ISIS‘ presence on Twitter is being identified and dismantled. Ninety-two hundred accounts were released at once in March. Then, after the Paris attacks, 5,500 accounts went down — another small victory at a time when the world feels hopeless and violated in the face of immense tragedy.
But most of that success is misattributed. It’s not Anonymous that’s doing the real work of fighting the Islamic State group online — even though the group has been the most bombastic about leading the digital charge. The ISIS campaign can actually be attributed to GhostSecGroup, now called Ghost Security Group, an online counterterrorism squad unaffiliated with Anonymous that works closely with U.S. government agencies.
The small group of elite, experienced hackers has been working to slowly wear down Daesh‘s online presence since January, shortly after the Charlie Hebdo massacre.
And though they recognize that Anonymous and #OpISIS are “well intentioned,” GhostSecGroup’s leadership toldMic that the sudden interest of Anonymous could end up costing innocent lives.
The slow business of counterterrorism: GhostSecGroup operates a two-pronged system. The first is CtrlSec, the arm of the operation run by a European named Mikros. This group deals purely with social media — they don’t “hack” Daesh, but instead map out their online communications networks, build extensive weekly lists of online handles and send them off to Twitter, which (according to CtrlSec) bans about 90% of everything CtrlSec send their way.
The numbers are sporadic, but GhostSecGroup told Mic that as of Wednesday, CtrlSec has banned over 110,000 ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts, many of which are likely repeats of the same jihadis making accounts many times over.
The main GhostSec team targets ISIS-affiliated domains, websites and forums. It’s less buzzworthy work, because the goal isn’t always just to take down a site, it’s slow intelligence-gathering. GhostSec finds Islamic State sites, hacks into the backend and determines if there’s any organizing, planning or coordinating. They spend time sorting through the forums and even planting moles in order to extract any information, and then use an intermediary to communicate that information to the FBI and other U.S. government agencies.
This work by GhostSecGroup in the past has been attributed, without government denial or confirmation, with preventing actual terrorist attacks and copycat massacres.
This is where Anonymous can end up doing more harm than good, according to DigitaShadow, the executive director of Ghost Security Group. (All members go by pseudonyms and shield their identities — they may have gone legit, but they still regularly receive credible death threats from ISIS.)
DigitaShadow told Mic that Anonymous’ methodology is just to find one of these sites and use a cheap, rudimentary form of hacking, like a distributed denial of service attack, to bring it down, essentially tearing down a potential source of useful intel.
“When it comes to terrorist attacks, one of the big worries is that you could take down forums and cost someone their lives,” DigitaShadow said. “Anonymous has a habit of shooting in every direction and asking questions later.”
He also said that there’s an issue of picking out the right targets in the first place. GhostSecGroup has a wide network of experts, volunteers and Arabic translators who make sure that any target they end up taking down is an actual ISIS hub.
“Sometimes it’s hard to differentiate an insurgent site from an innocent Muslim site,” Digita said. “I’m afraid it’s a lot of friendly fire.”
The underground Twitter wars: Taking down Twitter accounts may seem trivial, but social media is a vital platform for ISIS to spread propaganda and seduce potential recruits with glitzy, violent videos promoting their exploits and developing sophisticated ways of evading detection. For CtrlSec, it’s an endless game of Whack-a-Mole, though they say Twitter’s gotten better at working with them.
But that work is methodical, and GhostSecGroup has had to distance themselves from their old ties with Anonymous in order to do real counterterrorism work.
Anonymous is decentralized, often sloppy, and opens up the opportunity for ISIS moles to work their way in. The old mantle of “GhostSec,” the name Ghost Security Group originally used when they were affiliated with Anonymous, is still in use by Guy Fawkes-mask-wearing Anons.
The Islamic State group’s online presence is migrating away from Twitter as well, to encrypted apps like Telegram, where it can congregate quietly and even raise money. GhostSecGroup has begun using infiltrators to build relationships with jihadists and gain access to their private channels on apps like Telegram.
GhostSecGroup and CtrlSec keep an online form where anyone can report accounts or domain names they think are related to ISIS, and the form generates them about 500 leads a day. These tips are a big part of how CtrlSec builds the lists that they send off to Twitter. Technically, anyone can contribute to them.
Instead, the drum beats loud for Anonymous, which puts out rabble-rousing videos with colorful costumes and the cathartic promise of vengeance. We rally behind them and give them not just attention but credit for doing work that is possibly not theirs. All the while, they trample on the methodical slog of the quiet hacktivists doing the slow work of real counterterrorism.
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Jack Smith IV is a writer and reporter covering the intersection between the Internet, culture, politics, the economy and the future. Send tips, comments and feedback to jack@mic.com
If you think Russia is neutral, think again – Russia is actively attacking America in a propaganda war.
Of course, we already knew this: Russia’s anti-American fever goes beyond the Soviet era’s. But in case you want a reminder, here is a video that has emerged within the past week. Professionally put together, narrated differently in three different versions.
Here is the latest “Agitprop” or political propaganda:
This video calls Yeltsin weak and a puppet of the West (a common theme in the dark days of the 1990s) and shows Putin as a strong leader, ready to restore Russia’s global legitimacy. Background music is very aggressive in this Russian version. Creates an entirely different tone to the video.
I have seen and have a copy of the English version, but I do not have permission yet to share. Much gentler music, female narrator, the ‘feel’ is less aggressive but says basically the same thing. Here is the English female narrator version:
Here is a third version, male narrator, still trying to act all macho and crap. When I hear an announcer with an abnormally low guttural voice, my first thought is somebody is grabbing him by his package, pulling and squeezing – hard. Since he’s Russian, of course I prefer to think it’s another guy that’s grabbing his junk.
I’ll end with a small side-route. Want to find Russian Proxy Sites? Put “Russia is an aggressor again” in a Google Video search and see all the sites that host it.
Russian Proxy Sites – probably – they carried this Russian propaganda video right away. Most of these sites I’ve frequently seen before, so I am fairly comfortable listing them here. Of course, a few are “channels” on larger hosted sites.
RealClearPolitics
informationclearinghouse.info
investmentwatchblog
fortruss.blogspot
thesaker.is
off-guardian.org
sott.net
robinwestenra.blogspot
uprootedpalestinians.wordpress
oximity
reddit.com/r/russia
godlikeproductions
therussophile.org
disclose.tv
politforums.net
9gag.com/tv/p/ape6Be
lomak.net
whatreallyhappened
rutube.ru
The list goes on and on and on… I have a feeling somebody has already done this and compiled a list of Russian proxy sites. You’ll also discover a plethora of Twitter and YouTube accounts.
Staunton, October 30 — The flood of news stories from a country as large, diverse and often strange as the Russian Federation often appears to be is far too large for anyone to keep up with. But there needs to be a way to mark those which can’t be discussed in detail but which are too indicative of broader developments to ignore.
Consequently, Windows on Eurasia will present a selection of 13 of these other and typically neglected stories at the end of each week. This is the eighth such weekly compilation. It is only suggestive and far from complete, but perhaps one or more of these stories will prove of broader interest.
Russian Activists Want to Make Putin a Saint. The National Committee 60-Plus has called on the Russian Orthodox Church to adopt special rules to allow the accelerated canonization of the Russian president while he is still alive (forum-msk.org/material/news/11045307.html).
But Some Iconography about Syria Portrays Putin as a Shiite Muslim. There have been rumors at various points that Vladimir Putin has converted to Islam, but most such suggestions have had it that he has joined “traditional Russian Islam” which is overwhelmingly Sunni. But as a result of the Kremlin leader’s backing of Syria’s Asad, some iconography portrays him as a Shiite (golosislama.com/news.php?id=28121).
Russians Take Putin to Court for Doing Nothing. A group of Russians in Lipetsk have launched a law suit against Vladimir Putin which seeks to hold the Kremlin leader criminally responsible for having failed to do anything to prevent the current crisis in Russia (forum-msk.org/material/news/11038662.html).
Russia Producing More Rockets but Its Tanks Get Stuck in Muddy Roads. Russia’s main rocket factory has now gone to three shifts a day, signally that Moscow intends to boost its military preparedness (echo.msk.ru/news/1647024-echo.html). But the Russian government has not been able to do anything about a fundamental reality: Russia’s roads are so bad that its tanks continue to be swallowed by the mud (sibkray.ru/news/8/878277/).
Russians Wearing T-Shirts Showing Bombing of Syria. T-shirts showing Russian planes bombing Syria are becoming extremely popular in Russia, but Russian attitudes about the war may be less enthusiastic that Putin would like: He recently had to order that the death of a Russian soldier there be declared a suicide, something few Russians appear ready to believe (charter97.org/ru/news/2015/10/29/175858/and grani.ru/opinion/milshtein/m.245391.html).
Moscow has Given Only 317 Ukrainians Refugee Status. Despite its claims to be welcoming of those coming from Ukraine, the Russian authorities have given only 317 Ukrainians the status of refugee, a situation which leaves the rest in an irregular and potentially problematic legal status (qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/v-rossii-tolko-317-ukraintsev-poluchili-status-bejentsa/150233/).
Russian Soap that Smells Like Rubles Introduced in Vladimir Oblast. Russians in Vladimir Oblast can now buy soap that smells that freshly printed rubles. Like rubles, of course, the soap declines in size with every use (rufabula.com/news/2015/10/29/money-soap).
Ruble’s Collapse Leads to Flood of Chinese Tourism in Russian Far East. One group that has benefitted from the ruble’s collapse has been Chinese living near the Russian border. They have begun to flood into the region to take advantage of the lower prices as a result of the ruble’s decline. It seems certain that many Russians will be anything but happy about this collateral consequence of Russia’s monetary problems (asiarussia.ru/news/9660/).
Russian Cossacks Say Ukraine’s Donbas is Theirs. Cossack Groups in the Russian Federation say that Ukraine’s disputed Donbas region should be handed over to them, thus adding a new wrinkle to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and opening the way for new claims about Cossackia, a land that Moscow has long insisted doesn’t exist (ng.ru/regions/2015-10-28/6_kazaki.html).
Urals City Named Most Islamophobic Place in Russia. Muslims say that Pervouralsk-Vasilevsk-Shaitansk is far and away the most Islamophobic place in Russia. This may be something that the city fathers there will actually want to take pride in given the growing hostility to Islam in Russia (ansar.ru/person/pervouralsk-vasilevsk-shajtansk-samyj-islamofobskij-gorod-rossii-kto-izgonit-besa).
No Halloween in Russia if Church and State Can Help It. The Russian Orthodox Church and some Russian officials have stepped up their campaign against any celebration of Halloween, a holiday they view as a Western import that is especially noxious at a time of heightened tensions between Russia and the outside world (http://echo.msk.ru/news/1647224-echo.html and nazaccent.ru/content/18120-hellouin-po-nashemu.html).
Dr.Jessica Haro, working in publishing YleKioski, more than a year followed the activities of the Russian “factory trolls” in the Finnish media space and social networks. The results of its investigation of Radio Liberty hasreported. As it turns out, this work was for Jessica psychologically very exhausting: the journalist herself became the target of attacks trolling the Internet, personal attacks and attempts at litigation.
Recently, Jessica Haro shared her experience mixedwith readers Yle Kioski. According to her, the most brutal, heinous and stupid at the same time journalist said SMS message sent to her on behalf of her unknown long-dead father, who supposedly live and with dissatisfaction monitors occupational daughter.
Finnish journalist Jessica Haro its war with trolls
Jessica Haro told Radio Liberty about his “war” with the trolls and their associates.
I expected a negative reaction from some people, but do not assume that it will become such a scale
– When you started a year ago to investigate the activities of the pro-Russian Internet trolls in Finland, you assumed that this could have implications for you personally?
– I was expecting a negative reaction from some people, but it is not anticipated that this will become such a scale and is actually in store for me the campaign of persecution.
– How all this developed after your first publication of trolls?
– In this his first article, in September 2014, I was among other things invited readers faced with this phenomenon, to share their experiences, talk about techniques that use trolls, acting on the forums of the Finnish media and social networks, what themes and materials they spread or “throw” as subjects for discussion, and so on. d. The reaction started immediately, the activity of others were well-known in Finland, a pro-Russian activist JohanBackman, he gave an interview to several Russian sites where the accused me that I illegally make a list of pro-Putin sympathizers living in Finland, I cooperated with the CIA, with the Estonian Security Police.
A fragment of one of the interviews Johan Beckman
– It was a lie, including with respect to the list?
– Absolutely. I openly wrote that I was not interested in not only the names, nicknames but even users that my readers suspected of trolling. I’m interested in the phenomenon, its scale and specific techniques. But Beckmann and his supporters accused me of illegal activities, because the amount of this kind lists in private, outside the framework of official investigations without proper authorization in Finland does not allow the law. False charges against me were not limited to the Russian media, they appeared on some Finnish web sites and social networks. At the same time the Internet began orchestrated campaign against my employer – the stateTV and radio company Yleisradio, which is also accused of the fact that it allegedly defame people in Finland who are pro-Russian, and like Putin. In social networks circulated a petition, addressed to our Ombudsman, which all those who wish to sign. Then he was sent to half a dozen complaints, and they were composed almost equally, a blueprint.
– Who they signed? There are in fact should have been specific names?
The meaning of the campaign was to convince the ignorant people that I and my employer is doing something criminal
– Yes, but then I did not want to delve into that kind of people. While it may be worthwhile to understand – I do not exclude that transpired would be interesting due to the trolling activity in our segment of the Internet.
– But, perhaps, among the signatories were people quite sincerely convinced that you are doing something illegal, and they defend the freedom of speech?
– So in fact the meaning of the campaign was to convince the ignorant people that I and my employer is doing something criminal. All this was well prepared: the texts of the complaints I saw them, made up a very competent from a legal standpoint. In addition, I received a message from my readers – that the discussion of the petitions and complaints to the network by those who pointed out the absurdity of the charges have been blocked, thrown out of the discussion.
– And what Finnish media spread information about you that you call false?
– Oh, that’s interesting. Generally sites that may be called fake-news sites.One of them, verkkomedia.org especially “interesting”: it led the journalist Janus Putkonen, who now works in Donetsk on the side of the separatists and heads the news agency there DONI. In addition to participating in the campaign against me and Yle, this site (which is not very active after Janus went to Donetsk) spread all sorts of conspiracy “news.”
Janus Putkonen talks about his work in Donetsk:
– Were there any attempts to somehow interfere with your privacy or all of the limited campaign on the Internet?
– Well, it should be noted that the one from the other is not always possible to separate. With the publication of my material about the Russian “factory trolls” and her work in Finland, my e-mail began to fill all sorts of aggressive messages, including a Russian address. There were, in particular, my image and my colleagues, modified with Photoshop equipped with swastikas and other attributes, the words “the Finnish Fascists” and so on. N., In three languages - Finnish, English and Russian. Many of these letters were apparently originally written in Russian and then translated into Finnish using Google translator. There were phone calls – and curious, sometimes called the indignant readers who are familiar only with the disinformation articles about me and my own materials on the pro-Russian trolls have not read. There I addressed my original publication.
Although generally it was very unpleasant. Especially a series of calls and SMS messages from the Russian, Kazakh and Ukrainian rooms. I do not want to go into details as to exactly how they insulted and threatened me, but I will say that in some instances it sounded really scary. There was also an attack on my page in “Facebook” – came running to an incredible number of trolls, who accused me of everything from propaganda Russophobia in Finland to the bloodshed in Ukraine. Particularly “good”, for example, I want to die quickly … from uranium poisoning. By the way, I’m not the only one Finnish journalist who has been attacked pro-Russian trolls, but to me they are “specialized” special.
Post to social networks with the attack on Jessica Haro and her colleague
– Someone you supported? I am referring to colleagues and readers …
– Yes. Most of our audience – people sane and sensible. They do not believe the misinformation. I received not only hundreds of messages of support from all kinds of people, but also the set of the most diverse and interesting information from readers concerning the activities of the trolls. About 200 people have shared with me their experiences with the trolls.
– To sum up: you’ve won? I mean, you were able to show the Finnish audience how the “factory of the trolls,” and the media to help readers and Internet users to distinguish information from misinformation?
– I think, in general, yes. I managed, including with the help of my audience, find many interesting information about the methods and purposes of trolling, how attempts are made to manipulate public opinion. In addition, a number of experts gave me comment on that – and I hope they too were helpful. According to most of the readers’ reactions, people thought it was a good project – says a Finnish journalist Jessica Haro.
“Never interrupt the enemy while he’s making a mistake’ ~ Napolean
I’m gonna start with one simple sentence: We have the upper hand here. Sometimes it doesn’t feel like it, but make no mistake WE HAVE THE ADVANTAGE, just as long as we don’t squander it. Here’s why:
Nearly 6 years ago, as many of you know I started taking down jihadist recruiting, propaganda websites and forums. At that time they were often self-hosted servers, or offshore hosting providers, they were not prevalent on US social media like they are today. Most of the targets I chose were hosted overseas. My strategy then was really simple. I was trying to make it as difficult as possible for the bad guys to trust and maintain their own servers, and lines of communication. I figured I’d herd or funnel them into a smaller space, because smaller spaces are easier to watch.
Today, there are very few of these overseas Jihadist services left up and running. They pretty much gave up trying to keep their boxes online and, as we have seen, have moved over to US based technology. Everything from Telegram, and Surespot etc for messaging and Cloudflare for protecting their ‘online assets’ from people like me, and obviously Twitter and Facebook to spread their propaganda. So I’d say that strategy I was working on for all those years was relatively successful. Why?
Now we have them right where we want them.
That ‘smaller space’ I mentioned above (and MANY times in interviews int the past) is US based technology platforms. From there we can monitor, perform traffic analysis, even targeting packages. This was not as easy before when they were scattered on natty foreign and mostly uncooperative nations services and servers. And before all the pro-Snowden and Wikileaks shitnozzles start whining about eavesdropping and the constitution, non-US foreign nationals using US technology are NOT protected by OUR CONSTITUTION. It’s we the people, not them the people. So sit back down hipsters.
Speaking of Snowden, ever since he defected I’ve been saying how his ‘revelations’ have directly affected intelligence gathering capabilities, especially against jihadists. In fact 18 months ago I wrote an entire post, backed up with real world facts to outline the level of his treachery. Well today we have even more evidence, straight outta Raqqa from an online jihadist:
Yes people – that’s an actual jihadist praising up Snowden as a hero. I if you want to read more on this subject it’s all right here.Wanna know who else isn’t helping? ‘Anonymous’. As you *may* have heard the ‘hacking’ group <snicker> are currently trying to get 1000’s of what they decide are ISIS accounts suspended. Even though by their own admission they are actually just looking for Arabic language accounts many of which are not affiliated to ISIS:
They are also targeting (unsuccessfully) supposed ISIS websites, many of which are not actually ISIS run operations.Here’s a video from yesterday of Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince slamming them and alluding to the fact that many of their targets *may* in fact be either honeypots or have US intelligence ‘assets’ inside collecting the goods. This also finally answers the question: ‘J’ why you no ‘Tango Down’ no more? Well maybe the time for that was 6 years ago, and the environment is less ‘target rich’ now, because we’ve got them where we want them. Or maybe I’m working on ‘other things’. Either way Anonymous, you’re a dollar short and a day late, yet again. Some people paint, others sculpt I guess.
Well, like I said earlier, we have the upper hand. As long as the asshats stop ‘helping’ and WE don’t squander it. The bad guys don’t have the skills, technology (or will anymore) to create and maintain their own platforms. They have been herded onto our technology, and they want more of it, let me show you:
Yesterday I observed the Official ISIS ‘Tech Support’ account recommend the US Blackphone device to its Jihadi minions for communication as per:
Then, less than a day later I notice they are peddling a modded version of Rockstar Games hit game GTA5. They have re-branded it into something they are calling ‘Vexation and Chaos’:
For haters of the ‘infidel’ way of life these fuckstains sure do like to use our stuff a lot right?
Well I say good! Let ’em! But why not load the dice?
A herein lies our advantage, all these tools and platforms have a US codebase, a codebase US entities control, so why not add some value and insert some snippets that will determine if the user is in a certain location or similar, and use it as a trigger for monitoring or even a targeting package for drone bait? It could easily be based on multiple conditions being met, that way no the pro-Snowden snowflakes can’t complain about US citizens being ‘illegally’ monitored.
Remember Stuxnet? That software infected millions of machines, but only triggered if certain conditions were met. Among those conditions, the software detected WHERE it was geographically, AND if the system it was on was also running a specific piece of SIEMENS PLC/SCADA software that was ONLY used to control nuclear centrifuges. There could be no false positives there, if at least those TWO conditions were not met, it stayed dormant and didn’t trigger.
We have the advantage here, and we’d be remiss not to leverage it.I’d like to see a US ‘Technology Provider Coalition’ (or ‘syndicate’ or whatever), external to Government, so there can be no crying about ‘Government spying on me’ – building this kind of multi-conditional ‘feature’ into OUR technology. They are clearly enamoured with our technological prowess. Lets not squander this awesome opportunity. Because harassing Twitter to suspend randomArabic speaking users is counter-productive, hampers actual investigations, and fucking futile.
We need to stop pissing around, start thinking on our feet, critically and outside the box. Make no mistake, this is a war, and in wartime, extraordinary shit needs to get done. Nobody ever won a war staying inside their comfort zone.
I am consistently amazed at Russian Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
Within minutes Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported to President Putin that “All targets were destroyed”. We are left with two choices: either entirely too much forces/explosives were used (200 kt?), causing excessive collateral damage – killing innocent civilians and making a huge propaganda coup for ISIS, or there were troops on the ground at every single target assessing the target was actually destroyed. Not even forward observers can say with any certainty that a target is destroyed and drones only tell superficially. Certainly many hardened and reinforced buildings can withstand thousands pounds of explosives.
– OR – as is most likely the case, Russian military commanders, all the up the chain of command, are accustomed to lying to their superiors about better-than-actual results. That’ll come back to haunt you, guys!
Oh, here is one of the Russian cruise missiles flying overhead and hitting Syria, it doesn’t look like 200 kt to me.
Why Israeli ISIS Targets in Syria? Gee. I don’t know. Anti-semitic? They’re Russian. But I repeat myself.
Assessment: New Russian proxy site discovered: politicalvelcraft.org
Russian Warships In The Caspian Sea Launch 18 Deadly Cruise Missiles: All Israeli ISIS Targets In Syria Were Destroyed.
On Friday November 20, 2015 warships of the Caspian Flotilla launched 18 cruise missiles on seven Israeli U.S. targets in the provinces of Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo.
All targets were destroyed, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in a report to president Vladimir Putin.
During the aerial operation cruise missile were launched from the Mediterranean and Caspian Seas over a distance of up to 1,500 km, while aircraft were taking off from Russian and Syrian airfields.
From the Caspian Sea, 29 aircraft of the long-range and bomber aviation were involved in the airstrikes. According to Shoigu, ten ships are involved in Russia’s military operations in Syria, six of them are in the Mediterranean Sea.
“In the past four days, Russia’s strategic and tactical aviation carried out 522 combat sorties, a total of 101 air-and sea-based cruise missiles were launched, some 1,400 tonnes of bombs of various types were dropped.”
He added that during the mission the operational range of Tu-160 strategic bombers from the Mediterranean was over 13,000 km.
“A total of 826 enemy targets were destroyed,” Shoigu added. “Each day, 143 sorties are carried out. The sea fraction includes ten ships, six of which are in the Mediterranean Sea,” the minister said.
“In accordance with your instructions, the [Russian] Armed Forces are carrying out a retaliation operation to destroy the leaders of terrorist organizations and their supporters, disorganize their control and logistics systems, as well as destroy ISIS military and oil and gas infrastructure.”
He added that “in this regard, the aviation group has been doubled and increased to include 69 aircraft.”
Russian military operation in the Syrian Arab Republic stopped ISIS from delivering 60,000 tons of illegal oil a day to the black market. Now Islamic State terrorists are losing $1.5 million daily, Shoigu said.
The Russian Aerospace Forces are focused on undermining ISIS’s financial base, the minister said.
“Main efforts are focused on destroying the ISIL financial and economic base. A total of 525 tank trucks and 15 storage and refinery facilities have been destroyed in the operation.”
As a result of a cruise missiles’ strike on just one jihadist target, over 600 [U.S. & Israeli]ISIS terrorists were destroyed in Syria’s province of Deir ez-Zor, Shoigu said, adding that terrorists are suffering major losses.
“Twenty three terrorist training bases, 19 plants producing arms and explosives, 47 depots with ammunition and funds, as well as other objects were destroyed.”
“This helped the Syrian government forces to continue successful actions in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, mountainous Latakia and Palmyra.”
Taking Off From Russia With Fighter Escorts.
“The tasks are being carried out, and they are carried out well,” Putin said Thursday.
“But this is so far not enough to clear Syria of fighters, terrorists, and shield Russia from possible terrorist attacks,” the president added. “There is a lot of work ahead of us and I hope the next stages will be carried out just as professionally, and bring the expected results.”
The most damning statement of all: “Overmatched online, the United States has turned to lethal force.”
What the heck? How is that even possible?
RABAT, MOROCCO — The assignments arrive on slips of paper, each bearing the black flag of the Islamic State, the seal of the terrorist group’s media emir, and the site of that day’s shoot.
“The paper just gives you the location,” never the details, said Abu Hajer al-Maghribi, who spent nearly a year as a cameraman for the Islamic State. Sometimes the job was to film prayers at a mosque, he said, or militants exchanging fire. But, inevitably, a slip would come with the coordinates to an unfolding bloodbath.
For Abu Hajer, that card told him to drive two hours southwest of the Syrian city of Raqqa, the capital of the caliphate, or Islamic realm, declared by the militant group. There, he discovered that he was among 10 cameramen sent to record the final hours of more than 160 Syrian soldiers captured in 2014.
“I held my Canon camera,” he said, as the soldiers were stripped to their underwear, marched into the desert, forced to their knees and massacred with automatic rifles.
His footage quickly found a global audience, released online in an Islamic State video that spread on social media and appeared in mainstream news coverage on Al Jazeera and other networks.
Abu Hajer, who is now in prison in Morocco, is among more than a dozen Islamic State defectors or members in several countries who provided detailed accounts to The Washington Post of their involvement in, or exposure to, the most potent propaganda machine ever assembled by a terrorist group.
What they described resembles a medieval reality show. Camera crews fan out across the caliphate every day, their ubiquitous presence distorting the events they purportedly document. Battle scenes and public beheadings are so scripted and staged that fighters and executioners often perform multiple takes and read their lines from cue cards.
Cameras, computers and other video equipment arrive in regular shipments from Turkey. They are delivered to a media division dominated by foreigners — including at least one American, according to those interviewed — whose production skills often stem from previous jobs they held at news channels or technology companies.
Senior media operatives are treated as “emirs” of equal rank to their military counterparts. They are directly involved in decisions on strategy and territory. They preside over hundreds of videographers, producers and editors who form a privileged, professional class with status, salaries and living arrangements that are the envy of ordinary fighters.
“It is a whole army of media personnel,” said Abu Abdullah al-Maghribi, a second defector who served in the Islamic State’s security ranks but had extensive involvement with its propaganda teams.
“The media people are more important than the soldiers,” he said. “Their monthly income is higher. They have better cars. They have the power to encourage those inside to fight and the power to bring more recruits to the Islamic State.”
Increasingly, that power extends beyond the borders of the caliphate. The attacks in Paris were carried out by militants who belonged to a floating population of Islamic State followers, subjects who are scattered among dozens of countries and whose attachments to the group exist mainly online.
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the alleged architect of the attacks who was killed in a raid in France, had appeared repeatedly in Islamic State recruiting materials. The barrage of videos and statements released afterward made clear that the overriding goal of the Islamic State is not merely to inflict terror on an adversary but also to command a global audience.
The United States and its allies have found no meaningful answer to this propaganda avalanche. A State Department program to counter the caliphate’s messaging has cycled through a series of initiatives with minimal effect. Islamic State supporters online have repeatedly slipped around efforts to block them on Twitter and Facebook.
Overmatched online, the United States has turned to lethal force. Recent U.S. airstrikes have killed several high-level operatives in the Islamic State’s media division, including Junaid Hussain, a British computer expert. FBI Director James B. Comey recently described the propaganda units of the Islamic State, also known as ISIL and ISIS, as military targets.
“I am optimistic that the actions of our colleagues in the military to reduce the supply of ISIL tweeters will have an impact,” Comey said at an event last month in Washington. “But we’ll have to watch that space and see.”
Research for this article involved interviews with Islamic State defectors and members, as well as security officials and counterterrorism experts in six countries on three continents. The most authoritative accounts came from seven Islamic State defectors who were either in prison in Morocco or recently released after facing terrorism charges upon their return from Syria. All spoke on the condition that they be identified only by the adopted names that they used in Syria.
Those interviews were conducted with the permission of the Moroccan government in the administrative wing of a prison complex near the nation’s capital. The prisoners said they spoke voluntarily after being approached by Moroccan authorities on behalf of The Post. Other prisoners declined. Most of the interviews took place in the presence of security officials, an arrangement that probably led participants to play down their roles in the Islamic State but seemed to have little effect on their candor in describing the caliphate’s media division.
The cameraman
Abu Hajer, a soft-spoken Moroccan with a thin beard and lean physique, said he had been active in jihadist media circles for more than a decade before he entered Syria in 2013. He began participating in online Islamist forums after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, he said, and later became an administrator of an influential site known as Shamukh, giving him authority to admit new members and monitor the material other militants posted.
Those credentials cleared his path to coveted assignments within the Islamic State, a group that began as al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq before splitting off from that terrorist network in an ideological rupture two years ago.
The group has an elaborate system for evaluating and training new arrivals. Abu Hajer said that shortly after entering Syria he was groomed to be part of the Islamic State’s media team. He spent two months undergoing basic military training before he was admitted to a special, month-long program for media operatives.
The program “specializes in how to do filming. How to mix footage. How to get the right voice and tone” in interviews, he said. After completing the course, he was given a Canon camera, a Samsung Galaxy smartphone and an assignment with the caliphate’s media unit in Raqqa.
Abu Hajer, who is in his mid-30s, had come from an impoverished corner of Morocco. Now that he is in prison, his wife and children have returned to the encampment where they lived before departing, a shanty village of corrugated tin and plywood with no running water near a cement plant on the outskirts of Rabat.
In Syria, they were given a villa with a garden. Abu Hajer was issued a car, a Toyota Hilux with four-wheel drive to enable him to reach remote assignments. He was also paid a salary of $700 a month — seven times the sum paid to typical fighters — plus money for food, clothes and equipment. He said he was also excused from the taxes that the Islamic State imposes on most of its subjects.
He quickly settled into a routine that involved getting his work assignments each morning on pieces of paper that also served as travel documents enabling him to pass Islamic State checkpoints. Most jobs were mundane, such as capturing scenes from markets or celebrations of Muslim holidays.
Abu Hajer said he encountered only one Western hostage, John Cantlie, a British war correspondent who was kidnapped in Syria in 2012. Cantlie was cast by his captors in a series of BBC-style news reports that touted the caliphate’s bustling economies and adherence to Islamic law while mocking Western governments.
Abu Hajer said he filmed Cantlie in Mosul in 2014, and he said that by then the British broadcaster was no longer wearing an orange jumpsuit or confined to a darkened room and was allowed to wander among the markets and streets of Mosul for camera crews.
“I cannot tell you whether he was coerced or threatened. He was walking freely,” Abu Hajer said, an assertion that is at odds with what is known about Cantlie’s captivity.
A video released in January shows Cantlie in multiple locations in Mosul, including one in which he is riding a motorcycle with an armed militant seated behind him. It was among his final appearances before the series was halted with no explanation or subsequent indication of Cantlie’s fate, although articles attributed to him have since appeared in the caliphate’s magazine.
One of Abu Hajer’s next assignments took him to an elaborately staged scene of carnage, a mass execution-style killing choreographed for cameras in a way that has become an Islamic State signature.
After arriving at the site, he said that he and the other camera operators gathered to “organize ourselves so that we wouldn’t all film [from] the same perspective.”
Abu Hajer said he had grave objections to what happened to the Syrian soldiers in the massacre that he filmed in the desert near Tabqa air base. But he acknowledged that his misgivings had more to do with how the soldiers were treated — and whether that comported with Islamic law — than any concern for their fates.
As the soldiers were stripped and marched into the desert, Abu Hajer said he filmed from the window of his car as an Egyptian assistant drove alongside the parade of condemned men.
“When the group stopped, I got out,” he said. “They were told to kneel down. Some soldiers got shot. Others were beheaded.” The video, still available online, shows multiple camera operators moving in and out of view as Islamic State operatives fire hundreds of rounds.
“It wasn’t the killing of soldiers that I was against,” Abu Hajer said. “They were Syrian soldiers, Nusairis,” he said, referring to the religious sect to which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his closest supporters belong. “I thought they deserved to get shot.”
“What I didn’t like was that they were stripped to their underwear,” he said, an indignity that he considered an affront to Islamic law.
Abu Hajer also said he kept his lens aimed away from the beheadings because of his objections to the practice. But asked whether he considered refusing to record the massacre, he said he feared that would consign him to the fate of those he filmed.
“You don’t want to do it,” he said, “but you know that you cannot say, ‘No.’ ”
The machine
The contradictions of the Islamic State’s propaganda apparatus can make its structure and strategy seem incoherent.
The group exerts extraordinarily tight control over the production of its videos and messages but relies on the chaos of the Internet and social media to disseminate them. Its releases cluster around seemingly incompatible themes: sometimes depicting the caliphate as a peaceful and idyllic domain, other times as a society awash in apocalyptic violence.
The dual messages are designed to influence a divided audience. The beheadings, immolations and other spectacles are employed both to menace Western adversaries and to appeal to disenfranchised Muslim males weighing a leap into the Islamist fray.
A separate collection depicts the Islamic State as a livable destination, a benevolent state committed to public works. Videos show the construction of public markets, smiling religious police on neighborhood patrols and residents leisurely fishing on the banks of the Euphrates.
Even the concept of the caliphate has a dual aspect. The terrorist group’s rise is a result mainly of its demonstrated military power and the tangible territory it has seized. But a remarkable amount of its energy is devoted to creating an alternative, idealized version of itself online and shaping how that virtual empire is perceived.
That project has been entrusted to a media division that was operational well before the caliphate was formally declared in 2014. U.S. intelligence officials said they have little insight into who controls the Islamic State’s propaganda strategy, although it is presumed to be led by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the caliphate’s main spokesman.
The media wing has relied on veterans of al-Qaeda media teams, young recruits fluent in social media platforms, and a bureaucratic discipline reminiscent of totalitarian regimes. Defectors and current members said that phones and cameras they brought to Syria were impounded upon arrival by the Islamic State to prevent unauthorized and potentially unflattering images from finding their way online.
Only sanctioned crew members were allowed to carry cameras, and even they were to follow strict guidelines on the handling of their material. Once finished with a day’s shooting, the crews were to load their recordings onto laptops, transfer the footage to memory sticks, then deliver those to designated drop sites.
In an Islamic State enclave near Aleppo, the media division’s headquarters was a two-story home in a residential neighborhood, defectors said. The site was protected by armed guards, and only those with permission from the regional emir were allowed to enter.
Each floor had four rooms packed with cameras, computers and other high-end equipment, said Abu Abdullah, 37, who made occasional visits to the site as a security and logistics operative. Internet access went through a Turkish wireless service.
The house served as an editorial office of Dabiq, the Islamic State’s glossy online magazine. Some also worked for al-Furqan, the terrorist group’s main media wing, which accounts for the majority of its videos and mass-audience statements.
Overall, there were more than 100 media operatives assigned to the unit, Abu Abdullah said. “Some of them were hackers; some were engineers.”
Images from the Islamic State media obtained by The Washington Post are seen in screen grabs taken from the mobile messaging service Telegram, a promotional and recruitment platform for Islamic State.
Abu Abdullah had no affiliation with the media arm, but he often did its bidding. At one point he was tapped to install a generator at the media headquarters so that it would not lose power when electricity went down.
Another assignment involved recovering corpses from battle scenes and arranging them to be photographed for propaganda videos exalting their sacrifice. He would wash away dried blood, lift the corners of dead fighters’ mouths into beatific smiles, and raise their index fingers in a gesture adopted by the Islamic State as a symbol of its cause.
Many in the American public were introduced to the Islamic State through wrenching videos in which Mohammed Emwazi — a masked, knife-wielding militant with a British accent known as “Jihadi John” — slit the throats of Western hostages, including Americans James Foley and Steve Sotloff.
Scrutiny of those and other videos revealed an extraordinary level of choreography. Discrepancies among frames showed that scenes had been rehearsed and shot in multiple takes over many hours.
The releases showed professional-caliber attention to lighting, sound and camera positioning. Certain videos, including one showing a decapitated American Peter Kassig, appear to have employed special effects software to digitally impose images of Kassig and his killer against a dramatic backdrop.
Those production efforts were reserved for videos aimed at mass Western audiences and were addressed explicitly to President Obama. But defectors said that even internal events not intended for a global viewership were similarly staged.
Abu Abdullah said he had witnessed a public execution-style killing in the city of Bab in which a propaganda team presided over almost every detail. They brought a white board scrawled with Arabic script to serve as an off-camera cue card for the public official charged with reciting the condemned man’s alleged crimes. The hooded executioner raised and lowered his sword repeatedly so that crews could catch the blade from multiple angles.
The beheading took place only when the camera crew’s director said it was time to proceed. The execution wasn’t run by the executioner, Abu Abdullah said. “It’s the media guy who says when they are ready.”
The brand
For two decades, the dominant brand in militant Islam was al-Qaeda. But the Islamic State has eclipsed it in the span of two years by turning the older network’s propaganda playbook on its head.
Al-Qaeda’s releases always exalted its leaders, particularly Osama bin Laden. But the Islamic State’s propaganda is generally focused on its fighters and followers. Appearances by leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or his senior lieutenants have been rare.
Rejecting the lecture format employed by al-Qaeda, the Islamic State’s videos are cinematic, emphasizing dramatic scenes, stylized transitions and special effects.
“The group is very image-conscious, much like a corporation,” said a U.S. intelligence official involved in monitoring the Islamic State’s media operations. Its approach to building its brand is so disciplined, the official said, “that it’s very much like saying ‘This is Coca-Cola’ or ‘This is Nike.’ ”
The propaganda competition with al-Qaeda is a high priority, defectors said. One former Islamic State fighter said that he came under enormous pressure from the organization after it learned that his father had been a high-ranking al-Qaeda operative killed in Pakistan in a CIA drone strike.
Islamic State media figures pushed the recruit to appear in a video renouncing his father’s organization, said the son, who spoke on the condition that neither he nor his father be identified. His refusal, and reluctance to fight al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, damaged his standing in the Islamic State, and he said he fled in fear for his life.
Al-Qaeda has typically required extraordinary patience from its audience. Even its most media-savvy affiliate, the al-Qaeda branch in Yemen, often takes months to release new issues of its online magazine, Inspire.
The frequency and volume of releases by the Islamic State are staggering by comparison. The group has produced hundreds of videos in more than a half-dozen languages, puts out daily radio broadcasts and garners as many as 2 million mentions per month on Twitter.
The group also appears to have connections to prominent media organizations in the Middle East.
Twitter and Facebook have moved to shut down accounts associated with the Islamic State and ban the distribution of its messages, but users have found ways to resurface. Thousands of loyalists have also flocked to new services that are less vulnerable to government scrutiny, including Telegram, a messaging application created by a Russian software entrepreneur, although Telegram began shutting down Islamic State channels after the Paris attacks.
The Islamic State has also exploited apparent connections to news organizations in the Middle East. A segment that aired on Al Jazeera in 2013 depicted children attending schools in the caliphate. Images that later surfaced online appeared to show that the cameraman for that piece was Reda Seyam, a militant who had been linked to terrorist plots and is a senior figure in the Islamic State.
In a comprehensive examination of the terrorist group’s media releases in the summer, Charlie Winter, until recently an analyst at the Quilliam Group in the United Kingdom, identified 1,146 distinct pieces of propaganda, including photos, videos and audio releases, during a single month-long stretch.
Winter counted as many as 36 separate media offices that answer to the Islamic State’s headquarters in Raqqa — including affiliates in Libya, Afghanistan and West Africa — and saw evidence of extraordinary coordination across the network.
At one point during his study, on July 19, he noticed that every affiliate had simultaneously shifted to a new logo with the same stylized Arabic script. The icon appeared in the same location on every image and in the initial frame of every video release.
“There was clearly a communique issued,” Winter said in an interview. “The Islamic State is constantly striving to be as formalized, as bureaucratic-seeming as possible, to keep up the appearance of being a state.”
That effort to simulate legitimacy is particularly pervasive inside the caliphate.
The same videos employed to shock outsiders are used internally to cow the group’s less enthusiastic subjects. A constant stream of utopian messages is designed to convince residents, in Soviet-style fashion, of the superiority of the Islamic State.
While Internet access is often restricted to the public, propaganda units set up giant viewing screens in neighborhoods where residents come out in the evenings to watch approved videos streamed from laptops.
“It’s like a movie theater,” said Abu Hourraira al-Maghribi, a 23-year-old with a shaved head who wore an Adidas hoodie when he met with reporters in prison. The videos are drawn from the Islamic State’s expanding film library, he said, depicting “daily life, [military] training and beheadings.”
The Islamic State’s most notorious videos — including those showing the beheadings of Western hostages and the burning of a caged Jordanian fighter pilot — were shown over and over, he said, long after their audiences beyond the caliphate dissipated.
Abu Hourraira said he attended one screening on a street near the University of Mosul that attracted about 160 people, including at least 10 women and 15 children. One of the videos showed an execution by Emwazi, who is believed to have been killed this month in a U.S. drone strike.
“The kids, they are not looking away — they are fascinated by it,” Abu Hourraira said. Jihadi John became a subject of such fascination that some children started to mimic his uniform, he said, wearing all “black and a belt with a little knife.”
The Americans
The Islamic State maintains strict bureaucratic boundaries within its media wing. Camera crews were kept separate from the teams of producers and editors who stitched the raw footage together, adding titles, effects and soundtracks. Real names were almost never exchanged.
But Abu Hajer and two other defectors said that an American in his late 30s with white skin and dark-but-graying hair was a key player in some of the Islamic State’s most ambitious videos.
“The American does the editing,” Abu Hajer said, and was the creative force behind a 55-minute documentary called “Flames of War” that was released in late 2014. The film strives to create a mythology surrounding the Islamic State’s origin and connection to the historic Muslim caliphate.
It culminates with scenes of Syrian soldiers digging their own graves while a masked fighter, speaking English with a North American accent, warns that “the flames of war are only beginning to intensify.”
Another American-sounding figure surfaced more recently, delivering daily news broadcasts that appear to emanate from a radio station that the Islamic State overran last year in Mosul. After the attacks in Paris, his voice was the one that most English-speaking audiences heard describing France as “the capital of prostitution and vice” and warning that governments involved in strikes in Syria “will continue to be at the top of the target list.”
U.S. officials said they have been unable to determine the identity of that speaker or others with North American accents. The militant who appeared in the “Flames of War” film remains the subject of an entry on the FBI’s Web site appealing to the public for help identifying him.
The defectors
The Islamic State’s relentless media campaign has fueled a global migration of militants. More than 30,000 foreign fighters from more than 115 countries have flooded into Syria since the start of that country’s civil war. At least a third arrived within the past year, the vast majority of them to join the Islamic State, according to U.S. intelligence estimates.
Of the defectors interviewed by The Post, all but one said their decisions to leave for Syria could be traced to videos they saw online, or encounters on social media, that ignited a jihadist impulse. The only outlier said that he had been prodded by a friend to come to Syria and was promptly imprisoned for refusing to fight.
Abu Hourraira, who spent months fighting in Iraq, said he began searching online for material about the Islamic State as the group began to dominate headlines about the war in Syria. He decided to abandon his job at a dry-cleaning business in Casablanca only after watching the group’s emotionally charged videos.
“Some were like Van Damme movies,” he said, referring to Jean-Claude Van Damme, the Hollywood action star. “You see these men fighting, and you want to be one of these brave heroes.”
Like many countries in the region, Morocco has struggled to offset that pull. Moroccan security officials said that more than 1,500 men had left the country to fight in Iraq and Syria, plus more than 500 women and children, many of them seeking to join their spouses, sons or fathers.
Several of the attackers in Paris, including the alleged architect, were of Moroccan descent, but were born and grew up in Europe.
“The fight now is with the propaganda because it plays a very big role in these numbers,” said a senior Moroccan security official who spoke on the condition that neither he nor his agency be identified. Al-Qaeda recruitment relied almost exclusively on direct contact in mosques or other settings, he said, but “now, 90 percent are being recruited online.”
Defectors offered conflicting views on whether the Islamic State would endure. Some said that a cohort of young males in Iraq and Syria are already coming of age immersed in the group’s propaganda and ideology, and that a generation of children was being raised to idealize its masked militants.
But all attributed their decisions to leave Iraq and Syria to a combination of factors, including not only fears for their safety but also a disenchantment that set in when the reality of the caliphate failed to match the version they had encountered online.
Map: What a year of Islamic State terror looks like VIEW GRAPHIC
Some said they were haunted by scenes of cruelty they saw firsthand but that Islamic State propaganda teams edited out. Abu Abdullah, who wore a hood to disguise his identity during an interview, said he witnessed a mass killing near Aleppo in which Islamic State fighters fired into a crowd of Alawites including women and children.
When a 10-year-old boy emerged alive, the highest-ranking militant on hand “pulled out a gun and shot him,” Abu Abdullah said. The slaying was recorded by the ever-present camera crews, he said, but the footage “was never aired.”
Abu Hajer, the former cameraman, said his standing with the group began to slip when he became involved in helping to administer the Islamic State’s religious courts. After sharing views that he said were at odds with his superiors, the perks of his media position were withdrawn.
“They took away my weapons, my monthly income,” as well as his villa and car, he said. A relative told a Post reporter that Abu Hajer finally pulled his family out of Syria after he had received a warning in which an Islamic State militant dragged a finger across his throat.
A sympathetic colleague gave Abu Hajer the paperwork he needed to pass Islamic State checkpoints on the way out of Syria, he said. Another friend gave him cash to put his family on a flight out of Turkey. Moroccan authorities were waiting for him at the Casablanca airport.
He now shares a crowded cell with other militants in a high-walled Moroccan prison, with two years remaining on a three-year sentence. Asked whether he worries that his work will induce others to join the Islamic State, he gave an equivocal answer. “To a certain extent I feel responsible,” he said. “But I am not the main reason.”
The Islamic State (or ISIS) has recruited an estimated 20,000 fighters since 2011. As I explore ina new Brookings paper, a major reason for this level of recruiting success has been the group’s savvy use of propaganda and social media. Counter-messaging efforts, meanwhile, have been largely ineffective—in part because they are dwarfed by the sheer size of the ISIS communications footprint, but also because they have been too mono-dimensional and static.
How did ISIS propaganda become what it is? What is the nature of its appeal? What is the state of play in anti ISIS messaging efforts, and what steps would a better response include?
Combating ISIS propaganda networks
The perfect storm
The roots of the ISIS propaganda machine are deep. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—the founder of the group that became ISIS—was, among other things, a showman: of violence and of language. He spoke compellingly of “epic battles” and the Final Hour, alluding to the powerful apocalyptic themes present in Islamic literature.
But if you look at ISIS propaganda in 2011 and 2012, it is different than what it is today. It was more inward looking, more amateurish, and more domestic at that time. It became, over time, more global, adventurous, and creative.
With the fall of Fallujah in 2014—which occurred at roughly the same time that President Obama called ISIS a junior varsity team—the war in Syria changed. It became the first social media war, the war that attracted western Muslims in an unprecedented number, the first tweeted war. The right cocktail of forces elevated the ISIS media presence from good to great: the Islamic State of Iraq’s encounter with Syria, the global emergence of Twitter, and the more widespread knowledge of English all turbocharged ISIS propaganda.
Fear, act, believe
What is the appeal of what ISIS does? It is not necessarily about winning hearts and minds, though that is part of it. What ISIS seeks to present is a stark choice about the correct message. For ISIS, the message is about emergency, agency, and authenticity.
First, it sounds the alarms that an emergency is happening, that Muslims are being slaughtered. The advantage for the Islamic State is that this is at least somewhat true. The best propaganda is obviously always connected with the real world and with the truth. Then this element of emergency is coupled with the element of agency: ISIS tells Muslims in Manchester, Paris, and elsewhere that they have a role to play. In one English-language video, for instance, there is a clear message that these are golden days, concluding: “So ask yourself, either you can be here in these golden times, […] or you can be on the sidelines.”
And then there is the vital element of authenticity, a trait that this austere, grim, savage organization embodies chillingly well. The fact that it’s violent, ruthless, zealous for the law, and obsessed with utopianism only enhances its authenticity.
Doing counter-propaganda better
Many different entities—in the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and the Arab world—have tried and largely failed to combat the ISIS propaganda machine. Even the single most credible voice on jihad—al-Qaida—failed to reign in the Islamic State. So governments and even terrorist groups have not been successful in quelling its advance, but that doesn’t mean that there aren’t valuable elements in all these approaches.
Many of the counter-propaganda efforts have been limited in scope and funding, and have lacked clear political goals. Many of them were created to fight al-Qaida, not the Islamic State. It is difficult for risk-averse governments to match the Islamic State’s advantages in volume and originality, as Charlie Winter wrote in a recent paper.
Rather than oscillate between triumphalism and despair, we need a constant counter-propaganda effort. I have several recommendations:
We need to view the problem of the Islamic State as a political problem with a media dimension, not the other way around. All too often we think that these are public relations or messaging issues. But they’re related to the real world: there is a real war in Syria and Iraq, there’s real violence, there are real people being killed. Mosul did fall to the Islamic State, it wasn’t imaginary. So we need to realize that when we talk about messaging, it is intrinsically linked to a political reality. We cannot divorce propaganda from the political reality on the ground.
It takes a network to fight a network. Despite some steps to ramp up the volume of our counter-propaganda efforts, we still lack the volume necessary to be able to compete in this space. Volume has value. And the Islamic State—either itself or with its networks—still has the advantage in numbers, and it’s managed to create an echo chamber that gives its messages a life of their own.
There is a wealth of credible voices of people who have firsthand knowledge of ISIS violence that have not been fully tapped. In August 2014, for instance, the Islamic State killed almost 1,000 male members of the Sheitaat Tribe, a Sunni-Arab-Muslim Tribe in Syria. We know that there are Sheitaat Tribesmen now in refugee camps—they (along with Iraqis from Anbar province and Syrian refugees) have their own firsthand stories to tell. It would be a good investment for a Western or Middle Eastern government to hire some of those people and empower them to challenge extremists on social media. That’s an easy and inexpensive step.
On content, there is too much emphasis on the search for the magic bullet. What counter-propagandists really need is multifaceted content similar to the multifaceted content that the Islamic State produces. This could include sarcasm, fact-based approaches, ideological approaches, and others. Governments—especially the U.S. government—aren’t always the best-equipped to engage in ideological struggles; since there is an ideological dimension to the ISIS battle, governments should include the relevant actors in the design and implementation of its counter-propaganda strategy.
These are some common sense steps, though the larger task of countering the alarmingly effective ISIS propaganda products won’t be easy. While these steps cannot solve the problem—ISIS poses, as I’ve said, essentially a politically challenge—they can at least challenge ISIS and other extremists in their own space.
Alberto M. Fernandez
Vice President, Middle East Media Research Institute
Pop culture pictures hackers in clean, air-conditioned rooms, working global network magic from a desk. For the Army, though, that’s not enough. If American troops are to prevail against inventive foes in high-tech, close-quarters fights, the hacker elite have to get their boots muddy with the regular grunts. So now the Army’s sending cyber soldiers to its Combat Training Center wargames to figure out how. “There’s this idea that we could always do it remotely, from protected space. Well, we recognized, no, that’s not true,” Lt. Gen. Ed Cardon, head of Army Cyber Command, told reporters recently. For cyber soldiers to support frontline units effectively, he said, “you’re going to have to have some number — small, but some number — of them forward.”
The U.S. government is fighting at least a two-front cyberwar right now, according to a top Pentagon official. The challenges involve the daily fending off of millions of attacks on defense networks and the slow burn of economic espionage carried out by adversaries. “I believe there’s an economic cyber cold war playing out right now,” said Lt. Gen. Alan Lynn, director of the Defense Information Systems Agency. He made the comments Nov. 18 at CyberCon 2015, an event sponsored by Federal Times and C4ISR and Networks in Arlington, Va. Lynn, who is also commander of DISA’s Joint Force Headquarters DOD Information Networks, asked the audience of contractors and defense officials to imagine an adversary whose goal is to, over time, “erode global consumer confidence in U.S. …wholesale goods and businesses.”
As the temporary Pentagon organization created nearly 10 years ago to combat roadside bombs transitions into a smaller, permanent agency, the improvised explosive device problem has only proliferated and grown white-hot as forces continue to fight in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. So while many thought the role of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) would end as the wars were due to wind down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the newly named Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) is busier than ever, working to find solutions to protect soldiers and civilians against more and more creatively made and used bombs.
The department’s agencies lay out their plans for partnerships on cybersecurity, data centers and more. IT staff at the Department of Defense are planning a major push to encourage communication and collaboration among its agencies over the next few years. At FedScoop’s FedTalks event Tuesday, leaders from the Army and the Pentagon CIO’s office laid out their plans for unifying disparate agencies within the vast, sprawling department — working toward the common goals of saving money and enabling better communication with service members scattered around the world.
About the time one of the drones of today likely killed English-speaking Islamic State executioner “Jihadi John,” Skip Parish was gearing up for a conference he’ll be attending this week in Berlin geared toward the unmanned aerial systems of the future. They’ll be smaller, fly in swarms and will soon be firing lasers, says Parish, a Sarasota inventor and drone technology innovator. Parish will lead a panel at NATO’s Concept Development and Experimentation Conference, which kicks off today at the Swissotel in Berlin.
Facing constant threats to cyber infrastructure and data breaches at the highest levels of government, it’s no secret that the federal government views cyberspace as the next big field of conflict. Experts often draw parallels between cyber warfare and traditional operations, but some believe that certain age-old tactics need to be revamped for the 21st century. A week after members of Congress wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan Rice about the need for an “E-Neva Convention” in setting standards for cyber warfare and peacetime practices, Paul K. Davis, senior principal researcher at the RAND Corporation, released a paper on some parallels between traditional warfare and the digital landscape of today.
British spies are developing an offensive cyber capability to attack terrorists, hackers and rogue states, finance minister George Osborne said on Tuesday after warning Islamic State militants wanted to launch deadly cyber attacks of their own. Osborne said Islamic State (IS) fighters were trying to develop the ability to attack Britain’s infrastructure such as hospitals and air traffic control systems with potentially lethal consequences.In response to this threat and others, Britain was creating its own offensive cyber capability so spies could launch counter attacks, he said.
A senior Iranian Army commander says one of the objectives of ongoing exercises in the eastern parts of the country is to boost the forces’ preparedness against possible terrorist attacks on the border areas. Brigadier General Reza Azarian made the remarks as the Iranian Army’s Ground Forces continued drills dubbed Muhammad Rasulullah 3 (Muhammad the Messenger of God) in the country’s eastern city of Torbat-e Jam in Khorasan Razavi Province.
The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 20 Nov 15, Unattributed
Exercises with China, Japan, Mongolia, Vietnam, as well as three drills with India, are planned for 2016. Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) troops will take part in nine international exercises in 2016, the district commander said Friday. “The next year will be more abundant in terms of international military cooperation, troops are planned to take part in nine exercises,” Col. Gen. Sergei Surovikin said at a military council session.
In the six months after a cease-fire in eastern Ukraine was supposed to have taken effect this year, Russian-backed forces kept up a low-level barrage of sniping and shelling along the front lines, killing dozens of Ukrainian soldiers while avoiding censure from the Western governments that brokered the deal. Then, on Sept. 1, the guns fell silent — just as Russian forces began streaming into Syria. For two months, the cease-fire held and international monitors reported progress in implementing agreements on the withdrawal from the front lines of heavy weapons. Now the Russian guns are firing again. In the past week there have been dozens of incidents daily in which the supposedly withdrawn weapons, including heavy mortars and Grad rockets, have been fired at Ukrainian positions. Nine Ukrainian soldiers have been reported killed. Having proved in September that he could switch off the shooting in Ukraine when it suited him, Russian President Vladimir Putin has now, at a minimum, allowed it to resume. It’s a development that Western governments contemplating an alliance with the Russian ruler in the Middle East cannot afford to ignore.
Army.mil, 16 Nov 15, US Embassy Press Office, Kyiv, Ukraine
In response to a request from Ukraine, and as part of our ongoing efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defense and internal security operations, Nov. 14 the United States delivered two AN/TPQ-36 radar systems to Ukraine at a ceremony in Lviv. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had the opportunity to review the equipment, and was briefed by U.S. military personnel on its capabilities. The radar systems delivered today will help defend Ukrainian military personnel and civilians against rocket and artillery attacks, which have historically been the most lethal threat to Ukrainian personnel and civilians.
If you work for the federal government, your Twitter or Facebook profile can show a photo of you hugging Ben Carson or Hillary Clinton. But you can’t share, tweet, ”like,” friend, follow, comment on or retweet anything your candidate says or does when you’re on the clock. If your job is in intelligence or law enforcement, you can ”like” or comment on a tweet from a candidate when you’re not working — but you can’t share or retweet it even when you’re off duty.
The Washington Times, 17 Nov 15, Peter Vincent Pry
ISIS could kill millions by switching off America’s power. Three vitally important lessons are immediately apparent in the aftermath of the Paris terror attacks: First, the Islamic State, or ISIS, is planning more attacks against Europe and also the United States. ISIS-affiliated websites threaten that Washington, London and Rome will be attacked next and that their preference is “to taste American blood.”
It may have happened before but I can’t remember when the top acquisition officials of two of the three services announced their resignations in the same month — let alone on the same day. But both Bill LaPlante, the lead buyer for the Air Force, and Heidi Shyu, his counterpart at the Army, did just that yesterday, marking the end of significant new acquisition efforts by the Army and the Air Force. However, the Army has done so little in acquisition during the second half of the Obama administration that it may be moot.
Wireless power has been a dream of mankind’s for decades, but the technology finally appears to be gaining some traction. Theoretically, numerous studies have shown that wireless power is possible through a variety of aerial transmission modalities. Yet the problem with wireless power has been getting the technology to work at a reasonable range. So far, commercial use of wireless power has been limited, but progress is being made. For instance, Samsung now has a commercially available wireless charger for its cell phones. With the charger, consumers do not need to plug their phone into the wall for it to charge.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE EVENTS
December 2015, Washington, D.C.: 52nd Annual AOC International Symposium and Convention
Most Westerners are suckers for puppy dogs and kittens.
Either this is one of the most effective propaganda campaigns – ever – or the cuteness overload is strong in this story.
Dobrynya is the name of the new dog sent by Russian police to French police, to replace their dog, Diesel, who was killed in the attacks.
To quote an esteemed colleague: “If it comes from Sputnik, it IS propaganda” [emphasis in the original].
Call me a softie, but I AM a sucker for puppy dogs.
Score one for Russia.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to send a puppy to their French counterparts to replace Diesel the police dog that was killed during a police raid in Paris on Wednesday.
Diesel, a 7-year-old Belgian Malinois, was a member of a French anti-terrorist police unit. The dog bravely died when the French Special Forces raided an apartment building in Saint-Denis.
To support the French policemen, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to send them a little German Shepherd puppy, named Dobrynya [after one of the most popular folk heroes in Russian culture], Elena Alekseeva, the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, said on Instagram.
Although still a pup, Dobrynya would hopefully grow up to be an important member of the French anti-terrorist police unit.
“The puppy will be transferred to France to show solidarity with the French people and their police in the fight against terrorism,” Alekseeva said.
Diesel was killed during the siege in Saint-Denis that targeted terrorists involved in the Paris attacks. The dog was sent upstairs to check out a potentially dangerous situation before police officers could move in for an attack.
Russia: Soon, Very Soon the Blood Will Spill Like an Ocean
Attack On Russia Very Soon, Will Make Wives Concubines, Children Slaves
Uh, no. Not going to happen. They might kill a lot of people. They might kidnap a few women and children, but not in massive numbers.
In old street parlance, this is known as woofing sh*t. Perhaps they’ll try to carry off seven attack in Russia, perhaps Moscow, at one time, but that’s not kidnapping wives and children. There is just too much of a police and military presence in Russia for ISIS to carry this off.
Perhaps try at a small Russian embassy. Perhaps try this at some of the military installations around the world. Perhaps try at a Russian consulate. Try at a Russian cultural center. Better yet, kill two birds with one stone and try these attacks inside the United States or the UK.
The operative word is “try”.
Ain’t gonna happen.
ISIS RELEASES NEW VIDEO: ATTACK ON RUSSIA VERY SOON, WILL MAKE WIVES CONCUBINES, CHILDREN SLAVES (VIDEO)
In a disturbing new video from ISIS aimed at the Russian people, the terror organization threatens hell in Moscow.
In a disturbing new video from ISIS aimed at the Russian people, the terror organization threatens hell in Moscow.
This video features clips off ISIS fighters, European police, and running text of threats put to music.
A sample of what was said is:
“Soon, very soon, the blood will spill like an ocean…The kafir throats will tremble from the knives. We will make your wives concubines and make your children our slaves. Europe is shaking, Russia is dying. The Kremlin will be ours.”
Some people may have problems watching the video on their mobile devices so here is CNN’s video of it which should work on mobile. The original video is below that which is giving people problems.
ISIS on Thursday purportedly released a video and audio statement threatening to attack Russia “very soon.” In the nearly five-minute long video, a chant in Russian is heard over visual compilations of old ISIS propaganda and generic video of Russian cities and buildings. The video is titled “Soon Very Soon the Blood Will Spill like an Ocean” and was posted two weeks after a Russian commercial jet crashed in Egypt, killing 224 people. An ISIS affiliate has claimed it brought down the plane. The video was posted on ISIS-affiliated social media accounts.
Russian security services are working to verify the authenticity of the video, the country’s state news agency Sputnik reports.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow: “I’ve read news about this video, but have not seen it myself. I don’t know the authenticity of this video, and I don’t know the authenticity of these sources. “But in any case I’m sure this material will be subject of scrutiny by our special services.”
Russian air power has backed the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s military in its fight against ISIS since October 1. While Russian officials have said their airstrikes target ISIS, U.S. officials have said some have not been in areas where the terror group is operating.
Russia has no wish to see Syria become a radical Islamist state or a long-term safe haven for terror groups, with possible consequences for its own Muslim regions in the Caucasus.
Images of the video are below where ISIS says soon, very soon, it is coming after Russia.
The bitcoin equivalent of $3 million has been found on an account allegedly belonging to a person connected with ISIL.
One of the members of the Ghost Security Group (GhostSec), an anti-terrorist hacker team that traces and prevents terrorist online activity, shared this information recently in an interview to Newsbtc.com. Their identity is not being revealed due to security purposes. The address of the account hasn’t been disclosed.
According to GhostSec, bitcoin is the main cryptocurrency used by the members of ISIL. It is still hard to say whether ISIL terrorists have the technologies for bitcoin mining, but there is no doubt they regularly receive bitcoin donations.
GhostSec claims to have traced and successfully shut down some of the ISIL bitcoin addresses and bitcoin funding websites.
Beatrice Berton, junior analyst for EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), published a report this June indicating the intensive use of bitcoin by ISIL terrorists. Bitcoin operations are hard to trace, therefore ISIL followers all over the world use this currency to support the Islamic State, wrote Berton.
Besides its pragmatic advantages, bitcoin is also ideologically more convenient for ISIL adherents. It allows to avoid control of any Western state and only abide by the law of Shariah in any transactions, writes Ali Amin, Islamic State supporter, now sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment in the USA for teaching islamist militants how to use cryptocurrencies.
Several terrorist attacks on November 13 in Paris allegedly committed by ISIL militants took more than 120 lives. The GhostSec group are currently analyzing the ISIL online activity in an attempt to track the attackers and organizers.
Please note, the term “Strategic Communication” (SC) does not have an “s” at the end, it is not pluralized.
The author, LTC David Hylton, does not review how the concept of SC has been completely bastardized since its introduction and popularization since 9/11/01.
The author also forget to mention the now-famous George E. Little, then Acting ASD for Public Affairs, Memorandum of 28 November 2012, entitled “Communications Synchronization – A Local Coordination Process“, which tried to strike the SC from the DoD lexicon. But, according to Rosa Brooks in Foreign Policy:
…according to Pentagon insiders, the memo wasn’t coordinated or cleared with the Joint Staff or the Policy office before going out.
Strategic Communication is clarified as in Hylton’s paper:
STRATCOM was conceived as being formulated at the highest levels of government power and then permeating all levels of government activities to create a unity of messaging that harmonized and supported all other strategic activities.
Hylton, however, failed to mention the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriter, Ben Rhodes, who does not seem to work on “creat[ing] a unity of messaging that harmonized and supported all other strategic activities” at the national level. Also, note the s on the end of communication seems to unilaterally pluralized itself.
Also, please note, dear reader, that Strategic Communication (note: Wikipedia does not pluralize the term but most corporations do) has become a commonly used term in Industry.
Most corporations and universities take this term to mean that they can communicate their intentions at a high level, or to move strategic through the nation and the world. For example:
U.S. Air Force Public Diplomacy officers who have dealt with armed forces counterparts learn of their focus on strategic communications (STRATCOM), communications strategy (COMMSTRAT), communications synchronization, communication through action, and the “say-do gap.” Army Lieutenant Colonel David Hylton, a public affairs officer, usefully reviewed these concepts in an article, “Commanders and Communication” in the September-October, 2015, issue of Military Review.
Strategic Communication
Strategic communication (STRATCOM) was the first term adopted by the government (popularized following 9/11) that attempted to provide a working definition for synchronized strategic-level activities aimed at communicating a unified message supporting strategic objectives.
STRATCOM was initially viewed as the guiding force behind alignment of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to achieve national goals and objectives—a complex and daunting undertaking.
. . . STRATCOM was conceived as being formulated at the highest levels of government power and then permeating all levels of government activities to create a unity of messaging that harmonized and supported all other strategic activities.
Subsequently, STRATCOM became primarily focused on public communication activities.
. . . Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines strategic communication as—focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.
Communication Strategy
COMMSTRAT is inherently difficult to coordinate. The different goals, objectives, priorities, opinions, and agendas among all of the parties involved are often contrary to those of the commander. Additionally, COMMSTRAT relies on the guidance from high-level, whole-of-government STRATCOM policy makers at the Department of Defense or Joint Staff to guide and align its efforts with other government players.
Communication Synchronization
Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization, published in 2013. The publication defines communication synchronization as—a joint force commander’s process for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communication activities.
Communication through action
The 2008 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) theater strategic communication strategy says, Ensure actions match words. We must ensure we do what we say we do. Our actions will invariably have a greater impact than what we communicate verbally or in writing.
All actions—such as leader engagements, military-to-military engagements, movements on the ground, visits by leaders, overflights of aircraft, and transits of ships—send messages. In the Internet age, reports of actions taken and the results of those actions are quickly spread across the globe; they affect the perceptions of the audiences the commander is trying to engage. It is important to envision how the actions will be perceived by the different audiences and what message they will deliver.
. . . there is risk that actions taken may not deliver the desired messages or may conflict with words and images used. Moreover, inaction is a form of communication since not acting can also send a message, which may also pose considerable risk.
The “Say-Do Gap”
From a strategic perspective, planning a communication strategy should emphasize not permitting a say-do gap to emerge. A say-do gap arises in the minds of the targeted audiences when an organization’s statements conflict with the actions it takes.
Recent examples of a say-do gap came from operations in Afghanistan, where NATO forces proclaimed respect for the Afghan people and Islam, a verbal message that appeared contradicted by images and incidents of civilian casualties and military operations in and around mosques. Such apparent inconsistencies were successfully exploited by the Taliban via globally distributed images on the Internet.
We hurt ourselves more when our words don’t align with our actions. Our enemies regularly monitor the news to discern coalition and American intent as weighed against the efforts of our forces. When they find a “say-do” gap—such as Abu Ghraib—they drive a truck right through it. So should we, quite frankly.
One of my goals as I post commentaries is to increase Public Diplomacy’s awareness of what our colleagues and counterparts in the armed forces are doing in information operations, strategic communication, public affairs, and military information support operations (MISO). Better awareness can foster alignment of effort, cooperation, and collaboration. Army Major General Christopher Haas, the Director of Force Management and Development of the U.S. Special Operations Command, provided an overview of staffing, training, and equipping of the Military Information Support Operations (MISO) force during his testimony before the House Armed Service Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on October 22, 2105.
Major General Haas’s review of the selection and extensive training (42 weeks!) of MISO personnel will be of particular interest, I am confident. So will his review of the internet, social media, and the technical capabilities of the MISO force.
As I learned during my assignments as a POLAD at the Pentagon, “one team, one fight.” Here are some excerpts from Major General Haas’s testimony that will likely interest Public Diplomacy people.
. . . the extensive propaganda efforts employed by both the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Russian Federation make USSOCOM’s role in manning, training and equipping the MISO force even more critical.
. . . there is considerable work remaining—particularly in improving our MISO force’s capability through training to counter our adversaries’ influence on the world-wide web which they . . . exploit.
Overall end strength of the two active duty groups is 1051 officers and enlisted MISO Soldiers.
In 2014, the United States Army Special Operations Command re-organized the United States Special Forces Command from exclusively manning, training and equipping Special Forces units to now include Civil Affairs and the two active duty MISO Groups.
This streamlining of effort . . . . has already provided synergy to operations in AFRICOM, CENTCOM and EUCOM areas of responsibility, such as with operations against Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa where MISO, Special Forces and Civil Affairs elements have enabled partner nation efforts resulting in dramatic gains in combating this adversary.
Selection and Training
Prior to any formal training, service members seeking to enter the MISO force undergo an extensive selection process — a process designed to identify those able to function under physical and mental stress.
Assessment and selection is a ten-day process with eight selection cycles per year. All candidates are assessed against the core SOF attributes—integrity, courage, perseverance, personal responsibility, professionalism, adaptability, teamwork, and capability, as well as validated physical and mental occupational performance standards. All events are designed to measure specific attributes required to posture a candidate for success in the MISO field.
Candidates are isolated and undergo both physical and mental stressors to measure problem solving abilities, resilience and stamina.
Following selection into the MISO career field, our Soldiers attend a 5-phase, 42-week training program. This training includes extensive studies in MISO planning, linguistics, and cultural knowledge, interagency support, media development and dissemination, effective analysis and assessments and translator/interpreter management.
The end state of the training pipeline is to produce a skilled MISO soldier capable of planning, executing and measuring MISO across the full spectrum of operations in all environments in support of joint, interagency, multinational or coalition operations. These soldiers are capable of operating in both technologically superior and austere environments. They are responsive and adaptive to asymmetrical challenges; adaptive and comfortable with ambiguity. They are culturally aware, regionally focused and language-capable.
Two areas of this MISO training that differentiate them from other US Government capabilities are the focus on language and culture as well as a focus on influence principles.
While it can be challenging to produce fluent language speakers in many of the more challenging languages, the benefits of understanding language and culture are critical in determining how a culture communicates or the value a culture places on relationships. These shared assumptions drive meaning within any group. Linguistic and cultural knowledge provide an insight which is critical to conducting effective influence operations.
The extensive training that our Soldiers receive enables them to leverage the cultural nuances of influence. They learn when it is most appropriate to use an emotional appeal or a rational argument, what the best mix of media is to convey a certain type of argument, and what symbols are relevant in conveying the specific message. This training, combined with linguistic and cultural understanding, makes MISO a true SOF capability and a distinct asset within the Department of Defense.
In regards to training volume, in FY14 and FY15, our training base has maintained an 80 percent graduation rate.
The Web and Social Media
. . . our adversaries use the Internet to contact and recruit followers, gain financial support and to spread propaganda and misinformation. . . . we continue to adapt to emerging requirements. The current conflicts have identified that we have a need to continue expanding our MISO training, primarily with regards to the Web.
This training will incorporate social media use, online advertising, web metrics, and web design, among many other topics. Such a training solution will also enable us to stop being so dependent upon a contracted solution.
Media capabilities
We have been upgrading our MISO production and dissemination capability continuously to meet the force’s requirements. We have a state-of-the-art Media Production Center at Fort Bragg, with the capability to provide for print, audio, and video product development.
The Center also includes redundant archival features to preserve all past and current MISO planning and production efforts. Some of the current deployable equipment includes: the flyaway broadcast system, a radio, TV, and cellular broadcast capability, next generation loudspeaker systems, and an interoperable responsive short or long term mass printing capability.
Some of the future capabilities we are in the process of developing are the distributable audio media system, a leaflet-like system with embedded pre-recorded audio and/or audio-visual messages, an upgraded version of the flyaway broadcast system mentioned earlier with a 97% size/weight reduction, and the long range broadcast system; a pod-mounted radio, TV, and cellular broadcast system on manned and unmanned aircraft allowing MISO message broadcast out to 100 miles.
We are also in the process of testing an Internet Production Capability (IPC), which will be a fully integrated suite of work stations designed to perform web research, data capture, message product development, and web-based message delivery. The IPC will provide a secure means of navigating the Web, a means to conduct social media analysis, provide multiple methods to deliver online messages, and provide the ability to monitor real-time measures of effectiveness and adjust MISO programs/campaigns shortly after launching on social media.
The source of this review wishes to remain anonymous, here are his words in their entirety:
This is possibly one of the best primers I have seen in 20 years on the deeper ideological foundations of ISIS / Al Qaeda (geneologically it is actually the same organisation), the historical roots of the “death cult” heresy that has repeatedly emerged in Islam since its first few decades of existence. Unlike the West centuries ago and historical Islam, where heresies like this were brutally suppressed, in the contemporary Muslim world there seems to be confusion and a reluctance to deal with these toxic cultists. Partly this may be a result of the heretics’ war against the West eliciting sympathy, even if their war against mainstream Islam is far more intensive and dangerous.
Nance’s contention is that ISIS is an existential threat to mainstream Islam, and that is a accurate model. He argues that were the mainstream Islamic clerics to declare those who join the ISIS camp to be apostates, or heretics, the whole movement could be destroyed. He does not delve into why this has not happened, which likely reflects the unhealthy meddling in politics by the clergy across the Islamic world – having bad boys and heretics fight the infidels (i.e. us in the West) on behalf of Islam is an appealing idea evidently. More below.
Christendom used the Crusades much the same way, sending fanatics and adventurers abroad to cause mayhem elsewhere, while the church improperly meddled in politics to protect its material wealth from the state. After the end of the Crusades, the fanatics formed multiple rebellions and insurgencies under the banner of various heresies, resulting in very ugly military campaigns to suppress them.
History is repeating itself, and what we see today in the Muslim world is a snapshot of what happened in our world during the reformation / counter-reformation period, when church was forcefully separated from the state, and in the resulting vacuum, religious heresies were exploited to form destructive mass movements and mayhem, costing countless lives, and causing immense misery.
I strongly agree with Nance’s argument for a “Counter-ideology campaign” to destroy the recruiting base of ISIS / Al Qaeda – this does not obviate the need for military action to destroy the bulk of ISISs’ manpower base in Iraq and Syria. For the Muslim mainstream, declaring any Muslim who joins ISIS et al to be an apostate/heretic is not a bad start, that including any and all of the clergy who buy into this as well.
Nance has been controversial and evidently offended a lot of major polical players in the US, possibly why his insights are not being listened to (sound familiar?):
Participants: Jason Fields, Matthew Gault, Malcolm Nance
The recent terror attacks in Paris shook the world and put the focus back on Islamic State. This week on War College, we talk with American Special Operations intelligence veteran Malcolm Nance. Nance literally wrote the textbook on Iraq’s terrorists and is the executive director of the Terror Asymmetrics Project.
A virulent ideology powers Islamic State. Nance argues that it’s not a sect of Islam, but a death cult powered by an apocalyptic vision. To beat them, the West must fight against that vision. Ideas are harder to fight than a military force. Hard, but not impossible.
Or, as a very highly educated, highly authoritative and perhaps one of the most skilled professionals in this field calls his writing: bollocks.
I had the overwhelming, disgusted feeling as I read this fetid propaganda: this guy’s head is so far up Putin’s ass that they are, in all practicality, conjoined twins at the neck. Cogitate on that sight picture for a minute, if you will.
Informationclearinghouse.info, yet another confirmed Russian proxy site added to the list, which grows daily. Lucky #13 on the list, but there are hundreds.
________________________________
Putin – Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Man
Almost everyone now recognises that Russia’s military intervention in Syria to defeat the so-called Islamic State terror group was the right call to make. Russian President Vladimir Putin isn’t crowing about it. He doesn’t have to.
By Finian Cunningham
November 18, 2015 “Information Clearing House”Sputnik” – Putin’s vindication was made clear by the enthusiastic reception afforded to him at the summit of G20 leaders in Turkey last weekend. The Financial Times headlined: “Putin transformed from outcast to problem solver at G20”.
The paper went on to note that: “An audience with the Russian president was one of the hottest tickets in town, as Western leaders were forced to recognise the road to peace in Syria inevitably runs through Moscow.”
Even US President Barack Obama was seen to confer with Putin as the two leaders held an impromptu and earnest face-to-face discussion on the sidelines of the summit.
It was a constructive encounter with none of the antagonism that Washington has all too often displayed towards Putin over the past year. The Paris terror assault – with 129 dead and hundreds wounded in simultaneous gun and bomb attacks – no doubt concentrated the minds of world leaders attending the G20 conference, held in Turkey’s Antalya only two days after the mass killings.
The atrocity was claimed by the Islamic State terror network (also known as ISIS or ISIL), with seven of its operatives killed in the suicide attacks. Days later, the conclusion by Russian investigators this week that a terrorist bomb was the cause of the
Russian civilian airliner crash on October 31 over Egypt’s Sinai desert – with the loss of all 224 people onboard – has only added to the grim public realisation about ISIL and its affiliates. French President Francois Hollande – who skipped the G20 summit due to the emergency situation unfolding at home – appealed this week for a “global coalition to defeat Islamic State”.
This was made during a special address to both upper and lower houses of the French parliament at the Palace of Versailles. The French leader called on the US and Russia to join forces, along with France and other countries. Hollande is to fly to Washington on November 24 to discuss with Obama how to coordinate efforts at combating ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Two days after that, the
French president is due in Moscow to hold the same discussion with Putin. Putin has already acknowledged the appeal from Hollande, saying that he welcomes closer cooperation, adding that Russia has been consistently calling for a greater joint effort in combating terrorism.
Putin has even reportedly offered Russian naval coordination with the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the eastern Mediterranean for future airstrikes against ISIL. Within days of the Paris massacre, French warplanes launched extensive strikes against Islamic State bases in eastern Syria.
Russia and its Syrian ally have pointed out that previous military strikes by the US and France are in violation of international law since these operations do not have consent from the government in Damascus. It remains to be seen then how Russia would coordinate military operations with France in Syria owing to the legal implications.
Since the Paris mayhem, several French political figures and former military intelligence personnel have urged Hollande to re-think policy on Syria.
Opposition leader Nicolas Sarkozy, among others, said that “to not coordinate with Russia is absurd”. A think-tank, CF2R, with close links to French military intelligence, also advised the Hollande government to view the Syrian leader not as the enemy, and to dedicate efforts, in conjunction with Russia, on destroying the ISIL and related groups.
In other words, Russia is being proven right about its intervention in Syria. The most effective way to defeat the terror networks of ISIL and other jihadist groups like the Nusra Front is to support the Syrian state, to coordinate with the Syrian Arab Army on the ground, and to target the militants with a full-on campaign.
That is why Putin was received at the G20 summit with a newfound respect among other leaders. When Putin ordered the Russian military intervention in Syria, beginning on September 30, it was not done in half-measures. In a matter of weeks, the Russian air force has achieved more in terms of wiping out terror groups than the US-led coalition did in more than a year of airstrikes.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted in an interview this week that the US-led bombing supposedly against the Islamic State has been ineffective due to its conflicting priorities. Lavrov said that since August 2014, the Western so-called anti-ISIL coalition was focused on “weakening” the Damascus government and therefore it did not strike decisively at ISIL formations because they are seen as assets in the Western effort for regime change.
Some analysts go further and argue that the Islamic State and associated jihadist mercenaries are the result of covert Western sponsorship of these groups.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf Arab states are also known to have been major funders and facilitators of the jihadist brigades. Putin highlighted these links at the G20 summit when he announced that the financing of the terror networks in Syria has come from “40 states, including members of the G20”.
Thus, while Russia has been vindicated in its strategy and tactics on Syria, the appeal for a “global coalition” against terror has intrinsic limits. This is because key Western powers and their regional allies are committed in principle against such a Russian-defined front.
The United States, Britain and France are among those states insisting that the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has to relinquish power, sooner or later. Russia rejects that demand as a violation of Syrian sovereignty.
These Western states are also known to have supplied weapons, at least indirectly, to the jihadist terror groups.
British leader David Cameron complained at the G20 summit that Russia has hit “non-ISIL opposition to Assad – people who could be part of the future of Syria.” But who or where are these “non-ISIL” groups that Cameron says “could be part of the future of Syria”?
When Russia has asked the West for information and locations on “moderate rebels” to avoid in its airstrikes, the West has refused to provide any details.
France is as guilty as any other of the foreign states for fuelling a covert war in Syria that has spawned the terror problem of Islamic State and its affiliates. A problem that has, in turn, rebounded with horrific results outside of Syria’s borders, killing hundreds of French and Russian citizens in only the past three weeks.
Vladimir Putin has demonstrated true leadership on tackling terrorism in Syria and beyond. As the old English proverb goes: cometh the hour, cometh the man
However, the more troubling problem is this: how many other statesmen are ready and willing to do the decent thing and follow the Russian lead? Russia’s policy on Syria is the morally and legally correct one.
The Paris and Russian airliner massacres, as well as other recent terrorist atrocities in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and other countries, cry out for a real anti-terror effort based on respecting sovereignty and abiding by international law.
That challenge will expose those states that have built their policies on Syria out of deeply criminal objectives and methods.
This document, dated 2014, removes Information as a named Instrument of National Power, saying it underpins the three Elements of National Power: Diplomacy, Economy and Military. This deviates from US doctrine but accurately reflects how the US actually treats and uses information in a hierarchical context.
It is reassuring to see the UK has properly subordinated Cyberspace to Information. All too often US cyber professionals forget that cyber is not the ends as well as the means.
A few key points which are too voluminous to copy and paste all references (53):
Information Management is a key concept to controlling the information environment
Information Strategy is an integral part of operations
Denying critical information to an adversary assists deception and helps counter offensive actions
From Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 UK Defence Doctrine Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (5th Edition)
1.33. National strategy directs the coordinated use of the three instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic and military. The three instruments of power are underpinned by information. (*12)
Information 1.41. Information underpins all three national instruments of power and enables understanding and decision-making. Information should be regarded as a critical resource and its flow will be contested. Advantage can be gained by managing, in relative terms, the information flow better than your opponent. This is known as information superiority.(*15) While information is fundamental to the Government’s approach to crisis management, our national position is that information is not a discrete instrument of power.
1.42. Disseminating information, through a cross-government information strategy, enables the UK to exert diplomatic, economic and military influence in an effective and integrated way. At the same time, intelligence and information received across government shapes operations planning and execution at all levels. In times of crisis, Strategy the information strategy must include a strategic narrative,(*16) which outlines why the UK is engaged and what its objectives are. This narrative is crucial to efficiently managing information, as well as influencing a range of audiences and activities in a consistent, coherent manner.
1.43. Cyberspace (*17) is an operating environment within the information environment. In Defence, cyberspace is the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, (including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, as well as embedded processors and controllers) and the data therein within the information environment. As the world is increasingly interconnected with an associated growth in the use of cyberspace, our ability to operate in cyberspace is vital to our national interest and enables our national security, prosperity and way of life. Defence is increasingly dependent upon cyberspace and can expect adversaries to exploit this dependence. The UK government assesses the cyber threats to its interests and mitigates these through resilience measures, awareness and trusted partnerships. Activities in cyberspace are an essential element of our routine business and are fundamental to planning and conducting operations.
1.57. Information resources enable accurate and timely situational awareness, and understanding. However, information flows can compress the levels of warfare, especially at the operational level, such that reported events and activities, true and false, may have immediate impact at the strategic level. At the same time, this interconnected and information-rich environment invites intervention by strategiclevel political and military leaders seeking to influence tactical-level activity.
*12 – AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine views information as a separate instrument of power
*15 – See Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/13, Information Superiority.
*16 – See JDN 1/12, Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution.
*17 – For more information on cyberspace, see Joint Doctrine Note 3/13, Cyber Operations: The Defence Contribution (Restricted) and DCDC Cyber Primer, December 2012.
I was tracking several pro-Russian journalists and Russian proxy websites when I ran across this article at Strategic Culture Foundation.
A few key phrases made me convinced that this is a Russian Active Measures product aka a complete fabrication:
“The US is only pretending to…” The “United States”, the land, the people, the government? Russians tend to generalize quite frequently, stating “the United States” does this… “This” always happens to be something that only a human can do, like pretend…
“…executive order on the use of behavioural science”. How convenient that a U.S. Presidential Executive Order might be twisted into something it’s not. A “psychological manipulation” technique. It took me 0.573 seconds to find the link to the EO, why did Leonid Savin not post the link? Perhaps because he didn’t actually read it and didn’t want his readers to know that he was fabricating a lie?
Another reason? Pro-Russians just write such. Damn. Long. Articles. Lots of words that say nothing… And they’re never convincing.
Funny, I mentioned in this blog that Russia benefits the most from encouraging the Syrian refugee crisis and now Russia appears to be pointing fingers at the US. This appears to be another attempt to use my ‘spaghetti model’. Throw stuff against the wall and see what sticks. Apologies, Mr. Savin, this didn’t stick to the wall, it’s not done.
Maybe Russia is learning from reading my blog, I get a lot of hits from Russia every day… just saying.
By the way, Strategic Culture Foundation, at strategic-culture.org is yet another Russian proxy site.
Strategic Engineered Migration as Weapon of War
Leonid SAVIN | 26.10.2015 | 00:00
After reading the title, you may think it is describing the phenomenon that Europe has recently been facing: the hundreds of thousands of refugees, both victims of the hardships of civil wars and opportunists, who are invading the Balkans by land and by sea and then making their way further, trying to reach richer countries like Germany, France and Scandinavia by any means possible.
It would seem that this stream of refugees has objective reasons: armed conflicts and wars have been going on in Libya, Syria and Iraq for many years, while the situation is also turbulent in Palestine and Afghanistan. In Tunisia and Egypt, meanwhile, both of which experienced the Arab Spring, the situation also leaves much to be desired. Hardly anybody is taking notice of Bahrain, where opposition protests have been brutally suppressed for years, while in Yemen, air strikes are even being carried out on wedding processions. The location of these two states is not very convenient, however – there is simply nowhere to flee. There is also another important detail: camps are being built for Muslim refugees in Saudi Arabia, but nobody is going there for some reason. As a last resort, they stay in Jordan and Turkey.
Is there also some general reason for their frantic desire to flee so far from their homeland? Wealthy relatives who have already settled in the European Union, perhaps? Or stories about welfare benefits on which they will be able to live comfortably? After all, to make such a journey they have to pay handsomely for the services of smugglers. According to some reports, these smugglers take between $4,000 and $10,000 to transport a single refugee from Syria or Libya to Europe. Even if this person has wealthy relatives abroad, receiving money via bank transfer is impossible in war-torn Syria. Organising transportation on credit clearly involves certain guarantees, especially considering that the boats often sink in the Mediterranean.
Who is providing guarantees that encourage hundreds of thousands of people to rush from other continents to Europe and why?
Researchers have discovered a very interesting fact related to the use of social networking sites. It has come to light that calls on Twitter for refugees to travel to Germany have mostly come from the US. The time spent practising in other countries has not been in vain – from Iran during the 2009 presidential elections to Egypt and Tunisia, where the role played by social networking sites in mobilising the population was considerable.
What we are seeing now is the practical implementation of theoretical calculations of a strategic nature. Such strategies have been under development for a long time. One of them is a study by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University that bears the name «Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War», which the author also uses for the title of this article. The study was first published in 2008 in the Civil Warsjournal. Using a combination of statistical data and case study analysis, the author of the work, Kelly Greenhill, provides answers to the following questions: can refugees be a specific type of weapon, can this weapon only be used in wartime or in peacetime as well, and just how successful can its exploitation be? On the whole, Greenhill answers these questions in the affirmative.
In fact, researchers at the Belfer Center, along with researchers from other departments at Harvard University, have been working on designing strategies for conflict management in the context of broader foreign policy issues for many years. The director of the Belfer Center, Graham Allison, was an assistant secretary of defence in the Clinton administration. As well as this, the Center also funds the research of a special task force devoted to Russia.
The US is only pretending to sympathise with Europe, which is being hit hard by the migratory wave. In a recent article by Richard Haass, president of the influential globalist organisation Council on Foreign Relations that deals with European issues, the use of the word «managing” with regard to the migration crisis in the European Union was no accident. Savouring the problems being faced by Europe as a result of the influx of refugees, Haass notes that the US has both an obligation to help the European Union and strategic interests with regard to Germany and Europe as a whole. Despite this “obligation to help”, however, there has been no help at all from the US either in controlling the illegal infiltration of European countries or in terms of the temporary settlement of refugees.
There is also another interesting fact. On 15 September, Barack Obama signed an executive order on the use of behavioural science techniques in public administration. The most recent branch of behaviourism, known as «Nudge”, is nothing more than the latest way to manipulate people. The hand of Cass Sunstein, who previously worked at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration, can clearly be seen here. Along with a British colleague, he co-authored the bookNudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, in which psychological manipulation techniques in the context of everyday life are hidden behind fine words. (Incidentally, Sunstein’s wife is Samantha Power, United States Ambassador to the UN.) There is no doubt that the ‘nudge’ technique will be used far beyond the borders of the US.
The most effective weapon, however, both metaphorically and literally, may be those migrants capable of setting up a small guerrilla group to carry out subversive terrorist acts on the new territory. It is rather interesting that the US is not just playing host to the ones who seem the most ‘promising’ for this, but is also granting them refugee and resident status as well as the official protection of the US government.
As far as one can judge from a recently leaked internal document, a special report to US Congress for the 2014 financial year on the issue of migration prepared by the US Department of Homeland Security states that in 2014, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services applied 1,519 exemptions to individual applicants granted refugee status, resident status, and the official protection of the US government. And the most interesting thing is that in one way or another, all of these people have links with terrorist groups and extensive experience of subversive activities.
The list includes old allies of Washington from among Cuban exiles, Kosovo Liberation Army militants who for some reason cannot live well in their own artificially created state, and many other covert and overt allies of the US. There are members of the Nationalist Republican Alliance from Salvador, most likely those who shot political opponents during the Cold War and are now hiding from justice. There are fighters from the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama – ethno-separatists who are opposed to the Eritrean government. There is the Tigray People’s Liberation Front from Ethiopia and the Oromo Liberation Front from the same country.
The list also includes activists from the Burmese Chin National Front and its military wing, the Chin National Army, which are members of the so-called Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). Members of the Karen National Union, including militants of the Karen National Liberation Army (an ethnic group living in Burma and Thailand) also received a quota to live in the US on the spot.
Refugee status was given to 49 former Iraqi citizens from the Iraqi Democratic Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The list of «1,519 exemptions” also includes members of other organisations that have devoted many years to armed conflicts.
One can only speculate on the kind of future wars the US has in mind if it is planning to use such specific migrants as a weapon.