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Where to Look for Covert Russian Influence in the West

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The title is a wee bit misleading, however, this article really does a remarkable job revealing how Russian business is conducted versus Western practices.

When I took my MBA program at night, during the day I was working in IO.  The parallels between business practices and information operations are extensive.

</end editorial>



NOV 18, 2016 8:11 AM EST

Stories of shady Russian influence abounded during the U.S. election campaign, but the evidence in them was often sketchy and the eventual benefits to Russia questionable. The European Union, for its part, is dealing with a scandal in which both the Russian connection and the gain for the Kremlin are far less nebulous.

On May 18, EU Commissioner Guenther Oettinger — the German representative on the European Commission and a member of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU party — flew from Brussels to Budapest to attend a conference on the “car of the future.” He made the flight on the private jet of Klaus Mangold, a businessman who served on the management board of Daimler and who, more importantly, ran the Eastern Committee of the German Economy between 2000 and 2010. The Committee is a lobby group for German companies doing business in the former Soviet Union.

Mangold developed extensive ties in Moscow. He now runs a consulting company whose main area of expertise is navigating Russia, and he serves as Russia’s honorary consul to the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. His public stance on ties between Russia and Europe is, unsurprisingly, conciliatory. Earlier this year, he told the Russian state-owned agency RIA Novosti: “For 20 to 30 years we built an excellent relationship with Russia, and now because of sanctions we’ve been thrown back many years. It’s necessary to stop this negative development.” Mangold, in other words, is far more pro-Russian and well-connected in Moscow than any of the Donald Trump aides who have been portrayed as agents of Russian influence.

According to a June report on the 444.hu news and investigative journalism site, the real reason for Oettinger’s trip had nothing to do with driverless cars. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban allegedly wanted to talk to the commissioner, who used to have the energy portfolio before taking over the digital one, about the Paks 2 nuclear plant project — a controversial deal between Orban and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In early 2014, just before Russia annexed Crimea, Orban flew to Moscow to agree the building of two reactors at the Paks power plant south of Budapest. Russian state-owned Rosatom would be the contractor, and Russia would finance the project with a 10 billion euro ($10.6 billion) credit line. This was a breakthrough for Rosatom, whose attempts to drum up business in eastern Europe had recently stalled, in part due to the efforts of major U.S. competitor Westinghouse. Even then, there were fears that the EU would object to the choice of contractor without an open tender, but Oettinger as energy commissioner apparently gave preliminary approval to the deal.

Mangold is on the supervisory board at Rothschild, the investment bank which produced a favorable report to the Hungarian government on the economics of the Paks II project in September, 2015.

After the Crimea annexation, the EU introduced sanctions against Russia, energy security became a hot topic, Westinghouse secured EU funding to diversify the fuel sources of Russian-built reactors in eastern Europe, and the Paks deal grew toxic. In November 2015, the European Commission opened an investigation into the procurement procedure for the nuclear plant and a separate one into potentially illegal state aid.

In May, when Oettinger took his Budapest trip, the Commission was working actively on the cases. Days after, Hungarian government minister Janos Lazar flew to Brussels to discuss Paks 2.

In July, two members of the Green faction in the European Parliament submitted a written question to the Commission, asking Oettinger to explain the trip. On Nov. 3, a terse reply arrived from Oettinger. He wrote he had used Mangold’s plane “due to the lack of commercial flights to arrive in time for the meeting with Prime Minister Orban,” and the meeting was all about automated driving. “The Paks II nuclear project was not discussed,” Oettinger wrote.

The answers were unsatisfactory: It’s unclear what was so urgent about a Hungarian driverless car conference that Oettinger had to risk his reputation by hitching a ride on a known Russian lobbyist’s jet. It’s still unclear who paid for it, though Oettinger has since said the Hungarian government had offered the option. Besides, Oettinger failed to declare the flight as a meeting with a lobbyist, though he spent 90 minutes alone with Mangold on the jet. The Commission has tied itself into knots trying to explain how Oettinger’s flight was within EU ethic rules and did not constitute a meeting. “There is a clear difference between a meeting and a journey,” commission spokesman Margaritis Schinas said. He added that Mangold had nothing to do with Oettinger’s current digital agenda, so no conflict of interest was apparent.

Be that as it may, the Commission has just closed the Paks II procurement investigation, effectively clearing the project. The state aid inquiry continues, but it’s not an existential threat to the nuclear plant expansion. On Thursday, a note on the closure of the case appeared in the Commission’s database — but, despite the high exposure the case has received, not on its regular “key decisions” factsheet. Only the Hungarian government trumpeted the end of the investigation, saying it was now ready to begin construction.

The European Commission appears to be making a series of quiet compromises with Russian energy interests in Europe. Last month, similarly without much fanfare, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager suggested the EU antitrust authorities were nearing a settlement with Gazprom, the state-controlled Russian natural gas producer, that would exempt it from fines for abusing its monopoly position in a number of eastern European countries in exchange for a promise to behave in the future. Unlike U.S. companies such as Apple and Google, which have had a hard time dealing with the Commission recently, Russian entities do not make much public noise about their negotiations or try their cases in the media. They resort to sophisticated behind-the-scenes lobbying, and they are unusually good at it.

While pundits’ attention is drawn to Russia’s overt and covert support of hard right political forces, matters important to the Kremlin are being settled in quiet negotiations with technocrats. A talk on Klaus Mangold’s jet is worth far more than Retired General Michael Flynn’s much-publicized seating next to Russian President Vladimir Putin at a dinner hosted by the propagandist RT television channel. With Serb film director Emir Kusturica sitting on Putin’s other side, it’s unlikely that the next U.S. national security adviser was involved in any secret dealings there. Putin and his men don’t do business in public settings.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Leonid Bershidsky at lbershidsky@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Therese Raphael at traphael4@bloomberg.net

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-18/where-to-look-for-covert-russian-influence-in-the-west


Filed under: Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: information operations, information warfare, Russia

Russian Propaganda: You Be the Judge

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Profile photo of Claire Berlinski, Ed.Editor

I believe the following to be true:

A large-scale information campaign is deceptively injecting Russian propaganda into American public discourse online. It operates on both the left and the right, generating thousands of fake news articles, memes, tweets, and videos. Collectively, this propaganda is undermining our public discourse by providing a warped view of the world, where Russia can do no wrong, and America is a corrupt dystopia that is tearing itself apart. It is vital that this effort be exposed for what it is: A coordinated attempt to deceive U.S. citizens into acting in Russia’s interests.

The quote comes from a site called ProporNot. They’ve compiled a list of news sites that, in their view, seem intended to blunt opposition to and strengthen popular support for Russian strategic priorities. Have a look at their website, make up your own mind.

The authors argue:

… in an important sense it does not matter whether [people who spread this stuff] are being knowingly directed and paid by Russian intelligence officers (although some of them undoubtably are), or whether they even knew they were echoing Russian propaganda before being called out: If they continue to do so, for whatever reasons, their willingness to uncritically echo Russian propaganda makes them a tool of the Russian state. The term “useful idiot” often applies, and calling them out is justified, appropriate, and valuable.

Here are their suggestions for identifying it:

1) Check to see whether the social-media account/commenter/outlet consistently cites obvious Russian propaganda outlets such as Russia Today/rt.com, the Russian defense ministry, and other official Russian spokespeople.

2) Check to see whether the social-media account/commenter/outlet has a history of reusing text directly from obvious Russian propaganda outlets, especially without attribution.

3) Check to see whether the social-media account/commenter/outlet has a history of generally echoing the Russian propaganda “line” by using themes, arguments, talking points, images, and other content similar to those used by obvious Russian propaganda outlets. These themes include:

  • How wonderful, powerful, innocent, and righteous Russia and Russia’s friends are: Putin, Donald Trump, Bashar al-Assad, Syria, Iran, China, radical political parties in the US and Europe, etc. Investigate this by searching for mentions of, for example, “russia”, on their site by Googling for “site:whateversite.com russia”, and seeing what comes up.
  • How terrible, weak, aggressive, and corrupt the the opponents of Russia and their friends are: The US, Obama, Hillary Clinton, the EU, Angela Merkel, NATO, Ukraine, Jewish people, US allies, the “mainstream media”, and democrats, the center-right or center-left, and moderates of all stripes. Investigate this by searching for mentions of, for example, “NATO”, on their site by Googling for “site:whateversite.com NATO” and seeing what comes up.
  • An obvious bias towards Russia and Russian-backed policy in foreign affairs, including:
    • How fantastic Brexit and Ukrainian/Georgian separatism is, but how terrible Chechen separatists are,
    • How advanced Russian technology is, and how dangerous Western technology is,
    • How great it is when Western secrets get exposed, but how terrible it is when Russian ones do,
    • How militarily powerful Russia and their friends are, and how weak and craven Russia’s enemies and their friends are, etc.
  • How dangerous standing up to Russia would be: It would inevitably result in “World War 3”, nuclear devastation, etc, and regardless of who shot first or is bombing civilians where now, would be the West’s fault. Russian propaganda never suggests it would just result in a Cold War 2 and Russia’s eventual peaceful defeat, like the last time.
  • Pre-emptive discouragement of critical analysis: Assertions about them “having the truth”, or the need to “wake up the sheeple”, or how the “mainstream media” can’t be trusted.
  • Hyperbolic alarmism, anti-Western conspiracist insinuations, “Eurasianism”, racism, gold-standard nuttery and attacks on the US dollar, 9/11-trutherism, anti-Semitism, anti-“globalism”, anti-vax/anti-GMO paranoia, and generally ridiculous over-the-top assertions, which cites Russian propaganda outlets as “evidence”.

Before dismissing these concerns as lunacy, paranoia, elitism, hysteria, and DNC talking points, have a look at their arguments.

For what it’s worth, I don’t agree with the insinuation that Michael Flynn (Trump’s pick for National Security Advisor) is a Putinversteher, as some are now insinuating. From his book:

screen-shot-2016-11-18-at-10-48-25

I hope this means that President-elect Trump knew better when he suggested that. I have plenty of reservations about Flynn, but I’m not worried that he’s in bed with Putin. (I am, however, worried that he’s in bed with Erdoğan. But nobody’s perfect.)

Source: https://ricochet.com/390783/russian-propaganda-judge/


Filed under: CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: CounterPropaganda, information operations, information warfare, Russia, Russian propaganda

Fake LinkedIn Profile 101

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screen-shot-2016-11-19-at-6-34-03-pmI received a heads up on this profile just a few minutes ago.

Usually, a person puts in at least 10.5 seconds worth of effort into making faking a profile.

As you can see, this person put 0.5 seconds into the effort.

If you’ll scroll down, you’ll see lots of nothing.

Obviously, this person is recruiting contacts. They’re mining for contact information, contact names, and so on…

I would like to bestow the first annual award for the absolute laziest false profile builder in the world.

smh


Filed under: Cybersecurity, Information operations, Information Warfare Tagged: Cybersecurity, information warfare

Video: StopFakeNews #110 [ENG] with Benjamin Cohen

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November 28, 2016 – 12:17

The latest edition of StopFake News with Benjamin Cohen. Among the disinformation debunked this week. Russian Sputnik agency’s claims that life in Ukraine is worse than ever, an official Turkish delegation visiting Crimea turns out to be not so official, and in a first, a Russian site admits to a fake and apologizes. WOW!

Source: http://www.stopfake.org/en/stopfakenews-110-eng-with-benjamin-cohen/


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, information warfare, Russia, Russian propaganda

Will Russia Occupy Belarus In 2017?

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Redeployment of Russian military equipment by railway

Recently, the Russian Ministry of Defence disclosed logistical data of railway traffic to other countries for the upcoming year.

It revealed that the Kremlin is planning to significantly increase the amount of military cargo headed for Belarus.

This may be a sign that Moscow is preparing to redeploy a large number of Russian troops to Belarus in 2017.

A piece by Belarus Digest predicted that the Kremlin is trying to transform Belarus into a flash point for menacing NATO and Ukraine by deploying its military capabilities on Belarusian territory.

Unfortunately, this prediction is corroborated by the aforementioned logistic data, as well as the fruitlessness of the recent meeting between Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

The negotiation agenda: two different angles

On 22 – 23 October 2016 Alexander Lukashenko paid a working visit to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss bilateral economic problems. The lack of official comments on the results of the negotiations in Moscow raises some doubts about its real agenda. Moreover, the current state of affairs demonstrates that the Kremlin is unwilling to compromise and will continue to put pressure on Minsk.

Significant economic problems have been accumulating in Moscow-Minsk relations since the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014. The list of grievances includes permanent trade wars and restrictions of Belarusian goods on the Russian market, the gas price dispute and the incomplete delivery of oil to Belarus from Russia, and the sudden implementation of controls on the Belarusian-Russian border.

However, Alexander Surikov, the Russian ambassador to Belarus, announced shortly before the meeting that the two presidents would not be discussing economic problems. According to him, Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko would focus on political issues in the changing international context. He did not specify which ‘changes’ were implied.

Nevertheless, it seems that Putin had already set the political agenda for negotiations with Lukashenko during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Peru on 21 November 2016, one day before the meeting in Moscow. He explained why Russia is so alarmed by NATO’s expansion and stressed that the ‘situation is heating up’.

Without doubt, Putin did discuss the current security situation in the region with his Belarusian counterpart. According to Kremlin strategists, upcoming deployments of four NATO battalions in Poland and the Baltic states will undermine the strategic stability of the region.

Putin believes that Belarus must participate in Russia’s military response to NATO’s activities on its Eastern flank

For this reason, Putin believes that Belarus must participate in Russia’s military response to NATO’s activities on its Eastern flank. Part of this response includes the large scale ‘Zapad / West 2017’ military drills taking place on the territory of Belarus and Kaliningrad next year.

Military drills or occupation?

However, the newly revealed logistical data of Russian military cargo to Belarus illustrate the Kremlin’s far-reaching strategic designs. It seems that Moscow is planning to redeploy a large number of Russian troops on the territory of Belarus for purposes other than military drills.

According to these data, the Russian Ministry of Defence plans to send 4,162 railway carriages to Belarus next year. This would be 33 times more traffic than in 2015, and 83 times more traffic than this year. Some more argue that this increase in flow is connected with the ‘Zapad/ West’ joint strategic military exercises taking place next September.

However, comparing next year’s logistical data with the number of railway carriages coming from Russia in 2013, during the previous ‘Zapad’ military drills, paints a rather different picture.

The Russian Ministry of Defence sent only 200 railway carriages to Belarus that year. Moreover, almost half of the motorised brigade of the Russian Armed Forces (comprising 2,500 troops) took part in the joint military exercises on the territory of Belarus.

Source: Russian Ministry of Defence

In contrast, next year the Russian Ministry of Defence is planning to send 20 times more railway carriages to Belarus than during previous ‘Zapad’ drills in 2013. What’s more, the Kremlin’s strategists are not required to publish certain military logistic data in open sources. This is a usual practise. Therefore, to get a more realistic idea of the scale of Russian troops’ redeployment to Belarus, the number of railway carriages should be multiplied at least by a factor of 1.5.

This logistical military data indirectly confirms that Russia is going to redeploy a number of troops to Belarus almost equal to the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District, and not simply participate in regular military drills.

Obviously, the Kremlin does not need this many troops for training purposes. A more likely scenario is that Russia plans to transform Belarus into an outpost for military confrontation with NATO. Specifically, Russia may use Belarusian territory in order to generate security threats and challenges to the Baltic states.

the Kremlin must first set up a strategic military presence on the territory of Belarus

In order to accomplish this, the Kremlin must first set up a strategic military presence on the territory of Belarus. Obviously, if this many Russian troops arrive in Belarus, it will be difficult to send them home later. Without doubt, this is detrimental to the sovereignty and independence of the Belarusian state.

Implications of the meeting in Moscow

Notably, this Russian military logistical data appeared in open sources one week prior to Lukashenka’s visit to Moscow earlier this month, despite the fact that Belarusian military officials had not yet ironed out the details of next year’s ‘Zapad’ drills with their Russian counterparts.

In this regard, the publication of these data can be seen as a tool to put psychological pressure on Minsk in order to bring Belarus into line with the Kremlin.

Simultaneously, the Russian media launched an information campaign dedicated to Belarus immediately following Lukashenka’s visit to Moscow. Even certain federal-level Russian TV channels, such as ‘Channel One Russia’ and ‘Zvezda’, reported on the topic of Belarus

Some journalists’ stories drew parallels with the situation in Ukraine. According to them, the same fate of destabilisation awaits Belarus, as Western intelligence agencies are preparing a colour revolution to overthrow Alexander Lukashenko.

Other stories focused on the growth of nationalist sentiment and ‘Russophobia’ in Belarusian society, as well as an outburst of right-wing oppositional political movements and parties. ‘Zvezda’, the TV channel of the Russian Ministry of Defence, warned explicitly that Alexander Lukashenko could be overthrown by Ukrainian provocateurs and so on.

Belarus Digest has written articles outlining a hypothetical coup scenario in Belarus launched by the Kremlin. According to this sequence of events, Russian-backed sabotage groups could operate as Belarusian nationalists or ‘Ukrainian provocateurs’. In another scenario, based on the failed tactics of plotters in Montenegro, Russian agents could also pose as local security forces.

It seems that the Kremlin is preparing Russian public opinion for a serious crisis in Belarusian-Russian relations. The fruitlessness of Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to Moscow also signals that Belarus is refusing to become a Russian military outpost in the event of a confrontation between NATO and the West.

In the future, an intensification of tension and an increase in coercive measures by the Kremlin – should Belarus continue to defend its national sovereignty and independence – is possible. This could even entail a coup attempt and destabilisation as an excuse for the Russian military to intervene in Belarus and instal a fully pro-Kremlin regime in Minsk.

Without a doubt, such a pro-Kremlin regime would acquiesce to however many Russian troops the Kremlin desires on Belarusian territory.

Arseni Sivitski

Arseni is the Director of the Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies based in Minsk; he is also a military officer in reserve for the Belarusian Armed Forces.

Source: http://belarusdigest.com/story/will-russia-occupy-belarus-2017-28101


Filed under: Belarus, Information operations, Russia Tagged: Belarus, Russia

Avalanche Network Dismantled in International Cyber Operation

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JUSTICE NEWS


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, December 5, 2016

Avalanche Network Dismantled in International Cyber Operation

The Justice Department today announced a multinational operation involving arrests and searches in four countries to dismantle a complex and sophisticated network of computer servers known as “Avalanche.”  The Avalanche network allegedly hosted more than two dozen of the world’s most pernicious types of malicious software and several money laundering campaigns.

Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Soo C. Song of the Western District of Pennsylvania and Assistant Director Scott S. Smith of the FBI’s Cyber Division made the announcement.

“For years, sophisticated cyber criminals have used our own technology against us—but as their networks have grown more complex and widespread, criminals increasingly rely on an international infrastructure as well,” said Assistant Attorney General Caldwell.  “Avalanche is just one example of a criminal infrastructure dedicated to facilitating privacy invasions and financial crimes on a global scale.  And now a multinational law enforcement coalition has turned the tables on the criminals, by targeting not just individual actors, but the entire Avalanche infrastructure.  Successful operations like this one can disrupt an entire criminal ecosystem in one strike.”

“The takedown of Avalanche was unprecedented in its scope, scale, reach and cooperation among 40 countries,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Song.  “This is the first time that we have aimed to and achieved the destruction of a criminal cyber infrastructure while disrupting all of the malware systems that relied upon it to do harm.”

“We are committed to halting cybercriminal activity against the United States,” said Assistant Director Smith.  “Cybercriminals can victimize millions of users in a moment from anywhere in the world.  This takedown highlights the importance of collaborating with our international law enforcement partners against this evolution of organized crime in the virtual.”

The Avalanche network offered cybercriminals a secure infrastructure, designed to thwart detection by law enforcement and cyber security experts, over which the criminals conducted malware campaigns as well as money laundering schemes known as “money mule” schemes.  Online banking passwords and other sensitive information stolen from victims’ malware-infected computers was redirected through the intricate network of Avalanche servers and ultimately to backend servers controlled by the cybercriminals.  Access to the Avalanche network was offered to the cybercriminals through postings on exclusive, underground online criminal forums.

The operation also involved an unprecedented effort to seize, block and sinkhole – meaning, redirect traffic from infected victim computers to servers controlled by law enforcement instead of the servers controlled by cybercriminals – more than 800,000 malicious domains associated with the Avalanche network.  Such domains are needed to funnel information, such as sensitive banking credentials, from the victims’ malware-infected computers, through the layers of Avalanche servers and ultimately back to the cybercriminals.  This was accomplished, in part, through a temporary restraining order obtained by the United States in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The types of malware and money mule schemes operating over the Avalanche network varied.  Ransomware such as Nymain, for example, encrypted victims’ computer files until the victim paid a ransom (typically in a form of electronic currency) to the cybercriminal.  Other malware, such as GozNym, was designed to steal victims’ sensitive banking credentials and use those credentials to initiate fraudulent wire transfers.  The money mule schemes operating over Avalanche involved highly organized networks of “mules” who purchased goods with stolen funds, enabling cybercriminals to launder the money they acquired through the malware attacks or other illegal means.

The Avalanche network, which has been operating since at least 2010, was estimated to serve clients operating as many as 500,000 infected computers worldwide on a daily basis.  The monetary losses associated with malware attacks conducted over the Avalanche network are estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars worldwide, although exact calculations are difficult due to the high number of malware families present on the network.

Several victims of Avalanche-based malware attacks are located in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  A local governmental office was the victim of a Nymain malware attack in which computer files were encrypted until the victims paid a Bitcoin ransom in exchange for decrypting the files.  Two companies, based in New Castle and Carnegie, Pennsylvania, and their respective banks were victims of GozNym malware attacks.  In both attacks, employees received phishing emails containing attachments designed to look like legitimate business invoices.  After clicking on the links, GozNym malware was installed on the victims’ computers.  The malware stole the employees’ banking credentials which were used to initiate unauthorized wire transfers from the victims’ online bank accounts.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Western District of Pennsylvania, the FBI and the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) conducted the operation in close cooperation with the Public Prosecutor’s Office Verden; the Luneburg Police of Germany; Europol; and Eurojust, located in The Hague, Netherlands; and investigators and prosecutors from more than 40 jurisdictions, including India, Singapore, Taiwan and Ukraine.

Other agencies and organizations partnering in this effort include the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S.-Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the Shadowserver Foundation, Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Registry of Last Resort, ICANN and domain registries from around the world.  The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs also provided significant assistance.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Charles Eberle of the Western District of Pennsylvania and CCIPS Senior Trial Attorney Richard D. Green are prosecuting the case.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael A. Comber of the Western District of Pennsylvania and CCIPS Senior Trial Attorney Green are handling the civil action to disrupt the malware operating over the Avalanche network.

Individuals who believe that they may have been victims of malware operating over the Avalanche network may use the following webpage created by US-CERT for assistance in removing the malware: www.us-cert.gov/avalanche.

Anyone claiming an interest in any of the property seized or actions enjoined pursuant to the court orders described in this release is advised to visit the following website for notice of the full contents of the orders: https://www.justice.gov/opa/documents-and-resources-december-5-2016-announcement-takedown-international-cybercriminal.

16-1422

Filed under: Cybersecurity, cyberwar, Information operations, Information Warfare Tagged: Cybersecurity, cyberwar, Cyberwarfare, information operations, information warfare

Iran’s Proxy Activities Probed on Capitol Hill

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FILE - To show their support for the Houthi movement, women participate in a parade in Sana'a, Yemen, Sept. 7, 2016. Western and Iranian officials note an increase in the flow of arms to the Iran-backed rebels.
FILE – To show their support for the Houthi movement, women participate in a parade in Sana’a, Yemen, Sept. 7, 2016. Western and Iranian officials note an increase in the flow of arms to the Iran-backed rebels.

Iran’s destabilizing actions across the Middle East constitute a security threat that rivals that of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, Republican and Democratic U.S. senators said Tuesday.

“Iranian proxies remain a direct threat to the United States and our allies today,” said the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Bob Corker of Tennessee, pointing to Lebanese Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, and Houthi insurgents operating from Yemen, as well as Tehran’s influence in Syria.

“American citizens, uniformed and civilian, have been victims of Iranian terror. Iran-sponsored [entities], directed, trained and equipped are a threat to U.S. forces and American citizens today,” said the committee’s top Democrat, Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland.

FILE - A general view of Bushehr nuclear power plant, 1,200 km (746 miles) south of Tehran, Aug. 21, 2010.

FILE – A general view of Bushehr nuclear power plant, 1,200 km (746 miles) south of Tehran, Aug. 21, 2010.

“This is a problem that directly threatens U.S. security. In my consultations with leaders in the region, it is crystal clear that Iranian terrorism is on equal grounds with the nuclear threat [posed by Tehran],” Cardin added.

The committee met as Congress looks ahead to the presidency of Donald Trump, who has promised to take a hard line with Iran.

Experts on the Middle East who testified before the committee said there are steps that Congress and the next administration can take to limit Iran’s ability to foment regional conflict.

“Ratchet up direct and indirect operations to disrupt IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] activity and interdict support for proxies,” recommended Melissa Dalton of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“Conduct cyber-disruption of Iranian proxy activities, expose Iranian-backed groups, front companies and financial activities outside its borders,” Dalton said. “Exploit nationalist sentiment in the region that bristles at Iranian interference through amplified information operations, sustained financial pressure on the IRGC and proxies, and minimize the space that the IRGC can exploit in the region by building the capabilities of regional partner security forces.”

FILE - Lebanese supporters of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group hold placards and shout slogans against Saudi Arabia and the U.S., during a protest to show their solidarity with Yemen's Shi’ite rebels, known as Houthis, in front the United Nations headquarters, in Beirut, Lebanon, Oct. 10, 2016.

FILE – Lebanese supporters of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group hold placards and shout slogans against Saudi Arabia and the U.S., during a protest to show their solidarity with Yemen’s Shi’ite rebels, known as Houthis, in front the United Nations headquarters, in Beirut, Lebanon, Oct. 10, 2016.

Dalton conceded, however, there is no magic bullet to contain Iran’s regional ambitions.

“Absent ideological changes in the Iranian government, the United States will not be able to change Iran’s reasoning for supporting proxy groups,” she said.

Corker said Iran’s destabilizing actions in the Middle East deserve greater attention than they have received so far.

“One reason I opposed the nuclear deal with Iran was that I feared it would end up being our de facto Middle East policy, and that countering Iran’s regional efforts would take second fiddle [a back seat], if you will,” the chairman said.

Cardin was one of only four Democratic senators who opposed the international nuclear accord with Iran. Nevertheless, he argued it would be a mistake to scrap the accord, as Trump has threatened to do.

“We cannot just walk away without risking the credibility of U.S. commitments, the U.S. leadership role in enforcing sanctions and the security of our partners,” Cardin said. “I fear that walking away from the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] now amplifies the prospects of war with Iran, while leaving the United States isolated.”

Source: http://www.voanews.com/a/iran-proxy-activities-probed-capitol-hill/3625639.html

 


Filed under: CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Iran Tagged: iran, United States

“Actually, even Berlin is not enough to invade. We’ve got to pass through and capture Britain as such. All the evil of our Russian destiny is the Anglo-Saxons…”

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The bravado, the absolute lunacy, is strong in this one. “We”?

The most ignorable person makes an irresponsible statement about doing the impossible.  Perhaps Putin put him up to this, but it reflects badly on… whatever you want to call this unholy alliance between Russia and a mangy bunch of mercenaries.  Let’s hope somebody puts a muzzle and a bark collar on this cur.

</end editorial>



Anglo-Saxons – the root of all evil, evidently, the cause of all of Russia’s woes…..

The great and considered wisdom of former frozen chicken salesman Olexander Zakharchenko, leader of the DPR/DNR🙂

 




http://uatoday.tv/politics/russia-must-invade-britain-to-unleash-its-golden-age-donbas-collaborator-chieftain-820203.html

17:02 Dec. 6, 2016

Russia must invade Britain to unleash its golden age – Donbas militant chieftain

Donbas collaborator leader Olexander Zakharchenko (AP photo)

Donbas warlord wants to invade Europe, including Britain, and regain what Russia has lost in the Crimean War

The Donbas militants chieftain Olexander Zakharchenko said that Russia and its proxies must invade not only Kyiv and Berlin, but also Great Britain.

I’m not talking of Kyiv. Actually, even Berlin is not enough to invade. We’ve got to pass through and capture Britain as such. All the evil of our Russian destiny is the Anglo-Saxons,” the pro-Russian collaborator leader claimed in an interview published on YouTube.

Read also 30% of Donbas militants are Ukrainians and they’re ready to revolt – Tuka

He also said that after invading Britain, Russia’s golden age will come.

We will get back under control the territory lost by the Russian empire, plus we’ll take what’s ours that we have to get since as early as the Crimean War,” Zakharchenko said.


http://en.censor.net.ua/video_news/418061/zakharchenko_blames_russias_plight_on_anglosaxons_says_britain_must_be_conquered_video_in_russian

 Zakharchenko blames Russia’s plight on Anglo-Saxons, says Britain must be conquered. VIDEO (in Russian)

Leader of Donetsk terrorists Alexander Zakharchenko says Britain must be conquered so as to destroy the Anglo-Saxons who are “the evil to Russia’s fate.”

Censor.NET cites the warlord as saying that predictions indicate that only after the U.K. falls, Russia’s “golden age” will finally come.

“I’m not saying ‘Kyiv.’ In fact, not even Berlin must be taken. We should leave it behind and conquer Britain. The Anglo-Saxons are the evil to our Russian fate. If we succeed, Russia’s ‘golden age’ will come, according to all our predictions,” the “DPR” leader said.

Read more: Minsk agreements are not final document, – ‘DPR’ leader Zakharchenko


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia, Ukraine Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, information warfare, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

How Russian Propaganda Actually Works

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screen-shot-2016-12-05-at-8-37-16-pm
YourNewsWire.com story which caught my eye, completely and absolute crap aka Russian propaganda aka fake news. In this case the terms are interchangeable.

A reporter contacted me today but could not understand the concept of how Russian propaganda works.  So, please allow me to dedicate one entire blog to showing how Russian propaganda and fake news, almost interchangeable terms, work.

screen-shot-2016-12-05-at-8-41-03-pm
This shows how the words appeared in the fake Russian propaganda story.

One of the ways I’ve tracked Russian propaganda through the years is to track certain unique phrases the Russian propagandists copy and use in specific articles.  Last week I was tracking a story on a known Russian-proxy propaganda dissemination site, YourNewsWire.com.  My definition of a Russian propaganda site is that the site must contain at least 20% Russian propaganda, the rest is fluff, filler or “cover” – to make the site appear legitimate.  I don’t care what the fluff looks like as much as that 20% propaganda.

The story I was tracking at YourNewsWire is  “Obama To Sign Bill Making ‘Alternative Media’ Illegal“. In the story, the phrase “measures by Russia to exert covert influence” appears, already in quotation marks. I plugged that phrase into Google to see where else it appeared.

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Original Reuters story
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Here GlobalResearch.ca embellishes the story even more
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Here we see RT with the original faked story

Reuters published this (I added the emphasis), which appears to be the original:  “The top U.S. intelligence officer has asked Congress to drop a provision in a pending bill that would create a special committee to combat Russian efforts to exert covert influence abroad, saying such a panel would duplicate current work and hinder cooperation with foreign allies.” Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-intelligencwe-russia-idUSKBN13R2GB.  Please notice two different directions taken by these articles, the original story in Reuters says the effort is stopping, the propaganda story in YourNewsWire says the effort is continuing. If there is any doubt that

Please notice two different directions taken by these articles, the original story in Reuters says the effort is stopping, the propaganda story in YourNewsWire says the effort is continuing.

If there is any doubt that GlobalResearch.ca is a Russian fake news site, here is their version: “When Truth-Telling Becomes Russian Propaganda“.

This is one of the many ways that Russian propaganda works, because most Americans do not check if a story is real. I saw the phrase on RT, where it most likely began and was then spread through a network of other Russian and Russian proxy propaganda sites.

When I did the search, I took the top 60 results and copied them into a document for later analysis and reporting.  It is too voluminous to include here.  Perhaps tomorrow…


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Fake News, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Fake News, information warfare, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

Separating Fact from Fiction in Russia’s ‘Information Wars’

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Can the West respond to Moscow’s information attacks without using the same tactics?

The flurry of hacking, paranoia and fake news which preceded the biggest upset in recent US political history has led to talk of a new “information war” with Russia. But even as they debate the possibility of a Russian role in President-Elect Donald Trump’s unexpected victory at the polls, analysts and media alike need to understand the nature of Russian information warfare—and how the response can be just as damaging as the tactic itself.

The use of (dis)information to undermine the enemy is as old as the Trojan Horse. Back in the 6th Century B.C., the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu was already advising that the ideal form of attack would see you defeat an enemy purely psychologically, without landing a physical blow. Today, the information revolution allows for an unprecedented number of ways to influence and subvert other countries.

But while theorists and practitioners across the world are experimenting in ways to weaponize information, for some, the term “information war” has gone beyond psyops (psychological operations) to become a grand myth which explains away the world. Indeed, one of the most damaging ideas an information war can plant in the mind of the enemy is the idea of an information war itself.

Information war has long obsessed Russian geopolitical analysts looking to explain the failure of the Soviet Union. They assert that the country collapsed not because of its terrible economic, cultural and social policies, but because of “information viruses” planted by Western security services through Trojan-Horse ideas such as freedom of speech (Operation Glasnost) and economic reform (Operation Perestroika). Alleged secret agents in the Soviet establishment who posed as so-called modernizers, allied with a DC-dictated fifth column of anti-Soviet dissidents, supposedly oversaw the dissemination of these “viruses.”

For a long time, such theories were not in the Russian mainstream. But as the Kremlin searched for ways to explain its losses in the 21st Century—such as the 2004 and 2013 Revolutions in Ukraine or the 2011 protests against Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow—“information war” became a convenient way to cover up for policy failures.

In a 2012 article called “Russia and the Changing World,” Putin elaborated about how he perceives such “soft power”—namely, as “a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence;” a device used “to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries.” He rejected as “unacceptable” the work of “pseudo-NGOs and other agencies that try to destabilize other countries with outside support…”

Others were more specific. Describing the Arab Spring in a 2014 piece for The Military-Industrial Courier, General-Major Vasily Burenok, president of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences, wrote that “In North Africa, the main aim [of the West] was to inspire a civil war and sow chaos.” Meanwhile, in Ukraine, he claimed, Western “colonels” tried to “reformat” Ukrainian thinking during the Maidan revolution of 2013. The internet and mobile communications allow for new intensity and power in this “non-material” warfare, he observed.

And Moscow has acted accordingly. Over the past two years, since war with the West has become the Kremlin’s main message, Russian officials have alleged information wars to explain everything from anti-corruption reporting about Putin’s money to investigations into Russia’s Olympics doping programs.

Does the Kremlin really believe in these wars? Are they merely a convenient cover? Or are they a case of projection?

In Soviet times, the Kremlin ran an extensive operation to subvert the West through what were known as “active measures.” An estimated 15,000 KGB employees worked, in the words of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin, to “drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the eyes of the people in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America.”

Putin, as a former KGB officer, is, of course, well aware of this history.

Whatever its motivations, paranoia has become Russia’s foreign policy, with the Kremlin setting up its own fake NGOs and international propaganda-outlets; buying up political actors and supporting extremist groups; enabling hackers, troll farms, rent-a-mobs and corrupt businesspeople to destabilize democracies and eat away at Western alliances.

One noticeable aspect of the Kremlin’s approach is support for European far-right parties which then support the Kremlin’s foreign policies. The National Front in France, for example, has received funding from Kremlin-connected sources. Another is the use of disinformation to obscure Russian responsibility for such mistakes as bringing down Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 over Donbass or for bombing a United Nations aid convoy in Syria.

Disinformation (“dezinformatsiya”) was also an important part of Soviet active measures, but the media environment within which it spread has changed. The Soviets tried to prove their fake stories were actually true. Today, the fakes are sprayed into the chaos of social media and conspiracy websites, adding to the lack of trust in mainstream media and to the overall confusion of so-called post-fact societies. This amounts to not so much an information war, as what some analysts describe as a “war on information.”

At its most effective, the Kremlin does not invent new issues. It tries to fan the flames of existing problems such as corruption, anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiment, low-quality media, xenophobia, and conspiracy theories.

But responding to such tactics also carries the risk of replicating the Kremlin’s information-war mythology and seeing all domestic problems as products of an “information war.” This poses dangers.

For one, democratic leaders can use the claim of information warfare as an excuse to attack viable opposition. In February 2016, for example, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius alleged, with no proof, that strikes by the Trade Union of Lithuanian Teachers are influenced by Moscow. He apologized a day later, saying that he’d only meant to signal the pro-Putin proclivities of the union’s Russian counterparts.

Others can use the claim of an information war to go after the press. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has called a New York Times editorial criticizing his lack of reforms part of Russia’s “hybrid war” against Ukraine, while his interior minister, Arsen Avakov, labels independent Ukrainian journalists who do not toe the government line “liberal-separatists.” (Many of the journalists have received death threats.)

In Ukraine, there are also attempts to bring in new legislation which would allow for censorship under the cover of defending against “information aggression.” The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media criticized the proposed bill for potentially preventing media from acting as a watchdog on government. The Ukrainian parliament has not yet voted on the proposed change.

Such legislative tactics actually play directly into the Kremlin’s hands. Moscow’s aim is to sharpen the divisions in societies, to stir discontent and alienate communities. Those divisions can be severe.

In EU-member Latvia, for instance, one recent study by the Latvian Defense Academy found that 41.3 percent of some 1,715 respondents who speak Russian at home believe that “Russian intervention” to defend their “rights and interests” is “necessary and justified.” Initiatives by Latvian politicians to test Russian-language teachers for “loyalty” and to expel Russian-speakers might only help sharpen these divisions.

Ultimately, whoever wages it, an “information war” is a model used to explain the world which actually explains nothing. This doesn’t mean the West should ignore the challenge of Active Measures 2.0, but it needs to find its own way of evaluating them and its own language for combating them. Democracies are in a double bind: How can they respond to the Kremlin without becoming like it?

Peter Pomeranzev is the author of “Nothing is True and Everything is Possible” and is a Consulting Editor for . Coda l Disinformation Crisis. @peterpomeranzev

Filed under: CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, information warfare, Russia, United States

Senators seek to declassify info on Russia role in US election

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THE RACHEL MADDOW SHOW 12/1/16

Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, talks with Rachel Maddow about a new request by Democratic senators to President Barack Obama asking for the release of more information about Russia’s role in the U.S. election. Duration: 7:23

Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, information warfare, propaganda, Russia, Russian propaganda

World Anti-Doping Agency report details scope of massive Russian scheme

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December 9 at 11:44 AM

Report: Russian doping program ‘a coverup of an unprecedented scale’

The final part of the World Anti-Doping Agency’s McLaren report said Russian athletes were involved in an institutional conspiracy to conceal positive doping tests as Moscow “hijacked international sport.” (Reuters)

An investigative report Friday from the international agency that polices drugs in sport put the full scale of the Russian doping controversy into better focus, detailing one of the largest cheating scandals in history and implicating government employees and more than 1,000 Russian athletes who benefited from manipulations to conceal positive doping tests.

The Russian athletes and government officials were involved in an “institutional conspiracy” of an “unprecedented scale,” Richard McLaren, a Canadian lawyer and sports ethics expert who led the investigation for the World Anti-Doping Agency, said at a news conference Friday morning in London. The elaborate doping system and associated coverup began in at least 2011, McLaren said, and continued beyond the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014.

“It is impossible to know how deep and how far back the conspiracy goes,” McLaren said. “For years, international sports competition has been unknowingly hijacked by the Russians. Coaches and athletes have been playing on an uneven field. Sports fans and spectators have been deceived. It’s time that this stops.”

While the report could intensify calls for Russia to be barred from the 2018 Winter Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, McLaren said that decision should be made by the International Olympic Committee and the governing bodies of each sport.

The IOC already has established a disciplinary commission to address the Russian doping scandal. The Olympic governing body is in the process of re-examining Russian doping samples collected at the London and Sochi Games. “Professor McLaren’s completed report demonstrates a fundamental attack on the integrity of sport.” IOC President Thomas Bach said Friday in a statement. “As an Olympian, any athlete or official who took part in such a system should be excluded for life from the Olympic Games.”

Friday’s 144-page report confirmed the findings shared in an initial report in July, charging Russian sport and government officials with swapping out the tainted urine samples by athletes with clean samples.

“These athletes were not acting individually but within an organized infrastructure,” he said.

He called the Russian intelligence agents from the FSB — a successor agency to the KGB — “magicians” for being able to crack open tamper-proof bottles and fool doping officials.

“The story of how all the pieces fit together seems like fiction,” McLaren said.

Russian officials pushed back against the report and McLaren’s charges of a widespread systemic doping program.

“The Russian Sports Ministry declares with all responsibility that there are no state programs supporting doping in sport and will continue pursuing a zero-tolerance policy toward doping,” the organization said in a statement.

The report found that the scheme — which was spurred by Russia’s poor showing at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver — included athletes at the 2012 London Summer Games, the 2013 Universiade Games, the world track and field championships in 2013, and the 2014 Winter Olympics and Paralympics in Sochi, Russia. Among its specific findings:

  • Fifteen Russian medal winners were found to have doped at the London Olympics; 10 have had their medals stripped already.
  • Male DNA was found in the urine samples of two Russian women’s ice hockey players, a sign that those samples were tampered with.
  • Samples provided by two unnamed athletes who won four gold medals in Sochi showed physiologically impossible salt readings.
  • Forty-four bottles containing urine samples from 12 medal-winning athletes had scratches and marks on the inside of the caps, indicating tampering. WADA says this was determined by an unnamed “world recognized expert in firearms and tool marks examinations,” who found that the nominally tamper-proof caps could be removed and then placed back on the bottles without leaving marks visible to the untrained eye.
  • Six winners of 21 Paralympic medals from Sochi were found to have tampered urine samples.

The report also indicated that the systemic doping did not end with the Sochi Games. Russian officials continued swapping out dirty samples monthly at the Moscow testing laboratory for elite summer and winter athletes in 2014, McLaren found.

“The Report, and its evidence published today, shows the scope of subversion; and, focuses on the number of athletes that benefited over a prolonged period of time,” WADA President Craig Reedie said in a statement. “It is alarming to read that 1,000 Russian athletes . . . competing in summer, winter and Paralympic sport — can be identified as being involved in, or benefiting from, manipulations to conceal positive doping tests.”

McLaren found that Russia’s Ministry of Sport helped cover up positive doping results in more than 30 sports in all. Friday’s report did not name the vast majority of the offenders. Their names were instead redacted, but McLaren said their identities have been shared with the governing bodies of each sport, which have the authority to mete out punishments. He said information on 600 summer and 95 winter sports athletes have been forwarded to the international federations of each sport.

“It’s another staggering example of how the Olympic movement has been corrupted and clean athletes robbed by Russia’s state-supported doping system,” Travis Tygart, chief executive of the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, said in a statement. “The IOC has to act — and clean athletes won’t be satisfied until WADA is empowered to be a truly independent global regulator and the Russian Olympic Committee is suspended until deemed code compliant.”

Even as WADA tried to better police doping and curtail cheats, for years Russia was able to change its practices and stay one step ahead, he said.

“Our investigation has revealed that for every action by WADA, from Russia there was a reaction,” McLaren said.

WADA and IOC officials have been closely scrutinizing recent Olympic results and retesting athletes’ doping samples. More than three dozen medals could be stripped from top finishers at the 2008 Beijing Games, the 2012 London Olympics and the Sochi Games in 2014.

Friday’s revelations encompassed just the second half of McLaren’s investigation. Initial findings were released July 18, barely two weeks before the start of the Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. McLaren then found “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the Russian government ran a widespread doping system and recommended barring all Russian athletes from competing at the Rio Games.

The IOC opted against an outright ban of the country, leaving it up to the individual sports federations to rule on allowing Russian athletes to compete. Opinions varied from sport to sport on how to deal with McLaren’s initial findings, and while more than 100 athletes were forbidden from competing, nearly 300 Russians still participated in the Rio Games.

“I find it difficult to understand why we were not on the same team,” McLaren said Friday. “We should all be working together to end doping in sports. My investigation has gone a long way to bring this dark secret out into the open. Now we must move together and find solutions.”

Patrick Sandusky, a spokesman for the U.S. Olympic Committee, said in a statement: “As we have said consistently, the current anti-doping system is in need of substantial reform. We need to continue to embrace the opportunity to shine a light on bad actors and take the necessary steps to make global anti-doping efforts independent, robust and respected by athletes and fans alike.”

While acknowledging room for improvement, Russian sports and government officials said they were being unfairly targeted and challenged many of the conclusions of McLaren’s initial report. Friday’s follow-up report laid bare the extent of the evidence against Russia, including forensic analysis of past doping samples and emails, documents and other forms of communication. As part of the investigation, McLaren compiled 1,166 documents and pieces of evidence and has made them available on a searchable website.

McLaren was tabbed as a special investigator in May following a New York Times report in which Grigory Rodchenkov, a former director of Russia’s anti-doping laboratory in Moscow, outlined Russia’s elaborate doping scheme at the 2014 Sochi Games.

Rodchenkov, who cooperated with WADA investigators, told the Times he tampered with the urine samples of at least 15 medalists from the Sochi Games.

The scope and depth of the scandal could also have an impact on Russia’s ability to stage major international competitions. Russia is hosting the 2018 World Cup, for example. The bobsled and skeleton world championships are scheduled to take place in Sochi in February. Bobsledder Elana Meyers Taylor, a two-time Olympic medalist, has already called for the event to be moved.


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, information warfare, Russia, Russian propaganda

Caution, IO Folks, Your Skills May Be Used For Nefarious Purposes

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Ladies and gentlemen, please let me give you a caution.  Your skills are in demand.  You are very good at what you do.

You inform a target audience and influence them.  Also known as information operations, information warfare, marketing, public relations, advertising, perspective management, psychological operations, strategic communications, public diplomacy, social engineering, and any of another 30 or so names some people call what we do.  We inform and we influence. We never inform and not have an effect on our audience.  Maybe not the first time, maybe not every time, and maybe not until they have heard our message 150,000 times… but eventually what we say, and, more importantly, what we do, is going to sink in, give someone pause, and they might have an “aha!” moment.  It may be even more subtle than that.  Or even something might snap and everything becomes clear.

Most of the doctrine, policies, techniques, tactics, and procedures we use are totally unclassified, open for the whole world to read.  That is a good thing.

But when you put it all together and teach somebody “how to”, you are now enabling them to practice our art.  It is an art.  Sometimes it works, often it doesn’t.   We are working to change our art into a science, but we currently lack the computer processing power to factor in all the variables.  We lack the knowledge of how the mind, the human brain, how it actually works, to adequately predict how a certain piece of information is going to be received in any one specific brain.  We lack the knowledge of how culture, language, religion, history, geography, all the endless factors, how they will be affected and have an effect on the message.  The narrative.  We do not honestly understand what happens when it hits the wetware between your ears.  We think we know. We know in certain cases. We believe we know the expected outcome.  Most of the time…

When you produce a video describing our art form, how it works, how we put it all together, what to factor in, what to consider, you have now concisely and precisely described to some people who should not know how to push their message.  They will now have the knowledge, the skills, to sell their message to people who might always have been susceptible.  Now you may have enabled them to share their message so that they are effective salespeople of what could be an evil message.

Today, a reporter from an established news source was interviewing me.  He mentioned a video that had been produced and was being passed around a white-supremacist group as a ‘how-to’ for these racists.  I knew the lecturer.  I knew the producer. I knew their qualifications (very good, by the way).   The lecturer is an expert in psychological operations.  This was basically an instructional video on doing psychological operations on social media. It had been recorded in a professional setting but was publicly available on YouTube.

I could not hang up the phone fast enough.  I called the producer who had posted the video online and explained what was happening, what I had discovered.  The video was immediately taken off YouTube and put behind a paywall.  I also sent a note to the lecturer.  Crisis averted.

I would like to share this cautionary note with you, the experts within our community.  Please.  What you do is valuable. What you do is necessary.

But what we do is sensitive.  Take appropriate precautions, no matter what you do.


Filed under: Information operations, Information Warfare

Facebook Details Its New Plan To Combat Fake News Stories

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Providing new details about how it’s trying to counter the spread of fake news on its services, Facebook says it’s working with fact-checking groups to identify bogus stories — and to warn users if a story they’re trying to share has been reported as fake.

Facebook also says it will let users report a possible hoax by clicking the upper right hand corner of a post and choosing one of four reasons they want to flag it — from “It’s spam” to “It’s a fake news story.”

If a story is deemed false, it will be tagged with an alert message saying it’s been “disputed by 3rd party fact-checkers.”

A mockup provided by Facebook shows the screens it will use to allow users to report a potential hoax or fake news story.

Facebook

The social media giant was sharply criticized after the Nov. 8 election, as false stories were blamed for adding confusion to a dynamic campaign season. Since then, fake news and conspiracy theories were also identified as a motivating factor in a man’s assault on a pizza restaurant in Washington, D.C.

In the wake of that and other stories, some called for Facebook to hire editors to vet news stories; in today’s update from Facebook’s vice president in charge of its News Feed feature, Adam Mosseri, the company could be seen to be effectively outsourcing that job to third-party groups that it says have signed on to Poynter’s International Fact Checking Code of Principles.

The update to Facebook’s plan to cope with bogus information comes nearly one month after CEO Mark Zuckerberg acknowledged that Facebook had “much more work” to do in how it handles false stories.

Today’s news touches on four of the seven areas that Zuckerberg listed as part of his company’s fight against misinformation. It remains to be seen whether the moves will satisfy Facebook’s critics — both inside and outside the company’s ranks — who’ve faulted the way it deals with controversial, offensive and/or fake posts. As NPR’s Aarti Shahani reported in November, that effort has grown to include thousands of overseas subcontractors.

In a news release outlining how Facebook’s new reporting and flagging process will work, Mosseri said the company will rely on its users to report a story as potentially bogus, “along with other signals.” The story would then be sent to fact-checkers.

“If the fact-checking organizations identify a story as fake,” Mosseri said, “it will get flagged as disputed and there will be a link to the corresponding article explaining why. Stories that have been disputed may also appear lower in News Feed.”

Mosseri added, “It will still be possible to share these stories, but you will see a warning that the story has been disputed as you share.”

The flagged story will also be rejected if anyone tries to turn it into a promoted ad, Facebook says.

While fake news created a stir because of its intersection with U.S. politics, many of the people behind the sites say they’re mainly in it for the money.

Here’s how Craig Silverman of BuzzFeed News described what he found in researching the phenomenon, Wednesday’s Fresh Air:

“Facebook directly doesn’t really earn them a lot of money. But the key thing about Facebook — and this is true whether you’re running a politics site out of Macedonia or whether you run a very large website in the U.S. — Facebook is the biggest driver of traffic to, you know, news websites in the world now. You know, 1.8 billion people log into Facebook every month.”

Today, Facebook says it has “found that a lot of fake news is financially motivated” — and that it’s taking steps to remove some of that incentive.

“On the buying side we’ve eliminated the ability to spoof domains, which will reduce the prevalence of sites that pretend to be real publications,” Mosseri says. “On the publisher side, we are analyzing publisher sites to detect where policy enforcement actions might be necessary.”

Source: http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/15/505728377/facebook-details-its-new-plan-to-combat-fake-news-stories


Filed under: CounterPropaganda, Fake News, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda Tagged: CounterPropaganda, Fake News, information operations, information warfare

U.S. Faces Tall Hurdles in Detaining or Deterring Russian Hackers

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Robert E. Anderson Jr., center, served until last year as the F.B.I.’s most senior executive overseeing computer investigations. Credit Jim Lo Scalzo/European Pressphoto Agency

Russia remains a lawless country, bereft of morals or ethics.

Russia protects hackers that break laws, refuses their extradition, and covets their online prowess for their purposes.  Any hacker, regardless their skill level, suits Russia’s purposes.  Either they can quietly steal or attack on behalf of Russia, or provide noise to cover the good ones.

</end editorial>



U.S. Faces Tall Hurdles in Detaining or Deterring Russian Hackers

DEC. 15, 2016

WASHINGTON — When a suspected Russian cybercriminal named Dmitry Ukrainsky was arrested in a Thai resort town last summer, the American authorities hoped they could whisk him back to New York for trial and put at least a temporary dent in Russia’s arsenal of computer hackers.

But the Russian authorities moved quickly to persuade Thailand not to extradite him, saying that he should be prosecuted at home. American officials knew what that meant. If Mr. Ukrainsky got on a plane to Moscow, they concluded, he would soon be back at work in front of a computer.

“The American authorities continue the unacceptable practice of ‘hunting’ for Russians all over the world, ignoring the norms of international laws and twisting other states’ arms,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

The dispute over Mr. Ukrainsky, whose case remains in limbo, highlights the difficulties — and at times impossibilities — that the United States faces in combating Russian hackers, including those behind the recent attacks on the Democratic National Committee. That hack influenced the course, if not the outcome, of a presidential campaign and was the culmination of years of increasingly brazen digital assaults on American infrastructure.

The United States has few options for responding to such hacks. Russia does not extradite its citizens and has shown that it will not easily be deterred through public shaming. At times, the American authorities have enlisted local police officials to arrest suspects when they leave Russia — for vacation in the Maldives, for example. But more often than not, the F.B.I. and Justice Department investigate and compile accusations and evidence against people who will almost certainly never stand trial.

The American government divides the cybersecurity world into two categories: attacks directed or sponsored by governments, and those conducted by criminals. But Russian hacking defies easy categorization, American officials say, because the Russian government tacitly supports many private hackers and occasionally taps them for freelance government work. That has complicated investigations and upended the normal diplomatic order.

In May 2009, for instance, Secret Service agents met in Moscow with their counterparts in the Russian Federal Security Service, known as the F.S.B. The Americans said they were investigating a hacker who had installed malicious code in the software that some American businesses used to process credit card transactions. The hacker was stealing millions of credit card numbers and selling them in an underground digital marketplace.

The agents provided a name — Roman Seleznev — and the aliases he used online. His father was a member of the Russian Parliament. The Secret Service had followed his digital trail to Vladivostok, and they asked for help catching him.

Within weeks, all evidence of Mr. Seleznev’s online identity vanished from the internet. Rather than advancing the case, the Russian government had set it back, the American authorities believed. Prosecutors described their blunt conclusion in court documents: “Further coordination with the Russian government would jeopardize efforts to prosecute this case.” The American authorities were left to pursue Mr. Seleznev by themselves.

The Russians are not always uncooperative. This week they deported Joshua Samuel Aaron, 32, who was wanted by the F.B.I. on charges of stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from Wall Street banks. But Mr. Aaron, who was arrested Wednesday at John F. Kennedy International Airport after arriving on a flight from Moscow, is an American, not a Russian.

In another computer crime case, in 2014, the Justice Department shut down two global computer networks that had been used to steal millions of dollars. Called Operation Tovar, it involved intelligence agencies around the world. The target was 30-year-old Evgeniy M. Bogachev. Safely in Russia, he watched as the F.B.I. made him a most-wanted fugitive and offered a $3 million reward for his capture.

Evgeniy M. Bogachev is wanted by the F.B.I. for his involvement in a cybercrime case in which millions of dollars were stolen from unsuspecting victims. Credit via F.B.I.

In that case the F.B.I. was actually able to identify the person sitting at the keyboard. More often, the authorities identify aliases or internet addresses but cannot prove who is behind them unless the hackers get sloppy.

In the Seleznev case, for example, the authorities searched a Yahoo email account that was used to register some of the servers in the credit-card scam. Agents found, among other things, receipts for flowers that Mr. Seleznev had sent to his wife.

In the D.N.C. case and other election-year hacks, the authorities have concluded that people affiliated with the Russian government are to blame. But even if intelligence officials can identify who is behind those attacks, naming the actual perpetrators is even harder. One senior federal law enforcement official said this week that investigators still had many unanswered questions.

If it can be done, naming and prosecuting the hackers would follow a path set in 2014, when the Justice Department indicted five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on charges of hacking into American networks. The indictment links the men to specific email addresses and aliases, but does not reveal how the authorities made those connections.

“The chance of us ever getting those Chinese guys is about zero,” said Mr. Anderson. “But it does show them that there’s a change afoot. At least the way we’re looking at it policy-wise.”

Criminal charges have more practical implications, too. “It’s about denying them the ability to travel freely and preventing them from spending their ill-gotten gains anywhere but Russia,” said Leo Taddeo, the chief security officer at Cryptzone and the former top agent in the F.B.I.’s New York computer operations division. “You’re confining them to a prison that spans 11 time zones that can be a pretty unpleasant place.”

In short, even hackers take vacations. In July 2013, the authorities captured a notorious Russian hacker named Aleksandr Andreevich Panin while he was in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Panin was sentenced to more than nine years of prison for selling malware that resulted in the theft of nearly $1 billion.

“Cybercriminals be forewarned: you cannot hide in the shadows of the internet,” said Sally Q. Yates, who was the United States attorney in Georgia at the time and is now the deputy attorney general. “We will find you and bring you to justice.”

It was certainly true for Mr. Seleznev. After finding the flower receipt and making other connections, the American authorities made secret plans to capture him while he vacationed in the Maldives. Agents arrested him at the airport there in 2014 and hurried him onto a plane to the United States territory of Guam.

After a trial in Seattle, he was convicted in August of 38 counts related to hacking in a scheme that prosecutors said cost businesses more than $169 million.

The Russian government declared Mr. Seleznev’s arrest to be an unlawful “kidnapping.” It has denied involvement in the D.N.C. hack and criticized the American government’s efforts to arrest Russian citizens traveling abroad.

That is playing out now in Thailand with Mr. Ukrainsky, and in the Czech Republic with Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikulin, 29, accused of hacking into LinkedIn and Dropbox. He was captured in October in a raid at a hotel in Prague, where he was vacationing with his girlfriend, the police said.

The Russian response was swift: “We insist that the detained Russian citizen should be transferred to Russia.” He remains in the Czech Republic.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/politics/russian-hackers-election.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news


Filed under: Cybersecurity, cyberwar, Information operations, Information Warfare, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Cybersecurity, cyberwar, Cyberwarfare, information warfare, Russia

Baghdad – Ten Years Ago: 19 NOV 06

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Ten years ago, I deployed to Iraq for fourteen months during the time period historically known as “The Surge”.  I served as the Multi National Division – Baghdad Communications Line of Operations Chief which is a verbose way of saying I was the 1st Cav Division information campaign manager.  I wrote an essay once a week which was part of what the division operations officer later coined a ‘subliminal internal information campaign’.  I will post three or so for the first two weeks until I am caught up to the actual date.  This is the first of about sixty for your consideration. Thanks to Joel Harding for allowing me to use his venue.

WEEK 1 – 19 Nov 06

POLITICS-POLITICS-POLITICS

“War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” – Karl von Clausewitz

To any US military commander, the Clausewtiz quote is a no brainer, but oft, it is forgotten when applied to other types of conflicts or turmoil.  It is not lost on Dr. Harith al-Dhari, the chairman of the Association of Muslim Scholars.  The Association has been a supporter of the Sunni insurgency since 2004.  A few weeks ago, the media cited him as having said the violence (in Baghdad) is political not sectarian.

It can be hard for us to comprehend how these ever increasing ruthless extra-judicial killings (note our sanitization) could not be anything but genocide or ethnic cleansing, but then again we are not Iraqis.  To the typical Iraqi these days, death, murder, revenge and torture are neither an abomination nor a rarity.   They are a part of life.  This is Iraqi politics and Dr. al-Dhari knows this.

The political rhetoric is escalating pressures within the Division’s information environment on scale with the violence on the ground and, at times, even precedes the violence.  The leader of the Sunni Tawafuq Coalition and Minister of Education threaten to pull the coalition out of the government: politics.  A few days later, seventy plus people, all Sunnis, are kidnapped from the Baghdad University: politics.  No coincidence.

Harith al-Dhari is not immune.  Minister of Interior Bulani issues a warrant for Dr. al-Dhari’s arrest for crimes of inciting terrorism: politics.  Dr. al-Dhari calls on Sunnis to pull out of the government: politics.  The PM’s spokesman says the Government of Iraq really won’t pursue the warrant but instead will investigate the matter: politics.

We in the military operate on a different plane from that of most politicians, and especially Iraqi politicians, be they Sunni or Shia, Arab or Persian.  Work hard, be a team player, don’t rock the boat, be forthright (but not too candid), bide your time and good things will happen to a US soldier and officer.

In Iraqi politics, arguing, grandstanding and posturing are all an effort to upstage your opponent.  Deny your opponents position and ignore him.  You win.   Directness is meaningless.  Yet, we cannot discount the political maneuvering in the information environment as a mere war of words.

The threat of pulling out of the government is real because the violence on the ground is real.  The government has done little to stem the violence and fulfill its obligation to the populace. Should the Sunnis pull out of the government, which they may, and force the government to collapse, it is not the end of the Coalition effort.  As long as the Sunni are involved in the political process, we can still salvage a solution.

The Italian government collapses all the time, yet Italy hasn’t fallen into Civil War.  Iraq and its Sunni and Shia, however, are not Italians and European.  The Iraqis are spilling blood, the government does nothing, and their republic slips towards the brink.


Filed under: Information operations

The U.S. Response to Russian Pre-Election Meddling: An Overview

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The stark contrast between the Trump and Clinton camps, in the context of cybersecurity, explodes in the final sentence.

Notice, however, the author’s focus on cyber, avoiding any attempt to address Russian influence operations when cyber played such a minor role. The lack of focus on Russian influence operations will come back to haunt the United States and the West again and again, until influence is the main focus.  Russia will again attempt to influence voters in the United States until then.

The next time Russia attempts to influence voters in a US election will be more subtle, but more likely than not, more pervasive.

</end editorial>



By Andrew McClure

Monday, December 19, 2016, 12:39 PM

“Whatever the source of the material was,” Donald Trump’s deputy campaign manager David Bossie began, “if it was on the front page of the paper—it’s in the public domain.  We would look at it.”  Passions started to boil over and I could feel the tension in the room as the Clinton and Trump campaigns traded barbs over WikiLeaks and the role of alleged Russian intelligence activity throughout the election cycle.

After every presidential election since 1972, Harvard’s Institute of Politics has hosted a summit assembling key players from each campaign and members of the press to chronicle a “first draft of history.”  This year, the events over the two-day campaign managers’ conference offered a glimpse inside a particularly emotional electoral cycle.

Dan Balz of The Washington Post challenged the Trump team’s response to questions about the campaign’s use of material posted by WikiLeaks as an attack against Secretary Clinton:  “You all will not acknowledge that it was the Russians?”

Bossie:  “I personally don’t know who it was.  Do you?”

After some back and forth, Andrea Mitchell of MSNBC took over:  “Just to clear up, 17 intelligence agencies agree…”

She was referring to the joint statement released October 7 by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security fingering, for the first time publically, the Russian government for directing the theft of documents from the Democratic National Committee and other U.S. persons.  The statement went on to conclude that disclosure of these documents was “consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts.”  The move to name and shame Russia set in motion a flurry of speculation over how the White House might respond.

Official government attribution came nearly four months after reports first surfaced in June that the DNC had been compromised.  Three days before the party’s July convention in Philadelphia, WikiLeaks released its largest trove of files yet, leading to the ouster of DNC chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz over the appearance of favoritism during the primary process.  The final months of the campaign were characterized by a steady release of often mundane but occasionally embarrassing correspondence and narratives alleging Clinton corruption.

The U.S. government’s formal acknowledgement of Russian culpability demonstrated not only the degree of certainty behind the attribution but also a commitment on behalf of the public to investigate and respond to this particular form of cyber-enabled theft.  The events that followed would also bring into context comments President Obama made one month earlier to Vladimir Putin at the G20 summit in China on September 5th.  Speaking about cyber war, President Obama bluntly stated the United States has “more capacity than anybody, both offensively and defensively.”

After the announcement, the administration embarked on a series of actions aiming to deter Russian meddling in the election.  One week after the DNI’s assessment, Vice-President Biden appeared on Meet the Press promising a “proportional response” to Russian interference in the election.  When asked by host Chuck Todd if the public would know about the U.S. response, Vice President Biden said simply, “Hope not.”  President Obama echoed that promise late last week.

***

Before voters took to the polls, senior U.S. intelligence officials began publicly signaling to Russian leaders, in no uncertain terms, that their meddling could provoke consequences.  Four days before the election, NBC aired an exclusive story detailing what appeared to be a deliberate message from the Obama administration:  U.S. hackers had penetrated critical Russian control systems that operate telecommunications, the power grid, and Kremlin command and control networks; taking action to disrupt the upcoming U.S. election could lead to dangerous escalation.

The Russian reaction was immediate.  A Russian foreign ministry spokesperson suggested the Kremlin would consider the U.S. threat an act of cyber terrorism if carried out.  The spin from Moscow also suggested U.S. accusations were a partisan ploy to hedge against a potential Trump victory at the ballot box; his opponents would claim he won due to outside malfeasance rather than through a legitimate electoral process.

But what remains unclear is whether the U.S. attempt to signal escalation dominance in the cyber realm achieved anything meaningful.  By demonstrating unmatched capability to hold at risk vital adversary assets, was the administration seeking to specifically deter cyber interference with the voting process itself?  By that measure, it appears the government was successful.  On the other hand, if the point was to dissuade Russia from persisting in its Information Operations campaign to influence the domestic political discussion, U.S. government efforts were too late to be effective, coming as they did after months of steady leaks and over a year after the FBI first warned the Democratic National Committee to examine the security of their network.

The NBC report was actually not the first message of its kind.  It came a few days after government officials relayed an earlier message to Moscow to convey the seriousness of American concerns.  According to an account published in the Washington Post one week after the election, the Obama administration sent Russian officials a notice to cease the activity over a rarely used communications link established through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), housed in the State Department.  A senior administration official explained, “the fact that we used this channel was part of the messaging.”

The NRRC link was originally set up in 1987 to prevent strategic miscommunication and inadvertent escalation of a nuclear crisis.  The link was designed to function as a confidence-building measure and should not be confused with the White House-Kremlin Direct Communication line, or secure hotline, used to manage crisis situations.  In 2013, the U.S. and Russia agreed to expand the scope of the NRRC link to exchange inquiries regarding cyber security incidents.  Although on this particular occasion the message appeared to express concern over hacking originating from Russia, the statement avoided making a specific claim of attribution.

The threat of interference raised two key concerns in the days leading up to the November 8 election.  The first was whether intermediaries would distribute new material, authentic or doctored, in an attempt to sway voters at the last minute.  The administration’s messaging campaign appeared geared toward addressing this type of meddling.  The other fear was that systematic vote-tampering or disruption of the process could affect voter turnout or cast doubt upon the integrity of the final vote tally.  In light of this concern, state and federal agencies took measures to preserve electoral fidelity.

Before the election, federal government agencies worked to detect and counter potential eleventh-hour foreign interference, ranging from outright voter fraud, tampering with voter registration rolls, or attacks on voting infrastructure.  So far, however, there is no evidence of systematic interference with vote tallying.  Lingering questions instead center on Moscow’s motivation to nudge the electorate or amplify partisan discord.

The motives behind particular instances of cyber meddling can be difficult to infer, but two broad theories have been floated to explain state-sponsored Russian meddling during this election cycle.  One theory is that Russian leaders sought to advantage their preferred candidate.  Many believe President Putin harbors deep animosity toward Secretary Clinton, particularly following the contentious 2011 Russian parliamentary elections.  Her own electoral misfortunes, some suspect, are a sort of payback for her supposed role instigating opposition protests to undermine his candidacy and perceived legitimacy.

Another theory is that Russia’s cyber meddling sought to sow doubt and uncertainty about the legitimacy of American democracy and exacerbate partisan strife, leaving the next U.S. President embattled from the start.  An embattled President who is distracted at home is also weaker abroad.

Going forward, there is sure to be robust debate over what the current and future administrations can do to persuade foreign adversaries to refrain from actions contrary to American interests.  But the events this time around suggest that robust warnings before the fact, while an essential element of deterrence, may not be sufficient to ward off cyber malfeasance unless threats of retaliation are deemed to be credible.

***

Back at Harvard, the conversation continued to run high on emotion.  Reiterating her point about the emails, Andrea Mitchell stated, “They were hacked.  They were stolen.  And turned over to WikiLeaks.”

“If they were,” Bossie began, “it doesn’t make them untrue.”  The ensuing silence let the comment sink in.  No one from the Clinton campaign has ever claimed the emails released from the DNC or John Podesta’s personal account were not authentic.  The Trump campaign’s defense echoed the rationale proffered by some media outlets for their coverage of the story.

After some more back and forth, a visibly rankled member of the Clinton camp sighed. “Were you guys worried about being hacked?… Were you guys hacked?”

Barely heard above the commotion was Trump’s digital director Brad Parscale:  “That’s why we put security on our email… There’s this thing called two-layer authentication that came out like eight years ago.  They should try it at the DNC.”

The sarcasm prompted a rare moment of vulnerability for the Clinton team:  “At one point we asked the RNC a fair amount, like what kind of precautions they had taken.  Did you guys take precautions after the hacking?”

Parscale’s response – “Yeah, of course.  Like any business in the world we take precautions against all of our information technology.”

Source: https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-response-russian-pre-election-meddling-overview


Filed under: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, Information operations, Information Warfare, Propaganda, Russia Tagged: #RussiaFail, #RussiaLies, CounterPropaganda, information warfare

Baghdad – Ten Years Ago: 26 NOV 06

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This is the second of nearly sixty essays I wrote while serving as the Multi National Division – Baghdad and 1st Cav Division information campaign manager during “The Surge”.  Week One ended like this, “The Italian government collapses all the time, yet Italy hasn’t fallen into Civil War.  Iraq and its Sunni and Shia, however, are not Italians and European.  The Iraqis are spilling blood, the government does nothing, and their republic slips towards the brink.”

WEEK 2 – 26 Nov 06

BRINKSMANSHIP

“Mazin,” I asked of my Iraqi-American acquaintance, “What would you say to the statement, ‘every time they (the Iraqi government) seem like they are going over the brink, they pull something out’? “

“When you understand that,” Mazin replied, “you’ll understand Iraqi politics.”

Thanksgiving has passed, so it is time for the Christmas specials.  Given the events within our area of operations over the past few weeks, “The Grinch Who Stole Christmas” comes to mind.  Envision the scene where the Grinch and his sleigh are stuck on a peak while the Grinch’s dog, wearing a reindeer antler headpiece, dangles in the air.  One small weight shift will cause the sleigh to slide backwards to safety or barreling uncontrolled down the hill.  The hapless dog can do nothing.

This week’s events pushed the Government of Iraq and Prime Minister Maliki to the ledge as insurgents targeted Dawa party members and Ministry of Health deputies of the already embattled Prime Minister.  One deputy Minister of Health was kidnapped from his home and another deputy health minister survived an assassination attempt in central Baghdad.  The Sunnis, it seemed, were striking back very hard and were unwilling to make any political concessions.  They had the government back on its heels again.

By mid-week, external influencers to the information environment were giving the Prime Minister (PM) a boost.  The United States Government called upon Syria to be a constructive part of Iraq’s future and then announced a summit between President Bush and PM Maliki in Jordan.  Not to be outdone, Iran offered to host a conference between Syria, Iraq and Iran.  Suddenly, Maliki was popular and had some reason for optimism.

Internal events furthered the optimism as Maliki agreed to host insurgent leaders to discuss their issues.  Senior Shia leaders within the Ministry of Defense were arrested on corruption charges.  Perhaps, the PM indeed had a grip on the government – the ledge was suddenly in retreat, but not for long.

The car bomb attacks in Sadr City have thrust the government back over the precipice as the various leaders use information to further their cause.  Sadr appeals to Harith al Dhari to apologize and be brothers.  To nobody’s surprise, Dr. al Dhari refused to cow to Sadr and blamed the United States for the car bombs.  Sadr blames the US for protecting Sunni Al Qaeda and has threatened to walk out on Maliki’s government if the PM meets with President Bush.  The White House responded saying the meeting is still a go.

The ball is back in the Prime Minister’s court.  He is the PM and he cannot back down to the likes of Moqtada al Sadr…unless he believes Sadr will back out of the government and force its collapse.  If PM Maliki meets with President Bush, this is good for the Coalition and for the position of the PM or any future PM.  If Sadr backs out and forces the government to collapse, it may be for the best.

Let’s go back to the Grinch’s dog hanging over the ledge.  Inferring who may be the hapless dog doesn’t matter and the kiddie metaphors are finished.  The future of the government is sliding and is about to go over the brink.  Having the government collapse, however, can be like having the Park Service instigate a snow slide instead of waiting for the avalanche.  The collapse allows the Iraqis to regroup in a somewhat controlled manner.  The alternative is an avalanche also known as Civil War.


Filed under: Information operations

How To Control The Media

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screen-shot-2016-12-23-at-2-14-34-pmA liberal friend just posted a highly incendiary piece on Facebook, Robert Reich’s “Trump’s Seven Techniques To Control The Media“.  It is far too obvious this is a blatant attempt to attribute negative characteristics to the President-elect, likening him to Goebbels.  Reich’s attempt is more Goebbels-like, and it is a dreadful testimony to the depths to which Reich has descended.  Now Reich appears to be nothing more than a political smear artist.  But let’s put petty politics aside and examine the salient points in the article.

Of course, I took an interest.  Controlling the media, controlling the news?

There are 7 steps that Reich says Trump supposedly uses to control the media.

  1. Berate the media
  2. Blacklist critical media
  3. Turn the public against the media
  4. Condemn satirical or critical comments
  5. Threaten the media directly
  6. Limit media access
  7. Bypass the media and communicate with the public directly

*The seven step video from Democracy Now is at “Part 1, Robert Reich: Like a Tyrant, Trump Is Deploying Seven Techniques to Control the Media” and “Part 2: Robert Reich: Like a Tyrant, Trump Is Deploying Seven Techniques to Control the Media” are more Trump bashing than a discussion of Media control techniques. But still, the steps are embedded amidst the obviously biased political discussion.

This list looked very familiar, so I did some mild digging. Okay, confession time. When I hit a brick wall I became semi-obsessed.  Reich put a vague disclaimer on his website, but if you know me, I won’t let a mosquito buzz in my ear for too long.

I did an exhaustive search, and I do mean exhaustive.  I came up with some very strange results, which will be the result of my next blog.

After coming up with nothing, I cast my net out to experts, who suggested the following

  • Ralph Sawyer, The TAO of Deception, unorthodox warfare in historic and modern China
  • Goebbels
  • Bernays
  • Lenin
  • Mao
  • Sun Tzu
  • Aristophanes
  • Demosthenes

After searching, I found nothing.  My search continues, unless somebody can help.

I found this article about President Obama, from March 4, 2013.  “White House and Press Relations Getting Worse“.  In the article, President Obama is accused of doing the exact same things to control the press.

Apparently, Democracy Now and Robert Reich borrowed from the same list that the article from 2013 borrowed from.

Reich’s only concession to a reference is this vague paragraph:

Historically, these seven techniques have been used by demagogues to erode the freedom and independence of the press. Even before he’s sworn in, Trump seems intent on doing exactly this.

 

Reich did not invent this list, he borrowed it from somewhere.  I distinctly recall reading this previously.  He gives no examples of these demagogues.  He gives no references, no citations, and gives no credit.  The list has, therefore, no credibility. By extension, Robert Reich has no credibility.


Filed under: Information operations, Information Warfare, Political Warfare Tagged: information operations, information warfare, Political Warfare

Baghdad – Ten Years Ago: 3 DEC 06

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Week 3, Civil War?, of the sixty essays I wrote while serving as the Multi National Division – Baghdad and 1st Cav Division information campaign manager during “The Surge”.  Week 2, Brinksmanship, ended like this, “The future of the government is sliding and is about to go over the brink.  Having the government collapse, however, can be like having the Park Service instigate a snow slide instead of waiting for the avalanche.  The collapse allows the Iraqis to regroup in a somewhat controlled manner.  The alternative is an avalanche also known as Civil War.”

WEEK 3 – 3 Dec 06

CIVIL WAR?

A war between political factions or regions within the same country – Dictionary.com

Choose your definition and your poison Ladies and Gentlemen.  We have a Civil War in Iraq!  Don’t we?  Yes we do!  The violence is raging across the country and up and down the Sunni-Shia ethnic fault line:  Najaf, Baghdad, Baqaba and Samarra.  Well, this is kind of true.  Najaf has a car bomb now and then and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) arrested some insurgents in Samarra.

Really, though, all but three of the eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Anbar and Salah al Din are mostly calm.  Ninawa gets hot now and then.  The Kurds are doing so well the Koreans may soon leave.  The Coalition just completed transfer of Provincial Iraqi Control in Hilla and Najaf and Karbala should transfer in December and January.  Okay.

We have a Civil War in Baghdad!  The attacks against the Coalition remain constant and high.  The Extra Judicial Killings continue unabated as the Sunni and Shia are killing each other at will despite the deployment of more ISF and Coalition Forces in the city.  Yeah, but.  Watching the video streams along Route Iowa and other routes with cars coming and going to work in the morning completely unencumbered dispels the notion of a Civil War.  The energy production capacity is increasing and the job market has improved slightly.  Hmmm?

Why all the waffling?  Why not?  Everybody else is waffling.  Earlier in the week, Muqtada al Sadr threatened to withdraw his party from the government to protest the Prime Minister’s summit with President Bush and Jordan’s King Abdullah II.  When the Prime Minister and the President departed for Jordan, the Sadrists emphatically declared they would no longer support the Maliki government albeit on a temporary basis.

Not to be out done, the Prime Minister delayed the start of the summit because he was already meeting with King Abdallah II and because the King wanted to discuss the Israel-Palestine question and because he was affronted by the leaked memo questioning his capabilities and because he kind of sort of didn’t want to lose the Sadrists support and because, well, you get the picture.

The summit was reduced from two days of high level talks to breakfast, a meeting and a joint press conference.  At the joint press conference, President Bush emphatically supported the Prime Minister’s government, acknowledged the Prime Minister’s concerns and committed to do something about it.  Thank goodness somebody could be decisive.

In the information environment, we have Civil War!  Why?  Because the National Broadcasting Company said so, that’s why.  In this business, he who gets his word out first often wins.  Today, The Stars and Stripes political cartoon section provided reinforcing fires to NBC’s declaration of Civil War.  It is a done deal.  We have Civil War in the information environment.  So, what does it mean?

It means information is conditioning the Baghdad populace to believe it is at Civil War and it may be only a matter of time before the people take more definitive actions like erecting road blocks, fortifying neighborhoods, not going to work and not crossing the river unless the parties involved come to a solution.

The breakthrough to a solution may have come on Friday when two high ranking Sunnis, Vice President Tariq Hashimi and Deputy Prime Minister Salam al Zawba’i, unexpectedly aligned themselves with the Sadrists and criticized the current government.

The Supreme Council Islamic Republic of Iraq (SCIRI) and Dawa parties and the Kurds have to be feeling a little nervous.  The Sadrists and Sunnis are nationalists.  If the nationalists come together, they will likely fight for their country harder than those who are an extension of Iran.  The Kurds can always go back to neutrality and find haven up north.  SCIRI and Dawa, however, may not be so fortunate and may find themselves switching their attitudes toward Sunnis and Sadrists as a matter of self preservation.

In a land where the enemy of my enemy is my friend, waffling is not uncommon.  Right now, Baghdad is a hot waffle iron and sometimes waffles get burned.


Filed under: Information operations
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