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Igor Panarin – Our enemies entrenched in London

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Russia hates the UK, the UK is blamed for all the ills of Russia.

Normally I would have looked at this and filed it into an archival file, citing this as further evidence that the UK is Russia’s #1 target.

But Russia’s historical emotions run much deeper than merely placing the UK on top of their target list.

  • Here Dr. Igor Panarin, of Russia’s Foreign Ministry, calls the UK  “enemy”
    • Not adversary
    • Not competitor
    • Not antagonist
    • Not foe
    • Not opponent
    • Not contender
    • Not even an archenemy
    • Panarin calls the UK an enemy
  • This was recorded and posted onto YouTube on 20 August 2010
  • This was posted onto Facebook on 16 April 2016

I’ve read past Panarin postings about the UK. Many of facts he cites are many hundreds of years old. Their anger, their outrage, their rage – seethes.

Panarin then talks about how to “defeat” London.   Nations talk about ‘defeat’ when they go to war.  Given these assertions, is Russia declaring de facto “war” with the UK?

  • This video declaring Russia an enemy of the UK
  • Hyperaggressive flyby of USS Donald Cook
  • Iskander launch destroying “enemy”

How should this be taken?

</end editorial>


(Translated from Russian by my Chrome browser)
Uploaded to YouTube on Aug 20, 2010, posted on Facebook on 15 April 2016

For 500 years Britain is [in a] secret and obvious war against Russia, killing our kings, provoking wars, sponsoring and arming our enemies … Igor Panarin will talk about the reasons for the murderous policy and on how to defeat the London. 


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Igor Panarin, information warfare, Russia, Russian propaganda

The “Russian World” – Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination

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Screen Shot 2016-04-15 at 8.06.06 PMThe “Russian World” – Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination

May 2015

The Center on Global Interests (CGI) Introduction

Introduction

The concept of the “Russian World” (russkii mir) has a long history rooted in the 1990s, but it was propelled under the media spotlight in 2014, when Russian President Vladimir Putin used it to justify Russia’s interference in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin’s actions in its so-called “Near Abroad” — a reference to the post-Soviet space — are motivated mainly by its perception of Russia’s national security interests and the need to protect the country and the current political regime from destabilizing influences, be they coming directly from abroad or fed by domestic factors.

The concept of the Russian World offers a particularly powerful repertoire: it is a geopolitical imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas on which different regions of the world and their different links to Russia can be articulated in a fluid way. This blurriness is structural to the concept, and allows it to be reinterpreted within multiple contexts. First, it serves as a justification for what Russia considers to be its right to oversee the evolution of its neighbors, and sometimes for an interventionist policy. Secondly, its reasoning is for Russia to reconnect with its pre-Soviet and Soviet past through reconciliation with Russian diasporas abroad. Lastly, it is a critical instrument for Russia to brand itself on the international scene and to advance its own voice in the world. The Russian World is thus by essence a floating signifier developed by diverse actors around the Kremlin, one that speaks to different audiences and that can take specific flavors to be operationalized depending on the context.

This paper analyzes the trajectory of the term, its genesis and development, and moves on to discuss its dual identity — as Russia’s policy for the Near Abroad and Russia’s voice in the world. Finally, it explores the articulation of this term with Russia’s foreign policy orientations.

Source: http://globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CGI_Russian-World_Marlene-Laruelle.pdf


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, information warfare, Russia, Russian propaganda

Soviet Union: About the falsification of history

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The “rehabilitation” or rewriting of Soviet history has begun.

I only read about half of the below article before the retching noise and sensation emanating from my throat and stomach became bothersome.

  • The Soviet Union did not force communism upon Eastern Europe.
  • The Iron Curtain protected Soviet citizens from the West.  I’m grossly paraphrasing but that is the gist of that section. The Iron Curtain exists today in the form of sanctions against Russia.
  • The Soviet Union was the most technically advanced country in the world.
  • The Soviet Union (and now Russia) was falsely accused of aggressive behavior.
  • The media forced the West to create NATO and later to expand.

On and on and on…

Russian propaganda and now, again, Soviet propaganda, exists. Russia is rewriting history.  There will be an alternative history in Russia’s future, conspiracy theories may well be a reality in their future.

</end editorial>

If you do not tell the truth about yourself you cannot tell it about other people. Virginia Woolf


(Translated from Russian by my Chrome browser)

About the falsification of history

Grigory Vanin

About the falsification of history

The Soviet Union broke up almost a quarter of a century ago. Soviet history in the media and in textbooks has long been accustomed to, and is painted in bleak communist terror, which was allegedly the meaning of the Soviet political system.

It seems that the power of waiting, when will die the last witness of the Soviet past, and the new Russian generation will lose all interest in the heroic image of a great country, which for seventy years gives hope around the world for the triumph of justice. In the meantime promoted other values and other famous characters.

However, in the Russian society emerged and growing movement for the revival of the historic dignity of Russia. This happens after the strengthening of its political position in the world. While this public organization club format. His main task, they put the fight against the falsification of history, situational misinformation and forgery of documents aimed at destroying the unity of the peoples and social groups on our vast territory. In fact, in response to information aggression falsifiers of the past are being sought consolidating Russian national idea or ideology contrary to some blurring of political diversity in Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

“Forget your family, and you – no one”

As you know, the story – it’s policies of the past. Writing stories, factual interpretation – only ideological work. Without the past there is no future. The ideological basis of the identity of the person and of patriotism is, above all, historical memory, which is formed around the culture and language of communication in its diversity. All together brings people together in society, inhabiting the historical territory, and with the development of the economy of the nation is formed historical community. If you destroy the algorithm of nation, distort his identity a historical basis, the Company will begin to fall apart and the nation will not take place.

The main sign of the distortion of historical facts manifested in the direction of describing the very fact of its interpretation. If the orientation of the anti-Russian or anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, then surely lies behind the propaganda and disinformation purpose, information intervention in the historical consciousness of the Russian society with a view to its expansion, the formation of an inferiority complex. This is a direct objective of the so-called information warfare of the West against the Russian Federation and former Soviet republics.

The goal is not new and is not exclusive. Information sabotage against Russia is actively used in policy by Western governments for hundreds of years. In this case, fending off intervention systematically, the new historians and journalists, students of history need to be able to perceive the factual number of events, and link them to the political situation of the time in which the events occurred, abstracting from the modern ideological cliches and bringing them mentally in the social relations of the past . Only on the basis of the analysis and modeling of events may occur such an alternative interpretation of the Western propaganda of facts or processes, which will serve as a reflection on the past and the consolidation of society.

Without a decent understanding of the past is impossible to build the future without destroying itself. Moreover, the Russian state, losing the historical continuity of generations, condemning its history and denying the choice of previous generations, runs the risk of blindly go on about ideological Western competitors, losing its sovereignty. We have no reason to be ashamed of his past. It was worthy historically predetermined in the framework of the laws of evolution.

Below are a few examples of distortions of interpretation of historical events, adopted in Western historiography, and a real alternative to it, proceeding from the causality of social processes and facts. This is an extremely subjective view of the author.

1. There is a steady message that the Red Army and Stalin forcibly imposed communism in Eastern Europe . That is the fear of the Soviet Union and the Bolsheviks paralyzed the democratic forces in Eastern Europe, which were supposedly against communism and socialism.

In fact it was the opposite. By the beginning of World War II, almost all European countries have been struck by fascism in varying degrees. Fascism in Europe was due to the reaction of the bourgeoisie, primarily financial, to the growing popularity of Europe’s left-wing movements and parties , the authority of the Comintern after the First World War.

Bourgeois fascist regimes in Europe were the norm. Moreover, many of them were covered by ultra-nationalist slogans of socialism. So it was in Italy – the home of fascism – led by Mussolini . The Nazi party was called National Socialist, the German state flag was red with a swastika in a white circle, symbolizing the absolute vitality National Socialist ideas. It was a shrewd propaganda trick the Nazis in a crisis of depression 30s.

The Second World War was unleashed as an anti-communist, in which Germany was striking force in the intrigue financial cartels against the USSR and the core of the anti-Soviet European or Western coalition. Fascist Europe concluded peace treaties with Nazi Germany. It was the quintessence of political strategy in the next expedition to the East of Europe, as a continuation of the First World War. To this end, Germany financiers armed US and Europe.

Allies of the Soviet Union, the Anglo-Saxons really, in this war were hypocritical and searched in the midst of the best grazing two major powers and also their historical rivals – Germany and the Soviet Union.

This is not to say that the birthplace of the communist project of Marx and Engels was France and England, and the project plan for the British Prime Minister Palmerston , cunning political intriguer, tacitly supported the Marx intended to rival Germany in order to undermine its economy and the state.

Marx’s “Communist Manifesto” was developed and freely published in London in 1848, a policy paper of the Communist League, while in Germany a manifesto appeared only in 1872. First International, as an international workers’ organization, was established in 1864, also in London.

First International | Photo: armycarus.do.am

At this time in St. Petersburg for the first time published a complete translation of “Capital” of Marx and Marxism was a little-known philosophical current. KP Manifesto was published in Russia only in 1882, and before that there were attempts to transfer to the Russian language abroad, particularly in Geneva.

Continued… at http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/111599/

Continued at http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/111599/


Filed under: #RussiaFail, Information operations, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, Russia, Russian propaganda

Meet Olga Li, The Single Mother Of Two Taking On Putin

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Olga Li speaks calmly, almost eerily so for a woman who is taking on Russian President Vladimir Putin—a fight which could land her two years in prison.

The 29-year-old single mother of two, who was born in a small town in Kazakhstan, is not the sort of opponent normally feared by Moscow’s strongmen politicians. Yet from her office in a Soviet block of flats in the city of Kursk, the journalist-turned-regional representative has attracted the Kremlin’s wrath. Hailed as a “wunderkind of local politics” by independent media in Russia, she is currently the subject of a criminal investigation. But, while the Russian government tries to charge her with “degrading the dignity” of state officials and endangering Russia’s statehood—she is preparing to run for parliament as a member of the opposition.

“The opening of a criminal case against me is simply absurd,” Li told Newsweek. Her video statements, posted on the site of People’s Journalist, the local monthly newspaper she edits, take shots at powerful local and national officials. The videos consist largely of her, or a supporter, speaking directly to camera about instances of alleged corruption. They have garnered thousands of views and raised her profile outside her home region.

Her most direct criticism of the Russian president was delivered in a video entitled “An Appeal to Putin” that she posted last month. It has racked up over 376,111 views on YouTube. In under six minutes, Li accuses Putin of allowing “criminal conspiracy” at the top of Russian government, presiding over the “ruin of Russia’s financial system” and the “destruction of the rule of law.”

Li believes she is not alone in her disapproval of the current government—unlike official approval ratings, her own survey showed Putin’s approval in Kursk was only 25 percent. In October, state pollsters reported his approval rating was at its highest ever—89.9 percent across all of Russia.

According to Li, she had addressed her criticism of corruption among regional officials to Russia’s federal authorities in a letter written in June 2015, and documented her request in her paper’s September edition. In her letter she warned that if her appeal was ignored she would air her views in public. She doubts if her views were taken seriously in Moscow, or if they reached the capital at all.

“Today, people’s complaints are sent for consideration to the officials about whom they are complaining,” she says. The way forward, she suggests, is to do away with “this garbage” practice and make politicians more accountable to their voters. Her video to Putin was inspired by the “impotence” of citizens in the “lawlessness” of modern Russia, she says.

Li has been openly critical of many local authorities, including the deputy chairman of the regional assembly, Viktor Karamyshev, from Putin’s United Russia party, who was the first to announce the start of the hate speech probe. She has also clashed with prosecutors in Kursk, some of whom her newspaper colleagues are investigating for allegedly being tied to a corrupt million ruble road repair deal. Li hoped her video campaigns would make Moscow investigate suspicious deals more closely.

“Instead, the opposite happened,” she says. “Those who rob the Russian people are not held responsible but those who inform people about it are.”

Li, a political independent, is now looking for support from Russia’s liberals to take her anti-corruption campaign to a national level. She is in talks with Russia’s opposition Yabloko party and hopes to enter the upcoming parliamentary elections as their candidate in the autumn of this year. She says independent and opposition candidates often get their applications thrown out even if they have enough backing. While Yabloko are yet to give her a final answer, the Kursk representative is already feeling the difficulty of life in opposition.

“I am constantly receiving threats,” Li says. “I keep having photos of the killed Boris Nemtsov sent (on social media). They opened an illegal criminal case against my colleague Konstantin Berezin,” Li says, referring to the founder of the People’s Journalist newspaper. She also claims she has received veiled threats against her family. Li’s biggest fear is not the threat of prison but rather leaving her two daughters alone without her.

“My eldest is four years old, my youngest is two, she says. “Yes, I am afraid. But I want to live in a different kind of Russia where human rights are not just something on paper.”

(Translated from Russian by my Chrome browser)

Lee Olga “Appeal to Putin”

Source: http://www.newsweek.com/meet-olga-li-single-mother-two-taking-putin-446953?rx=us


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

Russia blamed for crashing Swedish air traffic control to test electronic warfare capabilities

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Anonymous sources in NATO say Russian intelligence was behind a major cyberattack on Sweden that grounded flights for over five days in November 2015Reuters

By

April 14, 2016 16:48 BST

Sources in the Swedish government have blamed Russian intelligence for causing a major cyberattack on Sweden’s air traffic control system that lasted for at least five days in November 2015, allegedly due to Russia testing out its electronic warfare capabilities.

Between 4-9 November 2015, hundreds of domestic and international flights were grounded at multiple airports across Sweden due to its air traffic control system going offline. The attack caused the radar systems to stop working, which made the computer screens to go blank. This meant that air traffic controllers were unable to see any aircraft on their screens at all.

At the time, the Swedish Civil Aviation Administration publicly blamed a solar storm for knocking out air traffic control systems, which also impacted radar stations in Norway and Estonia. According to a Swedish military leaks news site, however, the real story was much deeper.

Anonymous sources told Aldrimer.no that during the attack, Swedish authorities traced the source of the attack to an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group that has previously been linked to the Russian military intelligence agency, Spetsnaz GRU. Although Sweden is not part of Nato, it was so concerned that it sent urgent messages warning neighbouring countries that are Natoallies about the ongoing cyberattacks.

“The message was passed on to NATO either by Sweden’s National Defence Radio Establishment [Försvarets radioanstalt, FRA] or the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service [Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten, MUST],” a senior Nato source told Aldrimer.no.

The source says that Swedish authorities were particularly concerned that Vattenfall, the Swedish state-owned power company, would be targeted by Russian hackers. As Vattenfall is one of the largest energy providers in Europe and owns several nuclear power plants in both Sweden and Germany, the potential damage from a cyberattack could have been astronomical.

This is the Krasukha-4. It is a highly sophisticated electronic warfare system that is now being used to cloak its actions in Syria from Nato, as well as from IS and other rebel groupsVitaly V. Kuzmin, Wikimedia Commons

The source also says that at the same time that Sweden issued its warning to neighbouring Nato countries, at the same time Nato independently detected that Russia instigated electronic warfare activity in the Baltic Sea region that was jamming air traffic communication channels. Nato traced the signals and they led to a large radio tower in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, to the south of Lithuania.

In October 2015, a month before the cyberattack on Sweden’s air traffic control systems, a leading electronic warfare expert reported that Russia was using electronic warfare to both jam Islamic State (Isis) communications in Syria, as well as to mask its military activities from Nato.

The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration is currently investigating the true cause of the air traffic control system outage, but currently is not ready to release results from its analysis of data during the attack. Nato and the Swedish Armed Forces have both said they cannot comment on the issue.


Filed under: Electronic Warfare, Information operations, Russia, Sweden Tagged: Electronic Warfare, EW, Russia, Sweden

Russia loses $3.3 billion to cyber attacks

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 Please note these cyber attacks are not being blamed on a country nor a group.

That Russia Beyond The Headlines is running this story is good.  The blame is at the right place – nowhere.

The word “Cyberattacks” is being used in a generic sense.

I am beyond mystified to read the following sentence, however. “The surveyed companies believe that in the short term the number of attacks will increase by 173 percent, and the amount of damage by 192 percent.”  I can understand someone saying there will be an increase in attacks. I can understand someone saying there will be an increase in damages.  But there is not any actuarial table in the world which can predict an amount of increase of attacks or damage.  The next APT might well be unstoppable or easily stopped.  The next APT might really work well or fail. We might not even discover the next APT has been used for years. That is the inherent, implicit nature of APTs.

</end editorial>


April 14, 2016 ANNA KUCHMA, RBTH

Cybercriminals are becoming more and more active, with attacks against companies and government agencies costing the Russian economy 0.25 percent of GDP in 2015

Cyberattacks cost the Russian economy more than $3.3 billion – according to the year’s average exchange rate – in 2015, according to a joint study by Group-IB, the Internet Initiatives Development Fund and Microsoft.The total lost due to cyberattacks has reached 0.25 percent of Russia’s GDP and is comparable to half of the funds allocated from the state budget for health support in 2015.

The total lost due to cyberattacks has reached 0.25 percent of Russia’s GDP and is comparable to half of the funds allocated from the state budget for health support in 2015.

Direct financial losses are estimated at $2 billion, while the elimination of the consequences of cyberattacks cost another $1.3 billion.According to Group-IB, the number of DDoS attacks alone has reached more than 1,000 in Russia.

Why Russians support Internet censorship>>>

Cyberattacks have been experienced by 92 percent of the 600 companies surveyed, of which 42 percent are large commercial companies and government agencies.

Group-IB noted that cybercriminals most often target banks, including internet banking systems. The number of attacks is increasing, including using viruses written for the Android platform.

Some types of targeted attacks tested on banks will be used by hackers in other sectors, suggested Ilya Sachkov, Group-IB’s CEO.

The surveyed companies believe that in the short term the number of attacks will increase by 173 percent, and the amount of damage by 192 percent.

Source: http://rbth.com/business/2016/04/14/russia-loses-33-billion-to-cyber-attacks_584971


Filed under: APT, cyber security, Information operations Tagged: Cybersecurity

Russian Opposition Picks Holes In State TV ‘Exposé’ Of Navalny

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A 15-minute excerpt of what Rossia-1 television billed as a piece of investigative journalism accused Aleksei Navalny of being an agent recruited by William Browder, a former investor in Russia who is now a vocal critic of President Vladimir Putin, on behalf of British intelligence.

Surprise, surprise, Russian State TV is making up evidence.

In typical Russian propaganda fashion, it’s full of holes, grossly incorrect data, and even to the casual observer, it reeks.

Dmitry Konstantinovich Kiselyov, if I were you I’d lose the pink tie, it looks like an illegal activity in Russia.

I would also find some writers who know basic grammar, some real English-language editors, and a few basic fact checkers. Otherwise, this looks like poorly fabricated evidence designed to deliberately smear someone using evidence shat out of a room full of monkeys with typewriters, lead by someone with questionable sexuality who refuses to come out.  The tie almost matches your pinkish soft skin, you brute, you.  *sashays away*

Mic drop.

</end editorial>

ps. No, I am not gay, but I am so confident in my sexuality that I can act any damn way I want. Dmitry Konstantinovich , on the other hand, is surrounded by homophobes, and reputedly is overcompensating.


 By Tom Balmforth

MOSCOW — Russian state TV says it has exposed Kremlin foe Aleksei Navalny as a paid agent of the West. Navalny and his allies in the opposition say they have exposed the program as a sloppy hit-job full of fabricated “evidence.”

A 15-minute excerpt of what Rossia-1 television billed as a piece of investigative journalism accused Navalny of being an agent recruited by William Browder, a former investor in Russia who is now a vocal critic of President Vladimir Putin, on behalf of British intelligence.

Senior state media executive Dmitry Kiselyov included the preview of the program, which is to be broadcast in full on April 13, in his Sunday night current-affairs program Vesti Nedeli on April 10:

Describing the allegations as “pure fantasy,” Navalny said on April 11 that he intends to file a defamation suit — his first against a media organization. He said the program took a state-media campaign against Putin’s opponents to “new heights.”

The purported evidence underlying some of the assertions has drawn ridicule online, with activists and observers questioning the authenticity of what are said to be leaked MI6 and CIA documents. Among other things, they cite the suspiciously clumsy English in those texts, incongruous dates, and voices in tapped phone calls that don’t sound at all like those they are alleged to be.

The Rossia-1 clip features an all-star cast of Kremlin bugbears.

It begins with the late oligarch Boris Berezovsky, a onetime Kremlin insider who became one of Putin’s most vocal opponents from exile in Britain.

It features Sergei Sokolov, a man the Rossia-1 excerpt says was Berezovsky’s former chief security guard, saying that computer servers containing evidence incriminating Navalny — an anticorruption crusader who is serving two suspended sentences on financial-crimes charges that rights groups and Kremlin critics say were trumped up — were brought to Russia.

The program claims to chronicle ties between Navalny and Browder, who it asserts is a British agent code-named “Solomon,” since 2007. It also says Navalny was given the code name “Freedom” and calls him a player in what it claims was a CIA operation, dubbed “Quake,” that was first drafted in 1986 to “change the constitutional and political system in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.”

The clip goes on to say that Britain’s MI6 funneled money to Navalny through the Moscow Helsinki Group, Russia’s oldest human rights organization. Lyudmila Alekseyeva, its widely respected head, has strongly denied that assertion.

Damage Done

State TV reports have in the past set the stage for law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute politically active Russians. In some cases, they have taken a toll on their targets without leading to action by the authorities.

On April 7, opposition activist Natalya Pelevina quit the council of the opposition party Parnas after NTV — known for aggressive programs aimed at discrediting Kremlin critics and the West — aired footage that appeared to show her in intimate relations with Mikhail Kasyanov, a married former prime minister and leader of Parnas.

Navalny, a prominent opposition politician who heads an organization that has conducted several high-profile investigations into alleged corruption among Putin and his allies, has been targeted by state TV in the past.

Vladimir Varfolomeyev, a presenter with Moscow-based Ekho Moskvy radio, wrote on Twitter: “They could have jailed Aleksei @navalny about 20 times, if they made that their aim. So what is this spy fake about, and what is its mission?”

Those Pesky Articles

Navalny supporters zeroed in on apparent inaccuracies in the program. Several observers, for instance, noted that the purported MI6 and CIA correspondence contains strange wording, such as the incorrect use of definite and indefinite articles — a classic area of difficulty for native Russian speakers learning English.

A document the program suggests was from the CIA includes, for instance, the phrase: “Report on the health status of a Sergei Magnitsky.”

Another says that millions of rubles “will be transferred to out trustee from Moscow Helsinki Group until January 26th.”

“During our conversation, Mr. Browder was given an undercover name of ‘Solomon,'” a third reads.

The Guardian’s Moscow correspondent, Shaun Walker, wrote: “haha – those pesky English articles claim another scalp.”

Other lines in the same document are in convoluted, sometimes opaque English that would be surprising coming from a native speaker. “All Magnitsky’s current government controlled media have taken an active defensive position backed by Russian law enforcement agencies,” reads one.

Another contains no verb: “Within held events under the general code name ‘THE QUAKE.'”

The Insider investigative website noted in a reference to Russia’s sports minister, whose quirky English has been mocked in Russia: “They don’t just make mistakes, they speak in the language of Vitaly Mutko, which you can’t always understand at first.”

“Why would vesti news not find an English editor to proofread their fake intelligence report?” Twitter user Roman Borisovich asks:

 

The mistakes did not just concern language.

The show includes a purported CIA document from 2009 that features the name Valerie Plame — a former covert CIA officer who was exposed by the Bush administration after her husband criticized the war in Iraq following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar, author of the book All The Kremlin’s Men, wrote on Facebook that Plame left the CIA long before 2009.

Plame herself chimed in:

 

The Insider and Navalny compiled other apparent inaccuracies.
Russian satirical Twitter account @ThanksAbama pointed out that dates were muddled in supposed correspondence between Browder and Navalny, with Navalny replying in 2006 to a message sent in 2008. “I’ve given Navalny the ability to travel in time so that at least someone can get back to 2007 and sort everything out,” this tweet has Obama saying:

 

Navalny ally Georgy Alburov later tweeted that the mistake wassubsequently corrected — although it remained viewable on YouTube.

Navalny wrote that “Dmitry Kiseylov simply invented the dialogues” between him and Browder.

The Rossia-1 clip also features an alleged Skype conversation between Navalny and Ilya Ponomaryov, a former opposition lawmaker in Russia who now lives abroad — but the voices on the call don’t seem to resemble those men’s voices.

And prominent journalist Sergei Dorenko contested the claim that Sokolov was ever head of security for Berezovsky.

As the criticism mounted on Moscow, there were rumors that state journalists themselves were getting cold feet about the veracity of the report.

Aleksei Kovalyov, a former state media journalist who now runs a counterpropaganda site called The Noodle Remover, said he believes that editors at Rossia Segodnya — the media organization headed by Kiselyov — have been instructed to ignore the Browder-Navalny story.

Writing on Facebook, without producing evidence, Kovalyov said that the colleagues had been told in a widely distributed e-mail that the report was “probably fake.”


Tom Balmforth

Tom Balmforth covers Russia and other former Soviet republics.

Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-opposition-mocks-state-tv-navalny-expose/27667901.html


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

The CIA Is Investing In Firms That Mine Your Tweets And Instagram Photos

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Apr. 14 2016, 1:57 p.m.

SOFT ROBOTS THAT can grasp delicate objects, computer algorithms designed to spot an “insider threat,” and artificial intelligence that will sift through large data sets — these are just a few of the technologies being pursued by companies with investment from In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital firm, according to a document obtained by The Intercept.

Yet among the 38 previously undisclosed companies receiving In-Q-Tel funding, the research focus that stands out is social media mining and surveillance; the portfolio document lists several tech companies pursuing work in this area, including Dataminr, Geofeedia, PATHAR, and TransVoyant.

In-Q-Tel’s investment process.

Screen grab from In-Q-Tel’s website.

Those four firms, which provide unique tools to mine data from platforms such as Twitter, presented at a February “CEO Summit” in San Jose sponsored by the fund, along with other In-Q-Tel portfolio companies.

The investments appear to reflect the CIA’s increasing focus on monitoring social media. Last September, David Cohen, the CIA’s second-highest ranking official, spoke at length at Cornell University about a litany ofchallenges stemming from the new media landscape. The Islamic State’s “sophisticated use of Twitter and other social media platforms is a perfect example of the malign use of these technologies,” he said.

Social media also offers a wealth of potential intelligence; Cohen noted that Twitter messages from the Islamic State, sometimes called ISIL, have provided useful information. “ISIL’s tweets and other social media messages publicizing their activities often produce information that, especially in the aggregate, provides real intelligence value,” he said.

The latest round of In-Q-Tel investments comes as the CIA has revamped its outreach to Silicon Valley, establishing a new wing, the Directorate of Digital Innovation, which is tasked with developing and deploying cutting-edge solutions by directly engaging the private sector. The directorate is working closely with In-Q-Tel to integrate the latest technology into agency-wide intelligence capabilities.

Dataminr directly licenses a stream of data from Twitter to spot trends and detect emerging threats.

Screen grab from Dataminr’s website.

Dataminr directly licenses a stream of data from Twitter to visualize and quickly spot trends on behalf of law enforcement agencies and hedge funds, among other clients.

Geofeedia collects geotagged social media messages to monitor breaking news events in real time.

Screen grab from Geofeedia’s website.

Geofeedia specializes in collecting geotagged social media messages, from platforms such as Twitter and Instagram, to monitor breaking news events in real time. The company, which counts dozens of local law enforcement agencies as clients, markets its ability to track activist protests on behalf of both corporate interests and police departments.

PATHAR mines social media to determine networks of association.

Screen grab from PATHAR’s website.

PATHAR’s product, Dunami, is used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to “mine Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and other social media to determine networks of association, centers of influence and potential signs of radicalization,” according to an investigation by Reveal.

TransVoyant analyzes data points to deliver insights and predictions about global events.

Screen grab from TransVoyant’s website.

TransVoyant, founded by former Lockheed Martin Vice President Dennis Groseclose, provides a similar service by analyzing multiple data points for so-called decision-makers. The firm touts its ability to monitor Twitter to spot “gang incidents” and threats to journalists. A team from TransVoyant has worked with the U.S. military in Afghanistan to integrate data from satellites, radar, reconnaissance aircraft, and drones.

Dataminr, Geofeedia, and PATHAR did not respond to repeated requests for comment. Heather Crotty, the director of marketing at TransVoyant, acknowledged an investment from In-Q-Tel, but could not discuss the scope of the relationship. In-Q-Tel “does not disclose the financial terms of its investments,” Crotty said.

Carrie A. Sessine, the vice president for external affairs at In-Q-Tel, also declined an interview because the fund “does not participate in media interviews or opportunities.”

Over the last decade, In-Q-Tel has made a number of public investments in companies that specialize in scanning large sets of online data. In 2009, the fund partnered with Visible Technologies, which specializes in reputation management over the internet by identifying the influence of “positive” and “negative” authors on a range of platforms for a given subject. And six years ago, In-Q-Tel formed partnerships with NetBase, another social media analysis firm that touts its ability to scan “billions of sources in public and private online information,” and Recorded Future, a firm that monitors the web to predict events in the future.

Unpublicized In-Q-Tel Portfolio Companies

Company Description Contract
Aquifi 3D vision software solutions
Beartooth Decentralized mobile network
CliQr Hybrid cloud management platform Contract
CloudPassage On-demand, automated infrastructure security
Databricks Cloud-hosted big data analytics and processing platform
Dataminr Situational awareness and analysis at the speed of social media Contract
Docker Open platform to build, ship, and run distributed applications Contract
Echodyne Next-generation electronically scanning radar systems Contract
Epiq Solutions Software-defined radio platforms and applications Contract
Geofeedia Location-based social media monitoring platform Contract
goTenna Alternate network for off-grid smartphone communications Contract
Headspin Network-focused approach to improving mobile application performance Contract
Interset Inside threat detection using analytics, machine learning, and big data
Keyssa Fast, simple, and secure contactless data transfer
Kymeta Antenna technology for broadband satellite communications
Lookout Cloud-based mobile cybersecurity
Mapbox Design and publish visual, data-rich maps Contract
Mesosphere Next-generation scale, efficiency, and automation in a physical or cloud-based data center Contract
Nervana Next-generation machine learning platform
Orbital Insight Satellite imagery processing and data science at scale
Orion Labs Wearable device and real-time voice communications platform
Parallel Wireless LTE radio access nodes and software stack for small cell deployment
PATHAR Channel-specific social media analytics platform Contract
Pneubotics Mobile material handling solutions to automate tasks
PsiKick Redefined ultra-low power wireless sensor solutions Contract
PubNub Build and scale real-time apps
Rocket Lab Launch provider for small satellites Contract
Skincential Sciences Novel materials for biological sample collection
Soft Robotics Soft robotics actuators and systems
Sonatype Software supply chain automation and security Contract
Spaceflight Industries Small satellite launch, network, and imagery provider Contract
Threatstream Leading enterprise-class threat intelligence platform
Timbr.io Accessible code-driven analysis platform
Transient Electronics Dissolvable semiconductor technology Contract
TransVoyant Live predictive intelligence platform
TRX Systems 3D indoor location and mapping solutions
Voltaiq SaaS platform for advanced battery analysis
Zoomdata Big data exploration, visualization, and analytics platform Contract

 

Bruce Lund, a senior member of In-Q-Tel’s technical staff, noted in a 2012 paper that “monitoring social media” is increasingly essential for government agencies seeking to keep track of “erupting political movements, crises, epidemics, and disasters, not to mention general global trends.”

The recent wave of investments in social media-related companies suggests the CIA has accelerated the drive to make collection of user-generated online data a priority. Alongside its investments in start-ups, In-Q-Tel has also developed a special technology laboratory in Silicon Valley, called Lab41, to provide tools for the intelligence community to connect the dots in large sets of data.

In February, Lab41 published an article exploring the ways in which a Twitter user’s location could be predicted with a degree of certainty through the location of the user’s friends. On Github, an open source website for developers, Lab41 currently has a project to ascertain the “feasibility of using architectures such as Convolutional and Recurrent Neural Networks to classify the positive, negative, or neutral sentiment of Twitter messages towards a specific topic.”

Collecting intelligence on foreign adversaries has potential benefits for counterterrorism, but such CIA-supported surveillance technology is also used for domestic law enforcement and by the private sector to spy on activist groups.

Palantir, one of In-Q-Tel’s earliest investments in the social media analytics realm, was exposed in 2011 by the hacker group LulzSec to be innegotiation for a proposal to track labor union activists and other critics of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the largest business lobbying group in Washington. The company, now celebrated as a “tech unicorn” — a term for start-ups that reach over $1 billion in valuation — distanced itself from the plan after it was exposed in a cache of leaked emails from the now-defunct firm HBGary Federal.

Cover of the document obtained by The Intercept.

Yet other In-Q-Tel-backed companies are now openly embracing the practice. Geofeedia, for instance, promotes its research into Greenpeace activists, student demonstrations, minimum wage advocates, and other political movements. Police departments in Oakland, Chicago, Detroit, and other major municipalities havecontracted with Geofeedia, as well as private firms such as the Mall of America and McDonald’s.

Lee Guthman, an executive at Geofeedia, told reporter John Knefel that his company could predict the potential for violence at Black Lives Matter protests just by using the location and sentiment of tweets. Guthman said the technology could gauge sentiment by attaching “positive and negative points” to certain phrases, while measuring “proximity of words to certain words.”

Privacy advocates, however, have expressed concern about these sorts of automated judgments.

“When you have private companies deciding which algorithms get you a so-called threat score, or make you a person of interest, there’s obviously room for targeting people based on viewpoints or even unlawfully targeting people based on race or religion,” said Lee Rowland, a senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union.

She added that there is a dangerous trend toward government relying on tech companies to “build massive dossiers on people” using “nothing but constitutionally protected speech.”

Source: https://theintercept.com/2016/04/14/in-undisclosed-cia-investments-social-media-mining-looms-large/


Filed under: Information operations, Information Warfare Tagged: information warfare

The Russian army can “blind” the enemy

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This article is a perfect example of Russian propaganda, intended as much to pump up the expectations of the Russian population as anything else.

It must be taken with not a grain of salt, but a shaker.

Of course, this article will be cited by numerous Russophobes and Russian useful idiots as to the power of the Russian military.  Without revealing their cards, these will all just be words.

This article will also be touted by numerous EW experts from the Western world in their calls for more investment in EW equipment. They will say that Russian (and Chinese) EW programs are so advanced, that the West is so far behind, we need massive investments to catch up.

Without revealing their capabilities and limitations, without revealing adversary capabilities and limitations, one cannot even guess.  Even knowing those numbers we will not know their Mean Time Between Failures, we will not know human factors, we will not know actual ranges, we will not know precisely which vulnerability is being exploited, we will not if the applied algorithms are effective, we just will not know.

The truth?  It’s propaganda. Russian EW is good but not nearly as good as some say. Western EW is good, not nearly as bad as some say. Even the classified studies are off target unless they have hands on Russian EW equipment or have oodles of SIGINT of examples.  Perhaps Russian EW can adjust quickly to new threats, perhaps not. Perhaps they can withstand Western EW, perhaps not.

It’s all propaganda.

</end editorial>


(Translated by my Chrome browser)

MOSCOW, April 15. / TASS /. April 15 troops electronic warfare (EW) mark 112th anniversary since the establishment.

Currently, electronic warfare system is an essential component of the state military organization and an integral part of all armed conflicts of recent years, including, it has proved its effectiveness in the operation of air and space forces (VKS) of Russia in Syria.

The history of electronic warfare in Russia originates from the time of the Russian-Japanese war. So, April 15, 1904 during the shelling of the Japanese squadron inner road of Port Arthur station Russian battleship “Victory” and shore-fast “Gold Mountain” interfered in the Japanese radio, what is very difficult transmission of telegrams enemy ships-spotters.

According to the deputy head of the military department, Yuri Borisov, all military conflicts show that the electronic warfare systems are most effective and are very popular among the troops in all directions.

TASS / KRET

Aircraft systems EW

As I told Tass ex-Chief of the REB of the Air Force, now an adviser to first deputy general director of Concern “Radio-electronic technology” (KRET) Vladimir Mikheev, aircraft survivability with modern electronic warfare complexes increases by 20-25 times.

If previously active jamming stations were installed on the aircraft (SAP), today all aircraft equipped with airborne defense systems (BKO). Their main difference from SAP that GER is fully integrated and interfaced with all aircraft avionics, helicopter or droneVladimir Mikheevadviser to the first deputy general director KRET

Defense complexes exchange with the board computers with all necessary information:

  • about the flight, combat missions,
  • about the purposes and the flight routes of the protected object,
  • about the possibilities of their weapons,
  • about the real situation in the electronic ether,
  • about potential threats.

In the event of any danger of the route can be adjusted so that the protected object is not included in the zone of fire exposure, providing avionics loss (reduction) is the most dangerous enemy air defense and aviation, while enhancing the combat effectiveness of their weapons.

“Vitebsk”

One of the most effective onboard defense systems. It is designed to protect aircraft and helicopters from the anti-aircraft missiles with radar and optical (thermal) guidance heads.

“Vitebsk” is set to:

  • modernized Su-25SM,
  • attack helicopters Ka-52, Mi-28N,
  • transport and combat helicopters Mi-8,
  • heavy transport helicopters Mi-26 and Mi-26T2,
  • special and civilian aircraft and helicopters of domestic production.

The term “Vitebsk” will have military transport aircraft Il-76MD-90A.

There is an export version of the complex called “The president-C”, which enjoys great popularity in the international market and comes in a number of countries operating Russian aircraft.

“Arm-AB”

Specialized helicopter – jammer, whose main task is to provide jamming and creating a false environment for the cover of their airplanes or helicopters, as well as the protection of the most important land-based facilities.

“Arm-AB” is actually providing the electronic countermeasures system targeting aircraft and ground targets of the enemy, that is, can “blind” them.

In terms of interference on the system “lever” anti-aircraft missiles and aviation enemy interception complexes lose their ability to detect any purpose and to direct them guided missiles “air – air”, “ground – air” and “air – ground”, while this vitality and combat effectiveness of its air increased significantly.

The bearer of this complex is the most mass Russian Mi-8 helicopter .

“Khibiny”

In 2013, adopted the Russian Armed Forces entered the complex jamming “Khibiny”, designed to protect aircraft from air defense systems.

From the previous generation station complex “Khibiny” has high capacity and intelligence. He is able to help in the management of aircraft weapon, create a false electronic situation, as well as to ensure a breakthrough echelon of enemy air defenses.

This is what happened with the American destroyerDonald Cook in 2014 , when the Su-24 was taken to support ship’s air defenses.

Then the ship radars have appeared, putting the crew in stalemate. The plane disappeared from the screens, then suddenly changed its position and speed, then create electronic clones of other purposes. This information and the fighting weapon control system destroyers were almost blocked. Given the fact that the ship was in the 12 th. Km of the territory of the United States in the Black Sea, it is easy to imagine the feelings that are experienced sailors on that ship.

Now in development is a new complex “Khibiny-have” for frontline aircraft, in particular Su-30cm.

“Himalayas”

This complex – the further development of “Khibiny”, he is “locked up” under the plane of the fifth-generation T-50 (PAK FA).

Its main difference from its predecessor that “Khibiny” represent a container which is suspended from the wing, taking a certain point of suspension, and the “Himalaya” fully integrated into the board and are designed as separate elements of the aircraft fuselage.

Antenna complex systems are built on the principle of “smart skin” and allow you to perform several functions:. Reconnaissance, electronic warfare, radar, etc. The complex will be able to put the active and passive interference infrared homing missiles today, as well as current and future radar stations.

Features of this complex yet classified, t. To. T-50 aircraft is the newest fifth generation fighter and has not yet adopted for videoconferencing RF.

Land complexes EW

Modern ground electronic warfare systems operate in the mode of a digital signal processing, which helps to significantly improve their performance.

According to the adviser of the Deputy General Director KRET Mikheev, formerly EW plant operator alone was to determine the characteristics of the type of signal to scout tracked object and choose the type of noise to it.

Digital technology has a large library of electronic memory and the operator shall report the types of enemy equipment, and offers him the most effective noise signals and optimum possible resistance algorithmsVladimir Mikheevadviser to the first deputy general director KRET

“Krasuha-C4”

This complex has absorbed all the best from previous generations EW equipment. In particular, from its predecessor – the station noise SPN-30 – “Krasuha” inherited a unique antenna system.

Another advantage of the new system is almost fully automated. If before the system is manually operated, the “Krasuhe-4” implemented the principle of “no touch technique, and she does not let you down”, that is the role of the operator is reduced to the role of the observer, and the main mode of operation – a centralized automated management.

The main purpose of “Krasuhi C4” – a cover of command posts, groups of forces, air defense systems, important industrial facilities from air radar reconnaissance and high-precision weapons.

Features broadband jamming station complex can effectively deal with all the modern radars used by aircraft of various types, as well as cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

YouTube / TASS

“Krasuha-2O”

This version of “Krasuhi” is intended for jamming of US systems Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) AWACS.

AWACS – reconnaissance aircraft is the most powerful and control on board which sits a payment. In order for this aircraft, “blind”, you need a lot of energy. So, the power and intelligence of the second “Krasuhi” enough to compete with this plane.

The entire complex is set within a few minutes, without human intervention, and post-deployment it is able to “turn off” the AWACS at a distance of several hundred kilometers.

“Moscow-1”

The system is designed to conduct electronic intelligence (passive radar), interaction and communication with command posts and anti-aircraft missile control radar troops, aircraft guidance points, target designation and management departments and individual interference jamming devices.

The structure of “Moscow-1” includes intelligence module and control center units (stations) interference.

The complex is able to:

  • carry radio and radio intelligence to a distance of 400 km,
  • classify all the radio-emitting means according to the degree of danger,
  • provide support en-route,
  • provide target distribution and display of all the information,
  • provide feedback of the effectiveness of the units and individual EW, which he manages.

“The debut of” complexes “Moscow” was held in March 2016 under the joint tactical exercises of air defense forces and aircraft in the Astrakhan region.

“Infauna”

The complex, designed instrument-United Corporation (OPK), and provides jamming signals intelligence, defense manpower, armored and motor vehicles on the impact of fire out of melee weapons and grenade launchers, as well as radio-controlled mines and explosive devices.

Broadband radio reconnaissance equipment significantly increases the protection radius covers the mobile objects of radio-controlled mines. Ability to install aerosol screens allows conceal the technique of high-precision weapons with video and laser guidance systems.

Currently, these systems on a standardized K1SH1 wheeled chassis (BTR-80 base) are mass-produced and supplied to various units of the Armed Forces.

“Borisoglebsk-2”

It is a complex electronic countermeasures (ECM), also developed by the defense industry, is the technical foundation pieces EW tactical connections .

Designed for radio reconnaissance and jamming HF lines, VHF terrestrial and aeronautical radio communication, subscriber terminals of cellular and trunk communication in tactical and operational-tactical level.

The basis of the complex consists of three types of jammers and click Control featured on APCs MT-LBU – traditional track basis for ground-based EW. The structure of each system includes up to nine units of mobile machinery.

The complex has implemented innovative technical solutions of construction means radio intelligence and automated control systems. Specifically, the applied energy and broadband signals structurally secretive providing noise immunity and speed data.

Range explored and suppressed the frequency expanded more than doubled compared with the previously supplied jammers, and the speed detection frequency increased more than 100 times.

Marine systems EW

These systems are designed to protect the ships of different classes of intelligence and fire damage. Feature them is that for each vehicle, depending on its type, displacement, and problems solved by them, there is a special set of EW.

The structure of the ship’s facilities include:

  • radio stations, and electronic intelligence,
  • active and passive means of electronic warfare,
  • machines providing camouflage the ship in various physical fields,
  • shooting device decoys, and others.

All these systems are integrated with the ship’s firing and information tools to increase the survivability and combat effectiveness of a ship.

TC-25E and MP-405E

They are the main shipborne EW complexes.

Provide protection from the use of radio-controlled weapons and ship-based air through the creation of active and passive jamming.

TC-25Eprovides a pulse misleading and simulation of interference with digital copies of the signals for all major classes of ships. The complex is able to simultaneously analyze up to 256 targets and to ensure effective protection of the ship.

MP-405E – to equip ships of small tonnage.

He is able to forestall discovery, analyze and classify the types of electronic emitting vehicles and their carriers according to the degree of danger, and provide electronic suppression of all current and future reconnaissance and enemy weapons.

Specialist Day for electronic warfare. dossier

Source: http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3205728


Filed under: Electronic Warfare, Information operations, Russia Tagged: Electronic Warfare, EW, Russia

Bellingcat: The Russian Federation fired on Ukraine with Grads more than 300 times

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 Bellingcat has now proved that Russia was complicit in firing directly on Ukraine from Russia.

Russia lied about being involved in Ukraine. Russia directly attacked Ukraine.

</end editorial>


The international group of journalists of Bellingcat has established that Russia fired on Ukraine from the Russian side of the border with Grad rocket systems more than 300 times – from Russian territory.

The head of the organization Eliot Higgins has told about it to the German TV channel ARD, writes Ukrinform.

“We investigated attacks of summer of 2014 in Ukraine. A lot of things proved that firings were carried out from other side of the border, from Russia, but there weren’t enough proofs”, – Higgins has noted.

Now, according to him, proofs have appeared on the basis of the analysis of satellite data: having entered open programs of Google, “everyone can see that from the middle of July, 2014 of the field (in East Ukraine) were fired from Grads, more than 300 times”, it is noted in the reporting.

On the same cards it is possible to find also the jet systems of volley fire hidden in shelters.

According to journalists, the Russian military shot at least in 5 directions. There are video indications and on social networks, and to establish precisely places where they have been removed, it was also possible with the help of Google Maps, Higgins notes.

“All this demonstrates that it were the planned attacks”, – the journalist notes.

Embedded video below.

(translated from Russian by my Chrome browser)

Bellingcat: “Grad” firing from Russia. (16 April 2016 ARD)

Published on Apr 16, 2016

ARD Report on how Elliot Higgins of Bellingcat naryl evidence that the Ukrainian army has repeatedly shelled from the territory of Russia.
I’d like to believe that soon the Germans will remove the same (or better, goraaazdo longer), and about our InformNapalm.
Already there guys Bellingkata dug much more …
Actually, InformNapalm about this in July 2014 and wrote. With the proof … the https: //informnapalm.org/ua/vyznachen … By popular demand of workers, laid-The Quality in the HD: the https:? V = jE5vm //www.youtube.com/watch …

It is known that since the beginning of military aggression on Donbass journalists of Bellingcat repeatedly provided proofs of presence of the Russian troops and arms in the territory of Ukraine in spite of the fact that the authorities of the Russian Federation assured of the return.

Also experts of Bellingcat participated in a crash investigation of the Malaysian Boeing which has been brought down by fighters over the territory of Donetsk region in 2014, all 298 people have onboard died. In the report names of the Russian military which, according to rassledovatel, are involved in accident of MH17 were entered.

Source: https://news.pn/en/RussiaInvadedUkraine/158849



Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia, Ukraine Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

StopFakeNews #80 with Irena Chalupa

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Screen Shot 2016-04-18 at 12.08.37 PMThe latest edition of StopFake News with Irena Chalupa.

This week’s fakes includes:

  • claims that Odessa’s iconic statue of its Duke de Richelieu will be dismantled;
  • a Russian publication accuses President Poroshenko of cutting benefits for those Ukrainians who participated in the Chornobyl nuclear disaster clean-up operation;
  • distorted claims about abolishing EU visas for Ukrainians and more.

Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia, Ukraine Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

EAK Report – Internet and “information warfare” of president Putin

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April 18, 2016 – 16:20

Aggressive propaganda accompanies Russian aggression on Ukraine, writes Akademia Europejska.

Kremlin’s “information warfare theory” grew bigger and became a crucial element of the “hybrid warfare”.

Kremlin surprised the West with its propaganda activity, having used Internet very skillfully in their actions. Huge means are being invested in propaganda activities in Russia. Targeted area is Russia itself, Ukraine and almost all of the western countries. The essential message of Kremlin’s propaganda is not only the necessity of recreating the Russian Empire but also the exposure of the decadence of the democratic societies of the West. This message is to justify the need for a civilizational change, which is to be done on the whole continent, and steered by Russia.

Kremlin’s propaganda serves both lying in the news feed, as disintegrating Western societies and moldingof the attitudes of recruited elite supporters.

Kremlin’s propaganda is largely addressed to marginal circles, both far-right and far-left (or post-communist) oriented, as well as amorphous groups of the “outraged”, willing and ready to question “the system” of the West.

The “information warfare” done with the use of Internet is largely correlated with the traditional activities of agents.

The influence of Kremlin’s propaganda is especially dangerous in social media, where it targets mostly young people of yet unformed views and personalities.

Activities on the Internet – the virtual world – are to lead to activities in the real world. The ultimate goal of the informational warfare is not only the propagandistic success, but winning the war, gaining territories, power and influence. Kremlin’s military activities are tightly correlated with propaganda activities. Winning the war on propaganda precedes deciding on taking military actions.

One of the ways of stopping Kremlin should be taking an adequate response to its propaganda activities. It calls for both a proper theoretical thought, as well as a reaction from governments of countries supporting social activity on the Internet.

Psychological warfare and the disintegration of society

The war, which Russia is having against Ukraine today, is not only related to breaking the post- World War II rules of engagement, but is also ran in a new way, which was unknown to a certain degree before. The phenomenon had been named “the hybrid warfare”, initially paying attention mainly to the military aspect of the issue, symbolically represented by “little green men”.

The focus of attention had been shifting to what military actions of the hybrid-war are often accompanied by; intense propaganda activities, with Internet being the main tool. They are planned and carried out in Russia, having deep supply source in Russian literature on so-called “information warfare”.

Leading theoreticians of this war are Aleksander Dugin, one of the prominent ideologists of the Russian nationalism, and an ex-KGB officer from the “information front”, Igor Panarin. Joanna Darczewska, an analyst from OSW (Center for Eastern Studies), writes:

Russian authors describe “information warfare” as influencing consciousness of the masses as part of the global rivalry between systems of civilizations in the arena of information (…) Therefore, in some measure, by definition mixing military aspects with the non-military, technological (cyberspace) with social (information space), directly referring to the Cold War and psychological wars between the East and the West. 1

According to Panarin, information warfare should imitate military operations and is to be a planned manipulation. This propaganda war machine follows rules of: mass and long-term action, the desirable effect (irrespectively of the facts, the information desired by the propaganda is to be spread and repeated), the rule of emotional awakening (making people act irrationally, without thinking), the rule of intelligibility (the message is simplified, shown in black and white), the rule of reputed obviousness (contains associations with well-known stereotypes and myths). In other words, it is about fabricating information and fragmenting the public opinion, intimidating, and creating the impression that minority is majority, introducing chaos to channels of communication of an open, pluralistic society, viewed as the main threat by Putin’s Russia.

Modern Russian war on information is largely composed of well-known propaganda tactics of a totalitarian regime. Consequently, it is not an overstatement to compare Putin’s propaganda officers to Goebbels, although earlier propagandist standards of the bolshevics and stalinists seem to be more influential. Use of Internet is a brand new addition in the “information warfare”. It is not in the least about the mere ability to share information (in this case disinformation). Internet created completely new structures of social communication, it deeply changes the structure of society in a way not yet fully explored, and creates new psychosocial mechanisms.”Information warfare” is a propaganda project involving much deeper mechanisms.

Against the will of those Internet theoreticians, who idealistically believe in cyber-utopianism – picturing Internet as a giant forum of ideas, with free spoken public opinion – it is to be used for an aggression, escalating disintegrative tendencies and becoming a tool for questioning the democratic order of open societies. Any accomplishments so far of the theoreticians of the Internet are used as tools for mass disinformation, e.g. the rule of hive. Internet is used as an instrument for the essential content is to be dictated by “leaders of opinion” through modeled “web hubs”. You can say that Russian propagandists are creating an alternative idea of using Internet as a weapon, completely opposite to how cyber-utopianism views it2.

The internet environment of Alexandr Dugin is a perfect example of such a web and a system of hubs. It consists of a few dozen mutually connected internet portals. This is a very powerful tool of influence in Russian internet, consequently in Russian society. His intoxication with nationalism and post-Soviet revisionism (desire for reclaiming the empire with its areas of influence and dominance) is greatly a success of the “information warfare” Kremlin is having with their society. 3 Similar methods of “information warfare” are being introduced throughout the countries of the European Union, Poland being one of the areas of focus.

This very particular way of propagandizing had been given the name trolling4. Although the phenomenon of trolling had been widely noticed, the its methods of functioning are yet to be properly studied and analyzed. The most superficial understanding of trolling views it as a lie, which can be shared with masses, thanks to Internet. Truly, trolling is incomparably more complex and it cannot be understood outside a broader social context, nor without proper understanding of its psychosocial mechanisms.

On the rudimentary level trolling is sharing memes 5 – as content units (it could be one sentence, a picture, symbol) are called in sociology of the Internet. Trolling seems to be a technical act of using the Internet for reaching out a vast amount of people with a propagandistic, and therefore false information.

For example; supporters of French right receive memes about defending Christianity, post-communist German left get memes about defending peace and pacifism against American militarism, while Slovak receive content warning about German dominance in the EU. The goal is not convincing all recipients to one, consistent group of contents.

That is why no old-style ideology, like communism, is the content of memes. The primary objective of trolling is the disorganization and manipulation of enemy’s public opinion, and disorganization of society, not promoting any specific ideas.

While traditional propaganda referred to a consistent and uniformed ideology in order to persuade targeted social group to support idea of the choice, trolling’s objective is mainly social disintegration. Propagandistic content aimed at different groups, often of contradicting contents, are to build divisions, cause conflicts (e.g. “Volyn slaughter” meme is to strengthen the Polish-Ukrainian antagonism and create an impression of the authorities trifling with the memory of the victims).

Toxic memes therefore have a task much more complicated from an ordinary lie. They are shared throughout various place and can often reach groups of contracting values. It makes toxic memes greatly differentiated so that they can serve different goals, with different variations dedicated for different recipients.

It must be noted that trolling in principle doesn’t offer new content, only strengthening the ones already existing, emphasizing some contents over other.

Disintegrating public opinion is to cause insecurity and lack of trust. The anonymous, frustrated, lonely, part of an easily-controlled mob (mob being a crucial conception at Hannah Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism). The main objective is breaking the structure of a democratic discourse and destroying open society. 6

While we will not find an old type, consistent ideology behind the “information warfare”, it does come as part of a clearly presented view of the world. Democracy and the West are seen as decadent and nearing their end, and they inevitably have to be replaced with a new civilizational order. Escalating all tensions and conflicts (e.g. traditionalism-modernism, centralized state-regionalisms, social identity-individualism etc) is to lead to disintegration and destruction. It is to be a world of uncertainty faced with the resilience and strength of the “Russian project”. Only in this context can one see the importance of the role of the demonstrative lie used by Putin, Lavrov and other Kremlin representatives. A lie is a demonstration of force and decisiveness showing the doubtful ones the inevitability of what is coming (you can see a similar pattern in the strategy of ISIS.

Information warfare conducted with the use of Internet is an important, perhaps the most important element of the hybrid war. The military force is part of propaganda of fear and can be fully used when “an advantage in information war is reached, causing uncertainty, divisions, and defeatism”.

Continued at http://www.stopfake.org/en/report-eak-internet-and-information-warfare-of-president-putin/


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

Russian Propaganda in Georgia and the EU’s Measures

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April 18, 2016 – 15:59

Russian propaganda in Georgia becomes more sophisticated. While media continues to be the most effective propaganda tool, Russia makes a wider use of specific NGOs and clergy in promoting anti-western rhetoric in the country.

Russian Propaganda in Georgia bears fruit

Last year the Georgia’s Media Development Foundation published a research about Russian propaganda in the country, based on the year-long observations over the content in the local media, statements of the NGOs and public figures. Quite predictable, media turn out to be the main source of the anti-western rhetoric in Georgia, followed by politicians and religious servants.

The methods used by the Russian channels, compared to the propaganda during the Soviet times, have become more refined. Media specialists play with most sensitive human issues such as religion, tradition and family values. The surveys show that the number of Georgians who are concerned with respect for local traditions in case the country enters the EU have increased twofold over the last two years, up to 28%.

Photo – crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com

Moscow doesn’t rely much on the classical soft power instruments, such as language or culture. Anti-western messages spread by the Kremlin-controlled media say, for instance, that the USA fights against Georgian church and traditions. Examples of the narratives by the Russian media in Georgia include: ”Georgia has to stay with the Russian Federation because of its geography, common 200-year history and the Orthodox Christianity”, ”Georgian and Russian people are friendly to each other and only Georgian governments betray this friendship”, or ”the West is not a reliable partner and Georgia is in an illusion about its Western perspective”.

Russian TV channels on the Georgian media landscape

In Georgia, we can define four media audiences according to the preferred language, which are Georgian, Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian. Abkhaz and Ossetian audiences in the two breakaway regions need special attention. Russian is the main language for most of ethnic minorities in Georgia, (around 20 percent of the population), as well as the communication tool between different ethnic groups and audiences.

The National Democratic Institute research shows that among foreign TV channels a large part of the Georgian population prefers Russian not Western ones.  Young Georgian generation often does not Russian, but Georgians in their 40s and older speak Russian well and watch the Russian language media (TV/Newspapers). In most of Georgian cinemas, even non-Russian movies are demonstrated in Russian.

The Kremlin uses its propaganda tools not only via TV channels, but also with the help of certain newspapers, social networks and NGOs. For instance, the Georgian branch of the  Eurasian Society campaigns against the NATO and the EU and promotes so-called Eurasianism.  Part of the Orthodox clergy of Georgia also promotes anti-Western propaganda. The Russian Orthodox Church enjoys quite significant influence over the Georgian clergy.

As it comes to the matter of national security, it makes sense to set up a special counter propaganda center which will provide adequate information to all interested citizens and serve as a positive mediator in interethnic relations.

How the EU fights Russian propaganda

The European Union aims at fighting Russian propaganda by supporting independent media in the Eastern Neighbourhood countries and increasing awareness of “disinformation activities by external actors”, according to a strategic EU’s Communications action plan. The document also states that communication towards the east should “first and foremost focus on the development of positive and effective messages regarding EU policies towards the region”. The document, drafted by the EU’s diplomatic corps, also calls for efforts to persuade people in the benefits of EU-style reforms.

Last year a special communications unit called the East StratCom Team was set up, focused on proactive communication of the EU policies and activities in the six EaP countries and beyond, including Russia itself. Explaining the reasons to create the East StratCom Team, the European Council stressed „the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns.”

The action plan also calls for the 28-nation EU to promote more actively freedom of the media in the “eastern neighbourhood” region, mainly with the participation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. Proposals include targeted training and “capacity building” for journalists and media representants in the region. Brussels will also “consider how best it can support training for journalists experiencing conflict situations, to better enable them to report on issues of relevance to local populations.” The action plan doesn’t mention the creation of new media outlets in Russian language, but it notes that a “number of Member States are already increasing their support for broadcasting in the Russian language to cater to national minorities. In the meantime the EU will continue its support at local level for independent media, including Russian language media, to ensure that citizens have access to alternative sources of information in their local language.”

Source: http://www.stopfake.org/en/russian-propaganda-in-georgia-and-the-eu-s-measures/


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Georgia, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Georgia, Russia, Russian propaganda

“We are at war”

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“We are at war”.  Russia is at war.

  • Panama papers
  • Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakh fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan)
  • Belarus President Lukashenko’s “strange behavior”seeking alliance with Turkey
  • Brazil President Roussef’s impeachment
  • Sabotage in North Caucasus
  • Criticism of the Russian government
  • Sanctions as a result of Crimea

All ‘provocations targeting Russia’.

Russia is always the victim.  </end sarcasm>

  • “But the main external threat to Russia comes from the territories of former Soviet republics.” 
  • “That is the Russian way or another will have to intervene, not for the sake of the establishment there of its rules, and to protect their interests.”

These two sentences worry me.  Does Russia intend to forcibly seize their former territories?

Julia Brazhnikova is not a published author, nor is she a dissident, a politician, nor active in anything of note.  But when the Russian Foreign Ministry highlights her blog piece, people notice.

Will Russia use this to crack down on former Soviet republics?   Will Russia use this as justification for steps leading to invasions?  Will Russia use this as justification for more hyper-aggressive actions outside Russia’s borders?

On a side-note, notice that all these hyper-aggressive actions take place away from Russia, creating a false buffer zone around Russia?   Are these sort of an anti-Gleiwitz incident?

</end editorial>


Julia Brazhnikova

The jokes are over. Information on the Russian attack proved so effective that began directly to threaten national security. This is clearly stated in a tough, outspoken, and very pragmatic article, Alexander Bastrykin, published in “Kommersant”. It is recognized as an accomplished fact: against us using novoizobretёnnyh and hitherto unknown methods of conducting military actions. Therefore, we must act accordingly. As the war.

The attack in the modern sense – it is not always armed clashes or fighting. This, above all, the destruction of the mentality of the population, in order to manipulate them.

Too many negatives befell Russia in recent weeks. Panamanian documents.The outbreak of the conflict in Karabakh. The strange behavior of the leader of the Union State Alexander Lukashenko, for no reason at all to put things Turkey. Does not abate the activity of the fifth column. Impeachment Brazilian President Dilma Roussef. Frequent sabotage in the North Caucasus. The ongoing recruitment of Russian and CIS citizens to terrorist organizations.

Shrugs off event and say that we are fine – then abandon objectivity and sober look at the situation, and, therefore, give undeserved handicap opponent.

It is, however, more specifically accents. Firstly, all of the above events – and this is just tip of the iceberg – are clearly provocative. Secondly, they somehow are the consequence or result of the information war being waged against Russia.

In the inside of the Russian Federation the main danger is posed by the remnants of NPOs and NGOs. In large cities, first and foremost, of course, in Moscow and in St. Petersburg, feeding a huge number of media, and it is unclear who funded analytical, political, sociological agencies, centers and institutes. They are, in fact, are the producers and distributors of those same provocation in question.

By creating an unstable mental environment, sort of a swamp, they emit fluids designed to give rise to doubts in the whole positive. Drafts of these figures are based on two key settings: 1) all the achievements and successes of Russia leveled, 2) all actions of the authorities declared ineffective. Why joined Crimea – you can see, there are some problems. And why not joined the Donbass – there are also some problems. Why war in Syria – contacted in vain. Why do we need these EAEC, SCO, CSTO, CIS – all sit on our necks.Why the Central Bank raised the rate – it was necessary to omit. Why I dropped when it was necessary to raise?

Their main weapon in order of importance – Russian Internet segment.Actually, according to the theme, you can track the activity of trolls and provocateurs, causing their uncontrolled irritation. The key of them – is to support the economic policy of the government. It seems that someone is very influential forbidden to speak positively about the financial unit and the government as a whole. Any steps the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Development and the Central Bank in advance ridiculed and presented harmful to society. But every attempt to objectively evaluate their tactics is downright furious.

Criticism of the government is reduced to several positions, declared, of course, without any proof:

1) all economists and government bloc in the Kremlin – the Liberals.Although neither Nabiullina nor Ulyukayev nor Gref never made statements, even remotely resembling a liberal;

2) The Government and the Central Bank in its actions are subject to the West, in particular the IMF. But how this relationship affects their decisions – in the arguments of the “patriots” will not understand either one analyst and financier;

3) the government traitors! The most common slogan to find the enemy at all times. Recall: in an interview on the results of the “straight line” the President said that the government trusts and believes it is quite capable.Otherwise it can not be. To assume that a team of scouts near many years sitting candid pests – thus assume sorry, incompetent, and those and others.

The articles and comments on “traitors financiers” and “government, subordinate to the West” accents frankly distracts from external causes of the current economic problems. This is, firstly, the global economic crisis, in one way or another affects all countries of the world. Secondly, it sanctions and pressure on the Russian trading partners. Under these conditions, any inherent weaknesses of the Russian economy, such as the notorious resource orientation and insufficient development of domestic production, will inevitably be secondary.

Another trend lies in the publications of the “economic failure” related to efforts subconsciously cast a shadow over President. According to the principle of “tell me who your friends are and I’ll tell you who you are.” Since Putin is satisfied with the government, then, he shared his views. And again and Ulyukayev views Gref harm to the state, then … Complete themselves.Going wild president’s rating protects it from such infoatak. But abandoned suspicions are deposited in the unconscious to be activated as required. Of course, it is far more dangerous than open attack, which is always easy to refute.

On the same direction stuffing working overseas, like the movie about the secret riches of Putin or publications about the Panamanian offshore. They hit on the president’s friends, indirectly aiming at him. When people cease to trust “corrupt” Putin’s entourage, then gradually it will transfer distrust and state leader.

To oppose information attacks can only alternative information. If the articles “for Putin”, thank God, is greater than, the internal policies do criticized mercilessly. And at this stage, support is needed here. It is worth paying attention to the authors of the materials, without proof denouncing Russian financiers. Many of them are not averse to personal insults against the authorities, which may be a reason to remove them from the pages of websites and social networks.

All these facts outline the direction of future attacks “fifth column” and the non-systemic opposition. Its subject will be the executive and economic policy, which adheres to Russia.

Democratically blind eye to the obvious agents “from abroad” is becoming risky. The fact that the post of Director of the State Archive many years sat Sergei Mironenko, regularly expressing ideas against the state, not to say fascist, is a flagrant negligence on the part of those responsible for the Russian information space. Allow from the official statements of the rank that feat heroes Panfilov, is a myth, and Vlasov do have to justify – is unconditional surrender to the “fifth column”. The scary thing is that this is really done on a regular basis.

Next vector “brain” attacks on Russia – it is always delicate and extremely sensitive national issue. The most striking examples of attempts to warm up discontent in this area – information attacks on Ramzan Kadyrov. The figure of the Chechen leader, infinitely loyal to the President, became a sign of unity of Russia and not without reason infuriating non-systemic opposition.

However, in the Internet space rotates a number of semantic clichés accessing the subconscious archetypes. They are connected with the figures of the Jewish and Asian nationalities. All of them are characterized by trolls exclusively using derogatory adjectives and contemptuous epithets. Actively exaggerated about stuffing their cherished plans for the destruction of the white / Slavic race, like the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, “Asian dominance in Moscow”, etc. They contrasted novoizobretёnnaya “ancient Slavic faith”, in fact, imbued with extremism and calls to ostracize foreigners.Infoprovokatory very cleverly used attitudinal stereotypes, remaining even with the 90s, transferring them to the modern stage. Needless to say, as far as it is dangerous in any multicultural society, especially located at such a serious mental pressure.

. Next . Interestingly, Bastrykin drew attention to the situation in Crimea bazaar, pardon the expression, scandals in the region, the birthplace of “Russian Spring” – the phenomenon is not exactly random.That is, since the annexation of Crimea, Russia began to lead an active independent political line. Due to the Crimea, at least formally, we were under sanctions. Its origins are 80-percent rating from Putin Crimea. If all of these logical chains to remove the Crimea, the cause-and-effect relationships, has taken root in the Russian collective unconscious, may weaken or collapse. This, in turn, greatly hamper the growth of self-consciousness began in Russia and undermine the credibility of the government, which primarily seeks opponent.

“Our friends” are not idiots and extremely refined by working with other people’s mentality. West says the uncompromising position of the Crimea that they still hope to return it to Ukraine. Therefore, they will continue to be taken of all kinds of provocation, discrediting the process of integration of the Crimea to Russia and, ultimately, the outcome of the referendum.

It is necessary to remind all residents of the Crimea, which, if not for their firm will, the Black Sea Fleet would be in the hands of Ukraine, and the United States, and NATO bases would have settled in the Black Sea. This is likely to lead to full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, and in fact – with the United States and the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, their position on the entry of the peninsula to Russia simply must be unshakable.

And the leaders of the Republic of Crimea would be worth to remember that they, like all Crimeans, steel for the world and a symbol of the new Russia of Russians. It is a symbol, of course, very difficult, because it is connected with great responsibility, not only for their own actions, but also for its image.Any personal ambitions should be forgotten forever and prevent factors that could affect the course laid by the Government for the Crimea.

In addition, according to the failure of many projects launched in the Crimea two years ago ( http: //ria.ru/tourism/20160415 … . The country should deal with the professionalism and competence of existing personnel Sitting 20 years in the Ukrainian reality is clearly not officials cope with the role of carriers of the Russian national idea. not wanting to reformat is necessary to change, and as soon as possible. Otherwise, they will remain one slot in which “our colleagues” will always be able to drive a wedge.

But the main external threat to Russia comes from the territories of former Soviet republics.

Since “our colleagues” love to combine purpose they prepare a momentary break in relations between Russia and the former republics, primarily within the EAEC, and the explosion of dissatisfaction with the government, especially its economic bloc, in Russia itself. What leads a double blow from the outside and from the inside – is not difficult to imagine.

Probably not whether adepts LIH seeping in Russia, we have a long time did not pay attention to the situation prevailing in the post-Soviet space. Very concerned about the fact that article Bastrykin among countries – terrorist recruitment channels named hitherto considered relatively calm in this respect, Moldova and Belarus. This confirms the view that the entire post-Soviet area is under surveillance in the United States. And all Implemented (Ukraine) and upcoming (Moldova, Transnistria) coups, fighting, fighting – it’s not just the capture of individual countries to American hegemony. It is a springboard for the development of the preparation of an attack on Russia.

It should result in one detail. Immediately after the aggravation of the situation in Nagorno Karabakh was held two telephone conversations of the Russian and Kazakh presidents, with an interval of one day. This suggests that the Karabakh conflict threatens not only directly involved in his party. It is directed primarily against the Eurasian Union and is a danger to the integration processes in the post-Soviet space.

And if it was only the Karabakh …

One has not yet identified areas of work of the fifth column – its introduction in integration associations on the lands of the former Soviet Union.

An article about the Belarusian president’s visit to Turkey (! Well, what he forgot) posits the idea that Russia’s policy in relations with the former republics absolutely disastrous ( http: //regnum.ru/news/polit/21 … At sufficiently high quality diplomatic work Belarus would be so itself does not lead. We clearly underestimated the technique of brainwashing our partners in the USSR and the time did not understand what it is we are facing. Russia has long allowed Lukashenko all sorts of feints in his address, and now he went to establish contact with inadequate Erdogan.

The point, of course, not only in Belarus, as this is just one example. A similar situation exists in varying degrees in all the republics. Here’s an article with the intimidating title “Russia is losing influence on Transnistria» ( http: //www.ng.ru/editorial/201 …

Leaving the issue can no longer be left to chance. The situation in the post-Soviet Union is that Karabakh and Donbass could erupt at any time, anywhere. Again: the ultimate goal of these conflicts are not their members.They are the result should be the rupture of relations with Russia.

The first and most painful question – is the degree of interference in the affairs of another state.

Sami republic can not understand in their own countries due to the fact that they do not belong to these countries. In this space hosts an open enemy of Russia. He spends the public anti-Russian policy, constantly arranges provocations and conflicts in order to cause the Russian economy, fashion, and sometimes, as in Ukraine, and military damage.

That is the Russian way or another will have to intervene, not for the sake of the establishment there of its rules, and to protect their interests. This must be done, of course, not with the pressure point on the governments of neighboring countries, especially since many of them are actually in the service of the American NGO. This can be done only from the standpoint of clarifying them and to their populations the true extent of foreign intervention and its unfortunate and even disastrous consequences for their countries.

Learn Lukashenko and the Transnistrian government to the principles of honor, I think, is useless. To persuade them not to go to Turkey and did not enter into an agreement with opaque Europe behind Moscow – even more so.However, the methods of the American demon expulsion from the post-Soviet territories, of course, there is.

Keep in mind that the main weapon of the Dark – a lie. All that lies in 90% of cases, works for the enemy.

Russian business should develop programs to strengthen Russia’s economic presence in the post-Soviet Union. To do this, identify the mechanism of capture by American and Western companies the economic resources of the Middle foreign States with considerable raw material reserves: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, etc. No need to be an expert to realize that the lion’s share of income goes to colonize donor States, and multinational corporations. When this information will be made public, the enemy will lose one of the top levels of their defense – secrets.

In order to eliminate the non-systemic opposition structures embedded in integration projects (the main target for them – EAEC), it is necessary to start to monitor jointly with Russian companies in the former USSR. It should assess their real effectiveness and profitability, compared with businesses, effectively owned by the US and its allies. In cases of inefficiency and unprofitability even have to raise the question of their future feasibility.

Ministry of Culture is high time to take action on a significant intensification of cultural cooperation with the republics. The task should include not only the development of relations and joint leisure for your own pleasure, and to develop tactics to otvoёvyvaniyu mentality of the local population engaged enemy ideas. This direct strategic interests of Russia and its security. It lies in the cultural activities the main burden for the creation of a positive image of Russia in the “former”.

For this very worth to identify all the distortions of the history taught in schools, secondary and higher educational institutions of the CIS and Baltic countries, aimed at the creation of opinions about Russian-interventionists, invades the Soviet republics time right people, the so-called “dictatorship of the Kremlin.” Make public the juggling of the facts and on the basis of archival documents expose their lies, bringing it to the attention of the government and the population of the country.

For the sake of preserving the memory of the Great Patriotic War need tough diplomatic measures in response to public attempts at revival of fascism, with the connivance of the authorities, as is the case in the Baltic countries. It is necessary to finally stop the flow of offensive remarks and actions against the Soviet army. Why veterans living there have to endure the abolition of May 9, the broken monuments and ripped St. George ribbons?

And the main thing. It’s time to familiarize the Russian public with the present state of the Russian population in the former republics. Speak the number of Russian, who left after the collapse of the Soviet Union not only from Ukraine, but also from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus.Describe the position of the Russian language there is, among other things, which is the language of international communication in the CIS. Compare it with the distribution of the number of hours set aside for teaching English.And do not miss the sight of the that Britain and America are God knows where, but forgotten republics of Russia – nearby, in two steps. And the common historical past are much longer than in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and the United States … It is time to take your eyes from the suffering of Ukraine, which, in general, everything is clear for a long time, and pay attention to her “sisters.”

Some would say that it is, they say, will lead to a deterioration of relations with the “former”. Yes, the referendum in the Crimea and its reunification with Russia led to a sharp conflict not only with Ukraine, but also from the US and the West. But the truth is that these relationships deteriorate from overseas without us. Here it is necessary to watch that would cost, so to speak, more expensive: a broken rather conditional friendship or a new war.But America is committed to bring the post-Soviet countries is to open war with Russia. The last attempt – it is Donbass, Transdniestria, Karabakh. The next scheduled obviously, Belarus, Kazakhstan and beyond it, as the founders of the Eurasian Union.

It would be better to call this war is not the information, and the mental.This is a war for our thoughts. The enemy made a target of the thinking of whole nations. It handles the conscious and subconscious of our neighbors, and inside Russia poisons our souls through lie fifth column.

Yes, the opposition will require significant efforts. We still have not mastered the techniques of working with the collective unconscious, which are zakordonnye spin doctors, and prefer to continue to rely on intelligence and statistics. But according to the article, the head of the Investigative Committee, we are already in the front area. If you do not take urgent preventive measures, war is inevitable.

Source: https://cont.ws/post/250906


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, information warfare, Russia, Russian propaganda

Russia: “It is time to put an effective barrier to information war”

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Please note the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia Alexander Bastrykin is referring to information activities outside Russia which he is asserting have increased extremist activities inside Russia.

The Investigative Committee of Russia is supposed to be neutral, but this appears to be a strongly biased recommendation.

De facto he is asking to restrict this information inside Russia OR restrict the information outside of Russia.  He is not sufficiently specific in his call for action, what he says is illegal, immoral or unethical if enacted outside Russia. Internally, only, he is advocating further restricting free speech within Russia, which is already highly restricted.

The last decade of Russia, and a number of other countries, live in so-called hybrid war unleashed by the US and its allies. This war is being waged on different fronts – political, economic, informational, and legal. And in recent years, it has moved into a qualitatively new phase of open confrontation.

Notice, he says the US and its allies are waging hybrid war against Russia.  Russia is always the victim. </end sarcasm>

</end editorial>


(Translated by my Chrome browser)

Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia Alexander Bastrykin – on ways to combat extremism in Russia

04/18/2016

Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia, General of Justice of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Law, Professor Alexander Bastrykin, specially for the “authorities” – the ways and methods of struggle against extremism in Russia.

In 2015, the Russian Federation has been a negative trend in crime and extremist terrorist orientation.

Registered extremist crimes in 1329, which is 28.5% more than in 2014 (1034). The growing number of such crimes recorded in 56 regions of Russia.

The number of crimes such as public calls to extremist activity (art. 280 of the Criminal Code) and inciting hatred or hostility, and humiliation of human dignity (Art. 282), has increased by almost 40% compared to 2014 year.

Registered 42 crimes on the organization of an extremist organization (+ 2.4%).

And noted a significant increase (36.3%) in the number of terrorist crimes committed on the territory of the Russian Federation. Total recorded crimes in 1538 (2014 – 1128).

It prevented at the stage of preparation or attempted crime 70. With the use of the Internet committed 133 terrorist crimes.

The last decade of Russia, and a number of other countries, live in so-called hybrid war unleashed by the US and its allies

A particularly difficult situation is observed in the North Caucasus Federal District, which accounts for the bulk of terrorist crimes – crimes in 1168, or 75.9% (plus 32.3%) (in 2014 – 883).

The growth of this type of criminal manifestations contributed to both external (geopolitical) and domestic factors.

The last decade of Russia, and a number of other countries, live in so-called hybrid war unleashed by the US and its allies. This war is being waged on different fronts – political, economic, informational, and legal. And in recent years, it has moved into a qualitatively new phase of open confrontation.

The main elements of the economic impact of the steel trade and financial sanctions, dumping the war on the hydrocarbon market and currency wars. Skillfully manipulating huge dollar weight, States bring down the national currencies of developing countries. Russian organizations have been blocked channels of external long-term borrowing, which formed the basis for the development of investment real (industrial) sectors. It is noteworthy that the restrictions on the movement of finance are not affected short-term financing, which is currently widely used for speculative pressure on our national currency. In many respects the result of these measures was the deep devaluation of the ruble, falling real incomes, the decline in industrial production, the recession in the economy. There was a budget deficit and the ensuing consequences in the form of the sequestration of its expenditure, as well as increasing the fiscal burden to increase revenue.

Unfortunately, the tools of war have increasingly become international law and based on it justice.

Obvious examples of this was the decision in cases of Yukos, the decision on the murder of former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, the report of the Security Council of the Netherlands on the basis of the investigation into the collapse of the Malaysian Boeing MN17, check FBI legitimacy of awarding Russia and Qatar the right to host the world championships in 2018 and 2022 years, kidnapping, forcible transfer and condemnation of the United States to the long terms of imprisonment of our citizens Viktor Bout and Konstantin Yaroshenko and so on. d.

More than a thousand Russian citizens have left the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in the armed conflict

However, the most devastating effects of the steel of the information war. Supporting radical Islamic and other radical ideologies, the United States is completely destabilized the Middle East. The effects of artificially initiated coups, revolutions and crises in the region still suffers from Europe, which have captivated crowds of refugees, preaching qualitatively different socio-cultural traditions and displacing the local population. The consequence of such a policy and become terrorist organization “Islamic State”, “Dzhebhat en-Nusra”, “Al-Qaeda” and others involved in the armed conflict in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Manpower for the replenishment of these organizations are recruited throughout the world, including in Russia.

More than a thousand Russian citizens have left the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in the armed conflict. For these individuals have already filed 469 criminal cases. Of these, 135 people were killed in clashes with Syrian government troops.

The main channels of entry of Russian citizens in areas with increased terrorist activity pass through Turkey and Egypt, where they get both directly and through third countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) under the pretext of resting, receiving theological education, business and t. d.

The undermining of the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union, which is based on brotherhood principle was the peoples, was also initiated from the outside and was based on the methods of ethnic strife

The main reception of the information war – it is close to the manipulation of a particular social group by its ideology of radicalization. It is clear that a system of religious, ethnic, cultural and religious values – is the formation of social existence, which determines is the most significant feature of any nation (nation) and other similar social groups, such as self-identification. Many of these values are formed, maintained and passed on from generation to generation for centuries. Therefore, no nation is unwilling to give up their identity. Perhaps it is the only community of values, which it is ready to defend with arms and, as they say, to the last drop of blood.

Aware of the devastating effect of conflict on the basis of ethnic (ethnic) hatred, USA bet is this information element. At the current level of understanding of the problem it is clear that the undermining of the ideological foundation of the Soviet Union, which is based on brotherhood principle was the peoples, was also initiated from the outside and was based on the methods of ethnic strife. Not by chance in the early 1990s, almost simultaneously begin to arise numerous ethnic conflicts – Nagorno Karabakh, Georgian-Abkhaz, Ossetian-Ingush, Transnistria. At the same time held the first mass nationalist protests of citizens in Kyiv. Besides undermining the state and was conducted by the anti-Soviet agitation and financing the political opposition in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia and other countries.

Of course, in the representation of the local population what is happening at that time aware of how local conflicts. However, now it is clear that all of these were part of the initial collision, yet hidden, information warfare phase.

Undoubtedly, information and ideological “weapon” will be applied in the future. This is evidenced by the increase in the US government budget spending on a program of so-called development of democratic institutions in the countries bordering on Russia and Central Asian states. The true meaning of these assets becomes evident from the name itself flow articles, called “counter Russian aggression through public diplomacy and foreign aid programs, and the creation of stable government in Europe.”

Total for this article on expenses in 2017 allocated about $ 4.3 billion, of which about one billion will go to the program of so-called fight against corruption and to maintain democracy in countries neighboring Russia.

Received the earlier part of this program the money has already been spent by various non-governmental organizations under the guise of promoting education, development of civil society and other seemingly useful purpose. The result was inciting anti-Russian sentiment in the states adjacent to our country, the formation of Russia’s pro-American and pro-Western so-called non-system opposition, the spread of inter-confessional and political extremism within our country.

Recent developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh suggests repeated attempts to force the opposition of Russia to undermine the peace between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples and create another hotbed of war on the border with Russia.

It seems that it is time to put an effective barrier to this information war. We need a tough, appropriate and balanced response. This is particularly relevant in the context of the upcoming elections and the possible risks of destabilizing the political situation activation forces. Enough already play lzhedemokratiyu following of pseudo-values.After all, democracy or democracy – it is nothing like the power of the people, which is realized in its best interest. Achieving such interests is possible only by means of the common good, rather than absolute freedom and arbitrariness of individual members of society.

The following measures can be proposed in order to counter extremism.

Everything must be done to seize the initiative, to include young people at risk in the development and implementation of programs to counter armed extremism

It is important to create the concept of the ideological policy of the state. The basic element of it could become a national idea, which is really united to a single multinational Russian people. The concept would be to provide a specific long-term and medium-term measures aimed at ideological education and education of our younger generation. It was a conscious resistance to the radical religious and other ideologies of this kind could knock out the foundation on which to build a modern extremist ideology. With this protection, even the most generous funding of destabilization from the outside would be useless in Russia.

It is also important that the youth considered terrorist groups as a natural reserve.From this it follows that everything must be done to seize the initiative, to include young people at risk in the development and implementation of programs to counter armed extremism.

It seems appropriate forces supervisory and regulatory authorities to organize a wide-ranging and detailed verification of compliance with federal law, the activities of all religious, national, cultural and youth organizations, in respect of which there is reason to believe that they are engaged in banned extremist activity.

Using the experience of working in the North Caucasus, to organize specific and very targeted preventive work with representatives of the informal youth associations in order to adopt measures aimed at obtaining information about the negative processes taking place among young people, as well as identifying the ideologues and leaders of radical organizations, involving young people in extremist activity.

Worthy also support the positive experience of the Republic of Ingushetia, which created the military-patriotic club which unites the children of law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty, and children neutralized members of the bandit underground, which contributes to their rapprochement and mutual understanding between the formation of the atmosphere.

The proposed concept is expedient to define the limits and censorship in Russia, global Internet, as this problem is currently causing heated debate in the light of the activation of the right to freedom of reception and dissemination of information advocates. It is interesting in this regard, the experience of foreign countries, opposing the US and its allies. Due to unprecedented pressure from the information they went to the restrictions on foreign media in order to protect the national information space. For example, China’s Ministry of Industry and Informatization to 10 March 2016 introduced a ban on electronic media, fully or partially owned by foreign residents. These media will no longer be able to disseminate information via the Internet, and in the best case – by means of publications. Chinese media will also cooperate with foreign online media only with the permission of the Ministry. The guide national media will be able to work only Chinese citizens. online media servers only in China can be.

It seems that in a reasonable extent, this experience could well be taken into service in Russia.

For Internet service providers need to develop common rules for the storage of personal information of their customers and users in the right amount at the event that such information will be requested in the investigation of violations in the field of cyber security.

The public access to the “World Wide Web” (libraries, schools and other educational institutions) to install filters that restrict access to sites containing extremist material.

In addition, it seems appropriate to provide a non-judicial (administrative) procedure for the inclusion of information in the federal list of extremist materials, as well as blocking the domain names of sites that spread extremist and radical-nationalist information. In this case, if the holders of such information does not consider it to be an extremist, let them appeal the appropriate action authorized government agencies to court and prove his innocence there. This procedure will enable faster and more effectively respond to extremist propaganda on the internet. It is necessary to intensify the work on the introduction of modern technology for the effective control of radio and the Internet.

It is necessary to expand the range of criminal-law measures to stop illegal actions of terrorist organizations perpetrated on the Internet related to recruitment. To this end, consider the criminalization of the possession of such materials, their collection or upload from your computer. Modern technologies allow to present evidence to the court and to confirm the related social networking technical elements, showing the links between the accused and the relevant e-mail messages.

To expose the real aims and intentions of Islamic extremists, the establishment of the insolvency of their theoretical approaches, contrary to the realities of the modern world and the fundamental interests of the Islamic countries, seems useful regularly at the site of the State Council special hearings involving the Federal Security Service experts of eminent Islamic scholars and authorities, scientists Islamists. It was widely covered in the press materials of the hearings.

Particular attention should be paid to the migration process. Migrants are often the target of recruitment, radicalization. Many of them are in Russia with the excess length of stay, dropping out of sight of police. It is necessary to analyze the regulatory acts governing the presence of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship in the Russian Federation. Based on the analysis to take additional measures to improve the legislation.

It is necessary to improve the work of the police precinct with foreign citizens in monitoring the observance of the established rules of residence in the territory of Russia (control over the persons who give shelter for rent, filming the premises served on site, obtain information about the nature of the employment of these persons). security service departments to eliminate the possibility of corruption here.Make full use of public aid.

Certain features of extremist activity developed in the Crimean Federal District, where attempts are made to form the anti-Russian sentiment, by falsifying information about historical facts and distorted interpretations of current events call into question the results of the referendum on accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation. This act is a legal expression of the popular will of the population of the Crimea became an integral part of Russian constitutionalism. Taking into account the place of that act in the system hierarchy of value orientations of the Russian government and society certainly need its special legal protection, including by means of criminal law.

It should be noted that the criminalization of denial or falsification of particular importance for the state and society of historical events is a common practice. For example, in many countries, including in Russia, it provides criminal penalties for propaganda of fascism. France and a number of other states have criminalized the denial of the Armenian Genocide. In consideration of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation is a similar bill N938567-6 “criminalizing public denial of the Armenian genocide in Western Armenia and Ottoman Turkey during the period of 1915-1922 years”. In Israel there is a criminal responsibility for denying the Holocaust.

In view of the above it seems necessary to supplement the information contained in the federal law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity” definition of extremist activity (extremism) in such a manifestation, as a denial of the outcome of a national referendum. It is necessary to resolutely stop and deliberate falsification of the history of our state. In this regard, you may be prompted as to supplement the dispositions of Art. 280 of the Criminal Code (public calls for extremist activities) qualified by, presupposing calls for extremist activities, if they are associated with falsification of data about historical facts and events.

In addition to countering the ideological component of the ongoing information war against Russia, it is important to step up efforts to combat financial support for this activity, including tighten control over cross-border capital movements. As experience has shown, to the financing of terrorism is often used virtual cryptocurrency that has no central issuer, single point of control over transactions and payments is characterized by anonymity. In addition, as a result of the wide spread of these currencies can displace from the market of legal money, threatening the financial stability of the state. It is therefore suggested to introduce criminal liability for illegal issuance and turnover cryptocurrency and other money substitutes.

You should also review the legislation on social security for the presence of close relatives of persons involved in terrorism, entitlement to survivor’s pension and other benefits. A person who is going to commit these crimes should know that not only in the event of death will be buried in an unmarked grave, but will deprive their close relatives of the financial support from the state.

Another measure, which would contribute to an effective fight against extremism, terrorism and other dangerous manifestations of crime, – confiscation of property as a form of criminal punishment. Appropriate, as we know, the legislative proposals are prepared and are in need of speedy implementation of legislation. Unfortunately, this process is unduly delayed.

No less important is the legal mechanism and improve international cooperation between law enforcement and other state bodies authorized to counter terrorism and extremism.

Russian law regulates only the procedure for submitting a request for international legal assistance, while international instruments in this field include the possibility of closer integration until the establishment of international investigative teams. Such cooperation would help in cases when there is a need in the production of Russian investigative authorities of a number of investigative actions, or even a preliminary investigation as a whole on the territory of a foreign state and that the state according to provide such an opportunity. This gap became apparent during the investigation of criminal cases of the Georgian-South Ossetian armed conflict of 2008 and the terrorist act committed on board the Russian aircraft Airbus A321 over the Sinai Peninsula.

Source: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2961578


Filed under: #RussiaFail, Censorship, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, Censorship, CounterPropaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

MH17 – Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade A bell¿ngcat Investigation

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Screen Shot 2016-04-18 at 1.29.07 PMMH17 – Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade

Introduction

In a previous report, Origin of the Separatists’ Buk, 1 the Bellingcat investigation team described the movements of a Buk-M1 missile launcher in Ukraine, which was filmed and photographed in Donetsk, Zuhres, Torez, Snizhne, and Luhansk on 17 July 2014, the day Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) was downed. That report provided evidence supporting the hypothesis that this particular Buk-M1 was likely responsible for downing MH17 for two primary reasons: first, it was in range of MH17 shortly before it was downed; second, a missile was missing from the Buk the morning following the downing.

Origin of the Separatists’ Buk also described two separate military convoys filmed and photographed in Russia from 23 to 25 June and from 19 to 21 July 2014. These convoys transported Buk-M1 missile launchers along with numerous other types of military vehicles from an area near Kursk to an area near the Russia-Ukraine border in the Rostov Oblast2 . One Buk-M1 missile launcher in the 23-25 June 2014 convoy is particularly noteworthy, because it shares many common features with the BukM1 that was located within firing range of MH17 and was filmed on 17 July 2014 driving toward the center of an area that was assessed by the Dutch Safety Board to be the launch area of the Buk missile that downed MH17 in Ukraine.3 An examination of the vehicles and license plates of the military convoys in the summer of 2014 reveals that these convoys originated at a military base near Kursk, just west of the village Marshala Zhukova, where the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (military Unit 32406) is based. Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade posted images of vehicles seen in the June and July 2014 convoys, as well as photographs of the June 2014 convoy itself, on social media sites such as VKontakte4 (or VK, a popular Russian social network akin to Facebook), Odnoklassniki5 (or OK, a Russian social media site more popular with older generations), and Instagram. In addition to pictures of vehicles, some soldiers posted images of military certificates showing the completion of what can be presumed to be a military exercise that took place between 22 June 2014 and 25 July 2014.

The present report conducts a deeper investigation into the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, its organizational structure and placement in the Russian army, and the military vehicles involved in the June and July 2014 Buk convoys. This report also describes the results of a thorough investigation of soldiers and officers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade related to the convoys and/or other military operations in the summer of 2014. If the Buk crew consisted of Russian soldiers and officers, it is likely that some number of these soldiers and officers knew the crew members of the Buk missile launcher involved in the MH17 tragedy, or were possibly crew members themselves. Additionally, this report confirms that the certificates mentioned above belong to students of a technical university who completed a training course at the base of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade near Kursk. Some officers can be exculpated from involvement in any of the Buk convoys because cadets from two universities posted pictures of these officers in their photo albums at the base of the 53rd AntiAircraft Missile Brigade in the summer of 2014.

Download the report: https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/53rd-report-public.pdf


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Russia, Ukraine Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Russia, Ukraine

Measuring Public Opinion in Russia

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Kennan Institute | Wilson Center

The Authoritarian Bias: Measuring Public Opinion in Russia

Public opinion survey data from countries under authoritarian regimes are often treated as reliable, but how do they compare to survey data from democracies? How can social scientists detect the effects of propaganda and other forces on respondents in authoritarian countries? Kirill Rogov will discuss the challenges of working with poll data under these conditions.

This event is co-sponsored by The Center on Global Interests.

Speaker

Kirill Rogov, George F. Kennan Expert, Kennan Institute

RSVP NOW » Forward to a Friend
RSVP Now

Wednesday, April 20, 2016
11:00 AM – 12:00 PM

6th Floor Auditorium

Directions

Wilson Center
Ronald Reagan Building and
International Trade Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania, Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20004

Phone: 202.691.4000

kennan@wilsoncenter.org

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Filed under: Information operations

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Has Invented A Version Of History To Meet His Needs

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Russia scores a failing grade in the subject of history.

</end editorial>


Bruno Maçães

April 14, 2016

Russian Foreign Minister Sergie Lavrov at a meeting of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2015

Bruno Maçães is a former Europe Minister in Portugal and the author of the forthcoming “The New Eurasian Supercontinent.” He is currently traveling in Russia, Iran and Central Asia. Follow him on Twitter at @MacaesBruno.


Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, likes to think of himself as a man of ideas, whose contribution to shaping his country’s foreign policy comes from the ability to place it in a long historical context. In this he is no doubt unusual among his ministerial colleagues, the vast majority of which have assimilated the notion that we have entered a new historical age, so new in fact that perhaps history is now unnecessary or even, to a certain extent, misguiding.

That said, Lavrov cares little for history properly understood. He uses it in order to make certain points, and these are usually of the most current and even polemical character. His latest essay, meant to address Russia’s international standing in relation to what he calls “some examples from history,” starts by making the point that Russia cannot be seen as forever trying to catch up with the West, since it originally enjoyed “a cultural and spiritual level frequently higher than in Western European states.” The historical example here is of course Kyivan Rus before the Mongol invasions. Lavrov points out that at a time when royal marriages were the best gauge of a country’s place in the international system, the daughters of Grand Prince Yaroslav — who ruled Kyiv from 1019 to 1054 — became the queens of Norway and Denmark, Hungary, and France. His daughter Anna married Henry I of France and later wrote back to her father that her new country was “a barbarous place where the houses are gloomy, the churches ugly and the customs revolting.”

By arguing that Kyivan Rus is part of Russian history Lavrov shows how little of a student of history he really is. He reads it backwards. If he read it in the right way — from the past to the future — he would perhaps be more inclined to see the Rus as part of Viking history. Prince Volodymyr — Yaroslav’s father — was after all still so intimately linked to his ancestral home that he spent five years in Scandinavia before returning to Kyiv to claim the throne — bringing with him a new Viking army.

All these are in a way trifles, more or less childish provocations which Lavrov brandishes in full knowledge of how upsetting they are to Ukrainians. They do to some extent vindicate those Ukrainians clergymen who in 1944 — in events still far from being elucidated — took Yaroslav’s remains to Manhattan, where they were spotted soon after; they were afraid of physical and cultural appropriation by the advancing Soviets. Lavrov is engaged here in that very kind of exercise, but he is by no means alone and the real question is how in the end he comes back from his historical explorations to the present and the status of Russia in the international system. On this he makes a number of important points.

Still within the orbit of historical analogy, Lavrov starts by noting that Russia is in fact the political creation of Alexander Nevsky, who made the founding choice of resisting every and any attempt of assimilation coming from the West, even if that meant accepting a kind of temporary subjection to the Mongol empire. For Lavrov, the real danger to Russia’s special role and mission comes from the West. Anything — and by referring to the “Mongol yoke” he seems to imply literally anything — is preferable to assimilation by the West.

From that point on Russia’s destiny was traced, so to speak. In the coming centuries it would slowly develop what Lavrov calls “an original type of spirituality.” This idea is perhaps the very definition of conventional wisdom in Russia today. In my travels there this year I heard it from everyone, from a Circassian university teacher in Krasnodar to a half-deranged priest in Irkutsk. Lavrov is a politician. Whenever possible he appeals to the lowest common denominator.

What then is this Russian type of spirituality? All of Lavrov’s essay is a defense of “evolutionary change.” This is particularly obvious in the passages he devotes to the Soviet Union, which culminate in a complete rehabilitation of its signal contributions to human history and good government, but this is accomplished less in the name of revolutionary principles than as a corollary of the “continuity of Russian history, which should include all historical periods without exception.” If you thought that Czarist Russia was the preserver of throne and altar after the Napoleonic chaos, Lavrov disabuses you of the notion by noting how Alexander I and Nicholas II were prototypes of the cosmopolitan long-term project of subordinating national interests to the good of mankind.

Since the Russian special path stood at odds with the Western model of modernization, conflict between Russia and the West became a kind of historical given. The second wave of globalization (the first culminated with World War I) is for Lavrov very much a vindication of the Russian gambit that there are many different models of development, “which rules out the monotony of existence within the uniform, Western frame of reference.” He praises the Chinese economic miracle as having settled the issue once and for all. He also tries to argue that the Western revolutionary animus results from its belief in a single model to be imposed on political and social reality. Russia, by contrast, believes that change should be carried out in forms and at the speed that conforms with the traditions of a society.

Having set these two opposing world views, Lavrov is now ready to draw the political conclusion he is mainly interested in: the need to establish a new and improved international system — “without dividing lines.” What would this new architecture consist of? Here Lavrov is neither very explicit nor very original. He argues that a renewed and reenergized OSCE — rather than NATO — should have provided a common security umbrella less tainted by ideological blueprints of a bygone era. In practice this would involve the West’s abandonment of some of the most basic principles of its political culture, starting with the idea that public opinion should have access to the fundamental levers of political power. That for Lavrov is just one vision of politics among many and thus cannot provide a viable basis for the international system as a whole. No more color revolutions — to be replaced, perhaps, by “a moral basis formed by traditional values that are largely shared by the world’s leading religions.”

On the end of the Cold War and the international system that followed Lavrov makes two further — and rather revealing — points. First, he argues against the popular notion that the Soviet Union’s dissolution marked a Western victory. No such thing: it was the result of a certain desire for change in the Soviet Union itself “plus an unlucky chain of events.” The latter reference is important because it seems to suggest there was nothing necessary, inevitable and permanent about that dissolution. Second, Lavrov tries to get rid of the other justifying tenet of the current world order: freedom. That for him is a red herring: new NATO members are not freer than before. They confess to him — behind closed doors, of course — that they can’t take any significant decision without the green light from Washington and Brussels.

History took a different path. For Lavrov the fateful error was made by “our Western partners’ when they decided to expand NATO eastward, rather than using a unique opportunity to create a new international system “including all the colors of the modern world.” Thus Lavrov ends up offering us the quaint vision of an international system modeled on pluralistic electoral politics. He wants to carve up a role for an evolutionary party to go with the revolutionary party of the West, so committed to the “technology of revolution” that it cannot offer any viable solutions to common problems such as global terrorism or the depletion of the commons. At this point Lavrov sounds like no one as much as Nikita Khrushchev: the West wants to clamp down on Russia very much like, in the past, capitalists — big and small — wanted to silence those who struggled for a different and more just society.

Is this to be taken seriously? In some respects the answer must be no. With Khrushchev it was a piece of propaganda and false consciousness. That has not fundamentally changed, but then Lavrov does present us with the unavoidable world-picture of our age and that should be recognized: the international system is now fragmented into different and ultimately irreconcilable visions of the whole. In this it has come to resemble democratic politics in an open society. It is rather unfortunate that Lavrov seems blind to the bitter irony that he is defending the kind of pluralism for world politics which his country continues to fail to offer its own citizens.

Source: http://www.interpretermag.com/russian-foreign-minister-lavrov-has-invented-a-version-of-history-to-meet-his-needs/


Filed under: #RussiaFail, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Russia

Distance – Kaliningrad to…

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Gee, do you think Russia is trying to send a message?  Intimidation, flyovers, barrel rolls?

Distance from Kaliningrad to

  • Götland, Sweden  – 332.16 km (206.39 miles, and 179.23 nautical miles)
  • Riga, Latvia – 336.2 km (208.91 miles, and 181.42 nautical miles)
  • Vilnius, Lithuania – 307.11 km. (190.83 miles, and 165.72 nautical miles)
  • Warsaw, Poland – 278.64 km (173.14 miles, and 150.45 nautical miles)

Range, Iskander-M, 400 / 500 km.

Now take a look at their oft-copied video.

Russia is still incapable of a conventional invasion and takeover. This is an act of desperation, trying to bully the rest of the world with this gesture of intimidation.


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Russia

15 Characteristics of Russian Propaganda

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Monday, April 18, 2016

Paul Goble

Staunton, April 18 – Russian propaganda makes use of so many techniques to succeed that Moscow novelist and commentator Elizaveta Aleksandrova-Zorina performs a useful service by listing in an article in “Gazeta.ru” 15 of its favorite and, it should be said, effective methods (gazeta.ru/comments/2016/04/14_a_8178095.shtml).

These include:

  • A black and white division of the world into “ours” and the “alien” other;
  • Epithets that imply more than they describe;
  • Constant assertions that those supporting Putin not only are numerous but united;
  • Empty declarations that mean nothing but that appear to promise or justify everything;
  • Playing games with cause and effect, often reversing their true order;
  • A vicious circle or tautology in which the second part of an assertion is simply a repetition of the first;
  • Confusing the part and the whole by focusing on only one part of something such as liberals within the opposition;
  • Creating false dilemmas that don’t exist;
  • Careful preparation of headlines which are the only thing most people pay attention to;
  • Citations to experts, often false and even more often out of context;
  • Claiming the media say when in fact only one media outlet does;
  • Using weasel words like “so-called” or “it would appear” to give the appearance of objectivity;
  • Outright falsification; and
  • Conspiracy theories and suggestion of hidden motives.

Source: http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/04/15-characteristics-of-russian-propaganda.html


Filed under: #RussiaFail, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, counter-propaganda, CounterPropaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda
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