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Sony Caught in a Lie

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In this title, Sony: No online service has ‘stepped forward’ to distribute The Interview, Sony is caught in a blatant lie.

2600 has offered their services, I have offered to assist them posting the file on a Torrent server, 4chan has offered, BitTorrent, and others have made the offer.

Crackle is reportedly the leading contender. FYI, I created a Crackle.com account today, just in case.

Perhaps the title would be more accurate if they said “If we can’t earn some money, we’re not going to post it.  We really don’t mean for free, that was self-serving, disingenuous and a lie.”

Perhaps they want to post it to NetFlix and earn a teensy bit of money, or iTunes, or someplace else that charges so Sony can get a cut.

I mean, the publicity on this movie is out the roof. Everybody is talking about it and everybody is going to want to see it, but nobody wants to chance a lawsuit by hosting it physically.

So…  Sony is looking for “approved” hosts, most likely pay sources, eh? Is it too difficult for them to say that?

Is this Corporate greed?  Is this the MPAA gone wild (once again)?  Is Sony money-grubbing?

Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) must know they’re sitting on a potential goldmine, they just do not know how to capitalize outside the conventional theater system.  SPE is being forced to ‘think outside the box’ and that is something they’re not used to.  *gasp*  They also know the instant the movie becomes available for download it will uploaded to a Torrent file server almost simultaneously.

As for the physical threats, a Torrent file is the safest.  There is no concrete and mortar associated with Torrent files, so safety is obviously not their main concern.

Sony really means no Pay-for-View has stepped forward and offered their services.

It’s a new world, ladies and gentlemen, and Sony has no balls.


Filed under: Information operations

North Korea slammed by China

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North Korea is somewhat of a magnet, more so at this moment than most other times, for negative articles by the media outlets of the world. This article, Chinese Annoyance With North Korea Bubbles to the Surface, by the New York Times brings a new facet to the discussion. This is truly a negative article by a senior in the Chinese government, published by a state-run newspaper and the NYT picked it up.

This article might be considered an official but deniable story by the Chinese government, which figuratively says “North Korea, stop it”.  North Korea does not take criticism well, and rarely receives rebukes by China, so the North Korean leadership should* pay attention.

Is this propaganda by China? No and yes. This article reflects very negatively against North Korea, who should take this very seriously as a message pointed in their direction by their main benefactor.  This article only offers truthful information, most likely in an attempt to elicit a response from North Korea. Making a case this is propaganda is difficult, but it is intended to get a reaction from North Korea by the Chinese.

This might, I say again might, be the extent of China’s assistance to the US, as a response to the US’s request for Chinese assistance in the case of the Sony hack…. but it is a damn good one. Will China do more? Behind the scenes, I suspect so…

*This is North Korea we’re talking about, who never seem to react normally.  To anything, ever.


Filed under: Information operations

Congress seeks Viewing of “The Interview”

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In a show of defiance to North Korea, the US Congress is seeking a ‘private’ viewing of “The Interview”.

Congress is heavily guarded and it is doubtful North Korea can attack the Congressmen and women as they view the video.

I would only hope Congress makes the video available to the public, as the public was the intended audience.


Capitol screening sought for ‘The Interview’

By LAUREN FRENCH 12/22/14 5:25 PM EST

“The Interview” may be coming to a Capitol near you.

Democratic Rep. Brad Sherman of California wrote to Sony Pictures on Monday inviting the studio to screen the highly anticipated film at Capitol facilities to highlight Congress’ support for Sony Pictures as it faces intense push-back from North Korea.

The comedic film, which depicts Seth Rogen and James Franco as interviewers hired by the CIA to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was pulled from release by Sony over reported threats to theaters screening it.

“Screening ‘The Interview’will demonstrate the U.S. Congress’s support of the freedom of speech. This is about our right to live without fear, and knowing that our values will not be compromised by the idle threats of a despotic regime,” Sherman wrote. “Good or bad, Americans should not be deprived of the opportunity to see this movie.”

Sony faced a massive release of internal emails and data, a cyberattack the U.S. has pinned on North Korea. The North Korean government has denied those claims.

But Sherman, who represents a district where movie making is an important industry, said members of Congress should get a chance to view the controversial film.

“This is also about educating Members of Congress. Everyone is talking about ‘The Interview.’ I think it’s important for Congress to know, and see, what we are talking about,” wrote Sherman, the chair of the congressional Entertainment Industries Caucus.

(POLITICO Column: Romney! Cheney! Kim Jong Un! All together again!)There have been a number of calls for a high-profile screening of the film to show support for the U.S. film industry.

Sen. David Vitter (R-La.) asked President Barack Obama to screen the film at the White House after Obama called Sony’s decision to cancel screenings of the move “a mistake” on Friday.

The film was scheduled to open in theaters on Christmas Day.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/capitol-screening-the-interview-113750.html#ixzz3MgBPZ9tM


Filed under: Information operations

“The Interview” will be Shown on Christmas Day

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“The Interview” will be Shown on Christmas Day, according to Gizmodo.

Free publicity, increased interest – this is sure to be a sellout audience.

Yes, the movie sucks.  Yes, the plot is unlikely and probably unbelievable. Yes, the acting is Class B, perhaps even Class C (meaning pretty bad).

North Korea and all the other anti-American countries are currently waging a ‘cyber war’, of sort, against the United States.  I had a little slowdown this morning.  Did you? *cough* I had to wait a whole 1.5 seconds for some pages to load.  Oh, the agony.

The really bad news for me is that very few places were paying attention to North Korea.  I actually had someone visit this blog from North Korea. Now everybody is interested…  *grin*

I think of the movie release as an opportunity to stick it in the eye of Kim Jong Un.

I know someplace I’d rather stick it.


Filed under: Information operations

“The Interview” is available as a Torrent!

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https://kickass.so/usearch/%22the%20interview%22/

Up yours, North Korea!

5,127 Seeds, 61,479 Peers.  This should take you five minutes to download it.


“The Interview” results 1-25 from 3785

TORRENT NAME SIZE FILES AGE SEED LEECH
2.83 GB 4 2 hours 3359 55244
1.41 GB 4 1 hour 735 8169
851 MB 1 1 hour 262 4148
5
2.87 GB 4 1 hour 74 1012
6
987.81 MB 4 1 hour 73 742
1
1.41 GB 3 53 min. 10 465
1002.2 MB 4 1 hour 6 445

Filed under: Information operations

Merry Christmas to you!

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Peace.

Merry Christmas to you. Frohe Weihnachten. Feliz Navidad! С Рождеством. З Різдвом! Joyeux Noël. Crăciun Fericit! 聖誕節快樂. 메리 크리스마스! God jul! Hyvää joulua! Veselé Vánoce! Häid jõule! חג המולד שמח! मैरी क्रिसमस! メリークリスマス! Linksmų Kalėdų! کریسمس مبارک! Wesołych Świąt! میری کرسمس! לעבעדיק ניטל!

To all my Pennsylvania Dutch friends: En frehlicher Grischtdaag un en Hallich Nei Yaahr!

I think this covers all my friends and relatives.


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: Happy Birthday, Jesus, Merry Christmas

40 Ways Putin’s Russia is Alarmingly Reminiscent of 1930s Nazi Germany

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Joel Harding:

Russia overwhelmingly similar to 1930s Nazi Germany

Originally posted on InfoAge Strategy:

This list began over a Sunday morning cup of coffee, as I started thinking about some of the various parallels between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Germany in the 1930s.

I. The Leader

  • Political power consolidated in hands of one authoritarian figure
  • One powerful leader surrounded by a core group of lesser, key cronies
  • Support for The Leader from industrialists / oligarchs
  • Leader is unwilling to cede power/leave office
  • Leader harbors enormous resentment towards the West
  • Cult of the leader
  • Indoctrinated youth movement devoted to The Leader personally, and is used to attack regime’s “enemies”

II. The Legislature

  • Regime manipulation of the electoral process to ensure desired outcomes
  • Rubber-stamp parliament
  • Façade/trappings of democracy without actual substance, checks & balances

III. The Legal & Judicial Systems

  • Law enforcement used to suppress political dissent
  • Judiciary subverted to serve as regime’s politicized instrument
  • Punitive use of “psychiatric treatment”
  • Expropriation of property and trumped-up criminal…

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Filed under: Information operations

Waze App Hacked?

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Some of you might recall a story circulating about 10 days ago about the negative aspects of the app Waze.

Waze is an app that is considered a “social GPS”, where the GPS function is augmented by drivers actually on the road reporting real-time traffic tie-ups, construction, accidents and other things which affect driving conditions.

The story from 10 days ago went that the app was directing traffic through quiet neighborhoods not used to commuter traffic, through mostly unused roads, perhaps roads not constructed for heavy traffic. This story was heavily circulated.

I’m sorry, but when I worked at Luden’s Candy Factory in Reading, PA and had to rush through my ‘secret routes’, I didn’t give a tinkers damn which route I took.

But, I will tell you about a secret route I found in to work, here in DC.  Waze would have appreciated it.  I was working in a building near the Pentagon and wanted to avoid I-395, a traffic jam if there ever was one.  I found one, two, three roads, which were almost always clear of traffic and allowed me to get there in about 20 minutes, almost a miracle, even compared with I-395 at midnight.

Then there was the disclosure that Waze was used by the NYPD cop killer, here.

So tonight, when a friend called and told me that his copy of Waze was malfunctioning and showing city and town names in Hebrew, I thought, easy breezy, this should be all over the news.

Except it wasn’t.

No reporter has broken the news.

I downloaded the app onto my iPhone and tested it out but I could not duplicate the problem…

But imagine if someone could hack a GPS program, route traffic onto commuter routes.  It would suck. Routing them onto medical or emergency evacuation routes would suck for anyone needing assistance, too.

But the residents of the neighborhoods through which the traffic was routed tried to fight back. Cnet reports:

Some locals are trying to fight back by complaining to officials and reportedly logging fake accidents on the app to deter people from taking their neighborhood routes as shortcuts, but Waze said any phony reports are countered by all the real reports people driving through the area are making.

Also, hackers have struck before, here. Interestingly, the hackers contacted Waze on February 2 and received an official response on February 5th.  Then they gave Waze 40 days to fix the problem before making a public disclosure.  Then Google bought Waze.

Now we have a possible hack.  Could this be the same hackers?  If so, their motivation WAS to get Waze to improve the app.

What could be the insidious reasons?  Read the references, it’s not that easy.  Waze says their reports are based on massive amounts of reporting, but can that be the case on routes less traveled?

Thanks for the heads up, Norm!

Since Waze is owned by Google, now, will they respond?  How big must a disclosure be before they follow up?  Might this be a publicity stunt?  I could think of better ways for Google to get free publicity.  Might this be a publicity stunt by the hackers?  Motivation lulz?

 


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: Waze

The 20 Best Lessons from Social Psychology

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e.g. why are there 20 lessons and not 19?

Last spring, I took a class on social psychology. It was one of the most useful classes I’ve ever taken, so I figured I’d share some of the more interesting findings. Each paragraph has a citation to its right so you can get more information or read the original study.


1. Reciprocity has a strong effect on us.

20% of people send Christmas cards back to people they’ve never met, just because they received one from them. For the same reason, tips to waiters go up 3.3% when an after-dinner mint is provided with the receipt. And when the server looked the diner in the eye and gave them a second mint? Tips went up 20%.

2. You attribute a higher value to things you already own—this is known as the endowment effect.

Willingness to sell was twice as high as willingness to pay in one study. In other words, participants were willing to buy a mug for $5, but once they owned it, they wouldn’t sell for less than $10.

3. Heat makes us angry, and sadness physically makes us colder.

When you feel rejected, you report the room as being colder and you prefer warmer foods over colder foods. Crime rates are higher in hotter regions, and crime is more likely on warmer days. Baseball pitchers are more likely to hit batters when it’s hot. This occurs because heat causes arousal, but people misattribute that arousal to situations around them and not to the heat.

Duchenne smiles (example B) that are exhibited in high school yearbook photos are correlated with better life outcomes 30 years later. Here, Paul Ekman—an expert in facial psychology—exhibits both non-Duchenne (exhibit A) and Duchenne smiles.

4. Smiling is contagious—and can predict your happiness, professional success, and lifespan.

Humans laugh more at movies when other people laugh. Additionally, many people smile at getting a strike in bowling only after they turn around to their friends—you smile for the social approval, not for doing something successfully. In another study, students who exhibited “Duchenne smiles”—a more authentic type of smile that engages the eye and mouth muscles—in their high school yearbook were more likely to get married and were more likely to self-describe as “happy” 30 years later. Students with less intense smiles were more likely to be divorced. And in any given year, people who exhibited Duchenne smiles in their high school yearbook were half as likely to die.

5. How we’re approached and our desire to be consistent affect our decisions.

If I asked you to volunteer for an “Experiment at 7AM,” would you do it? What about a “7AM experiment”? 56% of people asked to volunteer for the first did so, but only 24% volunteered for a “7AM experiment”—fewer people want to wake up early, so the ordering of the words matters. In another experiment, some participants were called and asked if they would hypothetically volunteer for the American Cancer Society. When they were contacted a few days later and asked to volunteer, 31% agreed—versus 4% of people who were cold-called and asked to volunteer for the first time.

6. We act differently when reminded of who we are.

When participants were told that men and women scored differently on a particular test, female participants’ performance dropped dramatically. Male participants’ performance on a task dropped after interacting with an attractive female participant. When children are in a group on Halloween, they take more candy on average—but when children were singled out and asked their names, they took far less candy.

7. Being watched sometimes helps—except when eating.

Having an audience of people watching you complete a task improvesperformance on simple tasks but hinders performance on more complex tasks or when learning a new skill (they showed this with both humans and cockroaches—don’t ask). The mere presence of someone in the room causes this effect; even a repairman working on something in the corner slowed people down. Yet when it comes to eating, a full chicken will overeat in the presence of another chicken, and animals eat more in pairs than when alone.

8. Comparing people to their friends is the most effective way to make them do something.

When an electric company tried to encourage people to save energy at home, telling them “your neighbors are reducing their energy use” led to a 2% reduction in household usage. Telling people “save energy to save money” or “save energy to save the environment” did not decrease, and in some cases increased, energy usage.

9. Context—where we do something—has a substantive effect on what we do.

56% of actual voters voted for a pro-school budget when voting in a school vs. 53% otherwise. While that effect may not seem huge, it’s statistically significant and was reproduced in a lab environment (64% of people voted for a fake pro-school budget when shown pictures of a school vs. 56% who voted for it otherwise).

10. The more you’re exposed to something, the more you like it—this is called the mere exposure effect, and it works in milliseconds.

Participants shown a foreign word frequently were more likely to say the word had a positive connotation. The most immediate application of this effect is advertising; the more often you’re exposed to a commercial or ad, the more positively you will rate the company. Flashing images that elicit positive or negative emotions for only a few milliseconds subliminally conditions your attitude.

Continued at https://medium.com/@zmh/the-20-best-lessons-from-social-psychology-5270767c0fac


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: Social Psychology

Australia’s Defence Trade Control Act clamps down on researchers

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While not strictly of IO interest, it severely restricts research by anyone, including IO professionals, in Australia. All my research associates in Australia have complained loud and vociferously to me.  Please share this widely.

Also of interest:

Australia’s Act of Intellectual Terrorism: DTCA 2012 – Bayesians Without Borders – Bayesian Intelligence

The Defence Trade Controls Act is an Attack on the Rights and Freedoms of Australians

How the DTCA threatens Australian High-tech companies

Exploring the Impacts of the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012

What is the Defence Trade Control Act and why should I know? — Madderns Great Ideas Come To Us

Defence Trade Controls – National Tertiary Education Union


 

London, UK – 5 January 2015
by Mark Collinson

Australia’s Defence Trade Control Act (DCTA) has been described as an overtly strict and complicated defence policy that sails far too close to turning Australia’s research and development sector into what would appear to be Soviet-styled regime where an email to a fellow academic could land you a 10 year prison sentence. This may sound like fiction, but the DCTA lacks an exclusion clause that researchers and academics elsewhere enjoy.

Something as seemingly innocent as a university academic sharing an unrelated email with a fellow academic, who happens to be overseas, punishable by ten years in prison or a AUD 425,000 (GBP 221,700) fine and forfeiture of work.

As the internet makes sharing of research an ever easier process the DTCA is meant to tighten and control who can share what and with whom, and stop sensitive military research falling into the wrong hands. Unfortunately, this new set of guidelines can also make something as seemingly innocent as a university academic sharing an unrelated email with a fellow academic, who happens to be overseas, punishable by ten years in prison or a AUD 425,000 (GBP 221,700) fine and forfeiture of work.

The DTCA is based on the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulatory system which also has its fair share of critics. Although both the ITAR and the DTCA work along similar lines there is one key difference: where ITAR has an exclusion clause (section 120.11) which covers academic and public research, the DCTA has no such clause. This is bad news for Australian academics who will soon find themselves at a huge disadvantage when the DCTA is enacted on 17 May 2015.

When asked why academics were not excluded from the DTCA, the Australian DoD responded as follows:

Some academic research uses proliferation-sensitive controlled goods and technologies. While the sensitive items are used for legitimate civilian research by Australian researchers, they can also be used for the proliferation of military, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The overseas transfers of these proliferation-sensitive controlled items must be regulated to ensure that the controlled goods and technology do not end up in the hands of states or groups of proliferation concern.

The looming power of the DTCA has forced many academics that DefenceReport contacted to speak anonymously or not to comment at all. One defence researcher, who spoke to DefenceReport on the condition of anonymity, stated that the legislation is ill-conceived and the intellectual property rights of the DTCA are far worse than the controversies sparked by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP).

Hastily Put Forward

Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith with US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 14 November 2012

The DTCA was rushed through parliament during October 2012 in such haste that not only did it manage to avoid any major media coverage, but it also seems that the Australian senate committee were given very little time to debate and draw an adequate conclusion, or to fully consider the full implications to Australia’s research and development sector.

Although the DCTA is certainly intended to ease import regulations when dealing with the US by removing restrictions on importing military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) technology, there is a real and likely fear the over reliance on the goodwill of the US is simultaneously stunting Australia’s own research and development sector.

The Australian MoD told DefenceReport:

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (DTC Act) does not remove export restrictions with the US. The DTC Act contains two separate measures: measures to implement the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty between Australia and the US; and measures to strengthen Australia’s export controls. The Treaty measures in the DTC Act commenced operation on 6 June 2013 to create a framework that facilitates the export of controlled goods within an Approved Community, without the need for an export license.

DCTA is supported by the Defence and Strategic Goods list (DSGL) which lists goods that are targeted for regulation which are strictly military and also goods that could be used for military purposes, or so-called ‘dual-use’ goods. The DSGL itself is a 360-page document that only the most dedicated of lawyers could hope to fully comprehend.

Defence Research Brain Drain

Without the exclusion for academics, as enjoyed by the US and UK, university researchers would need prior permission from a Minister at the Department of Defence (DoD) to communicate new research to foreign nationals or to publish in any research journals. The logistics, not to mention the time, needed to obtain such permissions without any guarantee they might be granted will probably mean a very large number of students and professors choosing not to undertake research projects.

The broad scope of the DSGL also makes it a confusing document to read and one that requires a lawyer’s interpretation. The list seems to be growing weekly and includes everything from carbon fibres, plant pathogens, image processing and robotics.

Even if they do make revisions there is still going to be a huge amount of risk involved for anyone intending to study new research. Many will realise the opportunities abroad and take their innovative research elsewhere.

Critics say the DTCA was hastily rushed through Australia’s parliament and senate, and the lack of debate shows. The DTCA is intended to simplify trade between Australia, the US and the UK, while also tightening control over the exchange of the intangible transfer of military goods. In reality, while the Australian government may be doing their best to please their most important allies, it risks driving their top military and academic researchers from Australian shores for good. The very controls that were put in place to supposedly protect Australia’s interests are actually Australia’s biggest threat.


Feature photo / “Australian Attorney General’s Office in Canberra suburb of Barton, Australian Capital Territory” –Wikimedia Commons, 2014

Inset photo / “Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith with US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 14 November 2012” – Wikimedia Commons, 2014

About the Author

– Mark is a London based security reporter specialising in cyber and network warfare and security.


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: Australia, DCTA, Soviet repression in Australia

Capitol Club AOC IO Classes

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Description.  The Capitol Club of the Association of Old Crows is presenting a series of classes on Information Operations to educate interested persons.

  • Who: Persons with an interest in Information Operations, currently no restrictions in attendees.
  • What: Unclassified IO classes
  • Where: 3rd Floor Classroom, AOC building, 1000 North Payne Street, Alexandria, VA 22314
  • When: 0800-1700 20 January 2015
  • Why: To provide Information Operations education to members of the AOC and the general public.

Registration: Send an email to joel.k.hard@gmail.com  with name, rank (if applicable), and company. There is a strict limit of 25 people, due to  space limitation.

Cost: Free.

Lunch will be provided, courtesy Capitol Club, AOC.

If demand is far greater than expected, we will do this again, soon, at a larger facility.  This is our first attempt to do this.

If you would like to host such an event, let’s talk. Other courses, classes are available.

January 20th 2015 IO Classes

0800 – 1000       Dr. Leigh Armistead      Introduction to IO, IO Standards, Overview

1000 – 1200       Dr. J. Michael Waller     How to fight a war of information like a real war

1300 – 1500       Larisa Breton                   Measurement

1500 – 1700       Joel Harding                    Russian Information Warfare

Ukraine Information Warfare Initiatives


Filed under: Broadcasting Board of Governors, Influence, Information operations, Information Warfare, Military Information Support Operations, North Korea, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare, Public Diplomacy, Russia, Ukraine Tagged: AOC, Capitol Club, information operations, The Capitol Club of the Association of Old Crows

Russian Propaganda Builds on Western Freedom

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Originally posted on News Of PR Interest:

A recent story posted by the international TV network RT constitutes a clear example of the strategic approach taken by Russian propaganda: to take as much advantage as possible from the constraints democracy imposes on freedom of information.  To include the internal criticism expressed by western watchdogs protecting freedom of information.

RT (formerly named “Russia Today”) is a Russian state-funded cable and satellitetelevision channel directed to audiences outside of the Russian Federation.  Its is therefore a major tool to influence the global audience.

In their story, titled: Mass surveillance breeds self-censorship in democracies  they highlight passages from an International Survey titled Global Chilling, The Impact of Mass Surveillance on International Writers, conducted by PEN American Center, which is the largest branch of PEN International, the world’s leading literary and human rights organization.

global chilling

RT highlights that the study found that an increasing number of writers in democratic countries are censoring themselves due to fears about…

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Filed under: Information operations

The Media: A Weapon of War

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Originally posted on The Forbidden Truth Blog:

The editor-in-chief of Charlie Hebdo was not killed in today’s attack. His name is Gerard Biard and he declares, in part: Begin quote: “A newspaper is not a weapon of war.”End quote. Really? Seriously?? Are you attempting satire, Mr. Biard?? My dear sir, this is not an appropriate time for satire, IMNSVHO.

Of course a newspaper is a weapon of war! Every news media entity serves a government, the owners and operators of every news media entity are themselves citizen-slaves of a government. War would not be possible in the 21st century, without the overt propagandization of citizen-slaves by the media. The inspiration to go to war can only be achieved by government deploying its media as a terrorist weapon against its own citizen-slaves, brainwashing them, convincing them via deceit and lies that a foreign enemy means them harm, while their own regime, their greatest enemy in Truth, intends to protect…

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Filed under: Information operations

Turkish cartoonists threatened after Charlie Hebdo attacks

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An employee of the Council of Europe holds a pen and a placard reading “I am Charlie” during a minute of silence in front of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Jan. 9, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Vincent Kessler)

Author Pinar Tremblay

Posted January 9, 2015

I learned about the Charlie Hebdo attack from a phone call in the early morning hours of Jan. 7. The messenger was a political satirist and friend calling from Istanbul. He was calm as he explained the brutal attack. Then he said, “I received a call from a private number. The voice on the line ordered me to turn on the television to take a sneak peak at my own future.” It was not the first time my friend had been threatened. When I asked what he was going to do, he replied with his usual dark humor, “I will first mourn the loss of my colleagues and caricaturize my sorrow.”

Reactions among the Turkish public to the attack in France have varied widely. One group includes Turks showing solidarity with the #JeSuisCharlie hashtag on social media. One can see the high volume of solidarity tweets from Turkey on the day of the attack. There were also protests on the streets of Istanbul.

The Joint June Movement — a protest platform keeping the Gezi spirit alive and known for its opposition to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — organized a “We are Charlie” march with the slogan “We are not afraid.” Turkish cartoonists also joined in the global movement to stand in solidarity with the victims and their colleagues, publishing and sharing dozens of Charlie Hebdo cartoons and dedicating drawings to the victims.

Tuncay Akgun, executive editor of the prominent Turkish satirical magazine Leman, shared photos of the deceased Charlie Hebdo artists over social media with the caption “They were our friends.” Accompanying a photo of cartoonist and writer Georges Wolinski on a visit to Istanbul’s famous Eyup Sultan Mosque, the publication asked, “Is this man the enemy of Islam?”

The well-known cartoonist Musa Kart, who has been sued by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan several times, drew a searing cartoon with a character resembling Erdogan saying, “I condemn the attack. A 10-year prison sentence for those cartoonists would have been sufficient.” Political caricaturist Semih Poroy told Al-Monitor, “Cartoonists are without protection in Turkey. If freedom of speech is not guaranteed, some might even be inspired by the inhumane events of the Charlie Hebdo attack and try to repeat them.”

Another group of Turks immediately went on the defensive, taking the position that the attackers do not represent “real Islam” and that the attack is against Muslims, too, as it will inevitably increase Islamophobia in the West. Turkey’s top cleric, Mehmet Gormez, head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, fits in this group.

Gormez held a press conference Jan. 8, a day after the attack, and was criticized over social media for having not immediately condemned it. When he was asked what he thought about the attackers screaming “Allahu Akbar!” (“God is Great”), Gormez responded, “They are mocking the minds of people, not only of Muslims but also the Western community. They aim to manipulate the basic values of Muslims. They are abusing the name of Allah.” He also warned Muslims around the world to be vigilant against rising Islamophobia and argued that the attack in Paris was a direct assault on Islam.

It is an odd balance the members of this group are trying to maintain. They condemn the attack, but then follow with “However …,” and a justification of how Charlie Hebdo constantly provoked and offended Muslims. This group maintains a deep suspicion that Muslims did not carry out the attack. Rather, they blame people who supposedly want to put Muslims in the crosshairs. They are angry at social media users who suggest that the attackers might belong to an Islamist organization or that they reportedly yelled, “We avenged the Prophet!”

Another group is even more worrisome, oscillating between feeling almost satisfied with the attacks, citing justifications for it, and expressing anger toward anyone who might tie the attacks to Muslim perpetuators. “Should we condemn the event in France?” reads the headline of the Jan. 8 column penned by Ali Karahasanoglu for the right-wing daily Yeni Akit.

Karahasanoglu wrote, “I would not think about being involved in an attack as such, or advise anyone to engage in violence, but when asked whether I condemn it or not, I say, ‘Wait a minute.’ Because they ridiculed Islam. With their drawings, they scorned and belittled the prophet. Indeed, their editorial line was based on mocking people. They did not listen to the warnings of those who told them to change their course. Then, when something happens to them, why expect us to condemn it? Not that easy.”

Karahasanoglu then elaborated on the daily bloodshed in the Muslim world and complained that no one hears these Muslims’ cries. He ended his piece with the argument that the West supports those who contribute to killing Muslims and then asks for condemnation when 12 people are killed in the West. “There is no such world,” he concluded.

Yeni Akit also reported under the headline “Protesters in Paris offended our prophet again,” because someone carried a sign of a stick figure the Prophet Muhammad saying, “Je suis Charlie” (“I am Charlie”).

One news outlet, Haber Seyret, published a column by Saliha Eren headlined, “We do not have to apologize to anyone because we are Muslims.” Several Islamist newspapers and networks picked it up. Eren wrote, “I do not care what happens in France, when several children are dying from the cold in refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan with aid cut off from the UN.” She argued, “We are not going to care about your grievances until you stop putting the blame for each act of terror on Muslims.”

In the meantime, several established Twitter accounts known as AK Trolls — “AK” being the AKP — posted a number of mind-boggling tweets. One of the most popular and controversial AK Troll accounts, @esatreis, wrote, “This evil act [referring to the offensive Charlie Hebdo cartoons] cannot be justified with the argument that ‘They also drew cartoons of the pope.’ To attack a religion is a bigger terrorism than an armed attack.”

A similar argument can be found in Inspire, the al-Qaida magazine, which listed its 10 Most Wanted for Crimes against Islam. The list does not contain anyone involved in armed conflict or violence. The main crimes of those listed has been to somehow offend Islam and the prophet, like @esatreis told the Turkish Twittersphere. Also in the news was @AKKULIS, who features an Erdogan photo on his profile page. He tweeted, “This is a setup against Islam. Killers and victims are all French, so what is it to us?” Another Twitter user in this category took it up a notch, saying, “May they [the victims] rest in hell.”

The hatred toward the cartoonists almost oozes from such comments. Seasoned journalist Emre Uslu, affiliated with the pro-Fethullah Gulen media, suggested that AK Trolls seemed almost happy about the attack. Yet, the worst from among this group came from the account @GizliArsiv, which threatened Leman, warning, “Take a good lesson from the attack.” Remarkably, the user’s grievance wasn’t about the publication offending Islam or the prophet — but Erdogan. The tweet included a snapshot of a series of Erdogan cartoons and accused Leman of being disrespectful to him.

Although most members of this last group were anonymous, the Vahdet Daily columnist Ibrahim Yoruk tweeted to another Turkish satire magazine, Penguen, saying, “Learn from their mistake: There can be no humor with Islamic faith.” Another user, Kerem Cenk, allegedly wrote, “The number of heads to be taken out in Leman magazine is more than 12.”

What was the official political reaction to this intense public debate, even before news of the attack solidified? Umut Oran, a parliamentarian from the main opposition Republican People’s Party, told Al-Monitor that he had submitted a parliamentary question to the prime minister asking what kind of security measures had been put in place to protect the cartoonists of Leman and Penguen, who have been blatantly threatened. Cartoonists in Turkey are used to violence, including arson attacks and guns being fired at their offices, but at a time of mourning on this scale, the degree of blatant, unquenched anger against them is nonetheless frightening.
Source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-france-charlie-hebdo-attack-satiricals-warned.html?utm_source=Al-Monitor+Newsletter+%5BEnglish%5D&utm_campaign=b130080e05-January_09_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_28264b27a0-b130080e05-93108801#


Filed under: Information operations Tagged: Cartoons

Counter-Propaganda: The Case of ISIS

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Originally posted on Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence:

I’ve spent far too much time over the last few weeks thinking about counter-propaganda without really getting to a satisfactory conclusion so I’m just going to throw out some ideas and move on.   I’ll post on ISIS, then Russia, then draw a few general conclusions/recommendations.

  1. ISIS exists in two spaces. Firstly, on the ground in Iraq and Syria  and secondly, in the transnational space of the ‘global jihad’. These two spaces are connected but they are not identical.  Recent studies on ISIS have placed more weight on the first of these while a lot of Western political discourse either doesn’t discriminate or places more weight on the latter – in particular on the Western citizens becoming radicalized, travelling to the Islamic State and then returning to carry out terrorist actions in the West.   The argument is that it is the excellence of the IS information offensive that is allowing it…

View original 511 more words


Filed under: Information operations

Russian Culture Minister Calls for ‘Patriotic Internet’ to Block Western Influence

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In yet another attempt to censor, isolate and insulate Russian citizens from fair and objective reporting, Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky has called for the creation of a system of filters and blocked websites, somewhat like the Great Firewall of China.

The Russians seem to realize that without such a system to control what Russian citizens see, they risk the spread of revolutionary ideas, a colored spring revolution, the ability to coordinate demonstrations and other actions, they risk Russian citizens actually reading from non-Russian, non-propagandistic sources, that Russian citizens may see their leadership has lied to them, misinformed Russians, deceived them and been reinforcing “the big lie”.

Russia wants to isolate its citizens.


By Liz Fields

January 14, 2015 | 2:52 pm

Russia is now seeking to form a new kind of bloc — the type that would filter out Western ideas from its web browsers.

Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky has called for the creation of a “patriotic internet” to reinforce Russian values and keep out anti-Moscow voices that are “against the truth,” the Moscow Times reported.

The country must “consolidate the state and society on the basis of values instilled by our history,” Medinsky wrote in a statement published Tuesday on the website of a military historical society he chairs.

“Against us — and that means against the truth — a new blitzkrieg has begun,” Medinsky wrote. “We need a patriotic trend in the public conscience. We need films, books, exhibitions, modern video games, we need a patriotic Internet, patriotic radio and television.”

Medinsky’s call has already garnered support from Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who signed the statement along with several Russian army generals and film director Nikita Mikhalkov. They cited a televised statement made by Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk during his recent visit to Berlin as their motivation. Yatsenyuk referenced a “Soviet invasion of Ukraine, as well as of Germany.”

Yatsenyuk later told the television station he was speaking about the post-WWII Soviet occupation of East Germany, but the statement elicited outrage from Moscow, where bubbling tensions with Kiev have reached a boiling point following months of violent confrontations over Ukraine’s contested east.

The Kremlin has long accused Ukraine of being the West’s puppet, and, shortly after Yatsenyuk’s segment aired, Medinsky condemned the comments as the “first barrage against the historical truth, made by Yatsenyuk and his Einsatzgruppen,” a reference to the SS death squads of Nazi Germany.

The minister also compared the recent Charlie Hebdo terror attacks in Paris to Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, where Kiev’s army is still fighting Russian-backed separatists despite a tenuous four-month ceasefire.

“We cannot yield to the nonchalance of Europe, where the chants ‘I am Charlie’ are droning out the roar of artillery barrages by the Ukrainian army against the peaceful towns of the Donbass,” Medinsky said.

The West and Kiev have continued to blame Russia for lighting a fire under the insurgency in Ukraine’s east, and implemented crippling sanctions on Moscow that have contributed to the country’s recent economic woes. Moscow maintains it never sent troops across the border or weapons to aid the Ukrainian rebels.

While frigid East-West relations have dipped to an all-time post-Cold War low, Russia has intensified calls for increased “patriotic” ideals to be entrenched into the country’s culture, media, and educational institutions.

The latest call for a patriotic internet to incubate an “ideological counteroffensive in this war for the minds,” follows a proposal last spring from a Russian senator who sought the establishment of a “sovereign” intranet that would virtually block out the rest of the world — similar to North Korea’s totally censored nationwide network.

Source https://news.vice.com/article/russian-culture-minister-calls-for-patriotic-internet-to-block-western-influence


Filed under: Information operations, Russia

“U.S. International Broadcasting: Background and Issues for Reform”

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Screen Shot 2015-01-15 at 7.24.54 PMApologies, dear readers.  My interests were elsewhere when this was published.

Recall H.R. 4490, forming the International Communications Agency, keeping much of the BBG but changing names?

I was curious why the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) hadn’t done a report about US international broadcasting.  It turns out they did.

U.S. International Broadcasting: Background and Issues for Reform“.  20 pages, I could read that in my sleep and no coffee.  I have a feeling someone wanted this report bad.  …and they got it bad.  In one night, two at the most.

I tell you, dear reader, I did not like the report.

I felt as if the author went through the steps of history in a perfunctory manner, read the bill and only pulled out a few pieces to highlight and then gave only slight thought as to various options available. As such I felt the author was inexperienced and lacked the foresight necessary to present a multitude of options to the intended readers – Congresspeople.

Same to the authors of H.R. 4490.  This is the current structure of the BBG.  Let’s keep as much intact as we can and then label it “sweeping change”.

Apologies, but even in my MBA classes we always started from scratch in making new organizations, then discussed how we got from there to here.  I expected that approach but I didn’t even detect the slightest bit of innovation.

Oh, but we’re talking about Congress, aren’t we?  I should be impressed that anything got done at all?

I’m wondering what in the hell are you really doing to sell America to the world?

No.  I am not impressed.


Filed under: Broadcasting Board of Governors, Information operations, Narrative, Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communication

About Yesterday’s IO Classes…

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Outstanding, wonderful, unbelievably good, terrific, best ever!  All are words and phrases that could be used to describe…

The Capitol Club Chapter of the AOC hosted four Information Operations classes on January 20th, 2015.  The first class, an “Introduction to Information Operations” was taught by Dr. Leigh Armistead. “Fighting a War of Information like a Real War” was then taught by Dr. J. Michael Waller.  “Russian Information Warfare” and “Ukrainian Information Warfare Initiatives” was taught by Joel Harding, and “Cultures and Values” was taught by Christine MacNulty.  25 of 25 seats were reserved, the class started on time and the students included many senior IO personnel.  The discussions were lively and energetic. Everybody, including the instructors, learned much more than expected. To top it all off, four people joined the AOC as new members, on the spot!  We hope this is an ongoing series of classes!

In addition to being a world class educational opportunity, this turned out to be an incredible networking event.  Quite a few of the students were working in Information Operations positions, some very senior, some fairly junior.  Quite a few of the students just had a very strong interest and when the AOC Capitol Club offered these classes, they jumped!  The discussions were very animated and probing. Teachers prompted students, students questioned teachers, and everybody was included, nobody seemed to sit quietly.

For those of you interested in hosting such a class, feel free to contact the Capitol Club, AOC, we can accomodate special requests!  In all seriousness, during the class we discussed serious deficiencies in the US information spaces and system and would love to present to you and your employees, at your convenience, even in your facilities!  All the classes were very unique, all the presenters were unbelievably and uniquely qualified, and you and your employees could benefit greatly from an opportunity to learn from these teachers. Even if your only interest is to get you and your employees current and up to date, we would be glad to help.


Filed under: Information operations, Information Warfare

Who is this?

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Here is a video of Mariupol, in which I stumbled across a non-Russian speaker. ht to mj

To me he sounds British.

Now what in the hell is a British guy doing in Mariupol, Ukraine, in full combat garb, looking  like a Russian?

Except he doesn’t.

Look at the pants.

Screen Shot 2015-01-25 at 6.50.12 PM

Look at the jacket. Screen Shot 2015-01-25 at 6.29.29 PM

A different view now.

I don’t think they’re Russian.

The only equipment which is absolutely Russian is the weapon.

The magazine vest looks like a Russian vest but the camouflage doesn’t look quite right.

Here is the video:

Screen Shot 2015-01-25 at 6.25.16 PM

 


Filed under: Information operations

Cyber Operations by Private Actors in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict: From Cyber War to Cyber Security

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Volume: 19
By:  Gertjan Boulet
Date:  January 07, 2015

Introduction

Media attention to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict has focused on a significant number of hacking and malware attacks by private actors, described in this Insight as cyber operations.  As an example, the pro-Russian hacker group CyberBerkut has assumed responsibility for cyber operations against NATO, the vote counting system for Ukrainian elections, and a mobile device within the U.S. vice-president’s delegation during a visit to Ukraine.[1]

CyberBerkut does not mention support by Russia.  Similarly, several security companies have found Russian roots in a number of cyber operations, without explicitly alleging Russia’s involvement or revealing the identity of their clients.  In March, security company BAE systems (U.K.) alleged the involvement of “committed and well-funded professionals” from within the Moscow time zone in the use of malware Snake against Ukrainian computer systems.[2]  Media reports during the year also reported the use of Snake against the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to access documents on the crisis in Ukraine.[3]  In September, F-Secure (Finland) reported use of malware BlackEnergy by the Russian cybercrime gang Quedagh against the Ukrainian government.[4]  In October, FireEye (U.S.) reported malware attacks by Russian hacker group APT28 against Eastern European governments. FireEye found consistency between the targeted information and Russian interests and identified malware code in Russian written during working hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg.[5]

These recent developments reveal difficulties in applying traditional public international law rules and principles regarding state responsibility to cyber operations. Implicit attribution of cyber operations to Russia by media and security companies cannot substitute for the formal task of finding proof of involvement by Russia under international law.[6]  This Insightreveals the challenges that arise in attributing to Russia cyber operations in the Ukraine-Russia conflict on the basis of theArticles on State Responsibility (ASR)[7] and the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare(Tallinn Manual).[8] At the same time, a shift in the discourse from cyber war to cyber security is evident from the surrounding events and commentary.

The ASR and the Tallinn Manual

The ASR were adopted in 2001 by the UN International Law Commission, which promotes the codification and progressive development of international law.  Although the ASR involve both a codification and progressive development,[9] they are not easily applicable to cyber operations.

In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, an international military organization, invited an international group of experts to clarify “complex legal issues surrounding cyber operations,” more particularly regarding sovereignty, jurisdiction, state responsibility, jus ad bellum, and jus in bello or international humanitarian law (IHL).[10]  The group included technical experts, legal practitioners, and academics, representing think tanks, universities, and military organizations. Russia was not represented. The outcome of the experts’ work is the 2013 Tallinn Manual, which contains “rules” reflecting a consensus amongst the experts regarding currently applicable law governing cyber conflict, including consideration of how the ASR translate to a cyber context. Acting in their personal capacity, the experts recognized the lack of well-developed treaty law and state practice in relation to cyber operations; the Tallinn Manual therefore articulates differing positions among them.[11]

Attribution of Cyber Operations by Private Actors to a State

ASR article 5 provides a first basis for attributing conduct by private actors to a state, providing that the conduct of a person or entity empowered by law to exercise elements of governmental authority “shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”  As article 5 covers the scenario of private contractors that exercise public functions,[12] the Tallinn Manual includes as examples falling within article 5 a private entity empowered to undertake cyber intelligence (electronic gathering of political or military information) and a private corporation authorized by a state to conduct offensive computer network operations against another state.[13]  Russian empowerment or authorization of hacker groups and cybercrime gangs seems lacking in its conflict with Ukraine.

The Tallinn Manual also mentions private contractors in relation to ASR article 8, which provides that “[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”  The Tallinn Manual considers article 8 particularly relevant in a cyber context, applicable to private companies or citizens contracted or called upon by a state to conduct cyber operations against other states.  Article 8 would, however, not apply to private citizens conducting cyber operations on their own initiative (so-called hacktivists or patriotic hackers).  Hacker groups in the Ukraine-Russia conflict may qualify as patriotic hackers, but cybercrime gangs may be more profit-driven.

It is difficult to prove that Russia has “effective control” over these groups, which is the threshold set by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case[14] for attributing conduct under ASR article 8.  According to the Tallinn Manual, effective control goes beyond the mere encouragement or expression of support for the acts of non-state actors and beyond the mere provision of hacking tools to insurgent groups that choose to act against another state.[15]  Yet, the Tallinn Manual concludes that a use of force arises from “providing an organized group with a malware and the training necessary to carry out cyber attacks against another state.”[16]  Thus, Russian provision of malware and training to a group for use against another state could constitute effective control for the purposes of ASR article 8 as elaborated inNicaragua.

The Tallinn Manual indicates that “the provision of cyber attack tools for rebel use” is insufficient to meet the lower threshold of “overall control” established by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadićcase for classifying an international armed conflict under IHL.  The ICTY reserved the application of the “overall control” test for “organized and hierarchically structured groups,”[17] described in the Tallinn Manual as coordinated groups that specify cyber targets, share attack tools, and conduct cyber vulnerability assessments.[18]  Cybercrime gangs may well meet the required level of organization, but overall control by Russia would depend on its involvement with the targeting by the gang.  For the ICTY, the requisite level of control goes beyond financing and equipment to participation in planning and supervision.  The Tallinn Manual regards overall control as arising from the provision of “specific intelligence on cyber vulnerabilities that renders particular rebel cyber attacks possible.”[19]

ASR article 11 provides another basis for attributing conduct by private actors to a state: the acknowledgement and adoption by a state of the conduct of private actors as its own.  For the ICJ, this goes beyond mere factual acknowledgement, approval, or endorsement of private conduct.[20]  The Tallinn Manual applies article 11 to a state that supports non-state actors conducting computer operations against another state and that “uses its cyber capabilities to protect the non-State actors against counter-cyber operations.”[21]  To date, Russia has not publicly supported cyber operations by private actors in its conflict with Ukraine.

The Shifting Discourse from Cyber War to Cyber Security

Some scholars have observed that most cyber operations relate not to cyber war but to cyber security, with commentary therefore focused on state responsibility to prevent cyber conduct by private actors rather than on attribution of such conduct to a state.[22]

Rule 5 of the Tallinn Manual provides that a “State shall not knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect other States.”  This rule is inspired by the ICJ’s Corfu Channel judgment of 1948, holding that a state may not knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.[23]  Whereas the Tallinn Manual addresses sovereignty only in connection with jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the Corfu Channel case arguably provides a basis for tackling cyber operations beyond the scope of cyber war: so-called “cyber security” threats.

Tallinn Manual 2.0, scheduled for 2016, will further explore the application of the principle of sovereignty in a cyber context, examining cyber security threats under “the law of State responsibility, the law of the sea, international telecommunications law, space law, diplomatic and consular law, and, with respect to individuals, human rights law.”[24] With respect to human rights law, Russia’s accession to the first international treaty on cybercrime, the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention,[25] could stimulate cooperation with the United States and European countries on these matters. International consensus may also develop through ongoing discussions between Ukraine and the U.S. on their cooperation in the fight against cybercrime.[26]

About the author: Gertjan Boulet is a Ph.D. candidate in Law at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University Brussels, Belgium). He is a member of the Research Group on Law, Science, Technology and Society.


[1] CyberBerkut, http://cyber-berkut.org/en/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).

[2] BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Snake Campaign & Cyber Espionage Toolkit (2014), available athttp://info.baesystemsdetica.com/rs/baesystems/images/snake_whitepaper.pdf ; Ukraine Attacked by Cyberspies as Tensions Escalated in Recent Months, The Guardian, Mar. 9, 2014,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/09/ukraine-attacked-cyberspies-tensions-computer.

[3] Foreign Ministry Finally Free of Snake Virus, Flanders News.be (Aug. 6, 2014, 2:40 PM),http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/News/1.2053207.

[4] F-Secure, Blackenergy & Quedagh: The Convergence of Crimeware and APT Attacks (2014), available at https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf .

[5] FireEye, APT28: Window into Russia’s Cyber espionage Operations,  3, 5 (2014), available athttps://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/apt28.pdf.

[6] Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International law, 44 (2014); Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber-Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution, 17 J. Conflict & Security L. 229, 233 (2012).

[7] International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm., Vol. 2, Part II (2001); see also G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83.

[8] Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter Tallinn Manual], available at https://www.ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html. 

[9] James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility, in International Law 441, 447 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 4th ed. 2010).

[10] Tallinn Manual, supra note 8, at 3–4

[11] Id. at 5, 6, 11.

[12] James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 100 (2002).

[13] Tallinn Manual, supra note 8, at 31.

[14] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 50–51, 61–62, 64–65 (June 27).

[15] Tallinn Manual, supra note 8, at 33–34.

[16] Id. at 46.

[17] Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 138 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).

[18] Tallinn Manual, supra note 8, at 89–90.

[19] Id. at 81.

[20] United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 35 (May 24).

[21] Tallinn Manual, supra note 8, at 34.

[22] David Fidler, Cyberattacks and International Human Rights Law, in Weapons Under International Human Rights Law 299, 306 (Stuart Casey-Maslen ed., 2014).; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War, 17 J. Conflict & Security L. 187, 191 (2012).

[23] Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).

[24] Tallinn Manual, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, https://ccdcoe.org/research.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).

[25] Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, CETS No. 185.


Filed under: Information operations
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