One of the basic points of Guerilla Warfare is to demonstrate the government is incapable of protecting the people.
To wit:
“I had no electricity all night. These useless officials can’t run the city and they still haven’t built a local power station,” a resident of Sevastopol told AFP news agency.
Hybrid Warfare, Indirect Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, Political Warfare, this is a throwback to Guerilla Warfare.
Crimea without power after pylons blown up
Three-quarters of Crimea’s population remain without power after four electricity pylons were blown up.
Gas-powered generators have been providing power to major cities. A state of emergency has been declared.
The pylons brought electricity from Ukraine. Engineers were reportedly denied access to the site by Ukrainian activists.
Crimea was annexed by Russia last year, but the Ukrainian authorities have continued to supply power to the area.
Images on social media show Ukrainian flags on some damaged pylons – and Crimean Tatar flags on others.
Crimean authorities said they had managed to partially reconnect the cities of Simferopol, Yalta and Saky using generators.
But more than 1.6 million people remain without power, and water supplies to high buildings have stopped and cable and mobile internet is down. Some 150 schools were also without power.
Image copyrightReutersImage captionLarge parts of Sevastopol eerily quiet and dark overnight
“I had no electricity all night. These useless officials can’t run the city and they still haven’t built a local power station,” a resident of Sevastopol told AFP news agency.
“It’s not the first time Ukraine has cut off electricity to Crimea, we are already used to power cuts and stock up on batteries,” another one said.
Mikhail Sheremet, Crimea’s deputy prime minister, said the peninsula’s hospitals had backup power sources and would not be affected.
Two of the four main power lines were cut in an earlier attack on Friday, reports said.
Ukrainian authorities said they encountered activists blockading the site when they tried to repair the damaged pylons.
“The nature of the damage shows that it took place as a result of shelling or the use of explosive devices,” Ukraine’s state energy company Ukrenergo said in a statement.
Ukrenergo said it hoped to finish all repairs within four days.
Crimean Tatars, an ethnic group native to the peninsula who oppose Russian rule, held a protest at the site of the broken power lines in Kherson region, Russia’s RIA news agency reported.
First, it’s from NovoRossiya, so nobody is going to take it seriously.
Second, everybody know Russia does not want peace. They want to establish the land bridge between Donbass and Crimea, they want to dominate Ukraine and they want to do it without looking like a bully.
Sorry, Charlie, it’s too late.
Russian propaganda is so bad…
Now you ask: “How bad is it”?
Russian propaganda is so bad, the FSB has their hands in their own pockets.
Russia Is The Only Country Truly Trying To Bring Peace To Ukraine
on: November 22, 2015
RUSSIA, THE ONLY COUNTRY INTERESTED IN BRINGING PEACE TO UKRAINE ~ Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has rejected the assumption that the situation in Syria overshadowed the crisis in Ukraine for Russia pushing that conflict into the background.
Russia points to need to influence Kiev to restore truce — foreign ministry
“It is very common concept today that the Syrian events come to the forefront and everyone forgets Ukraine and it is Russia which is interested in it, first and foremost. I would like to tell you that every week we deliberately bring the Ukrainian topic on the agenda for discussion regardless of questions of journalists. The Contact Group, which includes a Russian representative, meets almost on a daily basis,” the diplomat said in a TV interview on Saturday.
“We are more than others interested in not letting this issue stay on the conflict stage in resolving it and moving to its settlement for many reasons,” she said.
“This is certainly the proximity of the two countries, closeness of the two nations. This is a huge number of refugees, displaced persons, people who came from the Ukraine to Russia,” Zakharova said.
“Obviously, that is the matter of implementation of the Minsk agreements which, on the one hand, should serve as the basis for co-existence of the different parts of Ukraine as a single state. On the other hand, this is a condition, far-fetched, of course, and we all understand, but these are conditions which let Europeans prolong the sanctions. That is why Ukraine is a very important issue for us,” the diplomat said.
Hybrid Wars is the latest name for the tactic/strategy that Russia used to take Crimea, to invade Ukraine in the Donbass and is supposed to be the latest buzzword for anything from Special Operations to Unconventional Warfare and here the author calls it “Indirect War”.
Notice the author says it is for “Regime Change”, whereas, to date, it has only been used to invade and occupy only a small portion of other country’s land – Georgia and Ukraine.
I include the section below the line and then the URL only because I want readers to know this is written by a Russian who works for a propaganda outlet, the product has been approved by a Russian academy and released through the “People’s Friendship University of Russia”.
After reviewing the book, I do not believe the author, as he states, “proves that Color Revolutions are a new form of warfare engineered by the US”. As most Russian propaganda or active measures pieces, the accusation is made but the evidence is lacking.
The author uses a typical Russian propaganda technique which claims the US has impossible capabilities.
The CIA has “brainwashing” capabilities over populations.
The State department (and CIA, together) is responsible for colored revolutions and regime change in other countries. They most likely are in touch with opposition parties to dictatorships, but all they would do is fan the flames and act as enablers.
The US military’s doctrine, especially special operations, purpose is not to induce regime change. Granted, US Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare was used to assist in regime change in Afghanistan, but that was an exception, not at all typical. The Northern Alliance did the work and Special Forces supported them.
Here are my personal beliefs, feel free to comment to your heart’s delight:
Information Operations, Information Warfare, Psychological Operations/MISO, Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communications – cannot be used to brainwash a population into doing something which they are not already leaning towards doing. I recently used an analogy that they can introduce a flame to gasoline, only igniting a fire which is waiting to combust.
IO, IW, MISO, PD and SC are used in the US to relay information, usually news and US positions, to a foreign audience. It is legal, moral and ethical, by all journalistic standards.
Russian IW was used as a cover for Russian Special Operations in Crimea and Donbass, in close coordination and synchronization. Russian IW is so full of lies, fabrications, bias, misinformation and disinformation that it is often immoral, biased, unethical and perhaps illegal. British OfCon sanctioned RT for exactly that reason. Because of the Pew Report, we know that Russian IW has not been effective – only China, Ghana and Vietnam have a favorable view of Russia. Russian IW acted as a cover for GRU and other Spetsnaz, Russian Naval Infantry in Crimea and for cover for Russian mercenaries, ‘volunteers’, and then for Russian conventional military forces, when the mercenaries and volunteers began failing.
A comment from my close friend, Fred Hoffman, regional specialist.
The Soviets were masters at using unconventional means to achieve strategic objectives. KGB penetration and manipulation of the West German anti-war movement in the 1980s is a classic example. If Russian government commentators of the Putin regime are accusing the U.S. of engaging in subterfuge to manipulate a foreign movement, probably this has more to do with mirror imaging on their part than with any basis in verifiable truth.
Unlike in the U.S., where propaganda directed against the U.S. public is illegal, the Russians (and the Soviets before them) have no qualms whatsoever about propagandizing their domestic audience. In fact, increasingly-strident propaganda has become one of the pillars of the Putin regime. Russian viewers are routinely told how NATO, led by the U.S., is determined to isolate and encircle Russia and impede Russia from assuming its rightful place in the international community. It is precisely within this context that Russian assertions about the color revolutions must be evaluated: These are not random, one-off assertions; they are the logical extension of the broader theme of xenophobic nationalism that dominates the regime’s message.
Interesting that Korybko accuses the U.S. of being responsible for the initiation and continuation of the Syrian civil war, and of all its attendant consequences (to include human cost). In reality, the Putin regime and the mullahs in Tehran have armed, equipped, advised, and now militarily supported an odious and repressive dictator whose forces brutally and intentionally target civilians. If anything, U.S. support for anti-regime forces has been laughably ineffectual. Assad’s continued grip on the reins of power has been as great a contributor to the expansion and existence of ISIS as anything else, and Russia and Tehran have been propping up Assad for years.
This ‘book’ is plainly an expansion of typical Russian propaganda and appears to be a compilation of Russian agitprop, complete with oft-cited US policy and doctrines which have been twisted to support Russian propaganda.
Sputnik International’s political analyst and journalist, Andrew Korybko, just published his first book on “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change”. It was reviewed by the Diplomatic Academy of Russia and released with the assistance of the People’s Friendship University of Russia, where Andrew is a member of the expert council for the Institute of Strategic Research and Predictions. His detailed work proves that Color Revolutions are a new form of warfare engineered by the US, with everything from their organizational makeup to geopolitical application being guided by American strategists. But unlike earlier researchers who have touched upon the topic, Andrew takes his work even further and uses the latest examples of the War on Syria and EuroMaidan to argue that the US has deployed a second, more dangerous step to its regime change toolkit.
Hybrid Wars, as he labels them, are when the US meshes its Color Revolution and Unconventional Warfare strategies together to create a unified toolkit for carrying out regime change in targeted states. When a Color Revolution attempt fails, as it miserably did in Syria in 2011, the backup plan is to roll out an Unconventional War that builds directly upon the former’s social infrastructure and organizing methods. In the case of EuroMaidan, Andrew cites Western news sources such as Newsweek magazine, the Guardian, and Reuters in reminding everyone that in the days immediately prior to the coup’s successful completion, Western Ukraine was in full-scale rebellion against the central government and the stage was set for an Unconventional Syrian-esque War in the heart of Eastern Europe. Had it not been for the sudden overthrow of President Yanukovich, the US was prepared to take the country down the path of the Syrian scenario, which would have been its second full-fledged application of Hybrid War.
Andrew’s revolutionary research ultimately shows that it was the US, not Russia, which spearheaded the use of Hybrid Wars, and that given his proven findings, it’s irresponsible to even call Russia’s alleged involvement in the Ukrainian Crisis a ‘hybrid war’. In fact, the US is far ahead of any other country in practicing this new method of warfare, as no other state has attempted a Color Revolution thus far, let alone transitioned it into an Unconventional War when their initial regime change plans failed. While some many think that such occurrences are spontaneous and happenstance, Andrew documents how Hybrid Wars are not only created from the ground-up by the US, but how they’re specifically deployed in areas where they’d be most geostrategically advantageous for the promotion of its unipolar policies.
Click the image to download the full PDF of Andrew Korybko’s research
Thus, not only does Andrew describe the very essence of Hybrid Wars, but the final part of his book forecasts where he believes they may happen next. He introduces the groundbreaking concept of the Color Arc, a contiguous line of states stretching from Hungary to Kyrgyzstan and where the waging of Hybrid Wars would most seriously damage Russia’s national interests. This is the first time that Color Revolutions have ever been analyzed through a geopolitical prism, and it brings forth a completely different way of looking at this weapon’s utilization. This new paradigm is absolutely essential for understanding the US’ new approach to regime change and the form, both physical and geopolitical, it’s expected to take in the forthcoming years.
“Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change” can be picked up in soft cover form at the People’s Friendship University in Moscow. As he’s offering his work for free, Andrew kindly asks that readers who are pleased with it consider donating to charity and individual efforts that directly assist the victims of the US’ Hybrid Wars on Syria and Ukraine. He hopes that your generous donation can help make their American-inflicted suffering more manageable. He can the reached at the mail:korybko.e@my.mgimo.ru
Apologies, dear readers. I am deviating from Information Operations, Information Warfare, Strategic Communication, and Public Diplomacy to hearken on a somewhat related issue which I find absolutely disgusting.
Huntswoman Gemma McCormick was killed engaging in a controversial fox hunt, complete with foxes, dogs, horses and jumps. She was unseated on a jump, fell and was killed. That is a tragic loss to any family, but it brought out the worst in those opposed to fox hunts.
I do not have a stand on fox hunts, I am not pro or con, but I am absolutely, deliberately and adamantly opposed to trolling – especially following a death.
I sent a message to the Ban Hunt Saboteurs group, offering the use of these pages to list and publicly ‘out’ the trolls.
Here is the paragraph that caught my attention:
Ban Hunt Saboteurs group, a pro-hunting group, claimed anti-hunt radicals had planned the trolling campaign against Ms McCormick and said to have identified at least 1,000 messages from 800 people cheering her passing, the Sunday Times reported.
Please bear with me as I attempt to publicly expose this shameful, hateful and hurtful behavior. Hopefully you agree with me, but if not, please bear with me.
The death of a huntswoman following a riding accident has been celebrated by Internet trolls in what some described as “sick and hypocritical”.
“A buzzing sensation enters my body as I read this brilliant news.”
Online troll
Gemma McCormick died after she sustained head injuries when she fell awkwardly as she jumped a fence during a hunt near Peterborough.
The 44-year old former helicopter pilot had been kept alive on a ventilator following her accident on November 5. She was taking part in a trail hunt when the accident took place.
Ban Hunt Saboteurs group, a pro-hunting group, claimed anti-hunt radicals had planned the trolling campaign against Ms McCormick and said to have identified at least 1,000 messages from 800 people cheering her passing, the Sunday Times reported.
The death of a huntswoman has been celebrated online Photo: Getty Images
One troll wrote: “A buzzing sensation enters my body as I read this brilliant news.” Another said the “horrific head injuries” sustained by the rider “sound[ed] sweet”.
Following the death of Ms McCormick, Rachel Baxter, a 41-year old youth worker wrote: “Karma. I salute you.”
She defended her comments in an interview with the Sunday Times.
She said: “I don’t have to explain or justify myself to anybody,” she said. “I think that if people are out hunting then there’s a risk that accidents will happen. That’s what that comment meant. It doesn’t mean anyone deserves to die. I could have worded it better but I’m entitled to my opinion.”
“These are mostly average people. A lot of them are housewives, older women, everyday people. These people can be somebody’s grandmother.”
Robin Cross-Carpenter, from the Ban Hunt Saboteurs group
Another online troll called her a “murdering bitch” and another one wrote: “I think she deserved what she gets.”
The trolls are already receiving backlash online with some users calling their comments “sick and hypocritical”.
Robin Cross-Carpenter, from the Ban Hunt Saboteurs group, told the Daily Telegraph most of the trolls were “common, everyday people”.
She said: “These are mostly average people. A lot of them are housewives, older women, everyday people. These people can be somebody’s grandmother.
“A lot of the [trolls] include people who work in jobs that deal with care. It is quite shocking because you would expect them to have some emotional attachment to humans.”
Ms Cross-Carpenter said she had challenged individuals so they take down their messages and had even threatened to contact their employers. She added: “One laughed at me but after I contacted their work they did take the message down.”
When, on Sunday evening, Belgian police asked citizens not to tweet about the armed operations that were being carried out around the country, anyone could have been excused for reacting with fear.
Belgian forces – searching for suspects in the aftermath of the Paris attacks – told citizens to stay indoors and not go near their windows for safety reasons.
They also appealed for social media silence about any police action users might witness – presumably to keep the suspects in the dark.
A tense time, no doubt. But Belgium reacted – how else? – with cats.
Instead of speculation about the sort of threat police might be reacting to, many people used the #BrusselsLockdown hashtag to post pictures of their pets.
IS digital propaganda exceeds anything previously terror groups created.
When the group took on the attacks in Paris was finished channels for disseminating statements, tribute videos and lavish propaganda images.
DN has mapped the network, from encrypted chat channels and sites on the darknet to the Swedish-language propaganda films.
Just hours after the last shot had been fired in Paris took the IS on the deed and promised more attacks. Terrorists “triggered his bomb belts among the infidels when the ammunition ran out,” wrote the group. “The attack is the first in a storm and a warning.”The message, first in Arabic and French but later also in English, were published on the messaging service Telegram. The channel used was one of the group’s most important. DN has followed since the Paris attack and to that of between the Wednesday and Thursday last week shut down. Over 16 000 people came when the constant stream of propaganda materials, movies and photos from within the IS-controlled areas.But Telegrams are just one of the many digital channels as IS uses. By mapping the sites and apps that terrorist sect uses most frequently could DN providing an overview of its propaganda machine. The picture that emerges shows a vast digital network of professionally produced material that flows into the channels designed with high technical level.
There is radio, digitally distributed magazines and numerous films, often set to music with dramatic music and lavish graphic effects.
– Their media network is extremely professional and based on the same principles that apply to commercial digital strategic communication, but of course without ethical constraints. I suspect that many of those who lead this have solid training, says Jesper Falkheimer, professor of strategic communications at Lund University who conducted research on terrorist groups using the Internet and social media.
IS propaganda is of great importance, not only for terrorists and their supporters, but also for the security guarding them. It confirms Mats Sandberg, director of the National Center for terrorhotsbedömning (NTC).
DN meet him on Wednesday evening last week after the Security Police decided to raise the threat level to Sweden. NTC is made up of personnel from the Security Service, the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service Must. It is their assessment that forms the basis of the increased threat level.
– The propaganda is important for our assessment. Partly to see what message the IS sends, how they do it and what they are addressed, says Mats Sandberg.
The propaganda IS spreads through their multiple channels, according to him, has become more serious from a European and Swedish perspective.
– It is clearer in terms of the direction that the assassination plan against Europe than they have been before, says Mats Sandberg.
Most relevant to the Swedish security service is the propaganda that contains the Swedes. Säpo Chief Anders Thornberg says in an interview with Dagens Nyheter that 286 Swedes have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the IS.
Recently, a well-produced films be disseminated via social media. The video follows several Swedish jihadists in place in Syria as they celebrate a religious holiday. It is special in several ways. Partly because it is Swedish, and directed to the Swedes, and for it, in addition to armed men and sheep are slaughtered, does not contain any of the violence that IS has become known for.
DN with the help of experts scrutinized the movie scene by scene, as it constitutes a clear case study of how IS propaganda works.
– IS has a media strategy and know exactly what they are addressed by each publication. This is, of course, to attract more Swedes to join, says Magnus Norell, one of Sweden’s foremost experts on Islamist terrorism.
After the film began to spread Expressen reported that at least five of the participants are dead, and the others’ fate is very uncertain. From information on when they died it is possible to calculate the most likely recorded during in 2013.
In the film, the men make jokes, play with the children and distribute slew sheep to poor.
– As the films fills the execution object. They want to show that “come here, we are fine, we are building a state, it is not only war but the kids play.” It is directed against both potential recruits and to their environment. They want to show parents back home in Sweden that there is no danger if their children go down to join the IS. It is in line with IS original message that was more favorable to attract people to come and build the new state, says Magnus Norell.
The sender of the film with the Swedes is Furat Media. A propaganda channel that launched on 5 June this year and originally directed against the Russian-speaking jihadists. One of the people behind the channel is believed to be the Georgian IS-General Omar al-Shishani. USA offer five million US dollars (44 million) to anyone who can provide information leading to his arrest.
Some of the IS channels can not even reach through the usual web, but is hidden in the so-called darknet. To navigate there is considerably more complicated than in the usual Internet, because the sites are hidden to become untraceable. But by reviewing closed down jihadistkonton on Twitter DN come across the address of the darknetsajt used to distribute films and photographs that propagate the terrorist group’s deeds. The site is described as unofficial, but is built as a hub for several branches of the propaganda business.
The same propaganda site has previously been up in several locations in the ordinary Internet, but then shut down almost as quickly as it appeared. On the darknet has then a week been able to spread their propaganda undisturbed.
Three days after the attack in Paris published a photomontage where the Eiffel Tower is in flames along with a text about “Muslim joy over the invasion of Paris”. In addition was a triumphant video up where the news reports about the terrorist attack mixed with the group’s own statements.
Other video features on the site include some of the most brutal scenes as IS produces, as beheadings and others where people are being killed in front of the camera. One presented with words about how the soul recover by performing decapitations, another calls for cutting the hands of the people.
The French journalist Nicolas Hénin who were hostages of the IS for ten months testifies to the terror group jihadists constantly refers to its own Internet propaganda in both jokes and threats. Several of his cellmates were beheaded and filmed by ICE, before he and three of his colleagues finally released in April last year.
A bunch of French-speaking IS-members shouted: “We will cut off your head and put it on your ass and upload it to Youtube. They had an antique sword, “he writes in The Guardian on one of the many fake executions, he was subjected to.
That the site has moved out of the darknet can be seen as a reaction to an increasingly intense search for the IS-channels online. While social media has begun to take a hard line against the group’s attempts to exploit them for internal communication, and as a base for recruitment.As late as last spring shut Twitter down about 10,000 accounts that were linked to the IS.
Until then, the number of IS-accounts on Twitter in a drastic pace. Only in 2014 were added over 11 000 pieces, according to a survey by the US think tank Brookings Institution. As they began to cut off from the site responded IS-hanger with the death threat of Twitter founder Jack Dorsey and all who work at the company. These had made to the “targets of the Caliphate troops,” was written in a threatening letter that was uploaded online along with a picture on Twitter Founder’s face in the middle of a rifle scope. Whether the threat came from official IS-channels is difficult to say.
The largest and most important producer of IS-propaganda is al-Hayat, a video production within IS behind the most lavish and scattered films.
The German jihadisten Denis Cuspert has been identified as the founder of al-Hayat. In Germany he made during the 2000s, a career as a rapper – the name Deso Dogg – before he was radicalized. According to documents from the US State Department as DN taken note of, he joined ICE in 2012. Two years later he turned up in one of the terrorists’ propaganda films, holding a severed head. The pictures are believed to come from a massacre of 700 IS-opponents who performed the same year.
Denis Cuspert, as in the IS took the name Abu Talha al-Almani placed in February 2015 the US Government list of “specially designated global terrorists”. People on the list receives all the US assets blocked, and it is forbidden for US citizens to transfer money to them or doing other business in their favor.
“Cuspert has been a willing seller of IS atrocities,” the US State Department in its decision.
He suspected, among other things have been behind an acclaimed video with the British jihadisten Mohammed Emwazi, also called “jihadi John”, who cut the throat of more of ICE detainees. Something that made the British media to appoint Cuspert to “IS Goebbels,” after the Nazi propaganda minister.
Reportedly, several media were killed Denis Cuspert in a US airstrike in just over a month ago, on 16 October.
But despite the initiator killed the propaganda channel Al-Hayat survived.As late as November 12 released a new video showing the violent executions.
The films have several characteristics that distinguish them from, for example, the gritty films that Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda made the world familiar with after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. While video messages from Osama bin Laden was monotonous, grinding and slow follow IS propaganda a narrative downloaded from action movies, video games and music videos. 3d graphics with burning letters, music and quick cuts on the contrary, murdered enemies and win some IS-warriors.
Several of the films includes cross-cuts between modern battlefields, and ambitious produced conflict between the crusaders and Arab fighters.Something that fits well with IS propaganda that they are part of a thousand-year war between Christians and Muslims. DN’s audit shows that the recurrent cutting the images on the medieval battles are taken from the Hollywood movie “Kingdom of Heaven” from 2005 to actor Orlando Bloom in the lead role.
Al-Hayat’s films belong to the propaganda that has been most pronounced official status in the IS. The same can be said of Dabiq, an English-language magazine that is distributed via the network. With professional layout, high resolution photographs and graphics published articles that celebrates and describes the IS rampage. The latest issue, number twelve in the order released last week, is largely about the terrorist attacks in Paris and headed “Right Terror,” about “justifying terrorism” on the cover. Inside the magazine appears hostages human corpses up. The photographs appear to have been shadowed by software to provide a more suggestive impression.
In the same issue: A long article that justifies that a man marries several women, image sat with white flowers in a romantic light. One of the articles are signed John Cantlie, a British journalist who was kidnapped in 2012 and since then has appeared in articles and video segments that celebrates IS, obviously under duress.
A recurring element in Dabiq are full pages with lists of the ten selected propaganda films from al-Hayat, ranging from execution videos to clips that will show how IS is about to build a functioning state. A list of the latest mixes a movie with a fiery terrain vehicle – marked “must watch” – of child soldiers and a film about food safety.
It is just one example of how the propaganda channels are linked together. Darknet-site highlights not only movies but also incorporates the latest issues of Dabiq and numerous references to the IS-channels on the app Telegram. They act in turn as constantly updated news feeds, where the images of war zones interspersed with propaganda films.Although there appears another, less brutal kind of propaganda. Images which show the construction of bridges in war-torn areas, children who receive medical treatment and storage of washing machines as evidence of prosperity in the IS governance.
Telegram during the autumn taken the role as one of ICE’s most important communication routes. The app has built-in encryption and is marketed as a safer alternative to competing programs. It highlighted in the independent rankings of security as one of the most reliable.
When Telegram in September launched the operation of open news channels jumped IS fast. The purges on Twitter had likely increased the need for a new platform for the terror group’s supporters. A plethora IS accounts DN’ve found is followed by thousands of people, some by well over 10 000. This despite the fact that they are short-lived. When a channel disappears quickly find the followers to the next, guided by information from other parts of the IS machine.
First, the past week has Telegram seriously started to close down the IS-channels. DN have sought the company behind the app without results.But despite the encrypted chat program and that the site was moved to the darknet, individual IS-terrorists proved strikingly indifferent to, or ignorant of, technical security.
After Paris The attack found a mobile phone thrown in a garbage can near the concert venue Bataclan. The police were able to successfully find a detailed plan of attack as well as a text message from the time it began: “Here we go, we start”, according to Le Monde. Same phone could be traced geographically back to the suburb where some of them believed to have lived the last days before the attack.
The US Air Force has told how the IS-warriors reveal their positions by posts on social media. On at least one occasion this resulted in the bombers could attack an IS mount.
Communication researcher Jesper Falkheimer says that terrorism has always been linked to publicity, but that IS has found other ways to spread their message.
– In the past, terrorist groups have been more dependent on traditional media. Now they can build up their own media systems, while taking advantage of the rapid contagion through established media reporting in real time.
At this writing continues this page in darknet be updated. Only on Friday added several new videos up, as usual, a mix between the most serious depictions of violence and material to make life at IS areas in good stead. A series of pictures to show an abundance of grilled chicken.Meanwhile Paris to characterize violent films.
One of those released last Friday using a cut scene where a pregnant woman seeking shelter from attack at the Bataclan concert hall by hanging out a window on the second floor.
IS Swedish propaganda film is a typical example how their propaganda work. The film is believed to be from 2013, and most participants are confirmed dead.
DN has gone through the film scene by scene with terror researcher Magnus Norell.
Professional Graphics initiates film
The high level of graphics, picture quality and clipping is typical of IS more official films. It will give a sense of IS professionals, with their own TV channels, movies and programs.
– This film is not anyone done this myself with a camera phone, and uploaded, but it is much more official, says Magnus Norell.
The enemies of Bashar al-Assad and Russia scorned
“You can run, but you cant hide.” IS-warriors show up weapons they claim to have taken from killed enemies.But just like the rest of the film, the message is also directed towards their own. It should show that the IS is so successful on the battlefield they use the enemy’s own weapons against them.
The Swedish jihadis show their faces
It is not uncommon for persons who joined ICE show it, without fear of being identified. The talks also clear Swedish, to direct the message of the film, specifically against Swedish jihadists.
– The purpose of the show face is to show that they have nothing to be ashamed of, but that they are proud of what they do. They also know that the risk of being prosecuted in Sweden is very low.
Jokes about to slaughter other than sheep
Unlike other IS-propaganda film contains no direct violence. But in a scene slaughters the Swedish jihadis sheep and jokes that they not only kill the animals, and “it is these that we practice”.
– They are very aware of what they do and how they are perceived. The purpose of their execution films is that they want to make themselves as nasty as possible. One should not even dare think of going against them.By joking about it want to keep the picture alive even in this film.
Many children are in the movie
The entire propaganda film is primarily intended to show how good life is in IS governance. The children are proof that there is life and joy to the side of warfare. It is also a signal to prospective rekryters families and social context in Sweden.
– They want to show parents back home in Sweden that there is no danger if their children go down to join the IS.
IS handing out food to poor
Although the IS primarily pose a threat to other Muslims who live in Iraq and Syria, they want to portray themselves as good Muslims and role models. Many images from the IS shows how they build bridges or offer medical assistance.
– It is no wonder that they hand out food, it is usual when celebrating the festival of Eid in Islam. They want to show that life is as usual. At the same time they are constantly with weapons, to show that they are always ready to defend themselves.
Invitation to join
“What are you among the kafir – the infidels? Come and live among the Muslims. ” The last call of an English-language jihadist is in line with IS original propaganda that focused more on getting supporters to join in building a new state.
– The idea is that even if you can not war, you can contribute in other ways, as a mechanic, doctor or teacher, says Magnus Norell.
One very disturbing scene, not sure what to make of it. Russian Spetsnaz pulling “soldiers” out of a truck marked “US Army”. Not US Army equipment or soldiers, but the threat is clear.
For those of you who might not know, Shaitan is the Devil, that’s the Arabic word.
Soon very soon. Our response to the IS
“Russia’s response to militants IS on the famous movie with threats “Soon, very soon.” Our text: “Soon, very soon, a rabid pack, We have a reception pack you. Will you pray to his Shaitan jail strong in dark cellars. You thank God – business You Shaitan Evil going around, foaming at the mouth. Soon, very soon, a rabid pack, We are one blow calm you. You no Schmal cowards, hiding in burrows, old men and women is only used to hurt. Soon, very soon, forest expanses , Will trees produce together. Give way, his older brothers, Also waiting for them to visit, arrange a feast Mother Russia all of you to my will and shielding dense snow veil Soon, very soon … ”
Source: http://cont.ws/post/147699
Two days into the electricity blackout in Crimea, human rights activists on the peninsula warned that some hospitals were being affected, while Ukrainian authorities predicted a fierce backlash from Russia.
Meanwhile, Russian-installed leaders on the peninsula warned residents that the blackout would last for another month.
More than 1 million people on the occupied peninsula were left without power on Nov. 21 after electricity towers supplying electricity from Ukraine were blown up in the Kherson Oblast, north of Crimea. Activists taking part in the blockade of Crimea were thought to be behind the stunt, though no one has claimed responsibility yet.
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on Nov. 23 seemed to implicitly express support for the blockade, calling for an official ban on goods being transported from Ukraine into Crimea. Ordering members of Cabinet to prepare corresponding legislation that would specify which goods can be brought into Crimea and which are banned, Yatsenyuk also called for engaging the Crimean Tatar community in the work “so that our decision will take into account” the needs of that community, a statement on the Cabinet’s website said.
UkrEnergo, Ukraine’s state-owned monopoly electricity transmitter, promised on Nov. 22 to at least partly restore power within 24 hours if its repair workers were given access to the downed lines. But Mustafa Dzhemiliev, the speaker of the Crimean Tatars’ Mejlis and one of the initiators of the blockade of Crimea that began in late September, promised to provide only partial access – to the lines that provide power to Ukraine.
“Now we will partially allow specialists to clear (the area) and conduct repairs. There is one power line there, which, passing by Crimea, leads to areas in Kherson Oblast. They are without power there as well, it turns out. We will let them restore that line. …” Dzhemiliev said on Nov. 23, according to Interfax-Ukraine.
Police have opened a criminal case against those behind the explosions on the charge of deliberately damaging power facilities, as well as two cases against activists for allegedly assaulting police officers.
While a state of emergency was officially declared on the peninsula by Russian occupying authorities, the Kremlin offered an unusually calm statement on the matter, with presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov noting that “emergency situations happen,” and adding that the Russian emergency services should be able to respond adequately.
Not everyone was ready to believe that the Kremlin would take the blackout lying down, however.
Ilya Kiva, the head of the Interior Ministry’s department for countering drug-related crimes, told journalists on Nov. 23 in Kherson Oblast that Russian tanks had approached the front line with Ukraine after the incident with the electricity towers.
“That is why in the given situation we are trying to be prepared. … We know that Russian forces have already gotten tanks ready – about 12 tanks went right up to the contact line, and that is one of the possible ways in which events will develop – so we don’t want them to see the energy blockade as a reason for the deployment, for the movement of Russian forces into Ukraine,” Kiva said in comments to Ukrainian television channel 112 Ukraina.
Ukraine’s Border Guard Service issued a statement in response to Kiva’s warning, saying they had observed no build-up of Russian troops on the border.
Some expressed concerns that Russia may retaliate for the blackout in other ways.
Oleksiy Skrypnyk, a lawmaker from the Samopomich party, said the blackout could have a boomerang effect.
“If Russia cuts us off from the parallel part of their electrical system, at a minimum, this would lead to rolling blackouts. The result of that would be worse than (what is happening) in Crimea,” Skrypnyk wrote on his Facebook page.
Residents of Kherson Oblast were alarmed by the fact that activists apparently blew up the electrical towers.
“Blowing up electrical towers is equal to throwing lawmakers in garbage cans. It’s extremism,” said Andriy Malchenko, a Kherson resident. “If Ukraine wanted to cut off Crimea, it could do it. But not this way.”
Sergey Askyonov, the Kremlin-backed leader of Crimea, on Nov. 23 warned residents to be prepared for the worst in comments to RIA Novosti.
“Unfortunately, we must inform our residents that, most likely, this period will stretch on for a while,” he said. “We believe that we must prepare for the worst, that this period will drag on until the first line of the power bridge from Kerch is ready, meaning Dec. 22.”
While the peninsula has been relying on generators to pick up the slack over the last several days, it is not clear how long those will last.
The group Human Rights in Crimea issued a statement late on Nov. 22 saying certain hospitals on the peninsula were already suffering from the blackout, with many hospitals only able to provide power to the emergency rooms and operating rooms, “while the remaining departments are functioning depending on unstable electrical connections.”
Staff writer Allison Quinn can be reached at a.caseyquinn@gmail.com. Staff writer Oksana Grytsenko contributed to this report.
Pertinent Reference and Resource Material from Cyber Studies Research Centre (CSRC), NATO Defense College and NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) regarding Russia.
Understanding the Georgia Conflict, Two Years On– Part 1 | Keir Giles Available for download here
Reviews and Commentaries Part 1: “The Tanks of August”
Understanding the Georgia Conflict, Two Years On – Part 2 | Keir Giles Available for download here
Reviews and Commentaries Part 2: Making Sense in the West
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010 | Keir Giles Download PDF
Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020 | Keir Giles Download PDF
Provocation, Deception, Entrapment – The Russo-Georgian Five Day War | C W Blandy Download PDF
Waking the Neighbour – Finland, NATO and Russia | Keir Giles & Susanna Eskola Download PDF
“Information Troops” – a Russian Cyber Command? | Keir Giles Download PDF
Published through NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)
Potential Challenges to Public Order and Social Stability in the Russian Federation | A CSRC Review Download PDF
August 2011
The State of the NATO-Russia Reset | September 2011 Limited preview here
Follow the link on the right for ordering information, direct from CSRC or via Amazon
Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian Military? | Keir Giles Download PDF
Published through NATO Defense College, March 2012
Russia’s “Draft Convention on International Information Security” | April 2012 Download PDF
A joint publication between CSRC and the Institute of Information Security Issues, Moscow State University
Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues | Keir Giles Download PDF
Published through NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), June 2012
Internet Use and Cyber Security in Russia | Keir Giles Download PDF
Russian Analytical Digest, August 2013
Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa | Keir Giles Download PDF
US Army War College Letort Paper, July 2013
Divided by a Common Language: Cyber Definitions in Chinese, Russian and English | Keir Giles with William Hagestad Download PDF
Published through NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), June 2012
Russia and Cyber Security | Keir Giles Access Abstract
Nação e Defesa (Journal of Portuguese National Defence Institute), November 2012
A report issued by CIMA in 2010, The Pentagon, Information Operations, and International Media Development, covered in great detail information operations activities of the Department of Defense (DoD) that caused tensions and difficulties for independent media and its developers. The activities included creating “good news” stories under fictitious bylines and placing them in media in Iraq; paying handsome sums to fledgling radio stations in Afghanistan to run military messaging, in some cases eroding their credibility. These and other activities occurred as the information operations apparatus at DoD was becoming an octopus with tentacles in a dozen agencies, with no one person in charge, and with a budget that was nearly impossible to track and analyze.
Since that report was issued much has changed. Information operations activity by the DoD has been reined in and its structure rationalized. Peter Cary, a veteran military affairs journalist and the author of CIMA’s 2010 report, takes another look five years later in The Pentagon and Independent Media–an Update, which CIMA is pleased to publish.
Cognitive psychology should be one of our primary drivers in the inform and influence disciplines.
Does anybody else want to go?
“Inside Jihad: How Radical Islam Works, and How to Defeat It”
When
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
7:30 PM-8:45 PM
Where: Westminster Institute, 6729 Curran St. McLean, VA
Dr. Tawfik Hamid, an expert in cognitive psychology, is an Islamic thinker and reformer, and one time Islamic extremist from Egypt. He was a member of a radical Islamic organization Jamaa Islameia JI (of Egypt) with Dr. Ayman Al-Zawaherri, who later became the leader of Al-Qaeda. After being radicalized in the JI (approximately thirty-five years ago), he had an awakening of his human conscience, recognized the threat of Radical Islam, and started to teach modern peaceful interpretations of classical Islamic core texts. Dr. Hamid is the author of Inside Jihad: How Radical Islam Works; Why It Should Terrify Us: How To Defeat It.
The book will be available at the event.
The event is free but requires registration by November, 30 2015.
American propaganda researchers are a lonely bunch. We’re like the old MaytagCorporation washing machine repairman. Maytag had a very successful commercialadvertising campaign that ran in print and television for twenty years. It proved just howreliable its machines were by showing its repairman whose phone never rang. Like thatlonely repairman, those of us who call what we do propaganda research are not oftenappreciated in American institutions of higher learning. To be frank, with few exceptions,I’m much more likely to write and speak about propaganda outside my nation of originthan inside. Call it the paradox of American propaganda. People outside the UnitedStates readily see propaganda in the management of democracy. As I stated in thechapter, “Pervasive Propaganda in America,” in my edited volume with leading propaganda scholars (Snow, 2014, 120): The United States of America is the leading purveyor of propaganda in liberal democratic societies and one of the leading propagandamanufacturers in the world today. The two dominant strains of propaganda in Americansociety, the commercial/cultural and the military/governmental, drive American production at home and abroad.
I would like to present a case for deeper study of propaganda, whether or not it is viewedas good, bad, or neutral. My argument is based on both historical precedent and a need tounderstand the propaganda environment today that knows no national boundaries. Idefine propaganda this way, and it is certainly open to debate: Propaganda is source- based, cause-oriented, emotion-laden content that utilizes mass persuasion media tocultivate the mass mind in service to the source’s goals.
Its utilization is not good or badas all social institutions (government, commercial, citizen-based) use propaganda fortheir own purposes. The ethical questions associated with propaganda involve itsmeans/ends agreement or lack thereof and its asymmetrical exchange of information thatalways favors the sponsor of propaganda. At its best, propaganda involves pro-social causes that do not stray too far from the truth; at it worst, propaganda serves strictly a pro-source function that uses whatever means necessary to fulfill its goals.
Russia’s operation in Syria will continue despite the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish air force, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said. Meanwhile, a US official has said that initial indications are that the Russian incursion into Turkish airspace lasted a matter of seconds.
Editor comment: seconds, hour, days, months. Encroaching on another nation’s airspace is entering another nation’s sovereign airspace. Period. Russia does this frequently to Turkey and has been warned on multiple occasions. Perhaps they might not deserve having a plane downed, but Russia does not seem to respect other nations’ sovereignty. Chalk one up for Turkey taking a stand.
Russia, of course, must respond. Russia appears to be stopping commercial air flights to Turkey. Expect covert action as well. Putin has responded with strong words, accusing Turkey of sponsoring terrorism. Putin calls Turkey ‘accomplices of terrorists’ after Russian jet shot down. Too much, too soon.
In the meantime US President Obama and French President Hollande are meeting.
Is the shooting down of a Russian Su-24 ‘Fencer’ bomber by a Turkish fighter – the first direct NATO vs Russia combat incident – a big deal or not? My first thoughts are that the answer is probably not, at least not in the long term, but we can expect a fair amount of overt sound and fury on the one hand, and probably some covert retribution from Moscow, too. WW3 is not, however, on the cards.
The Russians are saying it was on the Syrian side of the border, the Turks say the plane was on theirs. I have no idea at this stage which is true, although it certainly wouldn’t surprise me if the Russian jet had intruded. Putting aside the (remote) possibility of pilot error, Moscow has been willing to cross into NATO airspace in the past and may even had an operational reason for doing so, perhaps trying to set up an attack run on a rebel convoy or facility on the Turkish border. After all, let’s not forget that Ankara is playing an active role in the Syrian civil war, and in its eagerness to hammer Kurds, wherever they may be, arguably supporting some pretty toxic elements.
Moscow may well have been assuming the Turks would be as restrained as other NATO members, which was an undoubted mistake. Putting aside any cultural stereotypes, Ankara is not only embarked in a campaign to assert itself as a regional power, it also sees Moscow as a sometimes partner-of-convenience, but also local rival. Russian intelligence officers have assassinated Chechen fundraisers in Turkey, and generally the Kremlin has shown little signs of seeing in Ankara a serious ally, partner or player, even in the days when Putin and Erdogan were getting along. Only this Friday, Russia’s ambassador had been given adressing down about the bombing of Turkish-backed rebels. It may well be that Ankara leapt at the opportunity to teach Russia a lesson and also show that it was a serious player.
Putin’s immediate response has been mordant and tough, accusing Turkey of stabbing Russia in the back, of in effect protecting ISIS, and running to its NATO powers as if it has been one of its own aircraft that had been shot down. We can expect some kind of retaliation on the political-economic front (maybe stopping Turkish airliners coming to Russian airports?) and maybe also some unloading of additional serious ordnance on Turkish-backed elements in Syria. However, I suspect neither Moscow nor, at the very least, the other European NATO powers will want to let this go too far. Russia cannot fight hot diplomatic wars on too many fronts, and Europe clearly wants Moscow to be part of the solution in Syria and maybe Ukraine, too. And, frankly, there is in many capitals concern about Turkey, its agenda and its role in the region. Much will depend on where Washington falls, of course, but if Moscow can get even a crumb of contrition from Ankara or sympathy from Europe, then we can expect this to be splashed on Russian TV and allow the Kremlin to let this slide a little.
But even in this best-case scenario, I don’t imagine that will be the end to it. Moscow has already been willing to operate inside Turkey covertly, and is engaged in political tussles over influence in the South Caucasus as well as Middle East. I would expect some uptick in ‘mischief’ – perhaps some support for the Kurds or other violent extreme movements, for example – as well as a more assiduous campaign to push back and stymie Turkish regional ambitions.
It’s often said, with good reason, that Putin really wants a return to 19th century geopolitics, when might made right and realpolitik was all. Let’s not forget that one of the defining 19thcentury conflicts was that between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which were sometimes openly at war, sometimes ostensibly at peace, but never anything than enemies. Here we go again.
Article by Deputy Director Aivar Jaeski “Hybrid Warfare on the Rise: A New Dominant Military Strategy?”
Date: 24th November 2015
This article was adapted from Aivar Jaeski’s presentation for Baltic Russia Youth forum panel called “Hybrid Warfare on the Rise: A New Dominant Military Strategy?” that took place in Tallinn, 16.-19.October.
******
I must say that I don’t like the term hybrid warfare, its sounds far too nice. We all know that the Toyota hybrid is a very modern, ecologically clean, friendly, and technically sophisticated machine. Putting the word hybrid in front of the word war is like trying to soften the cruelty of Putin’s regime when he ordered the annexation of Crimea and initiated the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. War is ugly, believe me, I have seen it; there is nothing friendly or clean about it.
Regarding the term ‘war’, Sun Tzu wrote that ‘the supreme art of war is to conquer the enemy without battle’ already in 513 B.C. The annexation of Crimea was a well-conducted strategic act that must be defined as war. War is war. But why talk about the events that took place in Ukraine using such terms?
Putin’s team has implemented several new tactics in his approach to strategic combat. I would like to bring your attention toCRIMINALITY as an aspect of the new hybrid war. What do I mean by that?
In a normal democratic country, when you see people wearing camouflage (bought from a shop, as Mr Putin said), equipped with rifles, you might think this man is a hunter, but when these men are walking through the centre of the town, green and friendly, or driving cars that have no number plates, they are breaking the law; such people are criminals by definition since only particular authorities designated by the country in question have the right to give others the permission to carry weapons or remove car number plates. When armed people are blocking the work of governmental institutions, their actions are taken in blatant disregard for the law.
According to the Geneva Convention, the situation in Ukraine is defined as an international armed conflict. International armed conflict is a conflict between states. So we can say that by denying the presence of Russian forces in Crimea, the Russian leadership was breaking the international law of armed conflict.Here is a timeline containing statements made and real actions taken by the leadership of the Russian Federation.
22 Feb—Putin orders the annexation
23 Feb—a large military exercise is launched in Russia
24 Feb—Russian Forces enter Crimea
25 Feb—Foreign Minister Lavrov claims Russia’s ‘principled position of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Ukraine’
26 Feb—Defence Minister Shoygu announces that the snap exercise being conducted in Western and Southern Russia involving over 150,000 troops ‘is unrelated to Ukraine’
1 Mar—Putin is authorized by the Duma to use force in Ukraine
3 Mar—the Russian Foreign Ministry says that the Black Sea Fleet warships ‘are not involved’ in Crimea;
4 Mar—President Putin says ‘Those were self-defence forces.’
10-13 Mar—Paratroopers, artillery, and armour ‘exercise’ near Ukraine
16 Mar—Crimean referendum
18 Mar—Russia annexes Crimea
18 Mar—Putin says ‘Russia’s armed forces never entered Crimea.’
One year later, on 22 Mar 2015—the Documentary “Crimea: The Way Back Home” reveals the truth.
How can the international community trust the Russian President and his Foreign and Defence Ministers when they come to the negotiation table after telling such large lies?
In a civil war or internal armed conflict, Putin’s green men would be identified as combatants; criminal law would not apply to them. It was the use of civilians, or so-called non-legal combatants, that violated the law of armed conflicts in Crimean crisis. Unidentified civilians, who take active part in military actions, are unlawful combatants whose actions can be prosecuted by domestic law.
Thanks to the 27 February 2013 issue of the magazine Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er (the Military-Industrial Courier or VPK), we know that General Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces has written the use of civilians during a crisis into his military doctrine. Can we conclude that criminality is an accepted part of Russian military thinking?Stalin himself had a criminal record. He was prosecuted for robbery before he became a communist. After his death things started to normalize, but sometime during the 1970s, when the Soviet army lacked manpower, a decision was made to allow criminals, those who had been convicted of less serious crimes and had completed their punishment, could serve in the Soviet Army. This was the decision that brought criminal behaviour into the ranks of the Soviet Army conscripts. Today criminal behaviour has reached as far as the Generals, the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces.
Hiring actors to distribute false information to internal and external audiences is perfectly acceptable for the criminal mind. Most people familiar with this topic know the facts concerning Russian actor Galina Pyshniak, who was required to play the role of witness in the story of the crucified boy, a wounded bystander in a shooting incident, as well as a member of an angry crowd. This is another example of an unlawful combatant who can be prosecuted by domestic Criminal Law.
General Gerasimov’s doctrine also states that military actions should be undertaken during peacetime, and the first confrontation should be in the communication environment where military means can also be used.
The military uses special tools, not available to general public. Such tools were used to hack the telephone call of former Estonian Foreign Minister Mr Paet to EU high official Ms Ashton. The call was recorded and posted on YouTube. This is not the only incident; there are many examples from Lithuania and the US as well. These are illegal activities. Hacking is a criminal act, even in Russia.
Another unique tactic in the information war that the Russians have developed is the ‘Troll Farm’. The closest one is located 150 km from the EU border in St Petersburg, at Savuskina 55. Computer operators or trolls are paid to write false and inflammatory comments to blogs, online magazines, and various social media platforms. Today the main focus is, of course, Ukraine, but there is some activity regarding the Baltic States as well. The StratCom Centre of Excellence conducted a study on trolls in Latvia identifying five categories of trolls: 1) the blame-the-US troll, who consistently finds a way to put the US at fault for everything, even bad roads in Russia 2) the angry troll, who focuses on hate speech 3) the bikini troll, who asks naïve questions and posts pictures posing as a girl dressed in a bikini 4) the Wikipedia troll, who creates false arguments using lots of materials copied from many different sources, and 5) the attachment troll—the most dangerous type—because, in addition to leaving inflammatory comments, they also distribute viruses using attached links.
The Kremlin is currently putting more emphasis on means of combat that undermine and create confusion. By using a combination of falsified historical and present day facts, the trolls create confusion, influence public opinion through social media, and disseminate conspiracy theories with the goal of undermining Western values and the existing democratic system.
Another criminal tactic is the violent rhetoric used by the Kremlin, driven by the intent to scare. This tactic can also be traced to Russian convicts and criminals who live by the phrase ‘боится значит уважaет’, which means ‘if you are scared of me, you respect me’. Putin makes enormous efforts to show Russia’s superiority. His belligerent attitude can be seen in the Georgian conflict, the annexation of Crimea, and the continuing tension in Ukraine. If we look more broadly, we see it also in the increase in flights of old Russian nuclear bombers in sensitive airspace, as well as the establishment of the Arctic Joint Strategic Command, a fifth Russian military district, in December of last year.
In conclusion, the Kremlin leadership has broken a number of laws and we have been giving a rather soft name to an ugly thing instead focusing on the hard truth.
Call it non-linear war (which I prefer), or hybrid war, or special war, Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future. In many ways this is an extension of what elsewhere I’ve called Russia’s ‘guerrilla geopolitics,’ an appreciation of the fact that in a world shaped by an international order the Kremlin finds increasingly irksome and facing powers and alliances with greater raw military, political and economic power, new tactics are needed which focus on the enemy’s weaknesses and avoid direct and overt confrontations. To be blunt, these are tactics that NATO–still, in the final analysis, an alliance designed to deter and resist a mass, tank-led Soviet invasion–finds hard to know how to handle. (Indeed, a case could be made that it is not NATO’s job, but that’s something to consider elsewhere.)
Hindsight, as ever a sneakily snarky knowitall, eagerly points out that we could have expected this in light of an at-the-time unremarked article by Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. In fairness, it was in Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, the Military-Industrial Courier, which is few people’s fun read of choice. Nonetheless, it represents the best and most authoritative statement yet of what we could, at least as a placeholder, call the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ (not that it necessarily was his confection). I and everyone interested in these developments are indebted to Rob Coalson of RFE/RL, who noted and circulated this article, and the following translation is his (thanks to Rob for his permission to use it), with my various comments and interpolations.
Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013
(My comments are indented and italicised and in red, and the bold emphases are also mine)
THE VALUE OF SCIENCE IN PREDICTION
General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation
In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.
The experience of military conflicts — including those connected with the so-called coloured revolutions in north Africa and the Middle East — confirm that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.
There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he wants to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention.
The Lessons of the ‘Arab Spring’
Of course, it would be easiest of all to say that the events of the “Arab Spring” are not war and so there are no lessons for us — military men — to learn. But maybe the opposite is true — that precisely these events are typical of warfare in the 21st century.
In terms of the scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war.
The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.
For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly.
The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures — applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.
All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces — often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation — is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.
This is, after all, exactly what happened in Crimea, when the insignia-less “little green men” were duly unmasked as–surprise, surprise–Russian special forces and Naval Infantry only once the annexation was actually done.
From this proceed logical questions: What is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be armed? Only after answering these questions can we determine the directions of the construction and development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the forms and methods of the use of the application of force.
What Gerasimov is signalling here, and it may prove an important point, is that the Russian military needs to be tooled appropriately. This may mean a re-opening of the traditional hostilities with the politically more powerful defence industries (that want to pump out more tanks and the other things they produce) over quite what kind of kit the military gets. When former defence minister Serdyukov announced a moratorium on buying new tanks, Putin slapped him down and restated the order. Shoigu and Gerasimov will have to be more savvy if they want to make progress on this one.
These days, together with traditional devices, nonstandard ones are being developed. The role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a single intelligence-information space because of the use of the new possibilities of command-and-control systems has been strengthened. Military actions are becoming more dynamic, active, and fruitful. Tactical and operational pauses that the enemy could exploit are disappearing. New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals. The defeat of the enemy’s objects is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased. The application of high-precision weaponry is taking on a mass character. Weapons based on new physical principals and automatized systems are being actively incorporated into military activity.
All worthy enough, but in fairness nothing we haven’t heard before.
Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy’s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special-operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected.
This, on the other hand, does show something of a different nuance, with the renewed emphasis on “internal opposition”, something which harkens back to Soviet-era playbooks rather than post-Soviet military doctrine, which was largely cleared of such language except in some specific contexts such as counter-insurgency.
These ongoing changes are reflected in the doctrinal views of the world’s leading states and are being used in military conflicts.
Already in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, the U.S. military realized the concept of “global sweep, global power” and “air-ground operations.” In 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, military operations were conducted in accordance with the so-called Single Perspective 2020.
Now, the concepts of “global strike” and “global missile defense” have been worked out, which foresee the defeat of enemy objects and forces in a matter of hours from almost any point on the globe, while at the same time ensuring the prevention of unacceptable harm from an enemy counterstrike. The United States is also enacting the principles of the doctrine of global integration of operations aimed at creating in a very short time highly mobile, mixed-type groups of forces.
In recent conflicts, new means of conducting military operations have appeared that cannot be considered purely military. An example of this is the operation in Libya, where a no-fly zone was created, a sea blockade imposed, private military contractors were widely used in close interaction with armed formations of the opposition.
Yes, these were all used in Libya, but whether they were that new is open to question. The key point for Gerasimov, I believe, is that actions such as the no-fly zone that were presented as (and have traditionally been) the preserve of humanitarian interventions were really used to favour one side in the conflict, the rebels. Combined with the use of mercenaries to support them, this makes Libya a convenient synecdoche for the kinds of operations the Russians are really contemplating, in which the mask of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping can shield aggressive actions.
We must acknowledge that, while we understand the essence of traditional military actions carried out by regular armed forces, we have only a superficial understanding of asymmetrical forms and means. In this connection, the importance of military science — which must create a comprehensive theory of such actions — is growing. The work and research of the Academy of Military Science can help with this.
The Tasks of Military Science
In the main, I will comment less on this section, because often it really doesn’t connect so clearly with the first half. However, taken together it is worth noting that it presents a pretty scathing picture of modern Russian military thinking. I can’t help but wonder whether Colonel General Sergei Makarov, head of the General Staff Academy since only last year, must be feeling a little anxious about his prospects.
In a discussion of the forms and means of military conflict, we must not forget about our own experience. I mean the use of partisan units during the Great Patriotic War and the fight against irregular formations in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus.
These are interesting examples, not least because they omit other, equally or even more appropriate examples, such as the Soviet experiences fighting the basmachi rebels in 1920s Central Asia and supporting anti-colonial insurgencies in Africa, Asia and Latin America during the Cold War. In the latter, for instance, the Soviets tended to use military assistance, handfuls of specialists and trainers, third-party agents and extensive propaganda, influence and subversion operations to achieve political goals, ideally with as little direct conflict as possible and without letting Moscow’s hand be too obvious. Sound familiar?
I would emphasize that during the Afghanistan War specific forms and means of conducting military operations were worked out. At their heart lay speed, quick movements, the smart use of tactical paratroops and encircling forces which all together enable the interruption of the enemy’s plans and brought him significant losses.
Another factor influencing the essence of modern means of armed conflict is the use of modern automated complexes of military equipment and research in the area of artificial intelligence. While today we have flying drones, tomorrow’s battlefields will be filled with walking, crawling, jumping, and flying robots. In the near future it is possible a fully robotized unit will be created, capable of independently conducting military operations.
How shall we fight under such conditions? What forms and means should be used against a robotized enemy? What sort of robots do we need and how can they be developed? Already today our military minds must be thinking about these questions.
The most important set of problems, requiring intense attention, is connected with perfecting the forms and means of applying groups of forces. It is necessary to rethink the content of the strategic activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Already now questions are arising: Is such a number of strategic operations necessary? Which ones and how many of them will we need in the future? So far, there are no answers.
There are also other problems that we are encountering in our daily activities.
We are currently in the final phase of the formation of a system of air-space defense (VKO). Because of this, the question of the development of forms and means of action using VKO forces and tools has become actual. The General Staff is already working on this. I propose that the Academy of Military Science also take active part.
The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy. In north Africa, we witnessed the use of technologies for influencing state structures and the population with the help of information networks. It is necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objects.
The operation to force Georgia to peace exposed the absence of unified approaches to the use of formations of the Armed Forces outside of the Russian Federation. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in the Libyan city of Benghazi , the activization of piracy activities, the recent hostage taking in Algeria all confirm the importance of creating a system of armed defense of the interests of the state outside the borders of its territory.
Although the additions to the federal law “On Defense” adopted in 2009 allow the operational use of the Armed Forces of Russia outside of its borders, the forms and means of their activity are not defined. In addition, matters of facilitating their operational use have not been settled on the interministerial level. This includes simplifying the procedure for crossing state borders, the use of the airspace and territorial waters of foreign states, the procedures for interacting with the authorities of the state of destination, and so on.
It is necessary to convene the joint work of the research organizations of the pertinent ministries and agencies on such matters.
One of the forms of the use of military force outside the country is peacekeeping. In addition to traditional tasks, their activity could include more specific tasks such as specialized, humanitarian, rescue, evacuation, sanitation, and other tasks. At present, their classification, essence, and content have not been defined.
Moreover, the complex and multifarious tasks of peacekeeping which, possibly, regular troops will have to carry out, presume the creation of a fundamentally new system for preparing them. After all, the task of a peacekeeping force is to disengage conflicting sides, protect and save the civilian population, cooperate in reducing potential violence and reestablish peaceful life. All this demands academic preparation.
Controlling Territory
It is becoming increasingly important in modern conflicts to be capable of defending one’s population, objects, and communications from the activity of special-operations forces, in view of their increasing use. Resolving this problem envisions the organization and introduction of territorial defense.
Before 2008, when the army at war time numbered more than 4.5 million men, these tasks were handled exclusively by the armed forces. But conditions have changed. Now, countering diversionary-reconnaissance and terroristic forces can only be organized by the complex involvement of all the security and law-enforcement forces of the country.
The General Staff has begun this work. It is based on defining the approaches to the organization of territorial defense that were reflected in the changes to the federal law “On Defense.” Since the adoption of that law, it is necessary to define the system of managing territorial defense and to legally enforce the role and location in it of other forces, military formations, and the organs of other state structures.
We need well-grounded recommendations on the use of interagency forces and means for the fulfillment of territorial defense, methods for combatting the terrorist and diversionary forces of the enemy under modern conditions.
Again, here defence is used in Aesopian terms to address issues of offence. I don’t dispute there is a genuine need for this kind of coordination, and it may reflect the confidence of a recently re-empowered General Staff in trying to reassert some kind of supreme authority over national defence after years in which the security agencies have been dominant. But primarily I read into this a recognition of the importance for the close coordination of military, intelligence and information operations in this new way of war. If we take Ukraine as the example, the GRU (military intelligence) took point over Crimea, supported by regular military units. In eastern Ukraine, the Federal Security Service (FSB), which had thoroughly penetrated the Ukrainian security apparatus, has encouraged defections and monitored Kyiv’s plans, the Interior Ministry (MVD) has used its contacts with its Ukrainian counterparts to identify potential agents and sources, the military has been used to rattle sabres loudly on the border–and may be used more aggressively yet–while the GRU not only handled the flow of volunteers and materiel into the east but probably marshalled the Vostok Battalion, arguably the toughest unit in the Donbas. Meanwhile, Russian media and diplomatic sources have kept up an incessant campaign to characterise the ‘Banderite’ government in Kyiv as illegitimate and brutal, while even cyberspace is not immune, as ‘patriotic hackers’ attack Ukrainian banks and government websites. The essence of this non-linear war is, as Gerasimov says, that the war is everywhere.
The experience of conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown the necessity of working out — together with the research bodies of other ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation — the role and extent of participation of the armed forces in postconflict regulation, working out the priority of tasks, the methods for activation of forces, and establishing the limits of the use of armed force.
[…]
You Can’t Generate Ideas On Command
The state of Russian military science today cannot be compared with the flowering of military-theoretical thought in our country on the eve of World War II.
Of course, there are objective and subjective reasons for this and it is not possible to blame anyone in particular for it. I am not the one who said it is not possible to generate ideas on command.
I agree with that, but I also must acknowledge something else: at that time, there were no people with higher degrees and there were no academic schools or departments. There were extraordinary personalities with brilliant ideas. I would call them fanatics in the best sense of the word. Maybe we just don’t have enough people like that today.
Ouch. Who is he slapping here?
People like, for instance, Georgy Isserson, who, despite the views he formed in the prewar years, published the book “New Forms Of Combat.” In it, this Soviet military theoretician predicted: “War in general is not declared. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 1914 but rather, unnoticed, proceeds long before that.” The fate of this “prophet of the Fatherland” unfolded tragically. Our country paid in great quantities of blood for not listening to the conclusions of this professor of the General Staff Academy.
What can we conclude from this? A scornful attitude toward new ideas, to nonstandard approaches, to other points of view is unacceptable in military science. And it is even more unacceptable for practitioners to have this attitude toward science.
In conclusion, I would like to say that no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always have vulnerabilities and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist.
This is an obvious, if necessarily veiled allusion to Russia’s relative weakness compared with the West today and, probably, China tomorrow. The answer is not to not have conflicts, but rather to ensure they are fought in the ways that best suit your needs.
We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves. This is where military science takes on a crucial role.
The outstanding Soviet military scholar Aleksandr Svechin wrote: “It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template.”
This approach continues to be correct. Each war does present itself as a unique case, demanding the comprehension of its particular logic, its uniqueness. That is why the character of a war that Russia or its allies might be drawn into is very hard to predict. Nonetheless, we must. Any academic pronouncements in military science are worthless if military theory is not backed by the function of prediction.
Ed. note: In what I can only describe as a good Western piece of propaganda, this shows Syrian rebels blowing up a Russian helicopter.
Having once been a TOW Platoon Leader, I see this very old technology changing the outcome of a proxy fight between the US and Russia.
The Russians are all up in arms, saying “Turkey has shown its hand” and “Turkey is too aggressive”. To which I can respond without hesitance, Russia overplayed its hand by not respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and encroached on Turkey’s airspace once too often and got shot down. Most world leaders would apologize, meet in private, shake hands and agree to not have a fist fight in public. But petulant Putin will play the role of the alpha-male, and suspend commercial air traffic into Turkey until he realizes he is denying Russians another vacation spot. Russia will surely engage in a covert operation against Turkey. An esteemed colleague suggested the Tomb of Suleyman Shah, which is right on the Turkish border.
Watch Syrian Rebels Blow Up a Russian-Made Helicopter
The same day that Turkish forces shot down a Russian jet for allegedly violating Turkey’s airspace, Syrian rebels affiliated with the Free Syrian Army published a video purporting to show their fighters blowing up a stationary Russian-made helicopter on YouTube.
The video shows Syrian rebels launching what arms analyst Elliot Higgins, who runs Bellingcat, a website for open-source analysis, identified on Twitter as a U.S.-made TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missile at a helicopter sitting exposed in a field some distance away.
The First Coastal Division, the group that uploaded the video, said it destroyed the helicopter after forcing it to land with an earlier missile strike, according to Reuters. And the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a watchdog group monitoring the conflict in Syria, told Reuters that at least 10 passengers evacuated from the helicopter after it landed, escaping the second missile strike that ultimately destroyed it. It’s not clear whether the crew was Russian or Syrian.
Russian military officials have confirmed that two of its Mi-8 helicopters were dispatched on a search and rescue mission for the pilots who parachuted from the Russian jet downed earlier on Tuesday, and that rebels destroyed one of the two helicopters. “During the operation, as a result of small-arms fire, one of the helicopters was damaged, and forced to make a landing on neutral territory,” Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi toldreporters on Tuesday.
One Russian soldier died in the incident, and “the downed helicopter was destroyed by mortar fire from territory controlled by armed gangs” Rudskoi said. It hasn’t been confirmed whether the video below depicts the helicopter referenced by Rudskoi or if it’s of a separate incident.
French President François Hollande marched into Washington, D.C., Tuesday, accompanied by the beat of war drums and cries of “Aux armes, citoyens!” President Flanby — custard, as the French derisively dub their jiggly, inoffensive Socialist leader — has turned into Rambo these days.
Since the Nov. 13 attacks, which killed 130 people, Hollande and his ministers can’t seem to open their mouths without uttering the words, “la guerre.” French politicians are flying by the seat of their pants trying to respond — and be seen to be responding — to a jihadi threat that has been brewing over the past two years. Rafale fighter jets are now bombing Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq. Emergency rule has been extended. Prime Minister Manuel Valls has warned an already jittered populace of chemical and biological terrorist threats. Constitutional amendments are being mulled over, and politicians are discussing new laws that will be tougher than the old-new tough ones passed after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January that critics dubbed “le Patriot Act à la française.”
Paris is beginning to feel a lot like Washington back in those terrible post-9/11 days, when the world was either “with us or against us” as we waged our “war on terror” against the “axis of evil.” So, in a way, Flanby (turned Rambo) going to Washington is a bit like coming home.
This time, it’s a lightning visit à l’américaine. The moment Hollande steps off the presidential Airbus A330-223 until he boards it again for a Moscow-bound flight midweek, the French president will have one message for his U.S. counterpart: Europe is in peril! Quick Obama, step up to the plate.
“The problem is that the attacks in Paris and the refugee crisis show that we don’t have time. There is an emergency,” a European diplomat told theGuardian last week. The diplomat, who did not want to be identified, sounded like a British conservative when he noted that the migrant crisis “is dividing the Europeans, destabilizing the continent, so we have to act quickly, telling the U.S. administration the core interests of the Europeans, your best allies, are at stake.”
How it makes one wish for the good old days, when the Syrian migrants were just a “swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean,” as British Prime Minister David Cameron put it. Post-Paris attacks, European conservatives and right-wingers are turning them into a swarm of terrorists. But to his credit, Hollande has not jumped on the populist refugee-bashing bandwagon even though he faces regional elections next month, when Marine Le Pen’s National Front is expected to make big gains.
While the migrant issue certainly features on Hollande’s agenda, it’s not as high as trying to find some sort of solution to the Islamic State crisis, which, after all, is one of the sources of the refugee crisis.
The French president’s priority is to form “une grande coalition” to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. This involves getting the United States and Russia to put aside their differences and come together over a common enemy — with a little nudging from the French.
Russia appears to be inching closer to the U.S.-EU position in the wake of the Paris attacks and the Federal Security Service’s acknowledgment last week that a bomb brought down Metrojet Flight 9268 in Egypt’s Sinai region. In a rare diplomatic convergence on Syria, Russia approved a French resolutionat the United Nations last week, calling on member states to take “all necessary measures” to combat the Islamic State. On the military front, Russia, the United States, and France are coordinating on “deconfliction,” or alerting each other to avoid airspace collisions, as they pummel Islamic State targets in the eastern Syrian desert. Of course, the downing of a Russian fighter jet on Tuesday by Turkey, a NATO member, only heightens the tension and imperative for cooperation — lest things spiral out of hand.
But if we’re all allies in the fight against the so-called “caliphate,” we can’t seem to agree on the Lion King in Damascus. Over the past few months, there has been much talk of Washington and Paris easing their “President Bashar al-Assad must go” position to “Assad may stay a while” until a transition to the great unknown is hammered out.
In a rousing speech before a special session of parliament the first working day after the Paris attacks, Hollande signaled a shift in France’s hard-line stance when he noted that the country’s new top priority is the fight against the Islamic State.
The Paris attacks have done wonders for Assad. On both sides of the Atlantic, some influential people are starting to warm up to — or at the very least tolerate — him. In an interview with CBS News, former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell acknowledged that Washington’s Syria strategy has not worked and it was “time to look at something else.” Assad, he conceded, was “part of the problem,” but Morell noted that “he may also be part of the solution.”
In France, the calls for Hollande to adopt a realistic approach to Syria have turned into a roar. Former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine did not mince his words in a France Inter radio interview in late September when he said, “Let’s not forget that in the fight against Hitler, we had to ally with Stalin, who killed more people than Hitler.”
That’s a Socialist former minister and a darling in certain French lefty circles talking. In Parisian chattering circles, where speculation of a cabinet reshuffle is rife, Védrine is on top of the speculation charts to replace Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, the staunchest defender of the “Assad must go” position.
On the extreme right — a rising force in France — the romance with Assad, the exterminator of “les barbus” (the bearded ones), never faded. A day after the attacks, right-wing French weekly Valeurs Actuelles featured an exclusive interview with Assad that was chilling both for the sycophantic questions and the hubris of the replies. Here’s a sampling: “Q: If you had one message for M. Hollande and M. Fabius, especially after what happened in Paris yesterday, what would it be? Is it ‘please cut your relations urgently with Qatar and Saudi Arabia’?” To which, the Syrian strongman grandly replied: “My message to Hollande and Fabius … be serious when you talk about fighting terrorists.”
Right. Here’s my message to the “Assad may stay a while” crowd: Be serious when you talk about finding a solution to the Syrian crisis. Assad has no plans to take a hankie out of his coat and wave the Syrian people goodbye when that transition train arrives at the station. The Assads do not go gently into the good night; they learn lessons in holding on to power at the family breakfast table.
We may tell ourselves that the old devil Baathist we know is better than abarbu we don’t. We may even console ourselves that at least he won’t annihilate the minorities and blow up heritage sites. But this sympathy for the devil will get us nowhere.
If we make a peace that involves Assad in power without facing justice, it will be a peace to end all peace.
If we make a peace that involves Assad in power without facing justice, it will be a peace to end all peace. Sunni disaffection will see legions of young men across the Arab world and Europe getting lured by the call to fight Assad. We can legislate and pass emergency laws until the cows come home, but we will be swimming ineffectively against the tide rushing toward jihad.
I’m no fan of oil-soaked Gulf monarchs, but if they’re warning us about this route to a so-called peace, we must pay attention or we will all pay the price. It seems to me that over the past few months — and certainly after the Paris attacks — a number of people have been channelizing their anger and frustration over the Syrian quagmire onto Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Sunni powers. The justifiable old rancor over the Saudis spreading their deplorable Wahhabi doctrine is blinding our ability to understand that the Islamic State’s brand of jihadis poses an existential threat to the House of Saud. After all these years, is it that difficult to make the flow of Gulf money for noxious Wahhabi cultural imports illegal? In France, the doomsday scenario of a Muslim Brotherhood-like political takeover painted by writer Michel Houellebecq in his latest book,Submission, has tied neatly into simmering anti-Qatari resentment over a parvenu Gulf takeover of all things quintessentially French.
Into this “amalgame” — as the French call the mixing of unrelated ideas — a secular Baathist tyrant is a veritable savior. But look how our last savior, Nouri al-Maliki, saved the peace in neighboring Iraq.
There’s no question the Syrian crisis needs a political solution. Getting all parties together is the answer — as the Saudis did in Taif, when all parties in the grinding, complex Lebanese civil war were thoroughly exhausted. Frankly, I don’t understand why France, the United States, and Russia are mucking around these parts. (OK, I do understand why. I just wish they wouldn’t.) Getting the Iranians and Saudis, along with other Sunni powers, to sit together to sort out their Shiite-Sunni hissy fit will move us closer to a solution than Hollande jetting around Washington and Moscow. Whatever happens this week, if Hollande loses his nouveau Rambo nerve and turnsflanby before a steely Putin propping up Assad, there will be no let-up to the violence in the Middle East — or on the streets of Paris, Brussels, and places in between.
Vladimir Putin has called the shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkey “a stab in the back”, and warned of “serious consequences”. His emotional response was in sharp contrast to earlier, more measured statements from Moscow, calling for patience while the details of what happened became clear. The Russian president’s angry personal involvement is alarming, as it could lead to dangerous and harmful Russian responses regardless of the rights or wrongs of the incident.
Tensions between the two countries had already been rising. The shooting down of the plane comes the day after Turkey called for a UN security council meeting to discuss Russian actions in Syria, following the summoning of the Russian ambassador in Ankara to hear a protest over air attacks on Turkmen villages.
If Russia wishes to retaliate, there are a number of different ways in which to do so short of any kind of military action, including diplomatic, economic and other levers. Russia is a major export market for Turkey, and Turkish construction firms are involved in a large number of major building projects there, each of which provides a target for sanctions or other measures.
Another possible target is energy – the two sides are already in dispute over the price of Russian gas sold to Turkey. Many of these measures could, however, be counter-productive, causing at least as much harm to the Russian economy as to Turkey’s. But Russia has shown repeatedly that economic concerns come second to other factors, even in the current situation where the Russian economy has been fatally undermined by low oil prices.
A clash like today’s was probably inevitable given two factors: the firm and consistently applied Turkish rules of engagement when it comes to protecting its airspace; and Russia’s lax attitude to straying across other people’s borders. The contrast is with the other end of Europe, where Russian aircraft wandering into the airspace of Nordic and Baltic nations, whether deliberately or by accident, does not generate the same kind of unequivocal response. The diplomatic responses by northern European states to this problem provide much less of an incentive for Russia to ensure that its aircraft behave themselves and navigate precisely.
‘Vladimir Putin’s angry personal involvement is alarming.’ Photograph: Maxim Shipenkov/AP
The robust Turkish response to airspace violations will have come as no surprise whatsoever, especially after the precursor to this incident on 3 and 4 October, when Russian aircraft received similar warnings but removed themselves before being attacked. So Russia was fully aware of the rules by which Turkey is playing, and they are rules which Russia understands. Turkey’s habit of firm responses creates clear and unequivocal red lines and limits on what kind of behaviour by Russia is acceptable.
It will take some time before the circumstances of the shooting down are established, and the initial claims and counter-claims should be seen in that context. If the Russian Su-24 aircraft was one of those with dated navigational systems, relying on support from handheld GPS navigators, simple navigational error could be one cause. But Turkey says it gave the Russian aircraft 10 warnings over five minutes. Five minutes doesn’t sound long, but it is a long time for a fast jet to be heading in the wrong direction.
It may therefore be clear to others in Moscow that the tragic death of the air crew involved is likely to have been the result of their own error or a miscalculation by their commanders, and it is in the interests of neither side to escalate the situation. In October, the Turkish response when it came to involving Nato was very measured; the deliberate approach to calling for consultations under article 4 rather than article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was a political message. Despite Putin’s claims – apparently untrue – that Turkey raised the issue with Nato before talking to Russia, limiting the problem to a bilateral issue will be important for preventing uncontrolled and unnecessary escalation.
In any case, Russia will continue to deny that its aircraft entered Turkish airspace at all. But here, Moscow has a serious and self-inflicted problem. It may claim that it has “objective data proving that its aircraft never left Syrian airspace”. But after 18 months of misinformation, lies and outright fantasy peddled by Russia over its involvement in Ukraine – and in particular over the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 – this will be of little value. Put simply, thanks to Russia’s previous actions, even if its spokesmen do in fact tell the truth, its “proof” will have no credibility whatsoever.
Editor’s note: I have to give Russia credit, they keep trying. Okay, no credit given.
Another “spaghetti test” failure, however.
Here is an example of Russian propaganda gone wrong. (In my best dog trainer’s voice) BAD propaganda. Down boy!
A few key indicators:
Sensationalistic headline
Allegations are preposterous
“The Arab media” – such specificity (sarcasm /off)
No links, no way to track down the story.
“Official” Russian source (TV and Radio Company of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation “STAR”)
If it’s printed in Russian and seems too good to be true, it probably is.
Notice the “kernel of truth”, the picture of Obama and Erdogan together, from the recent visit. Now supposedly they got their heads together and planned this shootdown of a Russian plane. Sure. …and my wife is a Victoria Secrets model. Pure fantasy.
(Translated from Russian by my Chrome browser)
Obama and Erdogan agreed to destroy the Russian plane – Media
November 25th, 2015, 19:50
The Arab media reported that the plan for the destruction of the Russian aircraft was clearly established between the leaders of the US and Turkey. It is reported, in particular, GerasaNews.
According to the newspaper, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly received support from US President Barack Obama and the Russian plan to bring down a plane on the border with Syria.
Arab media compromising information received from some source in the administration of US President.
Also in the Arab media reports stating that fatal for the Su-24, the decision was made by Obama and Erdogan at the summit of “Big Twenty” in Antalya.
One of the basic points of Guerilla Warfare is to demonstrate the government is incapable of protecting the people.
Image copyrightReuters
I read this trash and almost puked.
(translated from Swedish by my Chrome browser)
Professional Graphics initiates film
The enemies of Bashar al-Assad and Russia scorned
The Swedish jihadis show their faces
Jokes about to slaughter other than sheep
Many children are in the movie
IS handing out food to poor
Invitation to join
NOVEMBER 19TH, 2015
Cognitive psychology should be one of our primary drivers in the inform and influence disciplines.
Very disturbing but truthful video.
Ed. note: In what I can only describe as a good Western piece of propaganda, this shows Syrian rebels blowing up a Russian helicopter.
Editor’s note: The picture on the left is late, I just received it.
Editor’s note: I have to give Russia credit, they keep trying. Okay, no credit given.
