It’s a basic fact of history that on July 20, 1969, NASA astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin became the first human beings to set foot on another celestial body, making history and defeating the Soviets in the space race.
The Soviets, of course, never made it to the moon at all. But why is that? After all, for most of the space race the Soviets were in the lead. They were the first to put a satellite into orbit, the first to send a man into space, and the first to send a spacecraft around the moon, taking pictures of the far side. Surely, even if they ultimately didn’t win the race, they were close to the finish line. So what happened?
This new video from Curious Droid explains. Essentially, the answer is a combination of political intrigue, poor infrastructure, and unstable technology. Take a look:
The Soviet political structure was one of constant infighting and backstabbing, and the Soviets were often their own worst enemy. Even as they were racing against the U.S., they were also racing against each other. Different research groups were simultaneously developing competing rocket designs instead of working together. At one point there were thirty different designs, all vying for the Kremlin’s approval.
Ultimately, the job went to Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, a rocket expert who oversaw both the Sputnik launch as well as Yuri Gagarin’s spaceflight. His job was to build a rocket powerful enough to bring astronauts to the moon.
However, he ran into a problem. While the U.S. had the infrastructure to build the massive F1 engines used on the Saturn V rockets, the Soviets did not. They were forced to build smaller engines for their N1 rocket, which ultimately used thirty engines arranged in a circle.
These smaller engines had to use a closed-cycle system, or staged combustion, which produced more thrust at a greater risk of overheating. NASA was able to use the more reliable, but less powerful, open-cycle system on the Saturn V.
While the Soviets did eventually build their N1 rocket and launch four test flights, every single flight failed and the rockets were destroyed. After those failed launches, the entire program was scrapped due to cost concerns. The Soviets never made it out of the atmosphere.
The fourth and final N1 launch ended with an explosion in the atmosphere. The program was cancelled shortly after.
YouTubeCurious Droid
Years later, the U.S. acquired several of these closed-cycle engines, and it was discovered that the Soviets had advanced the technology further than anyone thought possible. They had managed to solve the instability problem, producing the most powerful and fuel efficient engine of that size in the world. The technology they developed was later incorporated into the scaled-up RD-180 engine, which powers the Atlas V rocket to this day.
Ahmed Mansoor is a well-known and highly respected human rights activist, best known as one of the UAE Five and, as such, a highly intelligent man. So, when he got a text from an unknown number with a link claiming to offer proof of torture in state prisons, he assumed it was too good to be true and sent it to a University of Toronto security expert. What they uncovered wasn’t evidence of human rights violations, but a shocking cyberweapon designed to rip open an iPhone and take all of its data.
The link sent to Mansoor’s phone led to a piece of malware that would haveused three separate iPhone loopholes to, essentially, open up all of Mansoor’s communications. Everything, from his phone calls and texts to his Facebook updates and his location, would have been available. Considering Mansoor lives in the UAE, and is a notorious thorn in the side of that state’s government, this would have been potentially dangerous not just for him, but anyone he met.
The good news is that you can fix this problem just by updating your iPhone. Apple was alerted to the problems and has fixed them as of today. The bad news is that it appears there’s a growing industry of what amounts to private spies who will sell software for cracking smartphones and computers to anybody with the cash on hand. Mansoor’s bit of malware likely cost at least $1 million. And this is really only a taste of what will happen; in the future — as it gets cheaper and easier to do this — we’ll all have to find ways to protect our stuff.
Mansoor, however, is a guide on what to do when you get something too good to believe. Hacking is not inevitable. In fact, most hacking hinges entirely on you and I being foolish enough to click on links in texts, to buy that Bill Gates is going to pay us for that email forward, to just give our banking information out without checking the address of the website.
If something seems too good to be true, don’t click it, and there’s nothing even the shiftiest hacker can do.
It could be one of the greatest war photographs ever taken – or a fake.
A controversy is escalating in Ukraine over a photo that seems to capture the conflict with Russia-backed separatists in a single frame. It shows two soldiers carrying a wounded comrade down a dirt road as an explosion rips up the ground behind them, sending smoke into the sky. An empty baby carriage stands near a blown-out building by the road.
But a group of Ukrainian photojournalists is crying foul over the photo by Dmytro Muravskiy, who works with the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.
In an open letter published this week, they contend that the photograph was staged and call it part of a “clumsy” attempt by the ministry to engage in an information war with Russia.
“We kindly ask [viewers] not to put these photos on a par with Russian fakes,” they wrote. “The war is really going on…people are dying, and there is a huge quantity of documentary photographic and video evidence to prove it.”
“I’ve shot seven wars and I do not believe that picture,” Efrem Lukatsky, a Kyiv-based Associated Press photographer who signed the letter, told RFE/RL.
Muravskiy has stood by the photo — and is threatening to sue his detractors.
In an effort to prove the authenticity of the image, he posted videos on Facebook on August 19 in which two of the three Ukrainian soldiers pictured in the photo describe the moment it was taken — at one pointducking as bullets zip by, interrupting their account.
“I turned my ankle and there was an explosion behind me,” the soldier says. “My comrades threw me on their backs and we ran.”
Several photojournalists and others who have documented the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has killed more than 9,500 people since April 2014, were united in saying they believe the photo was staged.
“He makes war ‘beautiful’ and unreal,” said Yevhen Stepanenko, a documentary filmmaker and TV host.
Another war photo by Dmytro Muravskiy. “He makes war ‘beautiful’ and unreal,” said Yevhen Stepanenko, a documentary filmmaker and TV host. Others aren’t so sure.
The controversy plays into a larger debate over the state of journalism in Ukraine, which has been colored by the war and by Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula. Reporters and media-freedom advocates say truthful, objective journalism is falling victim to a form of nationalism whose adherents treat anything they see as criticism of Ukraine as treason.
Muravskiy says the Defense Ministry has taken to making posters and advertising material from his war photographs.
Other photographs that Muravskiy has taken of the conflict are unusual for their timing, light, and a style of image-handling that is more common in commercial photography than in news photography.
But it’s one particular aspect of the situation which some say points conclusively to the suspect image being staged: the absence of any photos taken just before it.
In a Facebook message to RFE/RL, Muravskiy said that he had deleted several images that were taken before the photo that has caused the controversy. A screenshot from his laptop shows images from after the explosion, but none has been released showing the moments which led up to the one in which the soldiers — one with a “sprained ankle” — are seen fleeing under fire.
Muravskiy claims the reason for deleting these key images — a highly unusual step for a photographer in such a situation — was lack of experience.
“Since I have never worked with publications before and I just [didn’t realize it] is so important. … For me, it will be a very big lesson,” he said.
Muravskiy told RFE/RL that he volunteers as a consultant to the Ukrainian military on engineering and management issues and was in the town where the photograph was taken because he tours the front lines in the conflict, inspecting forward positions.
He said the Defense Ministry has taken to using his photographs in the last few months and has made posters and advertising material from them. He said the ones the ministry uses are from training, not combat. Some of his pictures have been on display at the Defense Ministry.
The Defense Ministry press service declined immediate comment when reached by phone on August 25.
In a Facebook post the same day, Muravskiy threatened legal action over any further allegations that the photo is staged.
He said that from now on he would “respond to new accusations only in the form of lawsuits claiming damage to my business reputation.”
With reporting by Merhat Sharipzhan and RFE/RL’s Russian Service
In a speech earlier this year at the Russian Academy of Military Science, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, discussed the changing environment of modern warfare. Noting the rise of hybrid conflicts such as color revolutions, General Gerasimov highlighted the importance of, “leading military theorists and specialists as well as the defense industry and the government to jointly develop a “soft power” strategy to counter the potential threat from ‘color revolutions.’” The importance of this speech is two-fold. First, it demonstrates that while some have come to believe that Russia has developed a unique and profound soft power strategy, this is not the case. Second, this speech may indicate a trend towards a greater reliance on the use of soft power, though its use is framed as a defensive measure. Rather than using soft power to project values and appear more attractive as countries such as the United States attempts to do, this speech highlights the importance of countering foreign efforts directed against the Russian Federation. Though Russia traditionally relies on hard power to ensure state security and project power, the country may begin a revitalized effort of utilizing soft power to help achieve this, an effort not seen since the Cold War era.
During the Cold War, there were two major battles for power occurring. The most notable was a battle of hard power, comprised of conventional forces and rising nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. The other was a competition of soft power, including the battle for ideology, norms and influence between liberal and communist values. In the post-Cold War era, the West has sought to further expand its norms and influence throughout the international system through a variety of measures including soft power. Examples of these soft power elements range from liberal ideals such as freedom of press and speech to Western culture. These ideals and norms are spread in effect through Western media, the entertainment industry and U.S. foreign policy, to name a few. The United States is not alone in these efforts. To a certain extent Russia has also sought to further expand its ideology and influence outside of its borders through the use of soft power. Examples of these efforts include organizations like the Russian World Foundation and Rossotrudnichestvo, which promote Russian language and culture abroad and media efforts like Russia Today (RT), which according to the website, broadcasts in over 100 countries. But over the past few years, the discussion of soft power has notably increased.
One reason for the increased discussion around soft power, as Russia argues, is the decline of Western norms and influence globally. As Putin noted in his 2007 Munich speech, “the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations.” As the appeal of American values decreases, which is true to some extent, its ability to conduct soft power decreases as a result. Another reason for the heightened discussion is the crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s actions as a result. Since 2014, there has been an increased shift in Russia’s efforts to create an alternative message to Western norms and practices. Russia’s ability to produce these messages at a rapid rate in comparison to the United States has led some to believe that Russia has begun to develop a unique and profound soft power strategy.
Though Russia has been successful in comparison to the U.S. with quickly creating and dispensing alternative messaging, this is not the result of a developed soft power strategy. One reason for this is the goal in which this messaging seeks to produce. Rather than creating a constructive and appealing image of Russia abroad, these efforts are largely concerned with creating a division and alternative to the West. Through manipulative information influencing such as highlighting policy disputes in the European Union and disinformation practices focused on discrediting American organizations, Russia is attempting to defend its values by discrediting and dividing Western values. With soft power resources going towards these efforts, there has been a decline in leveraging resources to promote Russian appeal abroad. According to Jan Vaslavsky, director of the analytical center Rethinking Russia, the country is not fully leveraging its soft-power capabilities. As such, these actions demonstrate only a short-term policy instead of a long-term soft power strategy for Russia. Attributing less effort to promoting Russia’s image and values, “Russian strategists fail to appreciate that most American and European global soft power comes from the West’s capacity to forge productive partnerships and create new opportunities.”
Another reason is the lack of adaption in Russia to the modern era. As the concept of power has evolved over time, so has the conception of effective soft power. As author Bobo Lo notes in his recent book, Russian and the New World Disorder, “Economic strength and technological capacity underpin the growing ascendancy of soft power. The most influential powers in today’s world are those whose strengths lie principally in this area.”[1] The ability to project power and influence is incumbent in developing these realms. In today’s Russia however, the country is currently dealing with a severely weakened economy, massive currency inflation, a flight of foreign investment and a lacking innovative society for technological development. In order for Russia to develop a compatible soft power strategy as General Gerasimov has called for, the country will have to further develop and modernize these areas. The lack of a suitable soft power capability has only been exacerbated by the crisis in Ukraine.
Effectively transforming a pro-Russian Ukraine into an anti-Russian state, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have further diminished Russia’s image not only in the West but also in its near abroad. Even countries such as Belarus, which has served as one of Russia’s few supporters over the past two decades, is looking to better balance itself between the East and the West.[2] As with many of Russia’s neighbors, “Russia’s aggression has alarmed Lukashenko, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest allies, [whom] doesn’t want to become a second Viktor Yanukovych.” Many of Russia’s neighbors are alarmed by Russia’s actions in Ukraine, because they view this action as an indicator of Russia’s stance against their countries’ independence and sovereignty. However, the call for the creation of a soft power strategy may seek to decrease these suspicions and improve Russia’s relations with its near abroad.
As stated previously, Russia traditionally relies on hard power, such as a large military, to maintain its security and project power and influence. This tends to be the case both in its backyard as the situation in Ukraine has demonstrated, as well as globally with its military efforts in Syria. In light of the recent speech by General Gerasimov and the support it received at the Russian Academy of Military Science, Russia may develop a soft power strategy that addresses some of the identified deficiencies. With Russia’s image and partnerships damaged globally, an effective soft power strategy may be an increasingly beneficial tool for Putin and the federal government. But as with the current soft power policy, it is important to understand its intended goals. In discussing the need for a soft power strategy, General Gerasimov highlighted its importance in the context countering threats against Russia, noting that, “Since ‘color revolutions,’ [which] the Ministry of Defense in fact deems state coups, are one form of hybrid warfare, responding to them using conventional troops is impossible.” It would appear that the underlying goal is not to improve Russia’s appeal or relations abroad but to improve its ability to defend against modern conflicts such as color revolutions. Though the ends may be the same, highlighting the need to integrate, “diplomatic and other nonmilitary methods of interaction with other states,” it is interesting to see how in the case of Russia, the government is framing soft power in the context of a defensive tool. Still too early to tell, it will be fascinating to see whether Russia’s soft power strategy operates similar to the West or if it acts as a defensive tool against what Russia deems as exterior threats.
Though only one of a variety of tools available to a state, soft power can be an effective means for advancing the values and influence of a country. As the image and appeal of Russia has diminished not only in the West but also in its near abroad, calls for a soft power strategy could prove to be a beneficial move for the Russian Federation. The ends, ways and means in which this policy will play out however, remains to be seen.
Notes
[1] Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Washington: Brookings, 2015), 56-57.
Kremlin influence operations and propaganda noise, Nikolai Holmov wrote for Intersection.
Recently Ukraine has witness a well-advertised and long planned “peace march” taking part across the country, climaxing on 27th July in Kyiv upon the celebrations of the baptism of Volodymir. The number of participants, though in their thousands, perhaps not doing justice to the amount of preparatory media exposure it received.
The march was not without controversy with many in Ukraine perceiving the march of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy to be nothing short of a Kremlin influence operation within the country, whether planned or co-opted.
The Kremlin has a habit of getting Ukraine seriously wrong, twice erroneously betting upon Viktor Yanukovych, the spectacular failure of Novorossiya, and the war in the Donbas has now turned into a war of exhaustion rather than providing swift leverage to actually change the orientation of Kyiv or, more importantly, the will and determination of the Ukrainian people to withstand The Kremlin.
As such, the march by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy is far more likely to become a test of the Orthodox Church than it will be a test of the Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kyiv Patriarchy, is now likely to benefit from an enlarged flock at the expense of the Moscow Patriarchy.
The march also raises prickly issues for His All Holiness Bartholomew 1, the Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch, with increased and intensified lobbying from the Ukrainian political and religious classes to remove the Kyiv church’s subordination to the Moscow Patriarch and grant it autocephaly to the Orthodox Church. Should Kyiv eventually be successful, not only would a Kyiv Patriarchy radically reduce an instrument of influence for Moscow, there will also be many ungodly issues relating to property and earthly riches within the Ukrainian territory.
Kremlin attempts to play upon shared (or not shared) culture, history, language and values within Ukraine (and beyond) has not gathered significant traction among the Ukrainian constituency. Ukrainians are well aware of the Kremlin use, or perhaps better stated misuse, of Kremlin “soft power”, notwithstanding its blunt and bloody use of “hard power” at an ever-growing cost in Ukrainian lives reinforcing a rightful sense of national violation.
“Soft power” is a multifaceted and complex issue, but at its most basic, it can perhaps be summarized through the Western lens as the ability to influence (and co-opt) through the appeal of an attractive outcome for all actors with agency involved.
It is possible to debate the real desire of the Ukrainian constituency to become part of the EU or NATO beyond the rhetoric of the current elite which naturally sees both as form of security blanket. Nevertheless there is certainly a desire within the Ukrainian constituency to see the rule of law, rather than rule by law, a move to a free market economy rather than remaining a captured oligarchy state, and something approaching genuine democracy with effective and public serving institutions of State.
The values and systems that the Ukrainian constituency seeks are generally identified with perhaps a somewhat wooly notion of “the West” – not necessarily the institutions of Europe. Whatever the case, the values and societal model the vast majority of Ukrainians seek are not the values or societal model attributed to The Kremlin.
Therefore the Putinist system of governance holds no attractiveness for the vast majority of the Ukrainian constituency. The Kremlin is aware of this and Moscow no longer attempts to put lipstick upon a pig to make its system appear attractive for a Ukrainian constituency that recognizes a pig wearing lipstick for what it is.
The Kremlin is aware of its lack of attractiveness and therefore its version “soft power” is simply anything short of military action. It works not by way of Russian attractiveness or its appeal, but by way bribery and coercion, the goals of which may range from control, to influence, to disruption, to the dismantling of institutions, or polluting the public consciousness within whichever State it targets – including within Russia itself.
Separating signal from noise
Aside from the most recent perception among much of the Ukrainian constituency that identifies the march as a Kremlin influence operation, as opposed to the consistent easily, if wearily, refuted propaganda noise, there are other influence operation signals becoming more frequent. Some are clearly planned, yet others obviously opportunist occurring within capitols that the Kremlin seeks to influence.
The much propagandised story of Lisa F, which was a swiftly adopted Kremlin influence operation by virtue of opportunism, would seem too have backfired also, infuriating Chancellor Merkel and the German political class, garnering stern words (including from perceived Kremlin-soft politicians such as Frank-Walter Steinmeier) and thus having a negative effect across the German populous.
In the United States, empirical and some technical evidence would appear to point toward the Kremlin for the hacking of the Democratic Party emails, and their subsequent dumping in the public domain (conveniently) via Wikileaks.
The Kremlin is not responsible for the content of the emails (unless a few lines were added or altered) but in the likelihood of being responsible for the hack and behind the third party dissemination, another notable Kremlin influence operation occurred.
Undoubtedly among the continuing propaganda noise, more signals of note are going to being transmitted when opportunity arises or planned operations crescendo most effectively for audience digestion.
Dividing lines
Questions are raised about how those on the receiving end recognize the difference between espionage (which all States engage in) and what is an attack (which perhaps not all States currently have the capability for) that will leave behind something nasty and that in the months ahead bring down critical defences and/or infrastructure, or will lead to influence operations.
Yet further, how easy would it be to misinterpret intent or miscalculate effects? How to judge the proportionate response – at least in a timely manner?
There is an empirical convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. There is an empirical convergence of cyberspace and organized crime – indeed with Russia it is not always easy (if at all possible) to separate the State from organized crime, or organized crime from the State. There is an empirical convergence of cyberspace and geopolitics. This leads to the empirical convergence of the space between war and peace – and ultimately what will be deemed an act of war – or not.
As such, Kremlin “soft power” influence operations may manifest via recognized institutions, be they State, religious, civil society, media, in cyberspace, through organized criminality, or via far reaches of left and right political and/or ideological groups of whatever persuasion. The more radical the group, generally the easier it is to influence using the Kremlin understanding and methods of “soft power”. The results however may lead to unpredicted and perhaps counterproductive outcomes – and perhaps seemingly disproportionate responses where once clear lines are now smudged.
What to do?
How then to confront a belligerent and probing Kremlin that is leaving “soft power” traps in the peaks and valleys of the western democratic system (a system that is by definition generally tolerant, inclusive and law abiding) before tolerating the intolerable which has either done irreparable damage or requires a response far beyond that which would have been necessary if strategically planned for in advance ?
What is the current Kremlin objective both holistically and within any specific nation? What is the likelihood of those objectives being achieved? What are the most plausible outcomes and how great the damage done, should those objectives only be partially met?
Which actors and groups with agency are most influential in achieving those objectives? What strategies are most likely to bring the best results for The Kremlin when attempting to influence these actors or groups in pursuit of its objectives?
How much influence do these groups have and how to mitigate that (symmetrically or asymmetrically)?
What are the information channels used and believed most credible by those the Kremlin will seek to manipulate, bribe or coerce in pursuit of its objectives? How best to counter that messaging and undermine the legitimacy and influence of those channels? How is the counter-messaging balance to be struck between emotional appeal, cognitive thought, and credible delivery within the target audience and have resonance?
What counter-messaging content, and what format, are the most likely to firstly be accepted and secondly bring about required perceptional change when repelling the Kremlin influence?
How equipped is the policy toolbox to mitigate the notable Kremlin influence operations (let alone the constant noise), and are there other reciprocal and/or asymmetrical actions that can be taken?
How do you monitor any countermeasures and/or reciprocal influence operations, and over what time scale to decide upon its effectiveness – or not? Does any failure simply requiring a few tweaks or a complete overhaul to become effective?
Will there be an effective, collective, influence operation launched to meet “Western” or European objectives holistically, or will it be a matter of the Sovereigns acting individually to nation specific influence operations? Should it be both – one dealing with commonalities and one with specifics?
Is this the most effective use of limited will and energy, even though it is clear that Kremlin influence operations are here for years to come?
For the “West”, the question is, what lessons can be learned from Ukrainian countermeasures, a nation that has thus far borne the brunt of Kremlin aggression and continued attempts at internal meddling?
Russia will never miss an excuse to portray itself as a victim, push its agenda, and make the West appear as villains. Now Russia wants to do this using comic books as the medium.
Just because I love you guys, I went to Timur Amirkhanov’s VK page and copied his proposals for Russian superheroes at the bottom. Just between you, me, and Roskomnadzor, these boys and girls don’t look like they’ve ever handled a weapon and don’t know which end is the business end. …and dang, that is one beat up old APC!
Every comment I have for ending this editorial is cheap, petty, and shallow. Somewhat like the idea for this comic book. So I’ll stop here.
Timur Amirkhanov, a young man living in Siberia, is the proud recipient of a new 200,000-ruble ($3,100) grant from Rosmolodezh, the Russian federal government’s agency for youth affairs. Amirkhanov participated in Rosmolodezh’s educational forum “Terra Scientia,” where his proposal to create a “patriotic” comic book was a big hit.
According to Amirkhanov’s Vkontakte page, the comic book, titled “Time of Heroes,” is part of another project called “Honorable Choice”—a “military-sports” club for children that pits teams of youngsters against one another in competitions that test “tactical” skills, a knowledge of the armed services, and general physical fitness. The winners of a competition scheduled for this fall will win a free trip to Russia’s naval base in Crimea.
A “prototype” for the heroines of Russia’s new subsidized patriotic comic book. Photo: Vkontakte
Amirkhanov, who graduated from the Tver State Agricultural Academy last year with a degree in mechanics and technology,says the comic book represents a “new cultural trend in the development of military-patriotic education in Russia.” On Vkontakte, he writes that the project will make it possible to “speak with children in their language and also convey to them important and useful information.” Amirkhanov also lists three “primary goals” for the “Time of Heroes”: creating alternatives to foreign superheroes, increasing incentives for teenagers to become active in sports, and raising basic levels of knowledge about military service.
There are no drafts available showing what to expect from “Time of Heroes,” but Amirkhanov has published nine photos that he describes as “prototypes” for the heroes to be featured in the final product. There are six images of serious, large men aiming their rifles in different directions, and three pictures of attractive women posing seductively with guns.
Eighty-four people have written on Amirkhanov’s page to say that they want a copy of the comic book, when it’s published.
STOCKHOLM — With a vigorous national debate underway on whether Sweden should enter a military partnership with NATO, officials in Stockholm suddenly encountered an unsettling problem: a flood of distorted and outright false information on social media, confusing public perceptions of the issue.
The claims were alarming: If Sweden, a non-NATO member, signed the deal, the alliance would stockpile secret nuclear weapons on Swedish soil; NATO could attack Russia from Sweden without government approval; NATO soldiers, immune from prosecution, could rape Swedish women without fear of criminal charges.
They were all false, but the disinformation had begun spilling into the traditional news media, and as the defense minister, Peter Hultqvist, traveled the country to promote the pact in speeches and town hall meetings, he was repeatedly grilled about the bogus stories.
“People were not used to it, and they got scared, asking what can be believed, what should be believed?” said Marinette Nyh Radebo, Mr. Hultqvist’s spokeswoman.
As often happens in such cases, Swedish officials were never able to pin down the source of the false reports. But they, numerous analysts and experts in American and European intelligence point to Russia as the prime suspect, noting that preventing NATO expansion is a centerpiece of the foreign policy of President Vladimir V. Putin, who invaded Georgia in 2008 largely to forestall that possibility.
In Crimea, eastern Ukraine and now Syria, Mr. Putin has flaunted a modernized and more muscular military. But he lacks the economic strength and overall might to openly confront NATO, the European Union or the United States. Instead, he has invested heavily in a program of “weaponized” information, using a variety of means to sow doubt and division. The goal is to weaken cohesion among member states, stir discord in their domestic politics and blunt opposition to Russia.
“Moscow views world affairs as a system of special operations, and very sincerely believes that it itself is an object of Western special operations,” said Gleb Pavlovsky, who helped establish the Kremlin’s information machine before 2008. “I am sure that there are a lot of centers, some linked to the state, that are involved in inventing these kinds of fake stories.”
The planting of false stories is nothing new; the Soviet Union devoted considerable resources to that during the ideological battles of the Cold War. Now, though, disinformation is regarded as an important aspect of Russian military doctrine, and it is being directed at political debates in target countries with far greater sophistication and volume than in the past.
The flow of misleading and inaccurate stories is so strong that both NATOand the European Union have established special offices to identify and refute disinformation, particularly claims emanating from Russia.
The Kremlin’s clandestine methods have surfaced in the United States, too, American officials say, identifying Russian intelligence as the likely source of leaked Democratic National Committee emails that embarrassed Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.
The Kremlin uses both conventional media — Sputnik, a news agency, and RT, a television outlet — and covert channels, as in Sweden, that are almost always untraceable.
Russia exploits both approaches in a comprehensive assault, Wilhelm Unge, a spokesman for the Swedish Security Service, said this year when presenting the agency’s annual report. “We mean everything from internet trolls to propaganda and misinformation spread by media companies like RT and Sputnik,” he said.
The fundamental purpose of dezinformatsiya, or Russian disinformation, experts said, is to undermine the official version of events — even the very idea that there is a true version of events — and foster a kind of policy paralysis.
Disinformation most famously succeeded in early 2014 with the initial obfuscation about deploying Russian forces to seize Crimea. That summer, Russia pumped out a dizzying array of theories about the destruction ofMalaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, blaming the C.I.A. and, most outlandishly, Ukrainian fighter pilots who had mistaken the airliner for the Russian presidential aircraft.
The cloud of stories helped veil the simple truth that poorly trained insurgents had accidentally downed the plane with a missile supplied by Russia.
Moscow adamantly denies using disinformation to influence Western public opinion and tends to label accusations of either overt or covert threats as “Russophobia.”
“There is an impression that, like in a good orchestra, many Western countries every day accuse Russia of threatening someone,” Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said at a recent ministry briefing.
Tracing individual strands of disinformation is difficult, but in Sweden and elsewhere, experts have detected a characteristic pattern that they tie to Kremlin-generated disinformation campaigns.
“The dynamic is always the same: It originates somewhere in Russia, on Russia state media sites, or different websites or somewhere in that kind of context,” said Anders Lindberg, a Swedish journalist and lawyer.
“Then the fake document becomes the source of a news story distributed on far-left or far-right-wing websites,” he said. “Those who rely on those sites for news link to the story, and it spreads. Nobody can say where they come from, but they end up as key issues in a security policy decision.”
Although the topics may vary, the goal is the same, Mr. Lindberg and others suggested. “What the Russians are doing is building narratives; they are not building facts,” he said. “The underlying narrative is, ‘Don’t trust anyone.’
The weaponization of information is not some project devised by a Kremlin policy expert but is an integral part of Russian military doctrine — what some senior military figures call a “decisive” battlefront.
“The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness,” Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, wrote in 2013.
A prime Kremlin target is Europe, where the rise of the populist right and declining support for the European Union create an ever more receptive audience for Russia’s conservative, nationalistic and authoritarian approach under Mr. Putin. Last year, the European Parliament accused Russia of “financing radical and extremist parties” in its member states, and in 2014 the Kremlin extended an $11.7 million loan to the National Front, the extreme-right party in France.
“The Russians are very good at courting everyone who has a grudge with liberal democracy, and that goes from extreme right to extreme left,” said Patrik Oksanen, an editorial writer for the Swedish newspaper group MittMedia. The central idea, he said, is that “liberal democracy is corrupt, inefficient, chaotic and, ultimately, not democratic.”
Another message, largely unstated, is that European governments lack the competence to deal with the crises they face, particularly immigration and terrorism, and that their officials are all American puppets.
In Germany, concerns over immigrant violence grew after a 13-year-old Russian-German girl said she had been raped by migrants. A report on Russian state television furthered the story. Even after the police debunked the claim, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, continued to chastise Germany.
In Britain, analysts said, the Kremlin’s English-language news outlets heavily favored the campaign for the country to leave the European Union, despite their claims of objectivity.
In the Czech Republic, alarming, sensational stories portraying the United States, the European Union and immigrants as villains appear daily across a cluster of about 40 pro-Russia websites.
During NATO military exercises in early June, articles on the websites suggested that Washington controlled Europe through the alliance, with Germany as its local sheriff. Echoing the disinformation that appeared in Sweden, the reports said NATO planned to store nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe and would attack Russia from there without seeking approval from local capitals.
A poll this summer by European Values, a think tank in Prague, found that 51 percent of Czechs viewed the United States’ role in Europe negatively, only 32 percent viewed the European Union positively, and at least a quarter believed some elements of the disinformation.
“The data show how public opinion is changing thanks to the disinformation on those outlets,” said Jakub Janda, the think tank’s deputy director for public and political affairs. “They try to look like a regular media outlet even if they have a hidden agenda.”
Not all Russian disinformation efforts succeed. Sputnik news websites in various Scandinavian languages failed to attract enough readers and were closed after less than a year.
Both RT and Sputnik portray themselves as independent, alternative voices. Sputnik claims that it “tells the untold,” even if its daily report relies heavily on articles abridged from other sources. RT trumpets the slogan “Question More.”
Both depict the West as grim, divided, brutal, decadent, overrun with violent immigrants and unstable. “They want to give a picture of Europe as some sort of continent that is collapsing,” Mr. Hultqvist, the Swedish defense minister, said in an interview.
RT often seems obsessed with the United States, portraying life there as hellish. Its coverage of the Democratic National Convention, for example, skipped the speeches and focused instead on scattered demonstrations. It defends the Republican presidential nominee, Donald J. Trump, as an underdog maligned by the established news media.
Margarita Simonyan, RT’s editor in chief, said the channel was being singled out as a threat because it offered a different narrative from “the Anglo-American media-political establishment.” RT, she said, wants to provide “a perspective otherwise missing from the mainstream media echo chamber.”
Moscow’s targeting of the West with disinformation dates to a Cold War program the Soviets called “active measures.” The effort involved leaking or even writing stories for sympathetic newspapers in India and hoping that they would be picked up in the West, said Professor Mark N. Kramer, a Cold War expert at Harvard.
The story that AIDS was a C.I.A. project run amok spread that way, and it poisons the discussion of the disease decades later. At the time, before the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, the Kremlin was selling communism as an ideological alternative. Now, experts said, the ideological component has evaporated, but the goal of weakening adversaries remains.
In Sweden recently, that has meant a series of bizarre forged letters and news articles about NATO and linked to Russia.
One forgery, on Defense Ministry letterhead over Mr. Hultqvist’s signature, encouraged a major Swedish firm to sell artillery to Ukraine, a move that would be illegal in Sweden. Ms. Nyh Radebo, his spokeswoman, put an end to that story in Sweden, but at international conferences, Mr. Hultqvist still faced questions about the nonexistent sales.
Russia also made at least one overt attempt to influence the debate. During a seminar in the spring, Vladimir Kozin, a senior adviser to the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank linked to the Kremlin and Russian foreign intelligence, argued against any change in Sweden’s neutral status.
“Do they really need to lose their neutral status?” he said of the Swedes. “To permit fielding new U.S. military bases on their territory and to send their national troops to take part in dubious regional conflicts?”
Whatever the method or message, Russia clearly wants to win any information war, as Dmitry Kiselyev, Russia’s most famous television anchor and the director of the organization that runs Sputnik, made clear recently.
Speaking this summer on the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Information Bureau, Mr. Kiselyev said the age of neutral journalism was over. “If we do propaganda, then you do propaganda, too,” he said, directing his message to Western journalists.
“Today, it is much more costly to kill one enemy soldier than during World War II, World War I or in the Middle Ages,” he said in an interview on the state-run Rossiya 24 network. While the business of “persuasion” is more expensive now, too, he said, “if you can persuade a person, you don’t need to kill him.”
Correction: August 28, 2016
An earlier version of this article misspelled the surname of a spokesman for the Swedish Security Service. He is Wilhelm Unge, not Urme.
A Russian journalist and well-known critic of Vladimir Putin has been found dead in Ukraine on his birthday.
Alexander Shchetinin’s body was discovered by his friends early this morning at his Kiev apartment, according to a Facebook post from the police.
He had a gunshot wound to the head and there was also a suicide note, with a weapon found nearby.
‘Police ascertain the circumstances of the death of the journalist,’ a message on the force’s social media page said.
‘Notice is received by the Police Podolsky around midnight. When arrived at the scene investigative team, on the balcony of a man found gunshot wound to the head.’
Spent cartridges were also found at the scene and the door to his apartment was locked.
Shchetinin launched the Novy Region (New Region) press agency and reportedly called Russian president Putin a ‘personal enemy’.
He had officially become a Ukrainian after relinquishing his Russian citizenship.
Ukrainian police are continuing to investigate the circumstances of Shchetinin’s death.
By Nicholas Welsh, an intern in the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program.
In April, Prime Minister Turnbull unveiled the National Cyber Security Strategy, outlining five key themes of action to improve Australia’s cyber-security capabilities and meet the dual challenges of ‘advancing and protecting our interests online’. Just over three months later, the collapse of the census website, attributed (at least in part) to a series of distributed denial of service attacks from international sources demonstrated why we need such a strategy.
Cyber-crime is a difficult challenge for any government. The anonymous nature of the internet makes it difficult to find the individuals behind online activities, and the legal hurdles to convicting perpetrators (particularly if they are suspected to be overseas) are considerable, given cyber-laws vary greatly. The National Cyber Security Strategy will help to ensure Australian cyber-defence capabilities are, at the very least, in step with global technological advances But national-level defence can only go so far in a realm where Australia’s geographical isolation and border protection efforts are, in essence, immaterial.
The third of the five themes, titled ‘Global Responsibility and Influence’, seeks to partner with international law enforcement and intelligence agencies to ‘build cyber capacity to prevent and shut down safe havens for cyber criminals’. With the proximity of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) established in Singapore in 2014, Australia and the Asia-Pacific region finds itself in a somewhat unique position to combat the rise of cyber-crime on a level beyond the national. The IGCI’s cyber-focussed mandate and capacity building role complements the goals of the strategy nicely, but the extent to which the IGCI has, over the past two years, installed itself as indispensable in all cybercrime matters is debatable.
Since the IGCI’s establishment, the Australian Federal Police Force (AFP) has embedded officers in the Singapore complex, allowing them to use an extensive network of cyber expertise and personnel training programmes, both for regional and domestic benefit. Despite such benefits, the lack of any operational mandate for the IGCI means that bilateral (and increasingly multilateral) relationships between national police forces remain more valuable, and so cooperation and intel sharing among regional state law enforcement agencies remains compartmentalised.
Governments around the world commonly reference the difficulty of tackling a transnational issue like cybercrime alone and push a narrative of cooperation between national law enforcement agencies, as evidenced in the third theme of the cyber security strategy. In this context, the IGCI, which offers a pre-existing structure to facilitate the construction of a multilateral, regional framework for tackling cybercrime, would seem to be an under-used resource on Australia’s doorstep. Even without an operational mandate, the central coordination role that the IGCI could play in organising and sharing cybercrime intel equally among regional law-enforcement agencies has the potential to provide the Asia-Pacific region with a technological and informational advantage that states lack when acting alone.
While the current lack of extensive regional engagement with the IGCI may be in part due to its youth, the greatest hurdle to creating such a regional framework would be, as ever, political. Technological advances in the cyber-sphere are dual use by nature; increases in one state’s capacity to combat cybercrime could be seen as a threat against another’s cybersecurity. The IGCI is a non-political entity but it will still find it hard to convince governments the benefits of integrated cooperation to combat cybercrime outweigh the risks their own security will be undermined in the event of a state-sanctioned cyber-attack. Emphasising the reverse of the dual-use argument would be key. Any expertise gained by tackling cybercrime can also be applied to improving national cyber-defences, just as much as it could be used to improve offensive cyber-capabilities.
At this stage it looks unlikely the IGCI will evolve to have an operational mandate in conjunction with its coordination role. Transnational policing operations remain bilateral and multilateral, and so AFP regional engagement must seek to maintain and improve these individual state-level relations. However, the capacity for combating cyber-crime offered by the IGCI offers a potential regional coordination mechanism unique to the Asia-Pacific region. Given that the publicity of the census collapse has brought cyber-security to the forefront of public debate, investing in the development of such a mechanism is looking increasingly attractive.
The latest edition of StopFake News with Marko Suprun. Among the disinformation debunked this are two fakes concerning Ukraine’s future, an imminent economic collapse Russian media are promising, as well as the complete disintegration of Ukraine’s nuclear power industry. We also debunk yet another Russian claim about Ukrainian armed forces opening fire on OSCE monitors.
After online efforts fizzle, government turns to encouraging others to join battle to counteract the terrorist group’s propaganda
By NICOLE HONG
Aug. 28, 2016 4:20 p.m. ET
Recent initiatives by technology companies to push back against Islamic State’s social-media messaging highlight a sobering fact: The U.S. government’s battle on that front has mostly sputtered.
In a number of terrorist attacks over the past year, the attackers were found to have been inspired by Islamic State propaganda and videos, which are often described as Hollywood-level productions. Despite numerous military victories against Islamic State, U.S. officials acknowledge they have struggled to counteract the terrorist group’s online campaign.
“We were able to disrupt networks, arrest terrorist cells, kill terror operatives,” said Ali Soufan, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation counterterrorism agent who now runs a security consulting firm, the Soufan Group. But “we haven’t been doing a great job in countering the ideology.”
Since early 2014, approximately 100 individuals have been arrested in the U.S. on charges related to providing support to Islamic State. In 69% of the cases, officials found the individuals had watched or read the group’s electronic dispatches, according to a report released last month by Fordham University’s Center on National Security.
The government’s countermessaging efforts so far have been scattershot and, some close to the government think, largely ineffective. Officials say the government’s new strategy is to empower third parties to create their own messages, a contrast from earlier efforts that were criticized for having too much direct government involvement.
One of the government’s earliest messaging campaigns against Islamic State began in 2013 with a Twitter account run by the State Department called “Think Again Turn Away,” which aimed to dissuade people interested in joining the terrorist group. But the account would often tweet directly at pro-Islamic State accounts, sparking back-and-forths on Twitter that drew more attention to the voices of individual jihadists, critics said.
People looking to view the account’s tweets are now redirected to the account for the Global Engagement Center, a new State Department initiative created this year to combat Islamic State messaging. Unlike the previous effort, the center aims to reduce the government’s direct engagement online, especially in English, which officials saw as ineffective.
There are some encouraging signs. Since June 2014, there has been a 45% drop in pro-Islamic State tweets, said U.S. officials, citing data analytics technology that tracks Islamic State’s presence on social media. It’s unclear, however, whether the drop in tweets has resulted in fewer foreign fighters wanting to join the terrorist group. Islamic State supporters are also becoming more active on encrypted messaging apps, experts say, which raises the question of whether counternarratives on platforms like Twitter or Facebook are reaching the proper audience.
Government-backed messaging has always been fraught with challenges. In 1948, Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act, which said government information about the U.S. could only be distributed overseas. Those restrictions were later loosened but are still seen as somewhat outdated in the internet age. Nevertheless, the legal rules have forced the State Department to be careful not to present its messaging efforts as domestic propaganda, experts say.
The most significant hurdle lies not with the messages themselves, but with the messenger, according to current and former government officials. Experts widely acknowledge that directives from the U.S. government are unlikely to resonate with young people interested in joining Islamic State.
That presents the dilemma of how the government can support countermessaging efforts by tech companies and Muslim community leaders without undermining them.
A bipartisan congressional task force and the Homeland Security Advisory Council, which advises the Homeland Security secretary, have both recommended stronger countermessaging efforts by the government.
The task force’s report, released last September, noted that a State Department video featuring an Islamic State defector received only 500 views after two months, while Islamic State execution videos received tens of thousands of views within hours of going online. The task force recommended the government “urgently” develop ways to contest the propaganda and work with partners such as social-media companies and universities.
The Department of Homeland Security announced last month that it would set aside $10 million of its budget to launch the first federal grant program devoted exclusively to “countering violent extremism,” which includes countermessaging initiatives. School districts, local governments and nonprofits around the U.S. have been invited to apply.
Both the government and private sector are trying to use data analytics to target the messaging at the most vulnerable audiences.
Earlier this month, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a London think tank, published a report studying what kinds of counternarratives are most effective online. The experiments were funded by Google parent Alphabet Inc., Facebook Inc. and Twitter Inc. One conclusion from the study: The messages should be narrowly targeted to a particular audience.
Over the past year, the government has helped tech companies like Facebook create competitions for college students around the world to come up with their own campaigns against extremism. The efforts recognize that young people will respond best to messages created by other young people. This spring there were 54 universities in the competitions, up from 45 schools last fall.
In April, the House passed a bill that would require Homeland Security to use testimonials of former extremists and defectors to combat terrorism, a strategy that is widely employed in Europe. State Department officials also have encouraged media companies and filmmakers to host workshops where Muslim activists can learn to film their own content.
Whether the messages are dimming the appeal of Islamic State is hard to know. It’s virtually impossible to quantify the number of people who were convinced not to join a terrorist group. For that reason, some experts say the government should be wary of devoting too many resources to this area and focus on military efforts with more tangible results.
“You’re never going to get rid of bad ideas,” said Will McCants, a former senior adviser at the State Department who now is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “If we want to diminish them in the eyes of the public, let’s have it, but let’s also recognize that it is a marginal effort.”
The question about the role of the armed forces in the information space is in fact a question about the role of the factor of force in the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy. In Russia, this factor has invariably been treated as a hallmark of the country’s position as a global power, an instrument of deterrence, and a way to exert political pressure and build spheres of influence. The country’s military information strategy is designed to serve those tasks, and envisages multiple battle fronts, including internal and external affairs, the info-psychological front, the cyberspace and other spheres. Its visible consequences include a militarisation of the language of politics and propaganda, the imposition on public opinion of the narrative of an information war against Russia, and a radical change of the Russian army’s image. Today Russia forcefully demands that other countries respect its spheres of influence in the neighbourhood (as seen from its aggression against Ukraine and its armed intervention in Syria). It claims to be the guarantor of peace processes, even as it demolishes the European and global security architecture, and presents itself as a centre of power, asserting the right to co-decide on matters of global security.
Australia on Tuesday released what the government says is the world’s first how-to guide for combating radical Islamist propaganda in Southeast Asia, which it hopes will help disrupt local recruitment efforts by groups such as Islamic State.
Australia, a staunch U.S. ally, has been on heightened alert for attacks by homegrown Islamist radicals since 2014 and authorities say they have thwarted a number of plots.
The 43-page document, entitled “Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia,” will be accessible online and aims to provide tools to disrupt the winding path to radicalization, said Justice Minister Michael Keenan.
“The process of radicalization to violence is an incredibly complex issue. Terrorist propaganda affects each individual’s state of mind, their thoughts and emotions differently. There is no single pathway to radicalization,” Keenan told a conference in Canberra, according to an advanced copy of his remarks shared with Reuters.
“This compendium provides practical guidance and insight for governments, policy makers and civil society organizations in Australia and Southeast Asia to support their development of effective counter-narratives that undercut the appeal of terrorist propaganda.”
The document does not make for light reading. It contains tips for a successful strategy such as “protect the messenger” and “consider how military and counter-terrorism actions impact the strategic counter-narrative.”
It also offers case studies and examples, such as the Burqa Avenger cartoon in Pakistan, in which a teenage Muslim heroine battles extremist villains with books, analyzing their success in countering narratives put forward by increasingly media-savvy militant groups.
About 100 people have left Australia for Syria to fight alongside organizations such as Islamic State, Australia’s Immigration Minister said this year.
Canberra has been increasingly focused in recent years on preventing the spread of militant Islamism to its neighbors in Southeast Asia, which have large Muslim populations and, it is feared, could link up with its own homegrown militants.
Earlier this year, Australian police arrested five men suspected of planning to sail a small boat from the far north to Indonesia and the Philippines en route to joining Islamic State in Syria.
The men were detained after towing the seven-meter boat almost 3,000 km (1,865 miles) from Melbourne to Cairns in Queensland state.
There have been several “lone wolf” assaults in Australia, including a 2014 cafe siege in Sydney that left two hostages and the gunman dead. Also in 2014, police shot dead a Melbourne teenager after he stabbed two counterterrorism officers.
In 2015, a 15-year-old boy fired on an accountant at a police headquarters in a Sydney suburb and was killed in a gunfight with police.
My past week has been consumed with personal matters, my apologies.
There is a lot going on around the world, much of it news of tragedies around the world.
Then we have Russia, feinting like a boxer, poking and prodding, and generally being a PITA. …and no, that’s not bread. Like the neighborhood bully, we must be patient for them to grow up. Maybe by 2050?
I received a notification from Grammerly yesterday, stating I am writing approximately 48,000 words per week. That is mostly from this blog, but quite a bit is definitely from Facebook. If any of you needs a writer, I can research and write on almost any topic – and it seems to be prolific. Any advice on publishing books would also be helpful!
Today I happened to review the overall totals of people that viewed my blog in the past week and I thought I would share. I do this about twice a year. A professional friend in Russia does the same thing, but somehow records visitors to his Facebook page. He publishes the “top ten”, which is usually Russian oblasts, the UK, and the US.
Just as an FYI, there was a LOT of interest in the mushroom clouds in Russia, which I blogged about yesterday. That attracted a lot more interest than I expected. Nobody in the West, and certainly not Russia, seems to be saying they are from a nuclear test, but it generated a lot of interest.
Yes, I see you sneaking a peek at my page, China. Welcome! If you want advice on using a VPN to hide your presence better, let me know.
We welcome all readers of the Disinformation Review
back after the summer break.
Excluding cheaters? That’s racial cleansing!
During the past week, the number one topic for the pro-Kremlin media seemed to be the Olympic and Paralympic games. In light of the ban on some Russian competitors due to state-organised doping, Russian Government-loyal outlets took the opportunity to repeat one of their favourite narratives – the world-wide conspiracy against Russia.
Thus, in Vladimir Solovyov’s show we heard that through the ban on athletes, Russia is being punished for its annexation of Crimea, for its actions in Syria and for its opposition to US hegemony (http://bit.ly/2bIqyUa). In the “Vremya Pokazhet” show the viewers learned that the “persecution” of Russian sportsmen was staged by the USA and the UK (http://bit.ly/2bJIQl3), and that these countries created an atmosphere of hatred during the Olympics – although the Russian athletes present in the show said that they liked the olympic atmosphere and that they made a lot of new friends there.
Only two days later, the same show switched the main topic from the main Olympic event to the Paralympic games. Here, unlike in the “big” games, the entire Russian team was banned from participation due to massive government-led doping. This led to probably the nastiest disinformation attack from pro-Kremlin mouthpieces: journalist Yuriy Kot described the ban as “a racial cleansing and a manifestation of current fascism” (http://bit.ly/2bAe5Af).
Trouble with logic on the disinformation front
Apart from the major sports event in Rio, August also saw an escalation of the military situation in Ukraine and on its borders. Also here, the pro-Kremlin media obediently pushed the government message.
We saw the never-ending disinformation about “concentration camps” for Russian speakers in Ukraine being recycled once again (http://bit.ly/2c9Upa7), although in the course of more than two years of reporting this, pro-Kremlin media have never shown a single proof that would back their accusations. This time Komsomolskaya Pravda presented an alleged Ukrainian campaign “Beat the Muscovites” (http://bit.ly/2bq6dB3), but again without any proof.
The separatist site miaistok.su repeated another eternal piece of disinformation about “nazi” Ukrainians, and also compared President Poroshenko to Hitler (http://bit.ly/2bC8B6F). Multiple stories accused the Ukrainians over the recent escalation of the conflict (e.g. http://bit.ly/2bCw6g0) although in reality, it was the Russian army which was being mobilised throughout the month along Russia’s Ukrainian border.
The “Vremya Pokazhet” show continued its hostile anti-Western disinformation campaign also in its treatment of this issue. The anchor and his guest accused the USA of knowing in advance and permitting the terrorist acts in Crimea (http://bit.ly/2bAawtI). Just a reminder: The alleged recent terrorist attacks in Crimea exist only in pro-Kremlin outlets, no independent sources confirm them. Ukraine has denied its involvement from the very beginning and labels them as yet another Russian provocation on the peninsula: http://bit.ly/2c5Yknk.
During the shows, we repeatedly heard the eternal disinformation narrative that Ukrainians and Russians are one single nation – as well as the similarly old disinformation narrative that Ukrainians can define themselves only through their hatred towards Russia. How someone can both be a Russian and define themself only through their hatred towards Russia is only one of many mysteries posed by pro-Kremlin experts.
“Humiliation”
Pro-Kremlin journalists like to talk about the might of Russia and its superiority over the West. But they also complain about the constant humiliation that Russia has received from the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because this myth is one of the most repeated in pro-Kremlin outlets, and unfortunately sometimes repeated even in the West, we decided to dedicate a couple of sentences to it. And our conclusion is that there is in fact more evidence to the contrary.
In fact, the EU and Russia have a long record of cooperation dating back to 1994, when they negotiated a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Negotiations about a new EU-Russia agreement were ongoing until their suspension in 2014 due to the Russian Federation’s involvement in the conflict in and around Ukraine:http://bit.ly/2bwtEH8. Negotiations were also ongoing on visa facilitation. The EU has maintained a firm policy of reaching out to Russian society and its youth, mainly through Erasmus+ and other programs.
NATO too began reaching out to Russia in the early 1990s. Russia signed the Partnership for Peace with NATO in 1994. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, creating the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. And in 2002 they upgraded that relationship, creating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). No other partner has been offered a comparable relationship, nor a similar comprehensive institutional framework:http://bit.ly/2btpLbR.
In 1997, Russia was invited to the G7 group of major advanced economies in the world, so forming the G8. In 2006, Vladimir Putin hosted the G8 summit in Saint Petersburg. Russia’s membership was suspended only because of its illegal annexation of Crimea. Since 2012, Russia has also been a member of the World Trade Organisation.
One would be hard pressed to find another country so humiliated by being invited to almost every international club there is.
The Disinformation Review collects examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation all around Europe and beyond. Every week, it exposes the breadth of this campaign, showing the countries and languages targeted. We’re always looking for new partners to cooperate with us for that.
The Disinformation Digest analyses how pro-Kremlin media see the world and what independent Russian voices say. It follows key trends on Russian social media, so you can put pro-Kremlin narratives into their wider context. And finally… some Friday Fun before the weekend!
DISCLAIMER: The Disinformation Review is a compilation of reports received from members of the mythbusting network. The mythbusting network comprises of over 450 experts, journalists, officials, NGOs and Think Tanks in over 30 countries. Please note that opinions and judgements expressed here do not represent official EU positions.
Ukraine can rightly be regarded as an space power, despite the fact that, since its independence from the Soviet Union, it has endured significant economic challenges, and its space industry is under the patronage of the state. The country has a full cycle of the infrastructure needed for creating rockets, the necessary base of scientific…
It can come in the form of the massive snap military exercises Vladimir Putin announced last week.
It could come in the form of Russia’s recent menacing troop buildup on Ukraine’s borders.
Or it can come in the form of cyberattacks against the electoral systems of two U.S. states and several Washington-based think tanks — attacks experts suspect Kremlin-backed hackers of carrying out in recent weeks.
But regardless of the form this geopolitical extortion takes, there is always one simple message: Russia is prepared to wreak havoc and sow chaos until the West let’s it have its way.
This is the Putin regime’s way of saying: either you lift sanctions and let us have a free hand in the former Soviet space, or you will face perpetual crises; let us do as we please in Ukraine, in Georgia, and in Moldova, or else we will make your life a living hell.
The message comes at us as Putin prepares to meet Western leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, at the G20 summit next week in China.
And it comes as voices in many Western capitals calling for accommodation with Moscow are becoming louder and louder.
But accommodating an extortionist is never a good idea. All it does it whet their appetite.
If Putin gets a free hand in his backyard, then what will he want next?
Things to do when you hear a “whataboutism” retort:
Call out the tactic – say you don’t play “whataboutism”
Don’t get derailed – the propagandists are probably twisting facts to suit their narrative.
Don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good. Your opponent is attempting to distract you with facts that have little relevance to the topic at hand. Stick to the subject: “Yes, that event back then was a calamity. How does that justify Russia making a new calamity on purpose?”
The very first example was the “whataboutism” of choice by Russian trolls in 2014, a play on “Fatboy Slim – Weapon Of Choice” .
This was THE standard response to every accusation of Russia into Crimea, into Donbas, into Georgia, wherever Russia has shoved their way into a former territory. Every US military operation for the past 60 years was raised as a counter to what Russia has done and is doing.
Whataboutism has been the classic Soviet response and remains the classic Russian response.
The article contains this advice, sage advice:
Things to do when you hear a “whataboutism” retort:
Call out the tactic – say you don’t play “whataboutism”
Don’t get derailed – the propagandists are probably twisting facts to suit their narrative.
Don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good. Your opponent is attempting to distract you with facts that have little relevance to the topic at hand. Stick to the subject: “Yes, that event back then was a calamity. How does that justify Russia making a new calamity on purpose?”
Alex is a contributor to Euromaidan Press. He is a graduate student studying political and military history. He is an avid consumer of Russian propaganda.
Euromaidan Press presents its second video dealing with Russia’s propaganda tactics. Find the first video here: A guide to Russian propaganda. Part 1: Propaganda prepares Russia for war.The Russian propaganda machine produces endless streams of fakes and manipulative stories. While at times they may seem outrageous or silly, they are far from being random. Russian propaganda for both domestic and foreign audiences follows techniques that stem from Goebbel’s times. Ultimately, it is a weapon of war. In our series A guide to Russian propaganda, we examine how propaganda works, and how one can avoid falling for it.
During the Cold War, westerners dealing with the Soviet Union grew frustrated at the automatic Soviet response to comments that were even slightly critical towards the USSR. The Soviets would say “what about …” before bringing up some supposed example of western hypocrisy. The Soviets sometimes seemed less interested in defending communism than in just pointing out that the West was, also, imperfect. Western diplomats, journalists, and scholars started calling this practice: “whataboutism.” Whataboutism is a constant diversion away from actual relevant news items, facts, and arguments into constant accusations of hypocrisy. This amounts to almost a pseudo-ideology of “we are not perfect, but neither are you” rather than arguments like: “our system is better” or “you don’t understand.”
Whataboutism is alive and strong today in Russian propaganda. The basic mechanism is an attempt to use either the emotions of shame or anger to derail an argument. By accusing their opponents or even just their interlocutors of hypocrisy, propagandists hope to trigger the emotion of shame to blunt accusations or divert the conversation into a discussion about hypocrisy. If the counter-accusation the propagandist uses is absolutely ridiculous, as is often the case, then the propagandist is probably not trying to use shame, but rather use one’s anger to divert the conversation away from an important matter at hand and into a constant back-and-forth about some irrelevant piece of history.
Remember, the propagandists want to keep you distracted and confused. They don’t care about facts or truth, they just want to mentally divide and weaken their audience to make them more susceptible to propaganda or irresolute in the face of aggression.
Things to do when you hear a “whataboutism” retort:
Call out the tactic – say you don’t play “whataboutism”
Don’t get derailed – the propagandists are probably twisting facts to suit their narrative.
Don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good. Your opponent is attempting to distract you with facts that have little relevance to the topic at hand. Stick to the subject: “Yes, that event back then was a calamity. How does that justify Russia making a new calamity on purpose?”
Some examples of Russian/Soviet whataboutism:
1. Russia is not invading Ukraine and besides, what about the US hypocrisy in telling Russia to stay out of Ukraine?
This Russian propaganda clip from March 2014 tries to change the subject from Russia’s then-ongoing invasion of Crimea by attacking US hypocrisy. While Russian troops were invading Ukraine, this clip attacked the US for invading Iraq, fighting in Afghanistan, and using armed drones, all while denying that the Russian invasion of Crimea was actually taking place. Notice how the item concludes with the statement “actual military action has not even been given a green-light for by the Russian President, and Russia never said it’s interested in war with Ukraine. Regardless, the world’s top aggressor accuses Moscow of being one, applying double standards upon convenience.” In fact, Russian troops had seized Crimea several days before this clip aired, and Russia began also invading Donbas a little over a month later.
2. The “Rebels” in Donbas are organized and violent and it looks like they are being coordinated and supplied by Russia? What about the organized protests months earlier in Maidan?
This clip is from CNN in April 2014 during the first stages of Russia’s invasion of Donbas. At one point in the clip the CNN anchor asks a Russian propagandist about the refusal of the supposedly “pro-Russian protesters” to abide by the Geneva accords lay down their weapons and leave the government buildings they occupied. The propagandist immediately switches to talking about the Maidan protests and Crimea. She says that one can’t say the Russians occupying buildings in Donbas are Russian soldiers because they are armed and organized, because the protesters at Maidan were also armed and organized. She doesn’t mention that the protesters in Maidan were armed with self-made wooden shields and were self-organized, while the Russians taking over administrative buildings were armed with machine guns (see other differences between Euromaidan protesters and Donbas separatists here).
As proven by phone intercepts of Putin’s top advisor Glazyev, this distanced semblance to a popular uprising was crucial to the Kremlin in manufacturing the war in Ukraine by financial and organizational means. The techonology was to prop up “popular support,” ensure the relevant vote by the local authorities by means of armed men (mostly, Russians) occupying the administrative buildings, invade under the guise of providing “protection” to the local population.
3. Some of Putin’s shady financial dealings were revealed in the Panama papers. What about the other political figures who were connected to the Panama Papers?
This item from Russian propaganda tries to deflect attention from the shady dealings of close Putin associates revealed in the Panama papers by changing the subject to the dealings of David Cameron’s father, and one propagandists spins that the Guardian was only emphasizing the Putin angle to curry favor with MI6.
4. Russia murdered a British subject in London with polonium – but what about the Iraq war?
After the Financial Times published an editorial about Russia’s murder of Litvinenko in London in 2006, the Russian embassy in London responded with a classic whataboutism response. “Why not mind your British business thoroughly and ask why nobody has been until now held responsible for the British dead in the War in Iraq? The Chilcot Inquiry, by the way, equally lacks transparency. Is it because the establishment always knows better?…It is no minor matter that the wrong War in Iraq has led to an explosive mix of Islamic fanaticism and brains and guts of Iraqi Baathists and disbanded officer corps, which became a crucial factor in radicalization of British Muslims. The present migrant crisis in Calais and the Mediterranean has the same sources of flawed interventions and strategies in the Middle East and North Africa.”
5. Chernobyl is on fire, but what about nuclear accidents in the US?
According to the New York Times, the Soviets provided a classic example of whataboutism in 1986. After spending days denying or minimizing the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown and fire, the Soviet government finally admitted that there was an accident on TASS, the official Soviet news agency. The brief announcement was followed by a report about nuclear mishaps in the United States, like at Three Mile Island and Rochester.
6. Russian forces participated in the Crimea annexation, but what about Kosovo?
After the illegal referendum at gunpoint on 16 March 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the Duma, equating Russia’s annexation of Crimea to Kosovo’s secession from Serbia, essentially endorsing the intervention in Kosovo. However, at the time of the Kosovo intervention in 2008, then Russian President Medvedevcondemned it, saying that “Kosovo independence violates Serbia’s sovereignty, is a violation of international law.” Just seven months later, when Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, Medvedev contradicts himself by using Kosovo as an excuse for invading Georgia, saying that the Georgian region of South Ossetia was a different type of Kosovo.
Kosovo was “bad” for Russia where there was a need to condemn the “hypocritical West,” but good when Russia needed to justify its invasions and occupation of sovereign countries.
Video designer: Ganna Naronina; video script and idea: Alex Leonor, Alya Shandra
bids containing substitutions will be viewed as UNACCEPTABLE. If you are not able to deliver the line item as requested, DO NOT BID.
The cameras required are $100 – $150 commercial EXIR models:
Those cameras are solid commercial offerings (see our Hikvision EXIR test results) common in small to medium sized businesses but, even without the Chinese government ownership, are a strange choice for the high standards of sole source justification for federal facilities.
But the US government has filed a request for that with no meaningful visible defense:
On the other hand, it is a risk for the US government to be deploying Chinese government controlled surveillance cameras into high security federal facilities.
Battalion sized nuclear backpack units are being set up by North Korea.
In line with their usual bravado, the accompanying picture above shows what they are displaying as nuclear backpacks.
Below is an actual ancient US Special Forces nuclear backpack. It’s quite a bit larger and very much heavier.
This is, of course, North Korean propaganda. The DPRK supposedly has between 10 – 15 nuclear devices, but backpack sized? Me thinks not.
</end editorial>
Gabriel Dominguez, London – IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly
31 August 2016
Top soldiers from North Korea’s military have reportedly been selected to serve on units that would carry nuclear devices in backpacks and detonate them behind enemy lines in the event of a war.
On 29 August Radio Free Asia cited an unnamed source in North Korea as saying that: “Outstanding soldiers were selected from each reconnaissance platoon and light infantry brigade to form the nuclear backpack unit the size of a battalion.”
The special units have been formed since March, the source added.
It is not clear whether the units would operate as suicide squads.