A Response to General Allen

In response to General Allen’s call for targeting ISIS online.

General Allen is right on the diagnosis. Yes, the ISIS has been successful in promoting its brand and attracting support.  Yes, it has a very successful use of the Internet and social media. And yes, more needs to be done to tackle the ideological dimension behind the movement.

Yet, the general is also disingenuous. First, work is being done. Many countries involved in the anti-ISIS coalition do some work to contest the ideological space. They monitor radical websites, blogs, social media. They arrest propagandists.  They develop counter-propaganda material. They promote voices opposing or condemning the ISIS. Grassroots counter efforts have even been spurred (the #notinmyname campaign for example). Maybe these efforts are not enough. Maybe they are not quite right. Maybe they are not as effective as we wish or want.  But these efforts exist.

Second, this is not an easy task by any stretch of the imagination. This is not as easy as hopping on social media to highlight the brutality of ISIS’ rule.  It requires developing effective counter-narratives that address the fundamental motivation of why people are tempted by the ISIS’ message.  It thus requires a clear understanding of what might appeal to ISIS’ recruits and sympathizers. Listening to counter-terrorism officials, it is unclear that we have developed that understanding yet.  This is also difficult because the ISIS does not use the Internet and social media the way we (Western democracies) do. It does not use them as a marketplace where it presents its ideas and ‘consumers’ just buy-in. ISIS uses the Internet and Social Media to identify, stalk, lure, and indoctrinate prey. It is not just a contest of ideas.

Third, and to speak specifically of the US, we might be in a better position to fight this war if, for the past thirty years, we had not engineered a complete gut-out of our strategic communications assets. After the Cold War, Congress, in its infinite wisdom, killed the United States Information Agency. After defeating the Soviet Union, Congress could not imagine the rise of any other ideological competitor. That led to the dismantling of the human and organizational capabilities familiar with counter-propaganda. The State Department has never recovered from that and its very small counter-propaganda shop is not to the scale of the problem.  Meanwhile, in the US military, PSYOP/MISO capabilities fare no better. These forces have undergone repeated reforms in the past few decades but remain fairly small, overused, and tactically oriented. If given a choice, it seems the military will choose any piece of hardware over funding PSYOP/MISO or Public Affairs.  In IO, they will fund cyber over the soft side of perception management.

Pascale

Pascale Combelles Siegel