This article concentrates on the extreme lengths sources and reporters may have to go to maintain anonymity and still disclose illegal, unethical or immoral activities.

I had a deep education of covert and surreptitious communications when I was in Special Forces. In the past few years dealing with some sources who are in not-s0-well protected countries I have learned many new secure, encrypted communications techniques. Often they are called circumvention technologies, meaning they are deliberately designed to maneuver around firewalls, blocked addresses, and government censorship.

Using these technologies appears to be the status quo for working in today’s world, in many situations.  Imagine any of these characters discovering the name of the original source, what would happen?  Imagine these reporters becoming known to the scofflaws discovered here, their stories may have never been properly researched and written. They might have been “spiked”, sometimes literally.

</end editorial>

AUTHOR: ANDY GREENBERG.ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 04.04.16.04.04.16

TIME OF PUBLICATION: 9:17 AM.9:17 AM

WHEN DANIEL ELLSBERG photocopied and leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times in 1971, those 7,000 pages of top secret Vietnam War documents represented what was then the biggest whistleblower leak in history—a couple dozen megabytes if it were contained in a modern text file. Almost four decades later, WikiLeaks in 2010 published Cablegate, a world-shaking, 1.73-gigabyte collection of classified State Department communications that was almost a hundred times bigger.

If there’s some Moore’s Law of Leaks, however, it seems to be exponential. Just five years have passed since WikiLeaks’ Cablegate coup, and now the world is grappling with a whistleblower megaleak on a scale never seen before: 2.6 terabytes, well over a thousandfold larger.

On Sunday, more than a hundred media outlets around the world, coordinated by the Washington, DC-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, released stories on the Panama Papers, a gargantuan collection of leaked documents exposing a widespread system of global tax evasion. The leak includes more than 4.8 million emails, 3 million database files, and 2.1 million PDFs from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca that, according to the analysis of the leaked documents, appears to specialize in creating shell companies that its clients have used to hide their assets.

“This is pretty much every document from this firm over a 40-year period,” ICIJ director Gerard Ryle told WIRED in a phone call, arguing that at “about 2,000 times larger than the WikiLeaks state department cables,” it’s indeed the biggest leak in history.

Neither the ICIJ nor any of the reporters it’s worked with has made the leaked data public. But the scandal resulting from their reporting has already touched celebrities, athletes, business executives and world leaders. The documents trace $2 billion of hidden money tied to Vladimir Putin through accounts held in the names of family members and his celebrated musician friend Sergei Roldugin. Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson is facing demands from the previous Icelandic prime minister that he resign after the Mossack Fonseca documents showed that Gunnlaugsson may have failed to disclose ownership of a stake in certain Icelandic banks under the government’s rules for officials. And the leaks drag FIFA officials back into the news, showing that even an ethics lawyer for the world soccer body had financial ties to another FIFA official already accused of corruption.

But beyond those revelations—and there will likely be more as the reporting around the Panama Papers continues—the leak represents an unprecedented story in itself: How an anonymous whistleblower was able to spirit out and surreptitiously send journalists a gargantuan collection of files, which were then analyzed by more than 400 reporters in secret over more than a year before a coordinated effort to go public.

How You Coordinate History’s Biggest Leak

The Panama Papers leak began, according to ICIJ director Ryle, in late 2014, when an unknown source reached out to the German newspaper Suddeutsche Zeitung, which had reported previously on a smaller leak of Mossack Fonseca files to German government regulators. A Suddeutsche Zeitung reporter named Bastian Obermayer says that the source contacted him via encrypted chat, offering some sort of data intended “to make these crimes public.” But the source warned that his or her “life is in danger,” was only willing to communicate via encrypted channels, and refused to meet in person.

“How much data are we talking about?” Obermayer asked.

“More than you have ever seen,” the source responded, according to Obermayer.

Obermayer tells WIRED he communicated with his source over a series of encrypted channels that they frequently changed, each time deleting all history from their prior exchange. He alludes to crypto apps like Signal and Threema, as well as PGP-encrypted email but declines to say specifically which methods they used. Each time the reporter and source re-established a connection, they would use a known question and answer to reauthenticate each other. “I’d say ‘is it sunny?’ You’d say ‘the moon is raining’ or whatever nonsense, and then both of us can verify it’s still the other person on the device,” Obermayer says.

After seeing a portion of the documents, Suddeutsche Zeitung contacted the ICIJ, which had helped to coordinate previous tax haven megaleaks including a 2013 analysis of leaked offshore tax haven data and another leak-enabled investigation last year that focused on assets protected by the Swiss bank HSBC. ICIJ staff flew to Munich to coordinate with Suddeutsche Zeitung reporters.

Meanwhile, the shipments of leaked data continued piecemeal. “Over time we got more and more until we had all 11.5 million documents,” Ryle says. Obermayer declined to explain how their leaker sent Suddeutsche Zeitung hundreds of gigabytes or even terabytes of information at a time. That’s far too much to send over email, of course, though that quantity of data could easily be sent anonymously in the form of shipped encrypted hard drives. “I learned a lot about making the safe transfer of big files,” Obermayer says elliptically.

We’re not WikiLeaks. We’re trying to show that journalism can be done responsibly.
ICIJ DIRECTOR GERARD RYLE

The ICIJ’s developers then built a two-factor-authentication-protected search engine for the leaked documents, the URL for which they shared via encrypted email with scores of news outlets including the BBC, The Guardian, Fusion, and dozens of foreign-language media outlets. The site even featured a real-time chat system, so that reporters could exchange tips and find a translation for documents in languages they couldn’t read. “If you wanted to look into the Brazilian documents, you could find a Brazilian reporter,” says Ryle. “You could see who was awake and working and communicate openly. We encouraged everyone to tell everyone what they were doing.” The different media outlets eventually held their own in-person meetings, too, in Washington, Munich, London, Johannesburg, and Lillehammer, Ryle says.1

Remarkably, despite all that broad access and openness, the full leaked database has yet to leak to the public—perhaps in part because it’s so large and unwieldy. Obermayer admits that rumors of the massive leak spread, but says that the data itself remained contained. “Last fall I was really nervous, thinking ‘a lot of people know,’,” he says. “Word leaked out at places. But it never got further.”

Ryle says that the media organizations have no plans to release the full dataset, WikiLeaks-style, which he argues would expose the sensitive information of innocent private individuals along with the public figures on which the group’s reporting has focused. “We’re not WikiLeaks. We’re trying to show that journalism can be done responsibly,” Ryle says. He says he advised the reporters from all the participating media outlets to “go crazy, but tell us what’s in the public interest for your country.”

Weeks before contacting the subjects of the investigation, including Mossack Fonseca, Obermayer took one final precaution: he destroyed the phone and the hard drive of the laptop he’d used for his conversations with the source. “This may have seemed a little overachieving,” he notes, “But better safe than sorry.”He notes that even now, he doesn’t know who the source actually is. “I don’t know the name of the person or the identity of the person,” Obermayer says. “But I would say I know the person. For certain

He notes that even now, he doesn’t know who the source actually is. “I don’t know the name of the person or the identity of the person,” Obermayer says. “But I would say I know the person. For certain periods I talked to [this person] more than to my wife.”

A New Era of Megaleaks

The leaks are bound to cause ripples around the world—not least of all for Mossack Fonseca itself. The firm didn’t respond to a request for comment from WIRED, but it wrote to the Guardian that “many of the circumstances you cite are not and have never been clients of Mossack Fonseca” and that “we have always complied with international protocols … to assure as is reasonably possible, that the companies we incorporate are not being used for tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist finance or other illicit purposes.” Another letter posted to WikiLeaks’ Twitter feed, meanwhile, purports to show how the firm has responded to its own clients:

The leaks are bound to cause ripples around the world—not least of all for Mossack Fonseca itself. The firm didn’t respond to a request for comment from WIRED, but it wrote to the Guardian that “many of the circumstances you cite are not and have never been clients of Mossack Fonseca” and that “we have always complied with international protocols … to assure as is reasonably possible, that the companies we incorporate are not being used for tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist finance or other illicit purposes.” Another letter posted to WikiLeaks’ Twitter feed, meanwhile, purports to show how the firm has responded to its own clients:

Mossack Fonseca and its customers won’t be the last to face an embarrassing or even incriminating megaleak. Encryption and anonymity tools like Tor have only become more widespread and easy to use, making it safer in some ways than ever before for sources to reach out to journalists across the globe. Data is more easily transferred—and with tools like Onionshare, more easily securely transferred—than ever before. And actual Moore’s Law continues to fit more data on smaller and smaller slices of hardware every year, any of which could be ferreted out of a corporation or government agency by a motivated insider and put in an envelope to a trusted journalist.

The new era of megaleaks is already underway: The Panama Papers represent the fourth tax haven leak coordinated by the ICIJ since just 2013. The Intercept, the investigative journalism outlet co-founded by Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Jeremy Scahill, has also shown how encryption tools can be combined with investigative journalism to yield leaks like last year’s Drone Papers and a collection of 70 million prison phone call records. Dozens of media outlets, including the Intercept, now host anonymous upload systems that use cryptographic protections to shield whistleblowers. All of that—unfortunately for companies and governments trying to keep hold of their dirty data, but fortunate for public interest—means that the widening pipeline of leaks isn’t likely to dry up any time soon.

Source: http://www.wired.com/2016/04/reporters-pulled-off-panama-papers-biggest-leak-whistleblower-history/

Putin and his spokesman continue to flatter themselves.   “This is about us”.

No, gentlemen (and I choke using that word), this is much bigger than you. Even though you and your crusty friends are implicated, this is about hundreds of people.  You were just painfully exposed, that’s all.

We see you are attempting to create a Western plot against Russia and Putin, typical Russian tactic.  Russia always seems to say that it is Russia defending against a mythical ‘them’.

Now go cry privately.

</end editorial>

ps. Funny statement by Peskov: “Putin has got many friends both in Russia and abroad.” This whole thing is getting curiouser and curiouser. Yes, I intentionally spelled it that way.

• Kremlin claims ‘Putin, Russia and our stability’ are targets of Panama leaks
• Russian leader was accused of ordering media blackout about allegations
• Several of Putin’s inner circle are listed in Mossack Fonseca documents
• Includes Olympic ice dancer wife of influential spokesman Dmitry Peskov

By WILL STEWART IN MOSCOW and IMOGEN CALDERWOOD FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 07:37 EST, 4 April 2016 | UPDATED: 14:21 EST, 4 April 2016

President Putin is the victim of a Western plot designed to topple him through allegations members of his inner circle used an offshore tax haven, the Kremlin has claimed.
It insisted that ‘Putinophobia’ has become so great in the West that if there is nothing bad to say about the country it must be ‘made up’.

It comes as the Russian leader was accused of ordering a media blackout of the claims his closest circle laundered money and evaded tax using the services of Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca.

Among those accused is the glamorous wife of Putin’s influential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, despite her claim that she had no knowledge of ‘any offshore companies’.

‘Putin, Russia, our country, our stability and the upcoming elections are the main target,’ said spokesman Dmitry Peskov today, following the stunning revelations.
‘Although Putin is not mentioned anywhere, for us, of course, it is obvious that our president was and is the main target of such attacks, especially in the context of the coming parliamentary election, and in the long run, I mean the presidential election in two years.’

He continued: ‘Putinophobia has got so hot that a priori nobody can say anything good about Russia, they must say bad things and if there is nothing to say, one must make something up.’The wife of Peskov, Tatiana Navka, is listed among the alleged clients of the top-secret Panamanian law firm.

The wife of Peskov, Tatiana Navka, is listed among the alleged clients of the top-secret Panamanian law firm.

Putinophobia has got so hot that a priori nobody can say anything good about Russia, they must say bad things and if there is nothing to say, one must make something up.

Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov

The ice dancer and 2006 Olympic champion was listed as the beneficiary of offshore company Carina Global Assets Ltd – based in the British Virgin islands – from its 2014 launch, until it was liquidated in November last year.She was already romantically involved with Peskov at the time, and their daughter was born in August 2014. They then married in July 2015.

She was already romantically involved with Peskov at the time, and their daughter was born in August 2014. They then married in July 2015.

Intriguingly, Peskov’s wife has been quoted as having no knowledge that she ran the company, despite a leaked document saying that its purpose was to ‘buy investment assets to benefit its beneficiary’ – namely her. ‘I have never had any offshore companies or bank accounts,’ said Miss

‘I have never had any offshore companies or bank accounts,’ said Miss Navka, 40.

‘There were absolutely no foreign companies.’

But a copy of her passport was in the leaked papers for Carina Global Assets, which has a projected $1million assets, it was reported.

When asked if her documents could have been used without her knowledge regarding the offshore operation, she said: ‘I don’t know who might have done it. And personally, I would like to figure it out.’

In response to the claims that his wife is implicated in the scandal, Peskov added: ‘My wife never had any offshore company and does not have it now, she never opened it and, accordingly, she could not close it down.’This is why I am inclined to doubt the rest of the information.’

‘This is why I am inclined to doubt the rest of the information.’Russian law forbids senior officials and their families from using foreign financial institutions and offshore vehicles.

Russian law forbids senior officials and their families from using foreign financial institutions and offshore vehicles.
Nevertheless, several major pro-Kremlin newspapers and websites failed to carry reports of the stunning revelations – leading to claims that the president has ordered a media blackout.Among the platforms that have failed to cover the allegations is the official newspaper of the Russian government.

Among the platforms that have failed to cover the allegations is the official newspaper of the Russian government.The Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the major website LifeNews are both seen as key supporters of the Putin government.

The Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the major website LifeNews are both seen as key supporters of the Putin government.
Others that failed to cover the story were major publications Izvestia, Moskovsky Komsomolets and Komsomolskaya Pravda.Major television channels also did not rate the story worthy of coverage.

Major television channels also did not rate the story worthy of coverage.

An exception was investigative newspaper Novaya Gazeta, whose journalists took part in examining the initial leak of papers from Mossack Fonseca.Russian news agency TASS headlined that football figures Michel Platini and Lionel Messi ‘are mentioned in papers about offshore transactions’.

Russian news agency TASS headlined that football figures Michel Platini and Lionel Messi ‘are mentioned in papers about offshore transactions’.The news agency also highlighted offshore claims against

The news agency also highlighted offshore claims against former president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak, former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and Iceland’s PM Sigmundur Davio Gunnlaugsson before mentioning the allegations against Russian leaders.’Apart from that, there are materials about the transactions of several Russian entities and individuals,’ reported the agency.

‘Apart from that, there are materials about the transactions of several Russian entities and individuals,’ reported the agency.’The authors of the investigation claim that these transactions can be tied to people in Vladimir Putin’s circle.’

‘The authors of the investigation claim that these transactions can be tied to people in Vladimir Putin’s circle.’The report stressed: ‘At the same time, the authors of the publication admitted that the name of the president hasn’t been mentioned once in the papers they used.’

The report stressed: ‘At the same time, the authors of the publication admitted that the name of the president hasn’t been mentioned once in the papers they used.’

Those named in the leaked documents also included long-time friend of Putin, Sergey Roldugin, a cellist, who is also godfather to the president’s daughter Maria and a shareholder in Bank Rossiya.

‘I understand that other heads of states, governments and some sportsmen are mentioned,’ continued spokesman Peskov.’But after

‘But after all it is obvious that the main target of this attack is our country, and President Putin personally.”In terms of the main part of the story,’ he continued, ‘it has nothing to do with us, it does not refer to the president.’

‘In terms of the main part of the story,’ he continued, ‘it has nothing to do with us, it does not refer to the president.’He added: ‘Roldugin and many other

He added: ‘Roldugin and many other peoplefrom different spheres and fields remain friends of President Putin.from different spheres and fields remain friends of President Putin. ‘Putin has got many friends both in Russia and abroad.’

Peskov alleged that the West was hitting back because of Russian success in Syria.

He further claimed the Washington-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, a key player in the revelations, had ties to the U.S. government.

Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3522655/Russian-president-blames-Putinophobia-accusations-hid-piles-cash-Panama-wife-key-adviser-linked-tax-dodge.html

A major new animated feature, backed by the Russian government and church, is under production, putting Scotland firmly on the front line of what some see as a new cold war, a cultural one.

The movie, Kids against the Sorcerers, pitches patriotic and devoutly Orthodox Christian Russian school children in to a terrifying battle with occultist Scots backed by – as surreal as this may sound – Nato navies.

Kids Against the Sorcerers: Poster for the new patriotic Russian cartoon

Is Sergei Roldugin being thrown beneath the bus to protect Putin?

Is this the tip of the iceberg in Russia?  Can and will Russian investigative journalists, or someone else, tie this all together to implicate Putin?

• Can. Russian investigative journalists CAN investigate ties to Putin.
• Will they?  Doubtful. I believe they would prefer breathing.

If external investigators can receive copies of Russian internal financial documents, this would be the best and safest way to uncover the truth. Still, whoever leaks those documents risks their life.

Notice, already the Lithuanian Financial Crime Investigation Service (FCIS) is involved and making disclosures injurious to Putin.  Note the word crime in their title.  Putin has enemies outside Russia.

Notice, the Moscow Times is publishing these stories, which may be damaging to Putin’s reputation.  Respect, Moscow Times. Mad respect. You have mine.

This is information warfare at its base.

</end editorial>

The Moscow Times

Apr. 06 2016 16:27

The Lithuanian Financial Crime Investigation Service (FCIS) has confirmed that Sergei Roldugin, a close friend of President Vladimir Putin who was named in the Panama Papers, used Lithuanian bank accounts to carry out transactions using offshore companies, the Meduza news website reported Wednesday.

Four accounts in Ukio Bankos, which was placed into administration by Lithuanian authorities in 2013, were used to move a significant amount of money, the FCIS said, Meduza reported.

Transactions relating to the shares of Russian state-owned oil giant Rosneft were carried out by Dino Capital SA, registered in Panama, and Starcourt Worldwide Ltd, registered in Belize — companies identified as fictitious traders by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.

When the transactions were stopped at the request of the seller, a “penalty” of more than $1.5 million was paid to companies affiliated with Roldugin, the FCIS said.

These operations are an indication of money laundering, FCIS director Kestutis Jucevicius said, Meduza reported.

Source: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=564847&lang=en

Here are corruption allegations directly associated with Putin.

The Duck test is a humorous term for a form of abductive reasoning. This is its usual expression:

If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duck_test

</end editorial>

Published: Thursday, 31 March 2016 15:05

Written by Roman Anin, OCCRP

A murky Russian businessman that formerly ran a state property agency has been buying apartments in Moscow for a number of young women that include the daughter of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin; Putin’s alleged girlfriend; and a woman who, in a flirty web posting titled “Pussy for Putin,” offers the Russian leader a kitten and praises his leadership skills.

Grigory Baevskiy, 47, works for Arkadiy Rotenberg, a Kremlin insider and long-time Putin friend and his judo sparring partner. Records show Baevskiy not only helped Putin handle some of his most delicate personal situations but also made a fortune from questionable deals with the Russian state.

Shielding the Family

Putin has always tried to build an impenetrable wall around his family to protect them from the scrutiny he endures and the risks inherent in his job. The Kremlin has never even confirmed the identities of Putin’s children, despite worldwide media speculation for years over their background.

But cracks appeared in that wall last year, when Katerina Tikhonova, a young, low-profile woman without significant professional qualifications, was suddenly put in charge of a prestigious and ambitious US$ 1.7 billion project to expand the campus of Moscow State University (MSU). Investigations by the Russian daily RBC, Reuters and OCCRP proved that Tikhonova is actually the youngest daughter of the Russian leader.

Much of Tikhonova’s scientific work for the university was financially supported by the biggest Russian state-owned companies which are headed by Putin’s closest allies.

One of the most closely guarded secrets of the Russian state is where the President’s family lives. The information is seldom even recorded. However, in 2012, while establishing a foundation related to her work, Tikhonova listed her official address which OCCRP was able to verify. Tikhonova’s official residence is a modest one-room apartment in the Moscow region, not far from Novo-Ogarevo, the place where her father usually works and lives. For security reasons OCCRP will not disclose the address.

Since 2007, the apartment where Tikhonova is registered to live has belonged to Baevskiy, a businessman from St. Petersburg who to date has had no public profile.

In the mid-2000s, Baevskiy worked as director of the Directorate for Investment Activities (DIA), a state enterprise that belongs to the Russian Agency for Management of the State Assets.

The DIA’s main function is to oversee the management of state property. So when Baevskiy quit his public duties in 2009 he didn’t have to change his specialization: from state property he moved to manage the private property of Putin’s family.

The Putin Connection

Public records indicate that even as he was heading the DIA, Baevskiy was already closely connected to Arkadiy Rotenberg, one of Putin’s oldest friends. Rotenberg has been sanctioned by the US and European Union (EU) authorities as retaliation for Russia’s seizure of Crimea.

According to the EU Council, Rotenberg has thrived under Putin’s patronage.

“He has developed his fortune during President Putin’s tenure. He has been favored by Russian decision-makers in the award of important contracts by the Russian State or by State-owned enterprises. His companies were notably awarded several highly lucrative contracts for the preparations of the Sochi Olympic Games” the council said.

The Russian edition of Forbes magazine, in its 2016 rating of “Kings of the State Contracts,” rates Rotenberg asnumber one with more than half a trillion rubles (US $7.4 billion) in state contracts. Many if not most of the contracts awarded to Rotenberg companies were awarded without tender competition.

Baevskiy’s connection to Rotenberg is long-standing. In 2004, Baevskiy transferred a very expensive apartment in the center of Moscow, on Bolshaya Ordynka Street, to Rotenberg’s daughter Lilya.  Since 2006 Baevskiy, together with Rotenberg and his brother Boris, have been the founders of Otechestvo, a dacha community not far from St. Petersburg.

After leaving his post in the DIA, Baevskiy joined Rotenberg’s business, showing up on a list of people officially affiliated with the SMP Bank, which is owned by the Rotenberg brothers. From 2011 until 2014, Baevskiy also worked as the general director of the Russian Holding Company (RHC) whose ultimate beneficiary is Rotenberg.

The RHC holds many of the jewels of the Russian economy. It is the only shareholder of the National Chemical Group, one of the biggest companies in the Russian fertilizer market. The RHC is also involved in a management rolein a US$ 6 billion highway project as part of the “Silk Way,” a highway from the border of Belarus to Kazakhstan which will be a fast overland route from Western Europe to China.

Living Large

Baevskiy is not just an employee.  He has been developing his own businesses and, as in the case of Arkadiy Rotenberg, Baevskiy’s companies earn most of their money from Russian taxpayers. According to OCCRP calculations, in the past two years Baevskiy’s businesses won more than 6 billion rubles (US $88 million in current value) in state contracts.

Baevskiy’s biggest contract was a 2.7 billion rubles (US$ 82 million) award in 2013 to grade the land in preparation for the construction of a beltway road around St. Petersburg. (on 21.6.2013)

Baevskiy likes to spend the money he gets from the Russian taxpayers on luxurious things. He owns a long list of properties worth millions of dollars across the country, from St. Petersburg to Moscow and Gelendzhik in the south of Russia near Sochi where Putin also has a palace. His private apartment in one of the most expensive districts of Moscow, on Prechistenka street, is likely to be worth at least 50 million rubles (US $740,000). Baevskiy is also the owner of a sleek 65-meter superyacht, the Rahil, which was built in 2011 by the Italian manufacturer Benetti. Rahil, previously named Nataly, won a prestigious Nautical Design Award in 2011 as the best motor yacht in the larger-than-40 meter category.

Baevskiy’s boat the Rahil, formerly the Nataly, has won an award for best design. (Photo by: Benetti Yachts)

Ladies from the Circle

Tikhonova is not the only woman from Putin’s circle who obtained housing through Baevskiy. According to the Russian land register, in 2009 Baevskiy transferred a 228-square-meter apartment on Vereseaeva Street in Moscow to Leyasan Kabaeva, sister of Alina Kabaeva.

Alina Kabaeva is an Olympic rhythmic gymnastics champion and the head of the board of the National Media Group, one of the biggest media holdings in Russia. It is controlled by Putin’s long-time friend, Yuriy Kovalchuk. Kabaeva has been rumored for years to be Putin’s girlfriend, but Putin has aggressively denied these speculations along with other attempts to pry into his private life. The rumors have never been proven.

In 2013, Baevskiy also transferred a plot of land and a house in the upscale town of Uspenskoe in the Odintsovo district of the Moscow region, to Anna Zatsepilina, an 81-year-old pensioner. This is one of the most expensive neighborhoods in Russia, where 100 square meters of land can cost upwards of US$ 100,000. It is the favorite place for Russia’s richest citizens: oligarchs, high-ranking officials and celebrities. Uspenskoe is just a 15 minute drive from the official residency of Vladimir Putin in Novo-Ogarevo.

An elderly woman named Anna Zatsepilina appears in a 2013 documentary from Russian state TV Channel 1 about Alina Kabaeva and in other media reports from the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Anna Zatsepilina is the grandmother of Alina Kabaeva.

The Russian land register doesn’t provide details of the deals, so OCCRP could not find whether these properties were sold or just presented as gifts.

Kittens

Baevskiy owned a number of apartments but the majority were transferred or sold to persons allegedly close to Putin. Another was transferred or sold to another woman with a more tangential tie to Putin. In 2015, Alisa Kharcheva, 23, obtained an apartment and an underground parking space on Minskaya Street from Baevskiy.

In 2010 Kharcheva, who had just graduated from high school, appeared as ”Miss April” in an erotic calendar dedicated to Vladimir Putin’s birthday. Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov later admitted that the Russian leader liked the calendar: “The girls are beautiful,” said Peskov.

Afterwards, Kharcheva enrolled at the school of journalism at the Moscow State Institute of Internal Relations. In 2012, she sent another birthday greeting to the Russian President. In a blog titled “Pussy for Putin,” Alisa published suggestive photos of herself posing with a photograph of Putin and a kitten, which she said was a gift for the president.

“I think he [Putin] is a fabulous man, a strong leader and the ideal head of the country … I found a great kitty as a gift for the president. I believe it will bring Putin only luck … And until Vladimir Vladimirovich takes his gift, the kitty will live with me,” wrote Kharcheva.

Reached by a reporter from OCCRP, Kharcheva said she bought the property from Baevski, who she does not know, through a real estate agent.

When asked if she had any connection to Putin and if the apartment was a gift, she laughed and said “Nonsense. … Of course not. Everybody has already forgotten about the calendar.”

READ STORY IN RUSSIAN…

Source: https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/5106-russia-businessman-handles-insider-homes

Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends and Colleagues,

May I please draw your attention to this excellent publication, authored by retired Canadian Army Colonel Brett Boudreau, on behalf of the NATO Centre of Excellence StratCom, Latvia.  Colonel Brett has undertaken an exceptionally piece of research, a really very detailed analysis of the whole ISAF StratCom campaign in Afghanistan.  His evidence base is hugely impressive and his conclusions sobering.  He has not pulled his punches. For anyone with any interest in StratCom, Influence, PsyOps, IO et al I commend it to you for urgent reading.

I am particularly delighted that the report chooses to positively highlight, on a number of occasions, the work General Andrew Mackay and I undertook with our book Behavioural Conflict and our later papers on the need for TAA and a behavioural focus, The report lays bare the absence of proper TAA of Afghan audiences and an undue focus on attitudinal approaches when it was the behaviour, first and foremost, that needed changing, not opinions or perception. The report should raise many questions in NATO HQ and member nation capitals, particularly for those dealing with Russian and ISIS issues.

The report is entitled: “We Have Met The Enemy And He Is Us” An Analysis Of Nato Strategic Communications:  The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) In Afghanistan, 2003-2014. It is available from this link:

http://www.stratcomcoe.org/we-have-met-enemy-and-he-us-analysis-nato-strategic-communications-international-security-assistance

Cdr (rtd) Steve Tatham Ph.D., Royal Navy

Director of Operations (Europe & Africa)

IOTA-Global

The SCL Group

33 St James’ Square

London

Email:          steve.tatham@iota-global.com

Website:      www.scl.cc

Website:      www.iota-global.com

I seem to be blocked in Russia – again.

It happened shortly after the Panama Papers were released.

Hmmmm. A wee bit thin skinned are we, in Russia?  There’s nothing like a little truth among friends.  But Russia is not about letting the truth in for the citizens, or the government for that matter. Russia is all about controlling the version of the truth their people read.

I’m not even going to check the Russian Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications (Russian: Федеральная служба по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций) to see if I’m on their official list.

I can’t tell if the Russian Embassy here in Washington DC reads this or not.   Yo, Boris, where can a guy get a good bowl of borscht around here?

Just about the only country in the world that does not read this blog is Burkina Faso.  Poor Russia.

This normally lasts about four days.

In the meantime, Russia, thank you for drawing attention to my blog, once again.  I’ll buy the first bowl of borscht, okay?  But not at http://www.propagandamoscow.com/, please?  My last time there my wife’s purse was stolen.

Source: http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/russian-president-vladimir-putin-launches-bid-to-rehabilitate-soviet-legacy_1873345.html

ps. Zeenews.india.com has been the source of at least two pro-Russians stories in the past several days. Keep an eye on this one.

I normally do not comment here on US domestic politics, but this smacks of foreign influence, specifically Russian influence, of a potential US president.

John and Tony Podesta aren’t fooling anyone with this ruse. They are lobbyists for Vladimir Putin’s personal bank of choice, an arm of his Kremlin and its intelligence services. Since the brothers Podesta are presumably destined for very high-level White House jobs next January if the Democrats triumph in November at the polls, their relationship with Sberbank is something they—and Hillary Clinton—need to explain to the public.

Hillary Clinton, US presidential candidate, has direct Russian ties.

</end editorial>

John and Tony Podesta aren’t fooling anyone

By John R. Schindler • 04/07/16 1:00pm

The revelations of the so-called Panama Papers that are roiling the world’s political and financial elites this week include important facts about Team Clinton. This unprecedented trove of documents purloined from a shady Panama law firm that arranged tax havens, and perhaps money laundering, for the globe’s super-rich includes juicy insights into how Russia’s elite hides its ill-gotten wealth.

Clinton Campaign Uses Noise Machine To Block Reporters From Hearing Fundraiser Speech

11:36 PM 04/07/2016

Hillary Clinton’s campaign team reportedly used a static noise machine on Thursday to block reporters outside of a fundraiser in Denver from hearing her remarks.

That’s according to Stan Bush, a reporter for Denver’s CBS-4, who was stationed outside of the event, which was held outdoors at the home of Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper, a superdelegate who has endorsed Clinton.

Bush said that the noise interference machine was turned on after a band — later identified as Big Head Todd and the Monsters — finished playing music and before Clinton spoke. The device was placed inside of a fence on the property and aimed in the direction of the press, Bush wrote.

Special: American’s Are Buying This Flashlight To Feel Safer At Home
He posted video showing what it sounded like outside of the event before and after the machine was turned on. The device produced a low-intensity throbbing noise, much like a helicopter off in the distance.

Source: http://dailycaller.com/2016/04/07/clinton-campaign-uses-noise-machine-to-block-reporters-from-hearing-fundraiser-speech/

We are sleepwalking through the end of our era of peace. It is time to wake up.

By EERIK-NIILES KROSS 4/9/16, 6:00 AM CET

In modern 21st-century warfare, non-military approaches — propaganda, and economic, cultural and humanitarian sabotage — will play a greater role than purely military methods, Russian Armed Forces chief Valery Gerasimov argued, a year before the Russian occupation of Crimea.

“In a couple of months, even days, a well-functioning state can be turned into a theater of fierce armed conflict, can be made a victim of invasion from outside, or can drown in a net of chaos, humanitarian disaster and civil war,” he wrote.

The purpose of war today is not the physical destruction of the enemy, but the internal eroding of our readiness, will, and values.

Through the lens of Russia’s aggression in Crimea, the invasion of eastern Ukraine, the destabilization of Moldova, the escalating war in Syria and the refugee crisis, Gerasimov’s doctrine shows Russian activities over the past two years — both overt and covert, across the Middle East and Europe — to be part of a single, unified war against the (partially imagined) “hegemony of the West.”

The Kremlin’s strategic documents define the country’s main adversaries as the United States, NATO, and the EU.

Gerasimov’s doctrine draws on “reflexive control theory” — a favorite among Soviet military theorists — and asserts that control can be established through reflexive, unconscious responses from a target group. This group is systematically supplied with (dis)information  designed to provoke reactions that are predictable and, to Russia, politically and strategically desirable.

Before and during its attack on Ukraine, for example, Russia increased violations of NATO air space. The Kremlin spread stories about Putin’s readiness to use nuclear weapons, organized large-scale military exercises on its western borders, and behaved, in every forum, like a militant, aggressive, and irrational opponent. This was paired with a global information campaign: “There is no war in Ukraine. Russia is only helping to solve a crisis.”

This campaign, with its aggressive show of arms, was designed to make the West reluctant to intervene militarily or give assistance to Ukraine. By denying the reality of war, Russia allowed the West to hope that the Kremlin was looking for a way out. Russia hid its real goals behind the possibility of “finding a diplomatic solution.” And the West responded as predicted — our leaders sacrificed their negotiating position in the hope that this was sincere.

In this context, the West’s subsequent sanctions on Russia are a 21st-century version of the tactical territorial surrenders to Napoleon in the 19th century and Hitler in the 20th. The use of sanctions was a tactical loss in that it acknowledged the annexation of Crimea. These kinds of stop-gap measures degrade Western diplomacy and rob it of legitimacy.

Full-blown war requires a constant adversary. The Ukrainian government and Syrian rebels are not Russia’s constant enemies — the Kremlin’s strategic documents define the country’s main adversaries as the United States, NATO, and the EU. Russia will only negotiate a solution after it achieves its aims in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its other openly-declared strategic goal: to demolish the Western security architecture and rearrange our existing world order according to its own interests.

To be clear: Success in Ukraine and Syria will not be defined by military victory in either country. It will be defined by whether or not America and NATO decide to fight, and whether or not Europe confronts Russia over its values.

To understand how Russia advances this goal we have to grapple with the tenets of “non-linear war,” in which multiple participants — all changing sides as they go — fight each other in a military environment but where eventual success is independent of direct military activities. The architect of this theory is Putin’s adviser, Vladislav Surkov — the same man Putin tapped to meet  U.S. diplomats in Kaliningrad to “find a solution” to the Ukrainian war and sanctions.

If Russia is fighting a non-linear war, then the humanitarian disaster in Syria is not just the regrettable side-effect of Russian military operations. It is part of a larger effort.

In the past month, European officials have said they believe Russia is “weaponizing” refugees to fuel the crisis in Europe. American officials admit that “what Russia’s doing is directly enabling ISIL.” This is because the Islamic State is a perfect tool for creating chaos. If ISIL is contributing to the destruction of the “U.S. project” in Iraq and driving the West out of the Middle East, then ISIL is, for Russia, a permissible combatant in Russia’s war in the region.

For months, Russian state media has trumped up the likelihood of Europe’s imminent collapse in the face of the refugee crisis. Russia’s national army of trolls fill social media with these stories.  Right-wing extremists in Europe — whose ties to Putin and his ideologues are well-documented and enough of a concern to have warranted an official study by U.S. intelligence agencies — call for the dissolution of Europe. This is not just “Russian propaganda.” These are measures the Kremlin considers integral to winning small-scale battles in a larger geopolitical war.

Russia wants to destroy our core strength: our confidence in the values that underpin our political systems. European leaders who look to blame Germany for the refugee crisis, who want to build walls on their borders, to negotiate separately with Putin, and end the sanctions in favor of a “new dialogue” — all in the name of their “national interests” — are demolishing Europe’s unity.

There’s a reason Putin’s theorists are science fiction authors. Russian GDP equals that of Italy – it should not be an existential threat to the West. We must shake ourselves free from the Kremlin’s masterful fiction and confront the truth that we are in an asymmetric war. This is a war that we can win, and it matters that we do.

We are sleepwalking through the end of our era of peace. It is time to wake up.

Eerik-Niiles Kross, a member of the Estonian parliament, is the former head of Estonian intelligence and an expert on Russian military history and doctrine.

Source: http://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-war-smoke-and-mirrors-russia-occupation-crimea-ukraine/

h/t to anonymous. This is his work.

Wikipedia has acquired in the last two years an excellent collection of pages detailing Imperial Russian, Soviet and current Russian history in forced transmigrations, deportations, ethnic cleansing, and ethnic Russian colonisation of non-Russian areas of the Empire and later USSR. Links below.

Russian policy for almost 300 years followed the Roman model of dumping their own ethnic population into acquired territories, and supplementing this with transmigration of ethnic Ukrainians. The latter also included recruiting Ukrainian Cossacks as shock troops and militias to capture addition land in Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, the quid-pro-quo being settlement rights.

The attached maps are very enlightening, especially when considered against the genetic Y-haplotype maps for Scandinavian I, Slavic R1a and Hunnic Q genes, and the density maps. While the official number of self-identified ethnic Ukrainians in Russia is only 2 million, versus 110 million self-identified ethnic Russians in census data, the reality looks to be actually very different. Ethnic Ukrainians have tended to assimilate very quickly (this seems to be a historical trait for Scandinavian stock globally), and self-identify then as Russians (I have met a good number of “Russians” over the years who turned out to be multigenerational assimilated Ukrainians).

The Far East and Central Siberia had significant fractions of Ukrainians during the Tsarist Era, but the nominal percentage has declined since then, due to assimilation. The genetic maps show this quite well, at least out to the Urals – areas with overlapping high density of I/Q haplotypes and lower density of R1a show this, and also align quite decently against the 1897, 1926 and later maps showing ethnic Ukrainian populations across Russia. Included are various population density maps showing that Russia has relatively low density compared to Ukraine, and matches Ukraine only in some parts of Western / European Russia, specifically the South West and Moscow areas. The reality is that anything up to 10-20% of the “ethnic Russian” population of the Russian Federation may be assimilated ethnic Ukrainians, or Russians with significant Ukrainian ethnic heritage in their bloodlines. Russia may have between 11 and 22 million ethnic Ukrainians or descendents embedded in their population.

The other significant ethnic minority in Russia are ethnic Tartars (Turkic/Kipchaks), whom census data lists as 6.5 million in numbers, but huge numbers assimilated into mainstream Russian society over multiple generations since the schism with Kiev 800 years ago. Trying to even estimate their numbers is futile, and likely this could only be determined by testing DNA. Like assimilated Ukrainians, many ethnic Tartars self-identify as Russians – I know two of this ilk. It is likely ethnic Tartars or Russians with Tartar heritage outnumber ethnic Ukrainians in Russia.

Another major group are Russians of Ugro-Finnic heritage (Y-haplogroup N1), mostly now marginalised where speaking their own language, but also heavily assimilated across North-Western Russia.

Punchline is the myth of an ethnically homogenous Great Russian population as promoted by Moscow is bunk. Self identification as Russians in a chauvinistic and xenophobic culture as we see in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia will be high.

Of the nominal 110 million “ethnic Russians” how many are really ethnic Russians? Subtracting the likely number of assimilated Ukrainians and Tartars could reduce the actual number by 15 to 20 million. Impossible to be accurate.

The obsession with Pan-Slavism and the Greater Russian or All-Russian nation concepts, i.e. rejecting the unique cultural and genetic differences of Ukraine and Belarus, can be easily explained by a paranoid fear of losing cohesion in a disparate patchwork multi-ethnic state. The existence of both Ukraine and Belarus as distinct cultures and nations is an affront and challenge to these doctrines / ideologies.

The brazen and dishonest rejection of any unique Ukraine and Belarus culture, language and ethnicity may well be as much self-deception, as cynical deception, by Russians from the leadership caste down to the trailer trash.

Only a portion of Westernmost Russia actually fits their purist definition of a Slavic DNA dominant religiously Orthodox Russian speaker. The rest of the Russia by their own ideological definitions are not real Russians, or are contaminated with Ukrainian, Tartar and other peoples lacking the purity of Slavic descent.

The tragedy of Russia is that their obsession with absolute power and central control reflects the broken cultural paradigm of the “Russian World”, in which Russian ethnicity and Orthodox religion are chauvinistically promoted, and everybody else marginalised. Until the Russians accept they are a multi-ethnic polyglot more diverse than Europe, they will not be able to form a representative democracy, where everybody can have their say. As long as most Russians lie to themselves about who and what they are, how can they function as a society, let alone a democracy?

This is why Russia’s falsified foundation myth, and Pan-Slavist All-Russian nation ideologies and doctrines are about as relevant to the modern world as the ISIS delusion. Ultimately both lead to one place – misery, desperation, heartbreak and destruction. Like all deceptions, there is an immense element of self-deception.

The world at large needs to reject their Pan-Slavism doctrine, and All-Russian Nation doctrine, and declare these to be what they are – nasty jingoistic cultural chauvinism with an big element of toxic racism.

All-Russian nation – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaPan-Slavism – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussophone – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaNational delimitation in the Soviet Union – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaPopulation transfer in the Soviet Union – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaCategory:Forced migration in the Soviet Union – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaEthnic cleansing of Circassians – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussian Empire Census – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaUkrainians in Russia – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaUkrainians in Russian Empire 1897 – Wikimedia CommonsDemographics of Russia – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussians in Latvia – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussians in Estonia – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussians in Lithuania – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaEvacuation of Finnish Karelia – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaHistory of the Russian language in Ukraine – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussification of Ukraine – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaRussian language in Ukraine – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaUkrainization – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaHistoriography in the Soviet Union – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaHistorical revisionism (negationism) – Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaSuppressed research in the Soviet Union – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

by Roman Skaskiw

Roman Skaskiw served six years an infantry officer which included combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq with the 82nd Airborne Division, and another deployment to Afghanistan with the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team.  He has lived in Ukraine since 2012. His work has appeared in The Atlantic, the New York Times’ Homefires blog, the Daily Beast, Stanford Magazine, the Des Moines Register, in Fire and Forget and Home of the Brave — anthologies of military fiction, and elsewhere.  He has appeared on NPR’s Talk of the Nation, the John Batchelor Show, Iowa Public Radio, and elsewhere.

Nine Lessons of Russian Propaganda

Roman Skaskiw

After visiting repeatedly, I moved to Ukraine from the United States in 2012.  My parents had been born in Ukraine and taught me some of the language during my childhood in Queens, NY.

Being so close to Ukraine’s Maidan revolution and the subsequent Russian invasion gave me perspective on American perception of these events.  The audacity and effectiveness of Russian propaganda has left me in utter awe.  After two years of close observation, some strategies and motifs of Russian propaganda have become evident.  Hopefully these lessons will lend some clarity on the information war which overlays the kinetic one.

1. Rely on dissenting political groups in Western countries for dissemination.  Kremlin talking points appear with uncanny similarity in most alternative political movements in the West, including communist, libertarian, nationalist, and even environmentalist, whose protests occasionally overlap with anti-NATO protests.

I had an especially close look at the libertarian community as I have long been a part of it.  Rampant misinformation led me to write these three increasingly horrified essays about what some prominent libertarians were saying about Russia and Ukraine: Putin’s Libertarians, When Your Former Libertarian Hero Calls You a Nazi and The Latest Libertarian Shillery for Russia.

The persistence of demonstrable lies and their almost word-for-word repetition in radical left media was uncanny and put into perspective only after I discovered the Active Measures interviews and theDeception was My Job interview of Yuri Bezmenov.  KGB agents who had defected to the United States in the 1970s and 80s all said the same thing.  Espionage was a minor consideration of Russian intelligence.  Their focus was controlling the message and it often happened through influencing media and political movements in freer societies.

Russian intrigue with dissenting groups even makes an appearance in Joseph Conrad’s fantastic 1907 novel The Secret Agent.

Their impressively broad appeal is evidenced in their recruitment of both Western neo-Nazis and Western communists who claim to be fighting for World Communism to support the war in Eastern Ukraine.

Radical Kremlin ideologue Alexander Dugin articulates this strategy fairly explicitly: “The most important factor should not be whether these groups are pro-Russian or not. What they oppose is of much greater importance here. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. It is simple and easy to understand. If we adopt such an attitude in order to appeal to all possible allies (who either approve of us or who do not) more and more people will follow suit – if only due to pragmatism. In doing so we will create a real functioning network – a kind of Global Revolutionary Alliance.”

Much of Dugin’s work attempts to explaining why groups with diametrically opposed beliefs should unite to oppose the United States and, if only implicitly, support Russia.  Demonizing the United States and “Atlanticism” underpins his rhetorical strategy, just as demonizing capitalism and the bourgeois class underpinned communism’s (and also placed Russia as first among equals in a “Global Revolutionary Alliance”).

Dugin’s Anti-Atlanticism is a cargo cult for the reach and influence that Moscow had through Communism, but the centuries old influence that Moscow has among the West’s dissenting political movements remains palpable.

2. Domestic propaganda is most important. …

Continued at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/nine-lessons-of-russian-propaganda

Latvia shut down the local website of Russia’s foreign news channel Sputnik on Tuesday (29 March), calling the state media outlet a “propaganda tool” and questioning the credibility of its reporting on the Ukraine conflict.

Moscow set up Sputnik to promote its voice abroad, including in Latvia whose ethnic Russian minority accounts for around a quarter of its two million citizens.

“We don’t regard Sputnik as a credible media source but as something else: a propaganda tool,” Latvian foreign ministry spokesman Raimonds Jansons told AFP.

He spoke after the national Internet registry NIC suspended Sputnik’s right to hold the “.lv” Latvian domain name to which it had been posting articles in both Russian and Latvian since last month.

Russia’s foreign ministry called the decision “blatant censorship” and said “the Russian mass media adheres to the highest standards of professionalism and ethnics”.

Riga “once again, with the tacit inaction of leading human rights organisations, is ignoring its Convention obligations to ensure media pluralism and freedom of speech as it continues to target Russian mass media in Latvia,” the statement added.

The NIC made the decision after receiving a letter of concern from the Latvian foreign ministry, which drew attention to Sputnik’s coverage of Ukraine and routine denial of the country’s territorial integrity.

“We wrote pointing out our opinion that the fact that the head of Sputnik, Mr (Dmitry) Kiselyov is on the sanctions list of the European Union was something that needed to be taken into account” in the decision, Jansons said.

Ukraine and the West have repeatedly accused Moscow of waging an “information war” to justify its backing of pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its meddling in eastern Ukraine have triggered concern in Latvia and fellow Baltic states Estonia and Lithuania, which emerged from nearly five decades of Soviet occupation in the early 1990s.

BACKGROUND

By algi | on 04/04/2016

Today, 3 April 2016, the international volunteer community InformNapalm presents the first of a series of publications on the results of hacking dozens of mailboxes of the key coordinators directing the actions of militants, Russian mercenaries and Russian troops in the Donbas region and in Syria. The data was obtained by Ukrainian hackers from the anonymous group Falcons Flame (#FF) and transferred to InformNapalm for analysis and processing. For more information about the data leak operation, see “Why the Russian Defense Ministry is on fire – InformNapalm announces a series of publications based on the leaked data.”
This investigation concerns the message retrieved from a private e-mail exchange of the Union of Donbas Volunteers organization. The persons featured in the message are foreign mercenaries fighting in the Ghost brigade. It is an illegal armed group belonging to the LPR (Luhansk People’s Republic) terrorist organization. The brigade was organized by Alexey Mozgovoy and uses left-wing slogans to give an ideological backing to their actions. Follow these links for more information on the ideology of this terrorist group – [1]  [2]  [3].

We are publishing here the screenshot of the message and its headers:
The message is addressed to two recipients: the first mailbox, draft7771@yandex.ru, belongs to Olga Kulygina, alias Hans Christian; the second mailbox, sdonbassa@yandex.ru, belongs to the organization called Union of Donbass Volunteers. The message body contains the list of passport details of citizens of Italy, Spain, India, and Finland serving in the Ghost brigade in Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine. The author writes that they need visa support for the “legal stay in the territory of the Russian Federation”. The sender of the message is Alexei Markov, e-mail address redrat@yandex.ru, deputy commander of the Ghost brigade, alias Dobriy. Detailed information on him can be found on the Mirotvorets website.

Olga Kulygina

Olga Kulygina works for the Russian propaganda channel “ANNA-News”. She calls herself a “journalist”. Kulygina is a close friend of Alexander Boroday and Igor Girkin. It is known that Igor Bezler, the terrorist leader in Gorlivka, staged a shooting of prisoners to expedite the exchange of Kulygina, who was being held by the Ukrainian government, with 15 Ukrainian POW’s, including a colonel of SBU (Ukrainian Security Service). There are grounds to believe that Kulygina is employed by FSB (Russian Security Service) operating under the guise of a journalist. A brief investigation on her can be found here [1]. Kulygina has also been listed in the Mirotvorets database. A short excerpt from the description of her activities:
“Olga Kulygina played a major role in the organization of the Russian special services operations to support terrorist groups in Syria, Georgia and Ukraine.
She is one of the leaders of the agent network planted by the Russian intelligence to guide Russian nationalist groups. It is used for recruitment into sabotage groups and to control the radical movements back in Russia.
She participated in two military coups.”

“Union of Donbass Volunteers”

The organization was founded in the fall of 2015, allegedly to protect the rights of “volunteers” who fought in Ukraine. However, one of the main real aims of the organization is tracking and control by the Russian intelligence agencies of the people who have received combat experience in the Donbas. Our analysis of the information we received also reveals that the office is concerned with recruitment and visa support of foreign mercenaries, convalescence and rehabilitation of the injured, and survivor assistance. The close relationship with the intelligence agencies, immigration services, and border authorities of the Russian Federation is evident from the text of the request in the message.

Continued at https://informnapalm.org/en/russia-opens-visas-terrorists-operating-ukraine/

 In August 2015, the Russian official news agency TASS quoted United States Army Europe’s (USAREUR) commander, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, speaking on, among other topics, the growing robustness of Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities (TASS, August 19, 2015). What the US general said undoubtedly provided the Russians with confirmation that their efforts in building robust EW capabilities have borne fruit. Since late 2015, a number of articles have appeared inside Russia describing advances in EW, and open sources have repeatedly reported on EW equipment being delivered to the Russian Armed Forces. In this context, the book Radioelektronaya Borba (Electronic Warfare), written by a group of Russian authors under the editorial guidance of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kolesov and Igor Georgivich Nasenkov, is of special interest (Cast.ru, accessed April 11). The book was published in December 2015, but it seems it was not noted by the broader public until early spring 2016. At that point, however, it attracted an uncommonly large level of interest for a book on a military subject. This level of attention quickly becomes apparent when readingRadioelektronaya Borba, which offers a broad and detailed insight in the topic of EW from a Russian perspective.

Radioelektronaya Borba is divided into four chapters: “1. The History of Electronic Warfare,” “2. Electronic Warfare Units, Indigenous Electronic Warfare Industry and Technology,” “3. The World Market in the Field of Electronic Warfare,” and “4. Use of Electronic Warfare Means in Modern Conflicts.” These are preceded by an introduction to EW, as well as its definitions and principles, and concludes with some thoughts about the future of EW.

The book describes more than just Russian experiences and systems. US use of EW in a historical perspective as well as US systems and modern concepts for its development also fill a number of pages. The same goes for French and Chinese views on EW. The chapters “Electronic Warfare Units, Indigenous Electronic Warfare Industry and Technology” and “The World Market in the Field of Electronic Warfare” in particular give insight into the development of Russian EW systems, including modern ones. In addition, the book includes short descriptions of each of the Russian companies that currently produce EW equipment.

Chapter four, which describes the use of EW in modern conflicts, begins with Operation Allied Force (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s aerial bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999) and ends with Russian operations in Crimea and Ukraine (since 2014). The book provides little detailed insight into Russia’s use of EW in connection with the February–March 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ensuing, and still ongoing, war in eastern Ukraine. However, with regard to Crimea, the chapter mentions that Russian units were equipped with Leer-2 mobile technical control, electronic emulation and electronic countermeasure systems; Lorandit-M radio control and jamming complexes, and Infauna electronic warfare vehicles. The book also remarks that Russian spetsnaz (special forces) had cut Ukrainian stationary lines of communication with mainland Ukraine. For obvious reasons not much is said about the use of EW in connection with the continuing war in eastern Ukraine; the book only briefly touches upon it: “during the following events in eastern Ukraine, just sporadic use of electronic warfare by [the warring] parties was noted.” Based on previously published information on this topic from other reliable sources, this passage clearly comes across as an understatement. Nevertheless, the authors highlight the use of EW to disable enemy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)—a first for the post-Soviet space.

Comparing Radioelektronaya Borba with other Russian sources provides further insight into this country’s EW capabilities. In September and October 2015 Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier published a two-part article entitled “Electronic War—Myths and Truth” (Vpk-news.ru, September 30, 2015; October 7, 2015). Besides describing equipment, one of the articles had a short paragraph about the development of Russian EW units. According to the article, in 2009, EW centers were organized in each military district, of which the majority were subsequently reorganized into EW brigades, with the exception of the center in Crimea. In addition to these brigades, there is also the 15^th EW Brigade, which is subordinated to the Russian high command, and a number of battalions presumed to be tasked with the protection of essential military and industrial objects.

On the tactical level, a Russian textbook (Yuri Borisovich Torgovanov, Obshaya Taktika, SFU, Krasnoyarsk, 2013) describes the organization of the EW company in the mechanized and tank brigades. The company consists of about 100 men and is organized into five EW platoons, each with its own specialty. The company´s main tasks are to counter radio communication, systems for command and control, navigation equipment, and intelligence sensors, as well as to protect friendly units from artillery fire and attacks from the air—i.e. from munitions with proximity fuses. The company shall also carry out “radiodesinformatsiya” (“radio-disinformation”), something that presumably entails the emission of false signals. According to Obshaya Taktika, EW is an integral and essential part of current Russian tactics both in attack and defense.

Obviously the Russians take the view that EW is a force multiplier that they have and will continue to invest serious resources into. Indeed, as the closing paragraph of Radioelektronaya Borba states, tomorrow “…electronic warfare will become the part of the armed struggle that decides the outcome of the battle.” And commenting on Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, one recent foreign study notes, “Key lessons include the necessity for allies to train and prepare for substantial Russian electronic warfare (EW) capability, with the implication that they may have to operate in a degraded EW/cyber environment with GPS [global positioning system] signals suppressed or unreliable” (Chathamhouse.org, March 2016). So in light of Russia’s growing EW capabilities, perhaps the time has come for Western militaries to relearn how to utilize a map and a compass, signal flares, and maybe even the use of army buglers at the tactical level.

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45302&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=798d8c934682828c17a2f5847483646c#.VwzwFJMrIo-

Russia missed their opportunity to control these sensitive documents 25 years ago, they only have themselves to blame.

</end editorial>

For almost a year since the “decommunization laws” have entered into force, all the documents of repressive Soviet special service agencies in Ukraine’s archives have been available to all, free of charge.

Read also: Summary of Ukraine’s four new decommunization bills

We spoke about this with Ihor Kulyk, Managing Director for Development of National Memory Policy, of the Institute of National Memory.

In addition, today in Ukraine, a volunteer-led electronic archive of the national liberation movement is active at avr.org.ua. It holds over 20 thousand electronic copies of documents about Ukraine’s historic liberation movement of the 20th century, as well as KGB materials. This electronic archive is a joint project with the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv and the Lontskoho Street Prison National Museum.

It was previously reported that the Czech Republic would reprint online versions of the minutes of the security services of the Czech Ministry of Internal Affairs and intelligence and counter-intelligence reports. Patrons will also be able to view the Czech State Security leadership documents relating to the Communist coup of February 1948, as well as the actions of security agencies following the death of Czechoslovakian President Klement Gottwald.

Ukraine, in accordance with the law For access to the archives of repressive agencies of the Communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991, is currently in the process of transferring the archives of the Soviet secret police agencies from the Security Service, Interior Ministry, Defense Ministry and other military and civil defense structures to the Public Archive of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute.

“Today, Ukrainian police and defense structures are undertaking a revision of their archives to determine which documents of repressive Soviet organizations exist dating to 1917-1991. They must transfer the archives to the National Memory Institute by May 21 of next year. We are simultaneously securing all the requirements for the new branch of the national archive of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute,” said Ihor Kulyk.

The Center for Research on the Liberation Movement reports that there is active collaboration between the Archive of the Ukrainian Security Service and its Czech partners – the National Defense Service Archives and the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes. In particular, the preparation and publication of the document collections “The Czech Operation and its Consequences (with 1937-1941 NKVD documents of the Ukrainian SSR)” and “OUN and UPA in Czechoslovakian Special Service documents (1944-1959).”

The Czech side is transferring documents relating to the actions of Czechoslovakian special service agencies against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, while the Ukrainian side is transferring archival material regarding criminal cases against former residents of Czechoslovakia repressed by the Soviet totalitarian regime.

The law For access to the archives of repressive agencies of the Communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991 was developed with public participation within the framework of the Open Archives program of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Proponents are convinced that this step will not only help to deepen understanding about the nation’s history, but will help safeguard against the return of totalitarian practices in the work of law enforcement and special service agencies in independent Ukraine.

Following the collapse of the Communist regime, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Baltic nations and other Central and Eastern European nations have made the secret documents of correctional institutions and secret police accessible, and have passed them on to civilian authorities like the National Memory Institute.

Source: http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/04/11/ukraine-prepares-to-make-soviet-kgb-archives-available-online/

Sound familiar?

1. Russia is provoked – Russian language, people, culture, vodka is threatened
2. Russia invades
3. Russia occupies
4. Occupied territory holds referendum for accession
5. Russia consumes

It occurred on an accelerated schedule in Crimea. Now it is occurring in South Ossetia, a part of Georgia which Russia invaded, oops, liberated, in 2008.

1. Transnistria
2. South Ossetia
3. Abkhazia
4. Crimea
5. Donbass

Putin is slowly building the Russian empire, one accession at a time.

</end editorial>

South Ossetia authorities intend to hold a referendum on joining Russia before August of this year.

“We are discussing the dates, but we do not have a specific date set yet. It will happen in the near future, though, before August,”  President of the republic Leonid Tibilov told TASS.

According to Tibilov, residents of South Ossetia will go to the polls to say if they agree to change the Constitution of South Ossetia. If the decision is positive, the republic’s authorities will be able to appeal to the Russian leadership to seek accession to the Russian Federation.

“At the present time, based on the situation in the world, we would not want to expose our strategic partner – Russia – to serious political risks. Accordingly, we have concluded that we need to amend the existing constitution to introduce the changes that would allow the president, after consultations with the Parliament, to address to the Russian administration about a possibility of joining the Russian Federation, Tibilov said.

In late March, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia’s support for South Ossetia this year would amount to more than 8 billion rubles. The money will be distributed to support housing construction, the construction of a drama theatre and a hospital complex.

Many residents of South Ossetia already have Russian passports. In addition, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Ossetia decided to live by laws of the Russian Federation. The Russian currency has been in use in South Ossetia since 1992.

Source: http://www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/politics/11-04-2016/134126-south_ossetia_russia-0/