, the director of marketing at another Russian procurement firm, discussed how best to conceal the fact that certain goods Savin had purchased from Arc were intended for the Russian military. Savin asked Posobilov, “What can we do if a client is military all over?” Posobilov replied, “We can’t be the ones making things up. You should be the ones.” Similarly, on another occasion, defendant Fishenko directed a Russian procurement company that, when the company provided false end-user information, to “make it up pretty, correctly, and make sure it looks good.” On yet another occasion, Posobilov instructed a Russian procurement company to “make sure that” the end-use certificate indicated “fishing boats and not fishing/anti-submarine ones….Then we’ll be able to start working.”

Despite this subterfuge, according to the documents, the investigation revealed that the defendants were supplying Russian government agencies with sophisticated microelectronics. For example, the investigation uncovered a Russian Ministry of Defense document designating an Apex subsidiary as a company “certified” to procure and deliver military equipment and electronics. The FBI recovered a letter sent by a specialized electronics laboratory of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s primary domestic intelligence agency, to an Apex affiliate regarding certain microchips obtained for the FSB by Arc. The letter stated that the microchips were faulty and demanded that the defendants supply replacement parts.

In addition, in anticipation of an inquiry by the Department of Commerce regarding the export of certain controlled microelectronics, defendants Fishenko, Posobilov, and Arc salesperson Viktoria Klebanova allegedly directed Apex executives Sergey Klinov and Dmitriy Shegurov, as well as other Apex employees, to alter Apex’s website and forge documents regarding certain transactions to hide Apex’s connections to the Russian military. In connection with the cover-up, Apex removed images of Russian military aircraft and missiles and other links to the Russian Ministry of Defense from its website.

In addition to Fishenko, Posobilov, and Klebanova, the indictment charges Arc salespersons Lyudmila Bagdikian, Anastasia Diatlova, Sevinj Taghiyeva, and Svetalina Zagon, as well as Arc shipping manager Shavkat Abdullaev, with one count of conspiring to violate and 21 counts of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and with conspiring to commit wire fraud. According to the indictment, these defendants obtained controlled microelectronics by lying and submitting false information regarding the true nature, users, and intended uses of the high-tech goods, then exporting the goods, without the required licenses, to procurement firms in Russia. The defendants’ principal port of export for these goods was John F. Kennedy International Airport in the Eastern District of New York.

According to the indictment, in addition to owning and controlling Arc, Fishenko is also a controlling principal of the Russian procurement firm Apex, the defendant Sergey Klinov is the chief executive officer of Apex, and the defendant Dmitriy Shegurov is an employee of Apex. Apex and its affiliates supplied microelectronics to Russian government agencies, including Russian military and intelligence agencies. The defendant Yuri Savin was the director of marketing at Atrilor Ltd., another Russian procurement firm. Klinov, Shegurov, and Savin conspired with Fishenko and the Arc defendants to obtain controlled U.S.-origin microelectronics and to export those technologically sensitive goods to Russia without the required export licenses by falsifying information to hide the true nature, users, and intended uses of the goods. In addition, Fishenko, Posobilov, Klebanova, Klinov, and Shegurov were charged with obstruction of justice, and Fishenko and Arc were charged with conspiring to commit money laundering.

The individual defendants face maximum terms of incarceration of five years for the conspiracy charge, 20 years for each of the substantive IEEPA and AECA charges, and 20 years for the obstruction of justice charge. In addition, Fishenko faces a maximum term of incarceration of 20 years for conspiring to commit money laundering and 10 years for acting as an unregistered agent of the Russian government. The corporate defendants face fines of up to $500,000 for the conspiracy count and $1 million for each of the substantive IEEPA and AECA counts.

“As alleged in the indictment, the defendants spun an elaborate web of lies to evade the laws that protect our national security. The defendants tried to take advantage of America’s free markets to steal American technologies for the Russian government. But U.S. law enforcement detected, disrupted, and dismantled the defendants’ network,” stated United States Attorney Loretta E. Lynch. “We will not rest in our efforts to protect the technological advantage produced by American ingenuity. And, we will expose and hold responsible all who break our counter-proliferation laws, particularly those, like Fishenko, who serve foreign governments.” Ms. Lynch thanked the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas for its assistance in this matter.

“Today’s case underscores the importance of safeguarding America’s sensitive technology and our commitment to disrupt and prosecute networks that attempt to illegally export these goods,” said Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. “I applaud the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors who worked on this extensive investigation.”

“In this day and time, the ability of foreign countries to illegally acquire sensitive and sophisticated U.S. technology poses a significant threat to both the economic and national security of our nation,” said Houston FBI Special Agent in Charge Stephen L. Morris. “While some countries may leverage our technology for financial gain, many countries hostile to the United States seek to improve their defense capabilities and to modernize their weapons systems at the expense of U.S. taxpayers. The FBI will continue to work aggressively with our partners in the U.S. Intelligence Community to protect this technology and hold accountable those companies that willfully choose to violate our U.S. export laws.”

 “Today’s action is a perfect example of two of the core benefits of the administration’s export control reform effort—higher enforcement walls around controlled items and extensive coordination and cooperation among the enforcement agencies. I applaud our special agents who worked with the Justice Department in the interagency effort that led to today’s actions,” said Under Secretary of Commerce Eric L. Hirschhorn.

“The receipt of U.S.-made, cutting-edge microelectronics has advanced Russia’s military technological capabilities. NCIS and the Department of the Navy have worked closely with the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Commerce in this investigation due to the potential for significant enhancement of Russian naval weapons systems that would result from the illegal acquisition of these export-controlled technologies,” said Special Agent in Charge Timothy W. Reeves, NCIS Central Field Office.

As a result of this case, there may be victims and witnesses who need to contact the agencies involved in the investigation. If your business has been approached by one of the defendants or by someone trying to obtain export-protected, sensitive technology who appeared not to be legitimate, please report that information to businessoutreach@leo.gov. The information will remain confidential and will be handled by the appropriate authorities.

The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Daniel Silver, Hilary Jager, and Claire Kedeshian, as well as Trial Attorney David Recker of the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

 The charges contained in the indictment are merely allegations, and the defendants have not yet been convicted of these offenses.

The Defendants:

 Arc Electronics Inc.

Principal Place of Business: Houston, Texas

Apex System LLC

Principal Place of Business: Moscow, Russia

 Alexander Fishenko, age 46

 Shavkat Abdullaev, age 34

 Lyudmila Bagdikian, age 58

 Anastasia Diatlova, age 38

 Viktoria Klebanova, age 37

 Sergey Klinov, age 44

 Alexander Posobilov, age 58

 Yuri Savin, age 36

 Dmitriy Shegurov, age unknown

Sevinj Taghiyeva, age 32

 Svetalina Zagon, age 31”

 A message to the Russian trolls who are likely to post comments. This post briefly examines Russian intelligence. If you wish to make comments about western intelligence organisations I suggest you publish a post on the subject, as this will allow your research to be judged by other members.  Also, ‘whatisms’, circular logic, and comments intended to drive debate off topic will be ignored.

Source: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/russian-intelligence-have-sent-you-linkedin-alan-malcher-ma


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: Alexander Fishenko, Alexander Posobilov, intelligence, LinkedIn, Russian intelligence

MILNEWS.ca #UKR Update – 171717UTC August 2015

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Joel Harding:

The intense artillery duel in Mariupol worries me, as does the sabotage group arrested in Ukraine. Also, terrorists using tanks disguised as Ukrainian tanks is worrisome.

Much of this could be to set up the “provocation” that Russia is looking for to invade Ukraine, that the rebels need to launch a full-out invasion and for Russia to stand in the court of world opinion and point a bony finger at Ukraine and, using an evocative voice, say “Ukraine did it.”

But, we all will know, Russia did it.

Originally posted on MILNEWS.ca Blog:

View original 322 more words


Filed under: Information operations

Facepalm And Laugh Of The Day

RAND – Information Operations – The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization and Measures of Effectiveness

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RAND Study – Information Operations – The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization and Measures of Effectiveness

by Arturo Munoz, Erin Dick

28 August 2015

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Abstract

In an update to a 2012 RAND report on information operations (IO) in Afghanistan, this Perspective describes the continuing challenges of IO doctrine integration and harmonization and the establishment of measures of effectiveness for IO within the Department of Defense. Despite recommendations made in the 2012 report, little progress has been made in these areas, which will have an even greater negative impact as the United States reduces the number of troops in theater and as resources to combat the enemy’s propaganda offense remain limited.

Key Findings

While there have been some tactical IO successes in Afghanistan, little progress has been made in the area of doctrine integration and harmonization and the establishment of measures of effectiveness in the five years since the previous study period ended (2010).

  • This deficiency will have an even greater negative impact as the United States continues to reduce the number of troops in theater and as resources to combat the enemy’s propaganda offence remain limited.

Recommendations

  • The Department of Defense should implement the recommendations made in RAND’s 2012 report, U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010, especially those regarding integration and harmonization of IO doctrine and the establishment of measures of effectiveness for IO.

Source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE128.html


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: information operations

Bad RT Propaganda

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Just two decades ago – you could count the number of international TV news networks on one hand. Today, there’s a virtual buffet of opinionated global news outlets to suit almost any appetite… pick your prejudice, and you’ve likely got a channel that’s just tailored to your bias.

Most don’t make much of a secret of it – but one has stood apart. The BBC. Impartial, unbiased and reliable.

Its style has always been cold, hard news; delivered in laconic, no-frills reports filled with facts, attributions and – well…not much else.

On air – voiced always in an almost-drawling presenters voice, lacking any emotion or expression. Indeed, BBC reports, or ‘packages’ as they’re called have a particular brand to them. Reporters speak slowly, drag things out and enunciate random vowels seemingly just for the hell of it.

The intent is simple: get the facts across with minimal personal input. And that is what earned the BBC a stellar reputation world-wide over the years.

A reputation that the BBC of today seems to be decidedly set on demolishing, and judging by how quickly they’re blowing the charges on the pillars of the BBC’s reputation: the senior management appears to have set a no-nonsense deadline.
What really pushed me to start looking into the whole thing was an article published on the BBC – after reading which I had to double-check the URL to make sure I wasn’t on some spoof site.

Turns out I wasn’t. I had stumbled upon, by all appearances, a crude hatchet job. What’s worse – it was bad. The only thing worse than finding outright propaganda on the BBC is finding bad outright propaganda.

Go ahead, have a read and come back.

Back? Then let’s get to it.

First off, the very phrase “information war” is pathetic – no matter how often CNN, BBC and assorted internet joints stuff that click-bait phrase into their headlines. You don’t call a friendly argument between two mates in the pub a“banter war”. You don’t call a debate between two politicians a “political views deliberation war”. Why then call coverage by opposing broadcasters an “information war”?

Was there a declaration of information war? What are the casualties? Is Sally from the translators department recovering from that horrific incident where she broke a nail while typing out Merkel’s speech about the Ukrainian civil war?

The article opens by stating that “the Kremlin has been busily striving to win hearts and minds around the world mainly through its flagship international broadcaster RT.”

And what better way to win “hearts and minds” than by launching a global news network that focuses on controversial issues that are bound to alienate a major part, if not the majority of the mainstream audience (Libya intervention criticism), covering issues that aren’t popular or particularly interesting (fracking), giving air time to underdogs and “outcasts” (Jeremy Corbyn, Yanis Varoufakis).

Come to think of it, that’s sounds like a hell of a strategy to annoy hearts and minds.

The article went on to say that in 2015 “Russia significantly increased its spending on RT. The channel’s budget rose 75 percent, to 20.8 billion rubles (around £202 million; $300 million).”

First off, that’s misleading to the point of deception.

RT broadcasts abroad. That means we don’t pay for our spot on Britain’s Sky Cable in rubles. We pay in the pounds sterling – and that got a lot more expensive with the rubles collapse.

In fact, 80 percent of RT’s expenditure is in foreign currency. In dollars, RT’s budget has decreased from ~$400 million (average 2014 exchange rate), to $300 million in 2015 (as of today’s exchange rate) despite the funding bump.

It’s actually more complicated thanks to the rubles roller-coaster adventures, but accounting tells me that all-in-all our budget is down almost a quarter in dollars.

In effect, RT’s real, practical budget – has fallen, not risen.

You’d think that might be worth mentioning in a section dedicated to RT’s funding, right? I think there’s even a word for it: balance.

And still, it gets better… or worse, depending on how seriously you take the article…

“More than any of the other big international broadcasters, RT depends for its large number of views on disaster/novelty videos with little or no input from its journalists,” the BBC article declares.

When comparing RT to “other big international broadcasters,” Stephen Ennis would be advised to actually check what “other big international broadcasters” post.

CNN’s YouTube account for example seems to place its bet on cat videos, Obama bloopers and celebrity shenanigans. As well as disaster videos. With little to no input from its journalists. Oops.

The BBC itself isn’t far behind. Its top ten videos feature such fine examples of hard-hitting journalism as: a spider crawling around on a camera lens, a go-pro strapped to an eagle and an in depth package showing Justin Bieber and Elmo going through the ice-bucket challenge.

But since we’re talking about it: The BBC’s radio and online budget alone is bigger than RT’s entire annual budget. And still, the BBC is eating dust on YouTube.

I hope by this stage the reader appreciates how pathetic this looks: global news outlets trawling through each others YouTube accounts in an effort to belittle their achievements. “Information War” indeed. More like a teenage penis measuring contest.

Ennis goes on to say that “Only a handful of its top 100 videos can even loosely be described as “political” and none of them refers to the crisis in Ukraine.”

Now that was just lazy, Steve. Here it is, right there in our top 100.

And here is the description: Disturbing footage from Ukraine shows violence spiraling out of control during anti-government protests, with rioters attacking and capturing policemen standing their ground. The Interior Ministry has hinted at a tough response if the unrest continues.

At RT, we don’t believe in supervising every video with agenda-driven commentary. There’s enough of that around. Some videos are self-explanatory, and the viewer is free to make up his own mind.

The BBC article goes on to say that “Latvia and Lithuania have responded to the challenge posed by Russian TV by tightening media regulations and even temporarily banning some channels.”

Of everything in the article – it’s the language in this bit that irked me the most. It exemplifies how far BBC standards on impartiality have fallen.

When Latvia and Lithuania – both EU states – ban Russian news channels and expel Russian journalists – they’re said to be “responding to the challenge.”

Now, just imagine: Russia kicks out a Western news channel. It expels journalists by force. You don’t need to be clairvoyant to guess at the headlines. One thing’s for sure: it wouldn’t be “Russia responding to the challenge.”

Source: http://www.rt.com/op-edge/315830-bbcs-kremlin-news-journalism/


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, propaganda, Russia

E-Bombs vs Pervasive Infrastructure Vulnerability

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Published on Oct 18, 2012

28 minute video by Dr Carlo Kopp, Defence Analyst and Consulting Engineer Capability and Strategy Research, Air Power Australia.

“E-Bombs vs Pervasive Infrastructure Vulnerability”


Filed under: Information operations

Moscow’s Moves in Syria: 5 Messages Russia Is Sending to the World

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September 11, 2015As Russian ships and planes continue to deposit additional personnel and equipment in Syria, here are five geopolitical messages Russian president Vladimir Putin is sending to the world:

One: Reports of Russia’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. In other words, the narrative that Western sanctions plus falling oil prices combined with China’s economic slowdown have brought the Kremlin to the edge of collapse is quite premature. Russia has only a fraction of U.S. global power projection capabilities but in its ability to send forces to Syria it still ranks among a select few countries—with more European countries prepared to fall off that list—who can send and sustain military forces beyond their immediate borders. The Kremlin is clearly signaling that it plans to take an active role in setting the agenda in the Middle East—and not to passively accept an American vision for how the future should unfold.

Second: Putin is making it clear that he will not accept Washington’s default position that the removal of a brutal strongman from power is a path to greater long-term stability in the Middle East. And while the United States and Europe continue to debate their next moves, particularly in the wake of the migrant crisis, Russia is prepared to act on its assessment that more direct military assistance to aid Assad in combating the Islamic State is the best way to end the conflict. Putin has repeatedly indicated that if the goal of Western policy is to reduce the flow of refugees and decrease the threat of Islamic terrorism gaining a new Afghanistan-style base of operations, then the experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that overthrowing Assad and hoping the opposition can form a more effective and stable state administration will not achieve these ends. Having reached this conclusion, Putin is uninterested in asking for the West’s permission or Washington’s blessing.

Third: Russia is more confident of its position in Ukraine. The uptick in violence over the summer has receded, with the cease-fire again largely appearing to be holding. At the same time, Ukraine’s ongoing domestic political and economic woes suggest that there will be no major breakthrough that will solidify the Maidan revolution and put the country on an irreversible path towards closer integration with the Euro-Atlantic world. Instead, things appear to be settling down into a protracted frozen conflict where Moscow retains most of the leverage.

Forth: The Kremlin enforces its red lines. Just as Moscow would not permit the separatists to face catastrophic defeat last summer in Ukraine, Russia has signaled that it will not sit by and allow Bashar al- Assad to be overthrown or removed by outside military action. With more Russian forces on the ground, and reportedly augmenting Assad’s air defense capabilities, the risk calculus for any sort of U.S. or NATO action against Assad’s government has dramatically increased. Even more limited proposals; such as enforcing a no-fly zone to create protected space on the ground for refugees now opens up the possibility for a clash with Russian forces

And Fifth: Russia’s willingness to put “boots on the ground” in Syria, in contrast to a increasingly desperate search on Washington’s part for local proxies willing and able to fight both Assad and ISIS and the reluctance of key U.S. allies to take on more of the burden, serves several purposes. It reassures Russian partners that Moscow is prepared to meet its pledges even if there is a cost in terms of resources, lives, and reputation. This has not gone unnoticed in places like Egypt and Azerbaijan, where governments question the depth of the American commitment to their well-being. For Middle Eastern countries that have opposed Russian policy in Syria, Putin’s decision to up the ante may lead them to reassess whether the path to a viable settlement resides not in Washington, soon to be increasingly distracted by an election campaign, but through Moscow.

Putin’s decision reflects an assessment that the risk of greater Russian involvement in Syria is outweighed by the dangers to Russian interests if Assad should fall. Russia will not be persuaded by strongly worded demarches to reverse its deployment. The United States, in charting its response, needs to be guided by a similar calculation of the ends it hopes to achieve with the means it is prepared to commit.

Nikolas Gvosdev is a contributing editor at The National Interest and co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Vectors, Sectors and Interests (CQ Press, 2013). The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Office of the Russian President. 

Source: 


Filed under: Information operations

Poles furious after Russia blames them for starting World War II

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Another case of Russia revising history.


 

WARSAW – The Russian ambassador to Poland has sparked outrage for putting some of the blame for World War II on Poland, creating a new spat amid deepening tensions between the Slavic nations.

Russian Ambassador Sergey Andreev on Friday described the Soviets’ 1939 invasion of Poland as an act of self-defense, not aggression. The comment prompted Poland’s Foreign Ministry to declare Saturday that the ambassador “undermines historical truth” and seems to be trying to justify Stalinist crimes.

World War II began after Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union sealed a pact in 1939 that included a secret provision to carve up Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe. Germany soon invaded Poland from the West, followed by a Soviet invasion from the east 16 days later. Millions of Poles were killed in the war.

In an interview broadcast on the private TVN station, Andreev also said: “Polish policy led to the disaster in September 1939, because during the 1930s Poland repeatedly blocked the formation of a coalition against Hitler’s Germany. Poland was therefore partly responsible for the disaster which then took place.”

Poland’s Foreign Ministry expressed “surprise and alarm” at those comments, and Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna summoned Andreev for a meeting Monday on the matter.

“The narrative presented by the highest official representative of the Russian state in Poland undermines the historical truth and reflects the most hypocritical interpretation of the events known from the Stalinist and communist years,” the ministry said in a statement.

Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz also expressed displeasure with the ambassador.

“The role of an ambassador accredited in a country should be to build harmony and friendly relations between countries,” Kopacz said.

Relations have never been easy since Poland, a former Soviet bloc nation, rejected Moscow’s control and embraced the West, joining NATO and the European Union. But tensions have been especially high since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, a step that Warsaw has strongly condemned.

In other points of contention in recent days, Poland blocked a Crimean official hoping to attend an OSCE conference in Warsaw from entering the country, angering Moscow. Moscow has also protested a Polish town’s dismantling of a monument to a Soviet World War II general, threatening Warsaw with the “most serious consequences.”

Source: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/27/world/poles-furious-after-russia-blames-them-for-starting-world-war-ii/#.VgdzH5d2No1


Filed under: #RussiaFail, Information operations, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, Poland, Russia

Information Operations/Military Information Support Operations Planner

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COLSA – Information Operations/Military Information Support Operations Planner (MPA I)

colsa-openhire.silkroad.com

General Summary COLSA Corporation is seeking a qualified Information Operations (IO)/Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Planner to join the COLSA team in support of USCENTCOM in Tampa, FL. Planner(s) will assist in the deve…

Source: https://colsa-openhire.silkroad.com/epostings/index.cfm?fuseaction=app.jobinfo&jobid=591&version=1#.VgmofRkyZfM.linkedin 

Interested?  Write.


Filed under: Information operations, MISO Tagged: information operations, MISO

Beware Costly Conferences

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I just had a wonderful friend recommend an event that I should attend. On the surface it looked like a great deal, it’s labeled “Information Operations” and a quick glimpse at the website for the event shows some really neat speakers.
 
But when the speaker on “Russian Psyops” is a complete unknown to me, my antennae began quivering. I took a look at his bona fides and he consults to some mighty fine military and government organizations. But then I got to thinking, what have they done? I’ve been watching Russian Information Warfare, which includes Psychological Operations, for 18 months very, very closely and I never heard these organizations do one blasted thing. I didn’t hear his name, either, for the past year and a half.
 
The “main” speaker has an impressive resume, until you look at what he has actually done. Zero hands on. Consulted with some powerful offices but… Here’s a quote from my response.
 
“Like most academicians, he can give a big hand, little map briefing which sounds all great and glorious. He might even give some details which few others have, but I refuse to sit through an hour’s lecture of a repetition of things commonly known and hope for one tidbit of information. I’m finding more and more experts who are an inch deep, write great papers but have little insight. “
 
Then they list his wife as another speaker. Oh gosh, nepotism in my field? Again, no practical experience, little hand, big map, nothing in her CV broke the surface and caused a ripple.  But she writes great books but I’m not going to sit and pray for one detail to fall like manna from the sky. Hope is not an option.
 
Another speaker popped up who is an old friend of mine. The problem is, the organization for whom he worked accomplished nothing in his field. Is that a reflection on him, professionally? I hate to admit it, but yes. But, of the list of speakers, he is the ONLY one with actual hands-on experience.
 
Another speaker has ZERO online about her. Now normally, since this is Washington DC, that usually equates to having worked for the CIA for most of her career. That makes her alluring, but she doesn’t even list the field in which she works. Sorry, I’m not going to sit around and hope she has something good to talk about.
 
Another friend is speaking about cyber and he’s probably the best qualified of the bunch. He’s fully engaged in the China-US cyber agreement talks, which are highly contentious in senior cyber circles.  I read what he writes every day, but he might still be worth listening to.  He, alone, may be worth the price of the conference but it’s still too costly for me.
 
One of the speakers just left a job, in charge of combatting ISIS. He was an abysmal failure, which, in turn, has been reflected in US policy being an immense failure. Sorry, I don’t want to listen to the person probably most responsible for the US’ failure combatting ISIS.
 
They’re charging $250 for this all-day seminar. That was the final nail in the coffin. I’m not going to pay $250 for a fishing expedition in a pond with, perhaps, no fish.  They’re seeking to earn a profit, apparently.  The best ones are usually free.
 
Bottom line, beware of conferences, seminars and lectures hosting speakers with little to no practical expertise. Especially beware of conferences with generals, admirals and such speaking, unless a huge event which directly relates to them just happened. …and especially beware of conferences charging oodles of money.
 
Look at the speaker’s list. There are tons of conferences out there, few of which are worth a damn.

Filed under: Cyber, Information operations Tagged: Cyber, information operations

Thank You For Your Comments!

From Droid Armies to Luke Skywalker: What Star Wars Teaches Us About Hybrid Warfare

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Except for using some definitions which are way out of date, this is a very good article.

ht to mj


Indeed, what do Imperial Probe Droids and clone mercenaries tell us about the above type of violence? The answer, according to Justin Bauman, is that ‘hybrid threats’ are nothing more than advances in technology – advances that permit various actors to network and operate more efficiently on the battlefield.

By Justin Baumann for Small Wars Journal

This article was originally published by the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) on 16 October 2015.

A debate has been ongoing involving the future of land warfare. This debate is centered around the adversaries we might see on the future battlefield called Hybrid Threats. Hybrid threat proponents, like Frank G. Hoffman, state that hybrid threats are “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain their political objectives.”[1] This is nothing more than a relabeling of 4th Generation War (4GW) espoused in the late 1980’s by William Lind, et al. and other U.S. military analysts.[2] As Antulio J. Echevarria II stated in, Fourth-Generation War And Other Myths, “What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere, is that the increased ‘dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance’ brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide.”[3] The same is true for hybrid threats. Echevarria also wrote that 4GW “is based on poor history and only obscures what other historians, theorists, and analysts already have worked long and hard to clarify.”[4]Hybrid threats are nothing new: Nation-states and non-state actors have been doing this throughout history when waging war.[5]

Because the U.S. Army’s definition of hybrid threats is familiar to most readers, it will be used as a starting point for simplicity. The Army defines hybrid threats in Training Circular 7-100 Hybrid Threats, as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”[6] This means that conventional forces will work with different forms of irregular forces for mutually benefitting goals depending on their long-term and short term objectives. Unfortunately, this strategy has been a facet of warfare for centuries: The French and Indian War, The Peninsular War, Vietnam, and the 2006 Lebanon War just to name a few.[7] As Christopher Bowers states in Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries, hybrid threats “can include just about every type of organization from criminal gangs like MS-13 to the German Wehrmacht. If everybody is a hybrid, then nobody is.”[8]

So, what are hybrid threats and why have they received so much attention lately? This paper will show, through the medium of Star Wars, that “hybrid threats” are just recent, dramatic developments in technology that allow multiple state and non-state actors on the battlefield to network more efficiently and combine their military efforts for greater effect, resulting in military strategists to incorrectly identify them as previously unforeseen threat actors on the battlefield.[9]

The Human Domain

The problem with the U.S. military’s current definition of hybrid warfare is that it focuses on technology as the major, underlying factor that dominates the modern battlefield. As LTG Charles T. Cleveland and LTC Stuart L. Farris state in Toward Strategic Landpower, “The application of military force in its current form has limited utility when fighting modern wars among the people. Combat power in the form of superior weapons systems, cutting-edge technology and disproportionate force ratios may enable tactical success on the ground but does not guarantee strategic victory.”[10] This is a correct assessment and sums up the erroneous trust placed in technology alone as a means to win wars. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote in 1999 in Unrestricted Warfare, that the American government and their generals rely too heavily on technology as a means of fighting and winning wars.[11] This evaluation by Chinese military officers fifteen years ago correctly foreshadowed the flaws in American military thinking that led to arguably two stalemates in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a poor strategic foundation moving forward. This incorrect philosophy is characterized today by the U.S. defense community’s focus on “emerging” threats and inability to deal with conflicts that quickly develop (ISIL).

So what are all these strategists missing? The problem is that the question constantly being asked is how?, but the better question to ask is with whom? There is an exhaustive amount of academic literature written about all the threats we might see on the battlefield and how they’ll fight (Think Counter IED), but the focus is not on how they cooperate and collude with other entities in the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) to leverage their strengths for victory over larger, better funded opponents.

Enter Information Warfare and Network Theory. These two work hand in hand to give an advantage to those actors that were once considered the underdogs in asymmetric fights. Armed with the internet and existing human networks, non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the Taliban, and ISIL won against much larger, better armed opponents by using psychological operations and irregular tactics to continually hammer an opponent, winning tactically or informationally small battles while avoiding large scale, Phyrric victories (or defeats). The recent conflict in Ukraine has also shown how nation-state actors like Russia can utilize existing networks such as criminal organizations and irregular forces to achieve victory within the confines of the Law of War and avoid full scale invasions while still achieving political victory.[12]

But why Star Wars? Star Wars is a great format to discuss hybrid threat because examples of each of the different categories of threats and examples of how they interact within the modern landscape make an appearance within the six major feature films of Star Wars. Star Wars also explores the use of new and exotic technologies and it provides an excellent visual depiction to understand how threat actors within the COE fight wars, and why hybrid threats are not a new type of warfare, rather a redefinition of actor roles. Not all of these threats are present in every battle or conflict, but taking the films as a whole reveals what the relationship between these threat actors may look like in future conflicts, and how irregular forces are more lethal because of technological advances. This type of informative and entertaining medium is invaluable to anyone trying to understand hybrid threats, and creates a representation of how these threats will utilize new technologies and strategies (and help military strategists plan for the future).

Threat Actors

In order to relate hybrid warfare to Star Wars and vice versa, we need an understanding of the basic threat actors who participate in the COE.[13] This article will use Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat, to help form the foundation for ease of understanding while acknowledging the academic literature changes rapidly. Recently, the U.S. Military decided warfare fell into two different categories, Traditional Warfare and Irregular Warfare.[14] For this discussion, we’ll describe six different variations within Irregular Warfare that we could potentially see on the battlefield: Paramilitary forces, insurgent forces, guerilla forces, terrorists, mercenaries, and criminal organizations.[15]Additionally, this article covers the technology and niche capabilities that any and all of these threat actors employ and what their equivalents are in Star Wars to draw a picture of what future conflicts may look like on the battlefield.

Because current U.S. defense literature on categorizing threats is rather broad,[16] this article uses the following eight categories to structure our discussion of how Star Wars explains how these threats fight: Regular military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgent forces, guerilla forces, terrorists, mercenaries, criminal organizations, and niche capabilities.

Regular Military Forces

Regular military forces are the regulated armed forces of a state or alliance of states with the specified function of military offensive and defensive capabilities in legitimate service to the state or alliance.[17]

Regular military forces are readily apparent within the Star Wars films. The first that makes an appearance is the Droid Army of the Trade Federation in The Phantom Menace (For the purpose of this article, I address the Star Wars films in chronological order within the canon universe (Episode I – VI), rather than chronological order in terms of film production (1977 – 2005)). The Droid Army deploys to Naboo to force a trade settlement, but the Gungan forces defeat them using another hybrid threat concept, electronic warfare (EW). The ensuing battle is fought with linear tactics similar to those Napoleon or Wellington employed. The Trade Federation employs tanks, fighters, and other conventional army weapons. They also fight in conjunction with special operations forces (SOF) that use terrorist tactics to complete their goals. An example of this is Darth Sidious who, near the end of the film, sends his apprentice Darth Maul to capture Queen Amidala and destroy the two Jedi “ambassadors,” with the hope of forcing the settlement while the Droid Army defends the city of Naboo. Darth Maul received special training in light sabers and The Force. Because of this, he is an elite special operations fighter. Even though the Droid Army is ultimately defeated, their presence early on shows conventional armies form an important and integral part of Star Wars and the modern battlefield.[18]

The next conventional force to make an appearance is the Grand Army of the Republic, which consists of cloned soldiers “grown” on the planet Kamino.[19] [20] What sets this army apart from the Droid Army is that they are much more flexible and specialized. InAttack of the Clones, they are shown with different colors on their armor indicating the different ranks and units to whom they belong. In the movie’s battle between the Grand Army of the Republic and the Separatists (an insurgency who employ a droid army attempting to overthrow the Republic), the Clone Army exhibits a high level of hybrid threat counter tasks at the operational level as evidenced by their military victories.[21]An initial Jedi (paramilitary) attack in the stadium followed up with a major conventional strike demonstrates this broad strategy. They also focus on countering Separatist electronic networks by targeting the command ships that control the Droid Army as they try to withdraw. This combination between paramilitary, conventional, and EW led to victory for the Clone Army over an aggressive, multi-faceted hybrid Separatist army, showing how hybrid factions might fight each other.[22]

Next is the Imperial Army of the Galactic Empire serving the totalitarian regime controlled by the Emperor Palpatine. This army is characterized as a massive conventional army with armor (AT-ATs), aviation (TIE fighters), and specialized infantry (Snowtroopers). This army represents a combined arms threat, employing all of the war fighting functions to crush their enemies.[23] They do however, exhibit elements of a hybrid faction. In The Empire Strikes Back and Return of the Jedi, the Imperial Army, operating under Darth Vader’s orders, employs bounty hunters from the criminal element to hunt down and destroy Han Solo and Luke Skywalker. Additionally, they hire a local spy (Garindan) to track members of the Rebellion and use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to find the Rebellion’s secret base on Hoth.[24] [25] The Imperial Army’s objectives also align closely with the criminal network operated by Jabba the Hutt. Although the Empire and Jabba the Hutt operate through Bobba Fett, the army’s dealings with criminal elements fulfill Jabba the Hutt’s objective of capturing Han Solo for monetary gain, and the Empire’s goal of shutting down Rebel Alliance sympathizers. By letting these criminal elements continue to operate, the Empire is providing tacit support for their activities as long as their objectives align. This translates into an army that employs unified hybrid threat capabilities to attempt to destroy the Rebellion. While unsuccessful, this army illustrates the different threats that will be seen on future battlefields.

The final conventional army in Star Wars is the Rebel Alliance. This belligerent readily fits the classic definition of a conventional force using hybrid threat tactics to defeat the Galactic Empire. State entities such as the planet Alderan and Hoth sponsor and support non-state actors such as Han Solo and Luke Skywalker.

In A New Hope, Princess Leia possesses the schematics of the Death Star and, when properly used, leads to its destruction. Han Solo, a smuggler, and Luke Skywalker, a Jedi Knight in training, rescue Princess Leia, along with the Death Star plans stored in R2-D2. While these irregular elements are not directly controlled by the Rebel Alliance, they provide support so they can to work to defeat the Death Star together along with their conventional forces in the Battle of Yavin. In fact, Han Solo and Chewbacca allow Luke Skywalker to destroy the Death Star by clearing the trench that leads to the “small thermal exhaust port,” so Luke can fire the proton torpedoes into it. Thus, the combination of irregular and conventional forces working together enables a final conventional strike that succeeds.

Again, in The Return of the Jedi, the Rebel Alliance uses subversive tactics in conjunction with conventional means to overthrow the Emperor and defeat the Empire. The Rebel Alliance first launches a conventional military strike on the Death Star led by Admiral Ackbar, while simultaneously, special operations forces led by Han Solo destroy the Death Star’s shield generator on Endor (with the help of the Ewoks, a guerilla force). Concurrently, Luke Skywalker, a Jedi Knight, fights Darth Vader who is persuaded to switch sides and assassinate the Emperor. This three pronged attack with conventional forces (Rebel Alliance), special operations forces (Han Solo, Luke Skywalker), and guerilla forces (Ewoks), is hybrid threat operations as defined in TC 7-100. Just as “Hybrid threats will use an ever-changing variety of conventional and unconventional organizations, equipment, and tactics to create multiple dilemmas,”[26] so too did the Rebel Alliance. Ultimately, they included and used hybrid threat Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) effectively within their strategy to defeat the Empire.

Additionally, the Gungan army convinced by the Jedi at the end of The Phantom Menace to attack the Droid Army could be considered a conventional force by some, as they use conventional military tactics similar to the Droid Army. However, in a hybrid threat operating environment, irregular forces can “fight as an indigenous resistance or as a proxy for a hostile nation-state.”[27] In terms of a hybrid threat, the Gungans operate as a Guerrilla force. They are an indigenous entity that mobilizes from the local population and utilize conventional army tactics to fight the Droid Army for the Galactic Republic.

An example that illustrates this are the Peshmerga Kurds in Iraq in 2003, 2007, and later in 2014.[28] The Kurds did not face off against Iraqi Army units in large-scale battles, but the Peshmerga did work directly with CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces to prepare the battlefield for follow-on conventional forces in 2003. They accomplished this by disrupting large formations of main Iraqi units to allow the decisive operation of allied conventional forces to advance with much less resistance. The same is true in Star Wars as the Gungan forces drew the main Droid Army away from the capital of Naboo, allowing the star fighters, as the decisive operation, to escape and succeed in destroying the Droid Army’s command ship.

Star Wars explains this hybrid threat relationship well. Just as U.S. Special Forces linked up with the Peshmerga early on in the conflict, so too did the Jedi with the Gungan forces, who later provided crucial support in destroying the Droid Army. Here, Star Wars shows what indigenous forces might look like in a future hybrid threat operating environment and how indigenous forces might work with SOF or paramilitary forces for mutually benefitting effects.[29] This type of hybrid warfare is currently taking place in Northern Iraq as the Peshmerga are fighting ISIL with the help of US advisors and air strikes. The end result of this conflict will help defense planners much more accurately plan for future conflicts.

Irregular Forces

Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces[30].

Irregular forces are abundant within the Star Wars films. While these threats sometimes fall under nation-state actors, Star Wars shows precisely how they can be non-state actors as well. TC 7-100 defines paramilitary forces, insurgents, guerillas, terrorists, mercenaries, and criminal organizations as all falling under the category of irregular forces. This is how strategists define hybrid threats. It is an “adversary… that adaptively and rapidly incorporates diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities, as well as non-military means…to obtain its objectives.”[31]

In Star Wars, the different factions and opposing forces employ a multitude of different irregular threats to achieve victory. These range from the Rebellion using indigenous Ewok forces, to the Sith Order using mercenaries. What allows these irregular forces to be so successful, however, are the ways they utilize technology and work together with other network types to become more lethal, thus reducing any gaps in an asymmetrical fight. Because irregular forces are so integral to the hybrid threat concept and this thesis, this article covers the different types and their relative equivalents within the Star Wars films to visually elucidate this concept.

Paramilitary Forces

Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission[32].

The Jedi Knights are a paramilitary organization and the focus of the Star Wars films. They are distinct from the main conventional armies in the movies and are a separate entity, but with important military-like qualities. They organize themselves just like nation-state military organizations in terms of hierarchy (Jedi Counsel), equipment (fighters, weapons), and training (Padawans). Their mission however, sets them apart from conventional forces. As Master Jedi Mace Windu remarks to Emperor Palpatine inAttack of the Clones about peace negotiations failing, “If they do, you must realize there aren’t enough Jedi to protect the Republic. We’re keepers of the peace, not soldiers.”[33] This quote forms one of the main ideological traits of the Jedi: They are not soldiers, but more akin to police SWAT units or Gendarmes. They should not be taken lightly or underestimated however, because they usually form the core of the Republic’s and the Rebellion’s special operations forces, as evidenced by their role in taking out the two Death Stars.

Within the hybrid threat landscape, the Jedi Knights often work in conjunction with conventional and other unconventional forces to win battles in all of the films. In Attack of the Clones, they work alongside the Clone Army to defeat the Separatists on the planet Geonosis. Here, Jedi Knights, including Yoda and Mace Windu, take on the roles of conventional military officers and control main conventional units after rescuing Anakin Skywalker, Obi-Wan Kenobi, and Senator Padmé.[34] This transition from paramilitary forces to conventional forces is a hallmark of hybrid threat operational designs in TC 7-100,[35] and a prime example of conventional forces working with irregular forces; in this case Jedi Knights.

Insurgent Forces

The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself[36].

In the first three films (Episodes I-III), the main insurgent group is the Separatist Movement, controlled in secret by Emperor Palpatine. The Separatist Movement fits into the hybrid threat landscape because they work extensively with other non-state actors to complete their goals. A comparable example of a similar insurgency given by TC 7-100 is the Peninsular War fought from 1808 to 1814 between the French Empire under Napoleon I, and the Allied nations of Spain, Great Britain, and Portugal.[37] While this entire war was not wholly an insurgency, the use of guerillas and insurgents in Spain by Wellington and the allied forces mirrors the Separatists’ struggle.

In 1812, Wellington began to move through Spain defeating French forces. His advance “in the face of an enemy that was numerically far superior was made possible by Spanish regular and guerrilla forces pinning down French armies elsewhere in Spain.”[38] This insurgency in Spain, coupled with Wellington’s conventional forces, allowed the Allied forces to defeat the French. While the Republic ultimately defeated the Separatist Movement in Star Wars, the unification and alliance between the conventional Droid Armies of the Trade Federation, Techno Union, and Intergalactic Banking Clan with the Sith Order, formed an insurgency against the Republic using hybrid threat tactics much like the British, Spanish, and Portuguese in the Peninsular War.[39] One of the reason the Spanish irregular forces were able to fight on par with the French and win was they utilized the same weapon systems their French counterparts employed. This symmetry of battlefield technology enabled a Spanish fighter to kill at the same rate as a French fighter. In this way, a Spanish fighter was just as lethal as a French fighter was, and while they did not have the organization and funds the French had, they were able to make considerable gains in the COE.

Another comparable example of insurgent forces between Star Wars and hybrid threat is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s struggle against Sri Lanka. This separatist movement attempted to break away from Sri Lanka and create an independent nation for the Tamil people. They employed hybrid threats that were similar to the Separatists’ movement in Star Wars. The Tamil Tigers used terrorist tactics, employed criminal networks, and maintained a conventional force that “grew into a large experienced, battle-hardened land fighting force over the years.”[40] One of the most important characterizations of this “battle-hardened land fighting force” was that technologically they were almost on par with the Sri Lankan military, and this allowed them to fight for approximately thirty years. But just like the Separatists in Star Wars, the Tamil Tigers eventually lost their struggle as their opponent effectively countered these hybrid threats and technological symmetry.

Guerilla Forces

A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.[41]

Guerilla forces are everywhere in Star Wars. From the Gungans in The Phantom Menace, to the Ewoks in The Return of the Jedi, guerilla forces are included in almost every battle within these films. As this conflict takes place on planets all over the universe, it is inevitable that these indigenous populations are drawn into this epic conflict. A prime example is the Ewoks of the forest moon of Endor, who are rallied to fight for the Rebellion against the Empire by Han Solo and Princess Leia.[42] They play a major role in the Rebellion’s use of hybrid threat tactics and strategy to defeat the Empire.

The Ewoks, using primitive technology in the form of catapults and log weapons, allows them to actively participate with the Rebellion and defeat the Empire militarily. Normally, in a conventional fight between the Ewoks and the Empire, the Ewoks would be completely outmatched. However, by using the local terrain, coupled with very lethal weapons and tactics the Empire did not anticipate, the Ewoks were able to defeat the Empire who largely ignored them and blow up the Shield generator. While more attention could and should be paid to this topic of guerilla warfare within Star Wars, this example shows how hybrid threats play an important role within the Star Wars Universe.

Terrorists

A terrorist is someone who uses unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.[43]

It is important to note that terrorism within a hybrid threat can fall under actors and/or tactics. The Sith Order is a terrorist actor while there are other nation-state and non-state actors who use terrorism as a tactic in conjunction with their normal military operations. Star Wars illustrates this difference for those who wish to understand hybrid threats.

In The Phantom Menace, Darth Sidious sends Darth Maul to abduct Queen Amidala and assassinate two Jedi Knights, Qui-Gon Jinn and Obi-Wan Kenobi. In Attack of the Clones, the film opens with an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Senator Amidala. In A New Hope, the Empire commits a heinous war crime by destroying Princess Leia’s home planet of Alderan and attempt, through fear, to have her reveal the whereabouts of the Rebellion’s secret base. Moreover, in The Empire Strikes Back, the Empire holds the people of Cloud City hostage in an attempt to capture Luke Skywalker. Members of the Sith Order, a prime candidate for a terrorist organization, carry out these actions frequently. They use these tactics to take control of the Galactic Senate, and subsequently, when they come to power and control the Galactic Empire, use state-sponsored terror and military force to ruthlessly control the galaxy.[44] The Sith Order, as a terrorist organization, uses these tactics to pursue goals that are political, religious, or ideological.

Mercenaries

Mercenaries are armed individuals who use conflict as a professional trade and service for private gain.[45]

The primary example of mercenaries in Star Wars are the bounty hunters that make frequent appearances, especially Bobba Fett. While not a primary faction, they nevertheless form an important aspect of strategy for multiple factions. In Attack of the Clones, Darth Sidious hires a bounty hunter, Jango Fett, who then uses a local mercenary to try to kill Senator Amidala. After Jango is killed, his clone son, Bobba Fett, is hired along with others including Bossk, Dengar, and IG-88, to capture Luke Skywalker in The Empire Strikes Back.[46] [47] In fact, whom Bobba Fett works for during the course of the films is ambiguous, but is frequently employed by Jabba the Hutt. This example shows these minor hybrid threat factions working together to become more powerful and exert more influence within the COE. This trait may manifest itself in future conflicts as minor non-state actors, wishing to become more lethal, will frequently employ or work in conjunction with other unknown or shadowy forces. These networks must be understood to properly address the threat these hybrid factions pose.

A modern example of this is the different organizations that blended to become ISIL. From Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad until they became The Islamic State in 2014, ISIL went through many transformations as they absorbed non-state entities on the battlefield. This type of transformation may be seen more in the future by other groups looking to merge with more powerful factions to fight mutual enemies. Mercenaries are just one of those factions.

Today, mercenaries are characterized by the large firms that employ those willing to kill for profit. DynCorp, Asia Security Group, and G4S are all examples of large, multi-national firms that pay top dollar for hired hands.[48] The main threat here, as in Star Wars, is that these agencies operate with impunity and their loyalties are always suspect. As threat actors such as mercenaries transition between different sides within the Star Wars films, we see how these same actors may operate in today’s ever-changing COEs.

Criminal Organizations

Organized crime is a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years’ incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.[49]

The most prominent criminal organization within Star Wars is the Hutt crime lords of Tatooine, such as Jabba the Hutt in Episodes IV – VI. They use smugglers, assassins, and bounty hunters to control their criminal empire. In Star Wars, an example of a criminal organization being used within a hybrid threat is shown when the Empire hires Bobba Fett, working for Jabba the Hutt, to capture Han Solo and corner Luke Skywalker. This combination of conventional forces (the Empire), mercenaries (Bobba Fett), and criminal elements (Jabba the Hutt), shows how the Empire and other factions use other hybrid threats actors to achieve mutually benefitting effects.[50] Han Solo, before joining the Rebellion, made his living as a smuggler hired by Jabba the Hutt. Obi Wan-Kenobi and Luke Skywalker use this skill to smuggle aboard the first Death Star undetected after being pulled in by a tractor beam to rescue Princess Leia.[51]

A current example is Solntsevskaya Bratva, or The Brotherhood, the leading mafia organization situated in Moscow.[52] Their syndicate is worth billions of dollars and if a conflict were to erupt in that part of the world, Star Wars shows us The Brotherhood is a powerful threat that could work with nation-state and non-state actors in the region to accomplish mutually benefitting objectives.

Niche Capabilities

Threats may use sophisticated weapons in specific niches to create or exploit vulnerabilities.[53]

Niche capabilities are a hallmark of hybrid threats, and form one of the main concerns for military strategists based on the rapid proliferation of quickly developing technologies. Star Wars represents some of the niche capabilities that are difficult to anticipate, describe, and predict. These capabilities are also the foundation of what this article espouses: That hybrid threats are nothing more than new technologies being put to use by existing battlefield actors who now work in greater concert together, which makes them more lethal, increasing their importance on the battlefield. As we see, Star Wars provides the military planner or strategist with a better idea of how nation-state or non-state actors put these technologies to use to further their goals of political, ideological, or military victory with other organizations, rather than being the main propellant for their causes.

Information Operations

Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.[54]

All six films cover various types of information operations. Two of the most important types are EW and CNO. Within this futuristic universe, everything is linked by technology and computer nodes, much like we are seeing manifest itself in today’s world with the internet, wifi, Google, Bluetooth, and other unified, connectivity technologies. This is cyber warfare, but for the purpose of this article is included within EW. In Star Wars, one of the first examples is Anakin Skywalker destroying the Droid Army’s command station from the inside with a star fighter. Once this has happened, all of the Droids shut down, securing victory for the people of Naboo over the Trade Federation. This is extremely important. As drone technologies become more and more prolific, it will be crucial that U.S. military planners understand the threats to our use of this technology, and its use by other nation-state or non-state actors.

MILDEC also makes a few appearances. Notably, Padmé disguises herself as one of her handmaidens to confuse any potential assassins. Additionally, the Empire deliberately allows the Rebellion to believe their attack on the second Death Star in The Return of the Jedi is a surprise. The Emperor then springs the trap with his fleet in order to trap the Rebellion’s forces in vicinity of the fully operational Death Star. PSYOP plays a small role as well, but only at the individual tactical level. In Revenge of the Sith, Emperor Palpatine influences Anakin to make his fall to the Dark Side complete, and Vader tries to do the same with Luke, but ultimately fails.

Finally, R2-D2 utilizes CNO quite often to help the Rebellion achieve their goals. In A New Hope, it accesses a computer terminal on the Death Star and prevents the trash compactor from crushing Leia, Luke, Han, and Chewbacca.[55] This becomes quite a frequent occurrence by R2-D2, and the Empire would have most likely succeeded had they practiced better information technology (IT) security on their networks.[56] These examples provide important lessons for today’s military planners when preparing for hybrid threats.

Drone Warfare

A UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] is comprised of the unmanned aircraft, payload, human element, control element, weapons systems platform, display, communication architecture, life cycle logistics, and includes the supported Soldiers.[57]

While relatively new ten years ago, drones now play a huge role in America’s foreign policy and military strategy. This technology revolutionized warfare and is now a major issue that will define the next ten to twenty years of military technology, tactics, discussion, and strategy.[58] Star Wars provides an interesting and informative glimpse into how future drones might be used. In the first three films, the Droid Army is the major example of drones. Some might not consider them drones, but with the pace of technology today, robots and droids will play a large role in future conflicts.[59]Therefore, it is essential military strategists understand the implications this technology will have on future conflicts.

One of the most important examples of drone warfare within Star Wars was the Empire’s use of Imperial Probe Droids to seek out and find the Rebellion’s secret base on the snow planet Hoth.[60] These unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) looked for life indicating a secret base. With the rise of drones within the COE, military planners can look to Star Wars to illuminate this developing technology and its future use in hybrid conflicts. However, Star Wars might not have gone far enough. In July 2013, the U.S. Navy successfully landed a drone fighter onboard the USS George H.W. Bush.[61] This should be considered one of the biggest conventional military developments of the last fifteen to twenty years. While we see fighters and ships controlled by actual pilots in the Star Wars Universe, it is very probable we will see swarms of unmanned drones operating as the mainstay of carrier fleets in the next fifteen to twenty years. This increased lethality to carriers will have significant implications for hybrid threat TTPs.

Another good example of this within the Star Wars Universe is the Droid Army’s use of the “Droid Starfighter” in Episode I. These fighters protected the Droid control ship. Described as “agile starfighters,” they are “equipped with droid brains to ensure that they acted in concert and would sacrifice themselves without thought, over-whelmed the Naboo pilots and nearly secured victory for the Trade Federation.”[62] The same will be possible very soon as evidenced by the X-47B that landed on the USS George H.W. Bush. This technology will radically change the hardware seen on the battlefield, making carriers even more lethal, but this will not nor has it changed the basic nature of warfare.

Additionally, some strategists might want to consider the non-combat role and capacity for drones and droids. Take for example R2-D2. While it plays a small military role throughout all the films, and some consider it a rebel secret agent (a drone that passes information to supporters and the like),[63] R2-D2 was designed as a non-combat droid who assists with all matters of repair, automation, and support. In the future, these unmanned computer network droids (UCNDs) will hack and disrupt enemy information networks without human guidance, leveraging their artificial intelligence to rapidly identify and sterilize threats. This will be used by asymmetric threats to strike stronger opponents where they are weak (network security) while preserving their combat power to choose when to strike with more conventional forces (increased lethality).

When taken together with C-3PO, we see the importance of using these types of automated support and military drones for conducting hybrid threat operations or counter tasks. These drones are not a new faction however, and won’t be a new type of warfare. They are only an outreach of the factions who use them; a tool to be wielded by those who can afford them. And in the rest of the Star Wars films, from Darth Maul’s seeker drone, to Luke’s use of a Marksman-H combat remote,[64] we see the important impact drones will have in future hybrid threat conflicts.

Hybrid Warfare, Star Wars, and The Evolving Battlefield

Because hybrid threats are abundant within Star Wars, the movies provide important visual depictions for those studying their implications on future wars and conflicts. As we have seen throughout this article, smaller, irregular forces within the Star Wars Universe were able to effectively counter and win victories against larger, more organized adversaries. So what conclusions can we draw about hybrid threats? For starters, these irregular threats were primarily able to do so because their forces were just as lethal, if not more so than their opponents. This resulted from more robust hybrid networks and skill sets that allowed these factions to work together to accomplish their goals. While technology did play a large role in their increased lethality, the human network abilities of these factions to mobilize previously ignored actors within the COE and concentrate these technologies on their enemies is what we will see more of in the future. We’ll also see it move quite fast.

Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray discuss in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present that hybrid threat is not some new type of warfare with newly developed tactics and strategies, but these types of conflicts have been around for hundreds, if not thousands of years.[65]Hybrid threats are not a new type of warfare, but with the ability of new technologies to facilitate the creation and increased efficiency of these threat networks, hybrid threats are just the increased ability of irregular and traditional forces to work together to accomplish their goals. Just as the Jedi were able to leverage the lethality of the Ewoks, the Sith to mobilize the Droid Armies, and the Rebellion to concentrate smuggler and Jedi abilities alike, so too will future nation-state and non-state actors work together to fight wars.

Thus, Star Wars shows us that hybrid threats, the idea that previously unforeseen COE actors are now participating more openly on the battlefield, should actually focus or research on the redefined roles these non-state actors now occupy because new technologies allow multiple hybrid threats to work together focusing their new, increased technological lethality. Coupled with smart tactics and efficient use of the geopolitical landscape, these hybrid factions have only newly designated the roles these different factions play in the COE, not the makeup or concept of warfare itself.

Watching Star Wars through this lens of understanding that hybrid threats have always existed means we can focus more on countering any new technologies, economic landscapes, human networks, computer networks, or political maneuverings that will be the focus of future opponents, rather than being surprised when an adversary uses local criminal networks or other threat actors to disrupt our operations (It’s a Trap!). These tactics and strategies should be assumed and anticipated. This refocuses attention not on a plethora of new threat actors, but on how likely threat actors will work together with other known or unknown actors within the COE to increase their lethality and overwhelm their opponents.

The proliferation of technology has only magnified the effect and lethality of non-state irregular actors working together within the COE, but this only means that we still have to look at the other root causes of these conflicts rather than focus on the means to carry out attacks. In World War II, the U.S. Army did not look for a way to negate the effects of German bullets; they focused their energy on eliminating the root cause of the conflict (politics, economics, hostile governments, etc…). Another example is IEDs. While this cheap, low-tech weapon has made the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly more lethal, it is not the reason these conflicts arose or continue. It just allows the Taliban or ISIL, non-state actors, to be more lethal while preserving combat power for other ventures. This allows them more successes that promote recruitment and battlefield victories. Technology is the key to understanding the threat, but not to finding the solution.

Nevertheless, the most important lesson to pull from this exposé on technology, hybrid networks, and hybrid threats is that technology can never replace the skill of the war fighter, as some military analysts and strategists have come to think, nor is it the enemy we search. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote in 1999 in Unrestricted Warfare, that the American government and their generals rely too heavily on technology as a means of fighting and winning wars.[66] Defense planners have integrated this concept into hybrid threats, while forgetting the basic nature of warfare. Even as new technologies appear and greatly increase the effectiveness and lethality of the soldier, it will not replace the man (or woman) behind the weapon on the battlefield. It is not their weapon we need to understand, it is them and their networks (while not forgetting their weapon). While promoting and increasing the technological effectiveness of our soldier, we have forgotten an enemy soldier exists on the other side. Again, Technology is the key to understanding the threat, but not to finding the solution.

This article has only scratched the surface of the many lessons we can learn from Star Wars about the future of modern warfare (and will likely generate many heated discussions). But there are many examples that were considered and left out for brevity’s sake. If having read this article, you must tell someone about the comparison between The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Tusken Raiders, General Grievous’ striking similarity to modern prosthetics, or think this article completely misses the point, please don’t keep it to yourself. Tell your colleagues about the hybrid concepts revealed in Star Wars and continue the discussion. With Episode VII: The Force Awakens to be released in December 2015, that film will provide even more insights into some of the concepts explored here, and then maybe, just maybe, we can learn to make the Kessel Run in 12 parsecs..

Special Thanks to ADM Gial Ackbar, Maj. Nicholas Pomaro (USMC), MAJ Scott Smith, MAJ Stephen Harnsberger, MAJ Chris Sims, CPT Dan Meegan, CPT Peter Solana, CPT Tony James, and SFC Chris Bagwell.

End Notes


[1] F.G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid Threats: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable’, Orbis (2010), doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2010.04.009

[2] Lind, William S, Keith Nightengale, John F Schmitt, Joseph W Sutton, and Gary I Wilson. “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine Corps Gazette, 1989: 22-26.

[3] Echevarria II, Antulio J. “Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths.” Strategic Studies Institute. November 2005.http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf (accessed May 26, 2013).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Murray, Williamson, and Peter R. Mansoor. Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

[6] Department of the Army. Hybrid Threat . Training Circular 7-100, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010, v.

[7] Ibid., 1-1.

[8] Bowers, Christopher O. “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries.” Parameters, 2012: 40.

[9] For the purpose of this article, Star Wars is discussed assuming the reader has seen at least a couple of the films. Some simplicity has been incorporated as well into specifics of the Star Wars universe in order to help break the topic down for those who are not very familiar with the films.

[10] Cleveland, Charles T., and Stuart L. Farris. “Toward Strategic Landpower.” Army, July 1, 2013, 20-23.

[11] Liang, Qiao, and Xiangsui, Wang. “Unrestricted Warfare.” Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.

[12] Galeotti, Mark. “How the Invasion of Ukraine Is Shaking Up the Global Crime Scene | VICE | United States.” VICE. November 6, 2014. Accessed January 4, 2015.http://www.vice.com/read/how-the-invasion-of-ukraine-is-shaking-up-the-g….

[13] Not all actors in an Operating Environment (OE) are a threat. TC 7-100 defines a threat as an organization or nation that possesses the ability to challenge the United States.

[14] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013).

[15] U.S. Department of the Army. Hybrid Threat. Training Circular 7-100 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2010), 2-1.

[16] With good reason. Trying to categorize and fit these threats into nice little boxes will restrict and hinder discussion and understanding of our adversaries’ capabilities.

[17] Department of the Army. Hybrid Threat . Training Circular 7-100, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010, 2-2

[18] Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom Menace. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 1999.

[19] Star Wars Episode II: Attack of the Clones. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 2002.

[20] Wookieepedia. Clone Trooper. 2013. http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Clone_trooper(accessed March 2013).

[21] Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik. “Hybrid threats, cyber warfare and NATO’s comprehensive approach for countering 21st century threats – mapping the new frontier of global risk and security management.” Amicus Curiae, 2011: 14-17.

[22] Star Wars Episode II: Attack of the Clones. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 2002.

[23] Department of the Army. Tactics. Field Manual 3-90, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001.

[24] Wookieepedia. Garindan. 2013. http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Garindan (accessed May 24, 2013).

[25] Galactic Voyage. Garindan. 2013. http://galactic-voyage.com/Misc.-Characters-Garindan.htm (accessed May 25, 2013).

[26] Department of the Army. Hybrid Threat. Training Circular 7-100, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010, 1-2.

[27] Ibid., vi.

[28] Devigne, Jacqueline. “”Iraqoncilable”Differences? The Political Nature of the Peshmerga.” NIMEP Insights, 2011: 48-62.

[29] Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom Menace. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 1999.

[30] Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency Operations. Joint Publication 3-24, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009.

[31] Brian P. Fleming, “The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art” (United States Army Command and General Staff College Monograph, 2011), www.hsdl.org/?view&did=700828(accessed May 23, 2013).

[32] Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency Operations. Joint Publication 3-24, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009.

[33] Star Wars Episode II: Attack of the Clones. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 2002.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Department of the Army. Hybrid Threat. Training Circular 7-100, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010, 4-1.

[36] Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency Operations. Joint Publication 3-24, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009.

[37] Jackson, Andrew C., The Peninsular War 1808-1814. 2004.http://www.peninsularwar.org/penwar_e.htm (accessed May 25, 2013).

[38] Ibid.

[39] Wookieepedia. Clone Wars. 2013. http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Clone_Wars(accessed May 25, 2013).

[40] Ministry of Defence Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006 – May 2009. Factual Analysis, Sri Lanka: Ministry of Defence, 2011.

[41] Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations. Joint Publication 3-05, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011.

[42] Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi. Blu-Ray. Directed by Richard Marquand. USA: Lucasfilm; 1983.

[43] FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 5 December 1990; and Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 13 June 2007.

[44] Wookieepedia. Order of the Sith Lords. 2013http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Order_of_the_Sith_Lords (accessed May 25, 2013).

[45] Department of the Army. Hybrid Threat . Training Circular 7-100, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010.

[46] Star Wars Episode II: Attack of the Clones. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 2002.

[47] Schedeen, Jesse. Star Wars: Know Your Bounty Hunters. October 01, 2009.http://www.ign.com/articles/2009/10/01/star-wars-know-your-bounty-hunters (accessed May 2013, 2013).

[48] McKenna, Luke, and Robert Johnson. A Look At The World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Armies. February 26, 2012. http://www.businessinsider.com/bi-mercenary-armies-2012-2?op=1 (accessed June 23, 2013).

[49] United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime. Organized Crime. 2013.http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html (accessed May 24, 2013).

[50] Star Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back. Blu-Ray. Directed by Irvin Kershner. USA: Lucasfilm; 1980.

[51] Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 1977.

[52] Daily Record. Russian mafia take over as world’s top crime gang. September 17, 2008. http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/russian-mafia-take-over-…(accessed June 23, 2013).

[53] Department of the Army. Unified Land Operations. ADP 3-0, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011.

[54] Joint Chiefs of Staff. Information Operations. Joint Publication 3-13, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006.

[55] Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope. Blu-Ray. Directed by George Lucas. USA: Lucasfilm; 1977.

[56] Darth Vader should have taken information assurance training classes online.

[57] U.S. Army. “Eyes of the Army” U.S. Army Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 2010-2035. Fort Rucker: U.S. Army UAS Center of Excellence, 2010.

[58] Hazelton, Jacqueline L. “Drones: What Are They Good For?” Parameters, 2013: 29-33.

[59] Lin, Patrick, George Bekey, and Keith Abney. Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design. Preliminary Investigation, San Luis Obispo: Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Research, 2008.

[60] Wookieepedia. Viper Probe Droid. 2013.http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Viper_probe_droid (accessed June 4, 2013).

[61] Hennigan, W.J. Navy drone X-47B lands on carrier deck in historic first. July 10, 2013. http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-navy-drone-x47b-20130709,…(accessed July 10, 2013).

[62] Blackman, W. Haden. Star Wars: The New Essential Guide to Vehicles and Vessels. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 39.

[63] Martin, Keith. A New Sith, or Revenge of the Hope. 2005. http://km-515.livejournal.com/746.html (accessed May 26, 2013).

[64] Wookieepedia. Marksman-H Combat Remote. 2013.http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Marksman-H_combat_remote (accessed May 26, 2013).

[65] Murray, Williamson, and Peter R. Mansoor. Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

[66] Liang, Qiao, and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.

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Justin Baumann is a U.S. Army Officer. He has a B.A. in History and German from the University of Portland (Oregon), and a Masters of Public Administration from the University of Southern California (USC). He has previously deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Needless to say, he watches a lot of Star Wars.

Source: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=194339


Filed under: Hybrid Warfare, Information operations, Information Warfare Tagged: Hybrid War, information operations, information warfare

Russian Plane Crash: Sharm el-Sheikh Airport Security Failure

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Putin will be furious if he hears this and it turns out to be true, that a bomb was snuck onto Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 by someone paying £20 to skip bag security checks.

Metrojet, legally incorporated as Kogalymavia (Russian: Авиакомпания Когалымавиа).

Seemingly, within minutes of the plane crash, the Russians were saying 1) It wasn’t pilot error and 2) It wasn’t a mechanical problem.  How could they possibly know in that amount of time?

Sharm El-Sheikh, Qesm Sharm Ash Sheikh, South Sinai Governorate, a resort city on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, bordering the Red Sea, is the place of origin for the flight, which doesn’t seem to be emphasized enough.  The ‘Russian plane’ seems to be emphasized.  Hence the story below should be of extreme interest to many.

This supports the story that US and UK intelligence has presented, that there was possibly a bomb on board. This clearly points to a lack of security for Russian Metrojet Airline.

If this is true, Putin “will be brutal” in his treatment of ISIS.  He’s already using thermobaric explosives and cluster bombs against them in Syria, the only thing more brutal than those is a nuke.  I don’t think so, he’d never survive the “information pummeling” they’d receive.


Russian plane crash: Sharm el-Sheikh airport security concerns raised after tourists ‘pay £20 to skip bag checks’

‘The airport’s not safe. The staff I saw were arrogant, complacent, and a danger to the public’

Security concerns have been raised at Sharm el-Sheikh airport after a British holidaymaker claims he was “offered the chance to pay £20 to skip queues and baggage checks”.

Dale Parkyn, who visited the Egyptian resort with his wife earlier this year, told Sky News they were approached by a man in military uniform and asked if they wanted to avoid the long queues.

The 47-year-old from Harrogate, Yorkshire said: “What we did is we discussed it and he then produced a £20 note and said, ‘Have you one of these’ and you can avoid the queue.”

Mr Parkyn claimed the couple were able to walk through security gates and security procedure, avoiding all queues.

He added that after putting his case on the conveyor belt and being checked in, his baggage “did not go through any scanner”.

“When I think now, it was bizarre,” Mr Parkyn said, “At the time it was quite amusing that for us, for £20, we’d avoided all the queues”.

He said he realised the “gravity” of the situation upon hearing the Government’s announcement to suspend all flights to the holiday resort.

Brendan De Garis, from Maidstone, told the Sun razors were missed in one queue-jumper’s luggage.

David Cameron suspended air links on Wednesday amid fears an “explosive device” was used to crash a Russian passenger plane in Egypt, killing all 224 people on board.

A Number 10 spokesperson said the delays had been brought into place because “more information has come to light”.

The spokesperson added that a team of UK aviation experts are being sent to Sharm el-Sheikh to make an “assessment of the security arrangements in place at the airport and to identify whether any further action is required.”

UK investigators now believe the explosive device may have beenplanted in the aircraft’s baggage compartment prior to the flight’s departure.

Mr Parkyn said: “David Cameron did the right thing. The airport’s not safe. The staff I saw were arrogant, complacent, and a danger to the public.”

Security has since been tightened at the airport following the suspension of flights, including a ban on carrying hold luggage,Press Association reports.

Source: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/russian-plane-crash-sharm-el-sheikh-airport-security-concerns-raised-after-tourists-pay-20-to-skip-a6723591.html


Filed under: Information operations, Physical Security, Putin, Reputation Management, Russia, Security Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, Russia

Tales of Thierry Laurent-Pellet: A One-Man Russian Propaganda Franchise or Troll?

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LaurentTales of Thierry Laurent-Pellet: A One-Man Russian Propaganda Franchise or Troll?

10 Nov, 2015

Introduction

Thierry Laurent aka Thierry Laurent-Pellet aka Thierry Andre Laurent-peller tells a dramatic story of how his business travel to Ukraine turned into a nightmare with detention by the Ukrainian SBU, and a violent encounter which Laurent claims injured his back. This entire Pulse article is a review of the reporting and accounts of Laurent’s story between Russia InsiderNovorossia Today, and Koter News – The Gazette LLN-WSL-UC.

Choice of Publications for “Exclusive Interview”

Mr. Thierry Laurent is a French businessman whose business frequently took him into Ukraine. In a Pulse article on LinkedIn he linked to an article at Russia Insider, entitled “EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: Detained by the SBU, Beaten by Right Sector – The Incredible Story of a French Businessman in Ukraine.” There, Russia Insider wrote-up a synopsis of Laurent’s account, and posted several audio files of Laurent speaking. The SBU is the Security Service of Ukraine.

Russia Insider is an online “news” outlet where today, for example, one could find headlines like, On Fire”: US Navy Can Be SunkThe Refugee Crisis Will Be the Demise of Europe, Alex (ClubOrlov); and How Russia Is Saving Syria, Alexander Mercouris.

Observation: The exclusive interview of a French businessman who was allegedly a victim of a Ukrainian SBU detention and physical attack in Ukraine would be most newsworthy in France, but the exclusive went to Russia Insider. Here is Russia Insider’s contact information:

Office

We are a network of volunteers all over the world, but in Moscow, some of us work at a coworking space called Cowork Station. Stop by and say hello if you like.  Address is Leninsky Prospect 30A.

Physical mail

USA: Russia Insider, P.O. Box 22, Greenwich, CT 06836 USA

Russia: Russia Insider, Co-work Station, Leninsky Prospekt 30A, Moscow, Russia 119334

Not to worry, there was a French iteration of Mr. Laurent’s story here: Arrêté et menacé par le SBU, il quitte l’Ukraine. The publication? Novorossia Today.

Mais bien sûr!

Discrepancies in Stories Surrounding Alleged SBU Detention

In his Russia Insider recording on the SBU detention, Laurent claims he had to go to Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine to deal with his “ex-girlfriend.” He said he woke up at 6:15 AM and 5 armed men were in his room, asking him to come with them for interrogation. There is a recording, here, nearly 10 minutes long. There are no questions. It is just Mr. Laurent narrating.

In the Russia Insider recording above, Mr. Laurent states that after 3 hours in interrogation, he reversed the pressure, forced them to apologize, and then took him to the bus station. However, the Novorossia Today piece narrates about Laurent: “Released, he must press for the’ll (sic) walk to the bus station, waiting for his friends indeed for a long time in Kiev.” Also, the Novorossia Today article puts Mr. Laurent’s detention at 7 hours, not a little over 3 as Laurent seems to say in the recording at Russia Insider.

In the Novorossia Today narrative, Mr. Laurent is taken by 5 SBU policemen to the police station, and 7 heavily armed policemen escort him into the police station, while only 3 interrogate him. However, in Laurent’s Russia Insiderrecording he recounts only 5 SBU policemen from start to finish.

Also in the Novorossia Today account, the story recounts Laurent’s attacker as a gigantic man in a tavern who hit his spine, not in a restaurant as Laurent said in his recording for Russia Insider.

In his Russia Insider recording Laurent said the very big man hit him so hard in the spine he couldn’t breathe, telling Laurent that he’d seen him “at Maidan.” Despite that, Laurent summarily says he “managed” to escape. However, the Novorossia Today account claims that Laurent escaped the huge man byusing a taser against him.

Also, at Novorossia Today, a back or neck X-ray is shown, impliedly showing Mr. Laurent’s spine injury. Yet the name on the film is “O. Arnaud.” Most films have the patient’s name on them.

Photographic Fraud as Propaganda?

Another “journalism” website entitled Koter News – The Gazette LLN-WSL-UC, picked-up Thierry Laurent’s story of SBU detention, and headlined it under the following photo, as seen below:

Ukraine held by the SBU, beaten by neo-Nazis – A French businessman speaks

The photo that was placed directly over the headline, it turns out, is a grab from a video, yet is presented as if it must be Mr. Laurent in his alleged detention at the Koter News website. The photo’s URL I entered into the image search field at https://www.tineye.com/ as such:

http://img.scoop.it/z6yXIVvucYXVHcr3MJanrDl72eJkfbmt4t8yenImKBVvK0kTmF0xjctABnaLJIm9

The results were identical and very close images found, thanks to TinyEye.com, as follows:

A closer look at the first match at Zakon.kz, however, shows a close-up and story that appears to publish the name of a protestor as Mikhail Gavriluk, here (with link from capture below):

Below is a link to the video from which the photos of this awful incident involving the reported Maidan activist were taken (due to the nudity and brutality I will not embed the video, but link to it. DO NOT VIEW IT IF YOU ARE OFFENDED BY SUCH THINGS, OR CHILDREN ARE ABLE TO SEE IT):

Here is a screenshot, from the above link.

The purpose for the comparison is to judge the utilization of the photograph of the unfortunate nude man over the story about Thierry Laurent Pellet being detained and abused by the Ukrainian SBU at Koter News, seen below for review purposes:

Does the photo in the Koter News piece above give readers the impression that the man in the photograph is Thierry Laurent-Pellet, the subject of the story below it?

We know, for a fact, the man in the video is Mykhailo Gavrylyuk, seen and identified here, and here, his vk page here.

Readers may judge whether this was a falsification or deception. Who uploaded the story with the photo? It was “Scooped” by Koter Info, a Scoop.It! account holder. That account lists “journalism” as one of the account holder’s interests.

Ashamed to Be European

One wonders how Mr. Laurent-pellet could get his urgent message out that he is ashamed to be European without the help of News Front, which is an internet news website published by  in Cyrillic with offices listed at: 295034, Russia, Republic of Crimea Street. Shooting 57, per the News Front website contact page, and in Russian, Наш адрес:  295034, Россия, Республика Крым, ул. Стрелковая, 57. Here’s that upload from August 31st, 2015 in English (note the anchorwoman’s name: “Catherine Nollan”):

Having established his bona fides for News Front’s purposes at the end of August, Mr. Laurent was then invited by News Front to give his take on the MH17 Malaysian passenger jet shoot down over Donbass.

News Front

The Newsfront website solicits reader donations on its About and Help pages, providing detailed instructions on how to “help the militia volunteers information front!” using Sberbank, Yandex money, Western Union, MoneyGram, and full funds transfer instructions. The help page says donations are for:

– Protective equipment (body armor, helmets);

– First aid;

– Produce timely repair of technical equipment;

– Food, accommodation and the ability to quickly move from one hotspot to another.

Shabalin Mikhail Konstantinovich, is listed as the Western Union / MoneyGram account holder recipient, and the same name appears in fund transfer instructions. If there are issues, readers are given a Gmail email to contact:

Sending translation numbers and other issues
please contact us by email: elennewsfront@gmail.com

It is fascinating to read the SWIFT instructions down the page, a system that it has been suggested would be a powerful sanction in bringing Russian aggression under control.

Thierry Laurent Is On LinkedIn

It appears that Mr. Thierry Laurent has also been on LinkedIn. In fact, it was his Pulse article that directed LinkedIn users to the Russia Insider story of his alleged SBU detention.

Mr. Laurent had been joining LinkedIn Group discussions and slide shares in which pro-Kremlin LinkedIn participants have discussed and debated foreign policy toward Ukraine with Western LinkedIn users representing many opinions. This writer is one of those volunteers who, while professionally networking with others in public and private sector national security and intelligence group discussions discovered a consistent, coordinated, disruptive, and deceptive pro-Kremlin trolling aimed at disabling LinkedIn.com as a forum for U.S. perspectives on international relations.

This writer believes that Mr. Laurent has been part of that trolling effort, whether willingly or by cooption. Serially, trolls make aggressive assertions stated out of the contextual big picture, or skew of facts, aimed at demonizing the United States, NATO, Ukraine, and the West in general. Others seek to disrupt and derail examination of topics unfriendly to Kremlin views.

Centering on international relations, policy, national security, and intelligence topics, a number of volunteer participants on LinkedIn found themselves checking the trolling behavior on LinkedIn and using the experience as an opportunity for professional enrichment. The more I have engaged in this informal yet serious counter-propaganda project with my fellow LinkedIn participants, the more important I realize the effort is. There are many of us, who make the time in our busy schedules to help. The information war effort against the U.S. is massive and funded by nation states adverse to the U.S. political system, not just one or another politician.

Below you can see an exchange between Thierry Laurent and U.S.-based LinkedIn volunteers in a discussion of a Russian LinkedIn member’s slide share about the Russia-Ukraine relationship. It is one sample of many. See the exchange below:

In this the comment from the top, Mr. Laurent appears to write something cryptic in transliterated Russian, “moy horoshiy drug Evgeniye otvetili by vam s 9 gr” which could be translated as “my good friend Eugene will answer you with a 9mm Grach.” The standard issue Russian military sidearm is the MP-443 Grach.

While it is possible that the controller of the Laurent profile meant “my good friend Eugene will answer you with his sninegr,” that did not make any sense. Erring on the side of caution and considering the gun reference a veiled threat, the comment was reported to LinkedIn. As it turns out, the Novorossia Todayaccount of Laurent’s SBU detention mentions a friend of Laurent’s named Eugene (ostensibly during the Yanukovych presidency): “In fact, his activities led him to maintain friendships with important people. There will be Eugene, part of SBU.” See below:

Then Mr. Laurent did it again. He made a comment insinuating that another LinkedIn member was old, alcoholic, and that his best days were past (all false), followed by encouragement for him to kill  himself in a bathtub. That exchange was so disturbing that I did not reduplicate it here. After reporting this, Mr. Laurent’s profile disappeared, and all thought it was due to LinkedIn’s enforcement of its standards. Recently, however, Mr. Laurent’s profile popped-up again. He is once more availing himself of the free speech platform on LinkedIn.com.

Conclusion

For those who doubt that there is a Kremlin information war reaching out to redefine the U.S., NATO, Europe, and Western civilization before the world, the tales of Thierry Laurent, aka Thierry Laurent-Pellet, aka Thierry Laurent-peller, is a blatant example illustrating the reality of it.

This is a distracted world, with technologies driving faster decision making and cramming our schedules with more because we can. In that atmosphere, few read, reflect, or even finish a thought. Many act on emotional perceptions, letting their emotions control, instead of inform their thinking about what they see or hear. While to seasoned national security executives the efforts of Mr. Laurent may seem harmless and unconvincing, those he is trying to sway in the general public may not have as much time to filter and fact check the websites, headlines, photos, and assertions they sense.

By issuing false media propaganda purveyors put all media in doubt, especially if false media becomes more convincing. NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers said it well in his interview with the Wall Street Journal, “But what happens when suddenly our data is manipulated, and you no longer can believe what you’re physically seeing?” Indeed, by analogy, what happens when we lose the benefit of ham-handed attempts at deceptive propaganda, and it becomes so sophisticated we are not laughing anymore with certainty?


Filed under: Information operations

Russian Protest Artist Sets Fire To Door Of Security Services HQ

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Shock performance artist Pyotr Pavlensky stands in front of the burning door of Moscow’s FSB building.

By Tom Balmforth

MOSCOW — Russian performance artist Pyotr Pavlensky has been arrested after setting fire to the front door of the Federal Security Service (FSB) headquarters overnight in what he called a protest against the security agency’s campaign of “terror.”

A video titled Lubyanka Door Burning shows Pavlensky standing eerily motionless, wearing a hood and holding a fuel canister, facing the street in the dead of night as meters-high flames lick up behind him in a portal of the imposing and iconic Lubyanka building in central Moscow:

Around 30 seconds into the clip, a lone police officer jogs over to Pavlensky and detains him without resistance.

The 31-year-old performance artist has carried out a raft of headline-grabbing stunts in the past, including nailing his scrotum to the street outside the Kremlin, severing his earlobe while atop the wall of a psychiatric facility, sewing his lips shut to support punk protesters, and reenacting Ukrainian street unrest in the streets of St. Petersburg to highlight Kyiv’s Euromaidan protests.

Moscow police told Interfax news agency they have opened an investigation into suspected vandalism — a criminal offense that carries a jail sentence of up to three years — in connection with the FSB blaze.

“The burning door of Lubyanka — a gauntlet thrown down by society in the face of the terrorist threat,” Pavlensky wrote, casting the FSB, the successor to the notorious Soviet-era KGB, as the source of terror. “The Federal Security Service is using the method of continuous terror and holding power over 146,000,000 people.”

He goes on: “Fear turns free people into a matted mass of isolated bodies. The threat of inevitable reprisal hangs over every person within the reach of surveillance, the tapping of conversations and the borders of passport control.”

Pyotr Pavlensky: Russia’s Controversial Self-Mutilating Artist
St. Petersburg artist Peter Pavlensky arrives at a police station in Moscow for interrogation in November 2013

Vladimir Romensky, a reporter invited to witness the action for the independent Dozhd TV, said Pavlensky walked right up to the door of the hulking building, doused it in fuel, and lit it with a lighter.

Romensky and another journalist were also detained at the scene. They reportedly gave statements to the police and are currently listed in the case as witnesses. They were released early on November 9.

Pavlensky dubbed his protest action Threat, according to popular blogger Ilya Varlamov, who was also invited to witness the incident.

Explaining the concept of the performance in the blurb of the video he circulated online, Pavlensky wrote: “Military courts liquidate any manifestation of free will. Terrorism can only exist due to the animal instinct of fear. An unconditional defensive reflex forces a person to go against this instinct. This is the reflex of fighting for your own life. And life is worth fighting for.”

Pavlensky currently faces criminal charges for a performance last year in St. Petersburg, where he set tires alight and banged on sheets of metal to reenact a chaotic scene from the Euromaidan protests that toppled Ukraine’s pro-Russian president at the time, Viktor Yanukovych. He is also being prosecuted for “vandalism” in that case, but he has maintained a vow of silence in court and refused to stand for the judge. During the trial, the chief investigator in the case quit his job and offered to be Pavlensky’s lawyer.

In October 2014, Pavlensky clambered onto the roof of the Serbsky psychiatric hospital — a notorious institution where Soviet dissidents once underwent obligatory psychiatric treatment — and then sat silently, nude, after cutting off his earlobe with a knife.

In November 2013, a naked Pavlensky drove a nail through his scrotum and into a cobblestone on Moscow’s iconic Red Square in an action he called Fixation to serve as “a metaphor for the apathy, political indifference, and fatalism of modern Russian society.”

In 2012, he sewed his lips shut and appeared at a St. Petersburg church in support of Pussy Riot, the punk performance collective whose members were jailed for a video protest, performed in a church, that targeted the Orthodox Church’s leadership and Vladimir Putin.

Several of Pussy Riot’s members praised Pavlensky’s door-torching protest. Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, who spent two years in jail over the Pussy Riot video, called him “wonderful Pyotr and his performance” on Facebook. Maria Alekhina tweeted an image from Pavlensky’s video, with Pavlensky standing in front of the burning FSB. “It’s burning nicely.”


Filed under: Information operations

Russian News And Russian-Proxy News Sites

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After 18 months of saturation by Russian news and Russian-proxy news sites, I decided to present a compilation of each.

Russian news sites generally toe the Kremlin line, they carry State approved stories, are occasionally State sponsored, but must be over 80% owned by Russians.

The Russian proxy news sites carry mainly stories which are either pro-Russian or support Russian initiatives on a consistent, continual basis.  Many of these sites appeared shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Of note is Russia Insider, owned by expatriates (expats) living in Russia but wholly pro-Russian.  Most other listed sites are non-apologetic rags, promoting the Russian cause while pretending to be neutral.  GlobalResearch (dot) ca also owns GlobalResearch (dot) org, but is neither Canadian oriented or neutral.

A never ending list would consist of ‘reporters’, pro-Russian writers and experts who Russian news and proxy sites regularly present as experts, supporting Russia, Russian causes and events supporting Russian national interests.  I will hold this list for another time.

Equally important are Russian efforts to divide Western countries and alliances, as this promotes Russian national interests.

In total, there are 93,000 media outlets in Russia, including 27,000 newspapers and magazines and 330 television channels.[2] Television is the most popular source of information. There are three television channels with a nationwide outreach, and a multitude of regional channels. Local and national newspapers are the second most popular choice, while the Internet comes third. In all media spheres there is a mixture of private and state-ownership. The three nationwide television channels have been criticised for their alleged lack of neutrality.

Having marginalised print media, Putin turned his attention to Russian television. Broadcasters that once carried lively debates were turned into stultifying Kremlin instruments. As state-controlled TV stations began to spout increasingly convoluted theories to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin, Russian propaganda entered the realm of the absurd – so much so that Soviet propagandists would hide behind their Putinist counterparts.

Russian News Sites – internal to Russia.  Many State-owned/sponsored, some not.  Listed alphabetically. For more: Top 20 Russian News. Online Newspapers (in Russia)

  • Agentura.ru – Covers Russian secret services, intelligence and terrorism issues.
  • AK&M – News Agency – Provides economic, financial, and stock market news.
  • Argumenty i Fakty – popular weekly. On 7 March 2014 it was bought by the Government of Moscow
  • eXile – Alternative newspaper featuring essays, humor, book reviews, Moscow club guide, and more.
  • Expatica – Russia Information portal providing daily Russian news and essential information on living in, working in or moving to Russia.
  • Gazeta.ru – politics and business online newspaper.  Owned by Rambler.ru.
  • Interfax – Major Russian news agency. Toes the Kremlin line.
  • Inside Russia and Eurasia – Independent monthly intelligence report of the European Press Agency.
  • ITAR-TASS – One of the largest Russian information agencies. Successor to the leading Soviet news agency TASS.
  • Izvestia – popular daily
  • Kommersant – daily, news and business-orientated
  • Komsomolskaya Pravda – mass circulation, left-leaning daily
  • Lenta.ru – General news site, Europe’s fifth most popular site, Russian and former Soviet state coverage.
  • LifeNews – tabloid
  • Moscow Expat Life – Quarterly publication for entire expat community in Moscow addressing all aspects of living and working in this city.
  • Moscow News – English language weekly.
  • Moscow Times – Leading English language daily newspaper.
  • Moskovskij Komsomolets – popular daily, regarded as publishing sensational or provocative items on Russian politics and society
  • Moskovskiye Novosti – daily. Owned by Rossiya Segodnya through the RIA Novosti news agency.
  • Neftegaz – News and information about Russian oil and gas industry.
  • Novaya Gazeta Liberal newspaper known for its investigative journalism.
  • Other Russia, The – News from the Coalition for Democracy in Russia.
  • Pravda.ru (also http://english.pravda.ru/) – Pro-government news site, not online version of pro-communist printed newspaper of the same name.
  • Prime-Tass – Russia’s leading business news agency.
  • RBC Daily – Daily financial and analytical newspaper
  • RBC News – RosBusinessConsulting – Provides breaking news on Russian stock and financial markets, and daily commentary.
  • Regnum – Goverment-affiliated, one of the leading Russian online information services covering news from Russia, the CIS countries, and the Baltic states.
  • RIA Novosti – State-operated domestic Russian-language news agency
  • Rossiyskaya Gazeta – Russian government owned daily newspaper of record which publishes the official decrees, statements and documents of state bodies.
  • Russia Beyond the Headlines – English version of state owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper.
  • Russia in Global Affairs – Journal on foreign affairs and international relations. Also carries material from analytical centers and articles from Russian newspapers.
  • Russia Profile – Online information service and magazine offering expert analysis of Russian politics, economics, society and culture.
  • Russia Today – First 24/7 English-language news channel. Founder – RIA-Novosti.
  • Russian Life – Magazine covering the culture, history, travel and life.
  • Siberian Light – Blogging Russia  Covers Russia and the former Soviet Union, providing analysis of the most topical issues.
  • Sputnik – State run news agency. Formerly Radio Voice of Russia – Site of the state radio company. Features daily news, comments and special reports.
  • St. Petersburg Times – Major English-language newspaper.
  • Trud – Left-leaning daily
  • Vedomosti – Daily financial and analytical newspaper
  • Vesti.ru – state-owned online newspaper
  • Vladivostok Times – East Russian English-language newspaper.
  • ZhiznZhizn is regarded as a tabloid and a typical “yellow press”, often providing gossip, scandals and questionable facts. #3 most read news site in Russia. Weekly.

Many more ‘news’ sites in Russia, these are the most prolific.

 

Russian-Proxy News Sites – External to Russia.  These are the worst of the worst, unapologetically pro-Russian.  These are the sites most quoted by Russian trolls.

Proxy is an agent or substitute authorized to act for another person or a document which authorizes the agent so to act.

  • Russia Insider The mission of this site is media criticism and reform, run by Western expats providing “alternative” news.
  • GlobalResearch (GlobalResearch.ca and GlobalResearch.org)
  • OpEdNews “Progressive, Liberal”
  • Washingtonsblog 
  • Serendipity  This website is based on a libertarian (in the sense of J.S.Mill) perspective and is opposed to Fascism, Capitalism, Zionism, the Anglo-Zionist Empire, the Surveillance State and all who secretly work to cause wars for their own advantage and profit
  • 21st Century Wire – Started 2009.
  • La Russophobe – US-based popular Russia blog recording the rise of the Neo-Soviet Union.

Russian Opposition News Sites

Russian Neutral News Sites

Russian Neutral Magazines

  • Vokrug sveta –a Russian geographic magazine, one of the oldest popular science magazines in the world.

Russian Television Channels.

Most Russians get their news from Television, still, even in the age of the internet .

  • First Channel – national, state-owned channel – news and entertainment
  • Rossiya 1 – national, state-owned channel – news and entertainment
  • Zvezda – national, owned by Russian Ministry of Defense
  • NTV – national 50% state-owned – news and entertainment
  • Russia K – state-owned – culture and arts
  • Russia 2 – state-owned, commercial
  • Russia 24 – state-owned – news channel
  • Petersburg – Channel 5 – state-owned – commercial
  • TV Center – owned by Moscow city government – news and entertainment
  • STS – commercial – entertainment
  • Domashny – commercial, entertainment
  • TNT – state-owned, commercial
  • Ren TV – Moscow-based commercial station with strong regional network
  • Russia Today – state-funded, international English-language news channel
  • Dozhd – private independent news channel
  • ProRussia.tv – state-owned, in French

Russian Radio – National Coverage

  • AvtoRadio – state-owned/private national network
  • Echo of Moscow – news and analysis. On 18 February 2014, a shareholders’ meeting replaced the station’s long-serving director, Yury Fedutinov, with former the Voice of Russia’s Yekaterina Pavlova, a Kremlin-loyalist in ‘the latest in a series of personnel reshuffles at top state-owned media organizations that appear to point toward a tightening of Kremlin control over an already heavily regulated media landscape’ the state owned RIA Novosti news agency reported the same day. The station’s editor-in-chief, Alexei Venediktov, and his deputy, Vladimir Varfolomeev, were also removed from the broadcaster’s board of directors. Venediktov, one of the station’s founders, had written on March 11 on his Twitter account: ‘Gazprommedia (owner of 66% of the broadcaster’s shares) urged the early dismissal of the radio’s board of directors and a change in independent directors’.
  • Europa Plus – private national network
  • Radio Mayak (92.4%)
  • Radio Russia (coverage: 96.9% of the population)
  • Radio Yunost (51.0%)
  • Russkoye Radio – private national network
  • Voice of Russia – (Golos Rossii) a state-run external service, broadcasting in English and other languages. (Like the RIA Novosti news agency, the broadcaster was merged into a new media agency Rossiya Segodnya, officially “to save money”, under a 9 December 2013 presidential decree.)

Russian News – Official US


Filed under: Information operations

Appeals court rules in favor of BBG on “Voice of America” trademark

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Somebody tried to name their site “The Voice of America” and thought they could get away with it.

Fail.


Posted: 15 Nov 2015   Print   Send a link

Mondaq, 13 Nov 2015: “Namer v. Broadcasting Board of Governors, No. 14-31353 (5th Cir., Oct. 26, 2015) Costa, J. Affirming summary judgment in favor of the Board on its claim of trademark infringement for Namer’s use of ‘Voice of America,’ and an injunction preventing Namer from further infringing the Board’s ‘Voice of America’ mark.” See also the opinion (pdf). KIM: Involved Namer’s use of http://www.voiceofamerica.com, although I saw thevoiceofamerica.com in one account. See previous post about another legal challenge involving “Voice of America,” but not “our” VOA.


Filed under: Information operations

Disinformation Review: Week Three

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Dear all,
740077c1-10af-4501-aca2-50f50764a49f
Many thanks for all your contributions. Every week we have more and more people and organisations alerting us to disinformation articles, thereby helping to ensure that the picture on disinformation will become ever more precise each week.

This week’s disinformation trend sees multiple reports about Ukraine’s military action in the Eastern regions. Already last week, we saw a couple of disinformation articles about the military conflict between Ukraine and separatist forces. This week, they have become more prevalent, as you will see in the Review – mainly featured in TV Zvezda (run by the Russian Ministry of Defence), but also some Youtube videos. Some articles claimed that the OSCE confirmed an attack by Ukrainian forces – although the OSCE didn’t confirm this information. Other reports said that Ukrainian forces bombarded western Donetsk, although local residents denied it.

During the week, there were also reports that the Ukrainian army registered the preparation for an attack by the separatist forces. During the weekend, at least five Ukrainian soldiers were killed – the highest number since the cease-fire began two months ago.

Multiple disinformation articles were reported about the United Kingdom. In a story by Webnovosti.info, it is claimed that David Cameron threatened Vladimir Putin with “more” attacks on Russian civilian airplanes (the article claims that Western secret services were behind the Airbus crash in Egypt). This particular story was later translated into Czech. In addition, a 22-minute video blames the UK for lying in the Litvinenko case.

The Nordic audience was targeted by such stories as: the Dutch investigation into MH17 flight is biased; Sweden and Finland are causing a refugee crisis in Norway; and claims of infringing media freedom in Estonia (all spread by local versions of Sputnik).

Further articles this week stated that the EU and Germany want to legalise pedophilia (Czechfreepress.cz), and that since the Russian army started its operations in Syria, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have returned home (TV Zvezda again).

We are happy to announce that Political Capital Institute from Hungary, directed by Péter Krekó, has decided to provide us with regular updates about the disinformation efforts in their country. This week, it is mainly focused on Syria.

DOWNLOAD DISINFORMATION REVIEW WEEK THREE (.pdf)

For contributions, please e-mail jakub.kalensky@eeas.europa.eu

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Thank you very much once again for your reports, we are looking forward to the new ones,

East StratCom Task Force
Follow us on Twitter @EUvsDisinfo.

The Disinformation Review is a compilation of reports received from members of the mythbusting network. The mythbusting network comprises of over 400 experts, journalists, officials, NGOs and Think Tanks in over 30 countries. Please note that opinions and judgements expressed here do not represent official EU positions.

Source: http://us12.campaign-archive1.com/?u=8bc86e9f6ee27330e8902729c&id=ee7e3a0b00&e=f9d3e9dbe4


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Disinformation, Information operations, Propaganda Tagged: CounterPropaganda, disinformation, propaganda

This Is ISIS New Favorite App For Secret Messages

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1447740908363-cachedBy Shane Harris  (Update at bottom)

The terror group is pushing a new way to communicate quietly after the Paris attacks. It’s called Telegram.

In the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks, ISIS is encouraging its followers to use a popular chat application that can make text messages effectively invisible to government spies.

A day after claiming responsibility for the attack, ISIS posted a message on one of its Web sites—which had been moved to the so-called Dark Web—encouraging its followers to download the app, called Telegram, which also allows users to set their message to self-destruct after a certain period of time.

Telegram and similar apps have been vexing intelligence and security officials, who say they have prevented the U.S. from locating and tracking ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria.

Telegram in particular has been adopted by a lot more people than ISIS—as of a year ago, the company claimed more than 50 million users sending 1 billion messages per day.

Somewhere in that mix are an unknown number of jihadists, and, ISIS hopes, more to come. Of course, there could also be drug dealers, gangsters, and other assorted criminals. But apps such as Telegram are coming in for particular scrutiny by intelligence officials for their potential role in facilitating attacks. ISIS issued its claim of responsibility for the attacks via Telegram.

CIA Director John Brennan wasted no time Monday in highlighting the threat that he thinks such technologies pose when placed in terrorists’ hands.

“There are a lot of technological capabilities that are available right now that make it exceptionally difficult, both technically as well as legally, for intelligence and security services to have the insight they need to uncover” terrorist activities, Brennan said at a security conference in Washington, without mentioning any technologies by name.

Brennan linked one of the worst terrorist attacks in Europe to the profusion of 21st century technologies that, he said, are being abused in such a way that “20th century laws cannot effectively deal with [them].”

By tying the emergence of apps like Telegram to the threat posed by ISIS, and the Paris attacks in particular, Brennan may have opened a new front in the government’s efforts to reign in technology that, while it can significantly protect personal privacy, is nevertheless an obstacle to surveillance.

“I do think this is a time for particularly Europe, as well as here in the United States, for us to take a look and see whether or not there have been some inadvertent or intentional gaps that have been created in the ability of intelligence and security services to protect the people that they are asked to serve,” Brennan said.

FBI Director James Comey had been trying for several months to push some legislative or regulatory solution for what he saw as the risk of “going dark,” if the bureau and other agencies that conduct electronic surveillance cannot easily decrypt text messages, emails, and other communications used by criminals.

Comey and his Justice Department colleagues had effectively stood down from that quest. But the Paris attacks may have revived the effort. Brennan is the most senior U.S. official since the assault to speak publicly about the issue.

Telegram in particular has been adopted by a lot more people than ISIS–as of a year ago, the company claimed more than 50 million users sending 1 billion messages per day.

Terrorists use of ubiquitous and highly-secure technologies demonstrates that they have studied American intelligence operations and exploited leaks about government surveillance techniques, Brennan said.

“There has been a significant increase in the operational security of a number of these operatives and terrorist networks as they have gone to school on what it is that they need to do in order to keep their activities concealed from the authorities,” he said.

Of course, terrorists didn’t need the CIA to tell them that the U.S. government monitors their communications. Telegram is only one in a string of messaging systems ISIS has employed to protect its communications, U.S. officials told The Daily Beast. And some apps that have marketed their privacy-enhancing features, such as Snapchat and Secret have either disclosed their users’ supposedly-private information, or have been shown t

But Telegram is ISIS’ new “it” app—until they find another.

Founded in 2013, Telegram is the brainchild of a pair of Russian brothers, Pavel and Nikolai Durov. Pavel, the 31-year old founder of Russia’s biggest social network, VKontakte, or VK, is a vocal critic of Vladimir Putin’s government and provides the financial backing. Nikolai is the technical brains behind the outfit.

Not surprisingly, Telegram doesn’t market its product to terrorists. But being a force against government surveillance is built into the company’s philosophy.

“The No. 1 reason for me to support and help launch Telegram was to build a means of communication that can’t be accessed by the Russian security agencies,” Durov told TechCrunch last year in an interview.

The company says that Telegram has no connections to the Russian government. In fact, its headquarters are in Berlin.

Durov may have been trying to frustrate the Russians, who are waging their ownwar against Islamist militants. But he’s also piqued the Americans. And, it turns out, the Iranians, who this week arrested administrators of more than 20 Telegram groups, accusing of them of spreading “immoral” content, Reutersreported. Smartphone messaging apps are popular among Iranian youth, who compose the majority of the country’s population, and Iranian hardliners have been cracking down on potential subversion as the country opens up more to the West with the lifting of economic sanctions.

Telegram may be a tool for pro-democracy activists. But its anti-surveillance capabilities won’t win it any points in the CIA’s eye.

In his remarks Monday, Brennan was forceful in his assertion that technologies and policies set up in part to counter government overreach were making his agency’s job harder.

“In the past several years, because of a number of unauthorized disclosures and a lot of handwringing over the government’s role in the effort to try to uncover these terrorists, there have been some policy and legal and other actions that are taken that make our ability collectively internationally to find these terrorists much more challenging,” Brennan said.

He didn’t mention any names, but one in particular hung unspoken in the air: Edward Snowden.

Brennan seemed to give voice publicly to what dozens of his colleagues have argued privately, that a chain of events starting with the Snowden leaks in 2013 has worked their efforts to stop terrorist attacks. Following the disclosures, some European governments moved to enact stricter data protection rules seen as a bulwark against American surveillance. And the European Court of Justice recently invalidated an agreement that allows the free-flow of personal information from European countries to the U.S., based on allegations of surveillance found in press article based on Snowden’s leaks.

“I do hope that this is going to be a wake-up call, particularly in areas of Europe where I think there has been a misrepresentation of what the intelligence security services are doing by some quarters that are designed to undercut those capabilities,” Brennan said.

Source: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/16/this-is-isis-new-favorite-app-for-secret-messages.html


Update: http://news.softpedia.com/news/Encryption-In-Telegram-Messenger-Is-Completely-Broken-474106.shtml

Encryption in Telegram Messenger Is Completely Broken

Vendor doesn’t reply to responsible vulnerability disclosure

Cross-platform messenger app Telegram offers communication between two parties that is supposed to be encrypted, but messages can be easily extracted in clear text, a researcher has found; the company did not respond to responsible vulnerability disclosure messages.

The application has versions for desktop platforms (Windows, Linux and Mac), as well as for mobile platforms (Windows Phone, iOS and Android). A web version is available, too.

According to information from the developer, Telegram had 50 million active users as of December 8, 2014, who sent and received one billion messages on a daily basis; all this in just 16 months since its release.

The Telegram challenge

Telegram developers boast about the end-to-end encryption provided in the program and have launched contests with a $300,000 / €265,000 incentive for anyone who wants to try to crack the encryption used to protect the messages.

In the latest round, which ended at the beginning of February with no winner, contestants could act as a Telegram server that facilitates the delivery of information between the interlocutors. It was permitted to deploy any type of active attacks or methods for traffic manipulation.

In the previous contest, with a prize of $200,000 /€176,000, Telegram allowed the contestants to monitor the traffic between the two clients, which is basically a challenge to break the encryption securing the messages.

Simpler approaches are more successful

Zuk Avraham from Zimperium Mobile Security managed to find the secret text through a different approach that led to finding the strings in a non-encrypted form.

He started from the premise that hackers do not play by the rules and relied on an exploit for a Linux kernel vulnerability (CVE-2014-3153, also known as TowelRoot) to gain elevated privileges on the affected machine, and thus extracted Telegram’s process memory. By analyzing the dump file, he could easily find the text strings used for the test.

Taking advantage of the root shell access he gained on the machine with TowelRoot, he found among the files of the application an SQL database called “Cache4.db,” which appeared to include tables with encrypted content (“enc_chats” and “enc_tasks_v2”).

Brief examination showed that they indeed included the communication, but it was in plain text and all the messages used during the test could be seen.

On the list of features touted by Telegram there is also the possibility to define the lifespan of the exchanged text through a self-destruct option. Avraham was not able to do this, though, on account of a bug that is not security-related, he assumes.

However, he was able to retrieve deleted messages straight from the memory of the process, which would be of more interest to an attacker since it allows putting together entire conversations.

Telegram fails to respond to responsible disclosure attempts

Zimperium tried to contact Telegram several times since the discovery of the security flaws on January 17, 2015. The first attempt occurred the very next day after their findings, but the vendor did not reply.

The mobile security company has a vulnerability disclosure policy of 30 days, which means that if a month passes and the affected party does not answer to the notifications regarding security flaws, Zimperium publishes the research.

The policy says that the vendor is contacted several times (every five business days, through various communication means including email, direct phone calls or intermediaries) if contact cannot be established at the first attempt.

“If Zimperium exhausts all reasonable means in order to contact a vendor, then Zimperium may issue a public advisory disclosing its findings fifteen business days after the initial contact,” the text of the policy reads.

In the case of Telegram, Zimperium says that it attempted contact four times, between January 18 and February 2, but no response was received. On Monday, the company made the glitches public.

[UPDATE]: Telegram CEO, Pavel Durov, published a response to Zimperium’s report on the vulnerable state of the app. Durov rejects the validity of the findings since encryption no longer has value if an attacker has root access to the target device.

 


Filed under: Information operations, Secure Messaging Tagged: Secure Messaging, Security
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